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"But he's coming along very slowly- -rand what 
curious attitudes he goes into!" said Alice. 
"Not at all," said the King, "He's an Anglo-Saxon 
Messenger, and these are Anglo-Saxon Attitudes." 
( "Alice Through the Looking-Glass.") 
 Sir Robert Morier, in one of his letters, discusses a 
a certain factor in English politics: the existence of what 
t) 
he calls "the overlapping generation." BY this he means, the 
continued influence in any age of statesman who in training 
and character belong to the previous one. This is a fact which 
may be noticed in any line of life; but a ppecially striking 
example is found in politics at the opening of the century in 
which Morier lived: so that the thoughts and manners, the "seit- 
Geist" of that period to which is given the name "18th Century" 
1. Are carried far into the 19th Century iq and thi.s not- 
withstanding the tremendous changes which had taken place in 
the economic and artistic life of the nation. We find a contin- 
uity in politics which does not exist in the other branches of 
civilisation. It is strange to picture an interview between 
Sir Roger de Coverley and Mr Gradgrind; between Pope or Johnson 
and Keats; but Wellington and Canning would have met, with in- 
stant recognition and on equal terms, .Walpole and Carteret. 
The political decease of the 18th Century took place 
between the years 1830 and 1840. Two dates might be selected 
aslmarking its close: the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832; 
or the accession of Queen victoria/ 
Mort4r .1p. 402. / 
2. 
Victoria in 1837. Both are more or less inaccurate, yet 
both could be named with truth; for each introduced and sym- 
bolised a great change which overtook the course of British 
policy. They symbolised the entrance into politics, the 
one of the mentality, the other of the morality, of the Inglis 
middle class. such is the usual explanation: it is perhaps 
insufficient, but may serve its turn. 
The fact of the change is undeniable. By 1840 the 
student i s uneasily conscious of it: as one who sniffs 
sniffs suspiciously before deciding that the gas is escaping. 
By 1bó0 it is plain to all. We have passed from the age of 
facts to the age of ideas; from the rule of opportunism in 
politics, t o the rule at principle. We are no longer dealing 
with men who are guided by the necessities of the hour, or by 
the wisd an of expe rienc e; but with men guided by abstract 
ideas of the Right and the 3est, and who at any moment are 
liable to find the power of these ideas overrule the practi- 
V 
cal considerations of the moment . 
The men of the lath century prided themselves on 
being the children of the age of reason. They were not al- 
together insensible to the influence of great ideas; but they 
had none of the spirit of the fanatic , that rides triumphant 
over the logic of events. They modified their polici ae, sud 
changed their coats according as the wind blew. What ideals 
they had they apprehended crudely , somewhat like a child. 
Their literature, with its pointed wit, its polished and ele- 
gant/ 
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elegant expression, its musty and materialistic personifi- 
cations, typified their minds. They were not without their 
magnificence, but it was avformal and chilly grandeur. The 
precise and solemn harmonies of Latin pleá,sed their minds, 
rather than the stormy and irregular splendour of Elizabethan 
verse. They were extraordinarily sensitive to the effects of 
oratory for the time being, and their pail i amentary debates 
were titanic combats, but they had little real effect: we 
hear of Henry 'ox blushing and shuddering under the invective 
of Pitt, but we do not hear that he went out and hanged him- 
self afterwards; nor even that the Treasury was a penny the 
better. Their speech was divorced from action. Their speak- 
ers talked magnificent prose; but the greaten who transform- 
ed England in the reigns of Elizabeth and James did not talk 
prose at all, but poetry. The phrases that sprang naturally 
to the lips of Strickland, Eliot, the Wentworths, were of the 
same essence as those we hear from the heroes of Shakespeare - 
and Webster. In those days, feeling and action had been weld- 
ed into one indissoluble whole; in the loth centurz , we have 
action dissevered from principle, united to a superficial 
emotionalism; and in the Victorian age we leave both these 
phases behind: we are in a time when both moral and political 
ideas weret' formulated as principles, and governed the action 
of the national leaders. 
The pith century statesman, when faced with a crisis 
decid ed/ 
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decided his course upon the point of expediency. It might 
be a merely sel fish expediency - what can I gain by it? or 
it might be of a higher quality - what can the country gain 
by it? But the 19th century statesman, in the same position. 
at once brought the problem to the test of certain preconceiv- 
ed ideas. Will such .a course be consistent with national, or 
% liberal, or free trade, principles? or - Will it break away 
from our traditional policy of defending Constantinople? And 
he decided his action from sruch a point of view, instead of 
estimating the question upon its own merits. 
This tendency was noticeable in those statesmen who 
bel onged to "the overlapping generation " , as we11 as in those 
who were the true children of the 19th century. Palmerston, 
a real veteran of the old days, and Russell, who, though young 
er, had still spent the formative years of his youth largely 
under 18th century influences, both came under its power: but 
whereas Russell found himself at once in a congenial atmos- 
tis.R.cs...C 
phere, and was ,..r-f, a spiritual Victorian, Palmerston 
was never quite acclimatised, but only adopted some of its 
qualities, like the savage who obtains a silk hat and wears 
it with fondest pride. On the other hand, the younger genera- 
tion offered examples of men who had more the temper of the 
opportunist than of the idealist. Such was Disraeli: but 
Disraeli was not an ingl.ishman. 
This/ 
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This spirit, then, was not introducer into political 
life by the exemple of certain important leaders: it was the 
result o f influences of the mo st gene ral and indefinable kind. 
The times made the men, not the men the times. 
It is impossible to avoid paying honour to the men' 
of the Victorian age. With all the faults and follies that 
may attend it, idealism is in itself a quality which claims 
the respect of humanity; and these men, more or less in each 
case, were idealists. Amazement overtakes the young student 
of to -day. Contemporary writings have taught him to expect 
+4 a crowd of hoary and selfish hypocrites playing their o ma 
games with the destinies of human beings. He finds, instead, 
men conscientious, sincere, devoted even: having each his ovav 
enthusiasms which override his self- interest: striving, how- 
ever imperfectly, to give expression to the things that seem 
to them best. And he asks, in confusion: to what did all this 
labour lead? Was it only to the disaster which has overtaken 
us, and for which we blamed them? Here is some good: why has 
only evil resulted? 
We recall the wisdom of our ancestors: the way to 
Hell is paved wi th good intentions. Truth .s rel ati ve 
and an idea that has in it something not wholly true, if 
elevated into a universal law, may lead to destruction. 
In/ 
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In this lay the inherent weakness of Victorian 
idealism. No attempt was made to bring it into relation with 
fact, or to correct it by experience. There was no under- 
standing that all the rules of policy are only relatively true 
they were given an absolute value. 
Before going on to analyse this idealism, its na- 
ture and individual manifestations, it is necessary to exa- 
mine its sources, and to try to find the reason of its uni- 
versa] d ominati on in Victorian political circles, and even to 
a great extant among the whole nation. 
Let us first make clear what is here meant by the 
term, Victorian idealism. It consisted of two distinct char - 
acteristics, not necessarily connected. It implied a defin- 
ite attempt to guide the conduct by reference to certain mo- 
ral and intellectual principles. It also Laplied a preoccu- 
pation with ideas as distinct from facts, and an inability 
or disinclination to test the value of these ideas by a care- 
ful comparison with real and material conditions. 
The absolute rule of principle is not possible over 
a mind of an inquisitive and critical turn, accustomed to 
clear and accurate thinking. A man of this latter temper will 
not be cont ent t o accept any id ea without examining it. He 
will be continually revising his opinions. He will be inelin- 
to test every principle by considering it in operation, ani , 
find ing grave differences in many possible cases, will come 
t o/ 
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to the conclusion that no principle can be equally applicable 
to all times and circumstances, but that each should be modi- 
fied by the test of necessity. Principle should be the guide, 
butt not the tyrant., of his action. The characteristic of Vic- 
torian idealism, however, was that its principles were consi- 
dered universal. They were to be applied in all cases, other- 
wise the statesman laid himself open to the accusation of in- 
consistency. 
Consistency is ra er a deadly virtue in a~ statesman 
`- since it implies that he either. obstinate, or lacking in 
adaptibility, or not opefí to new ideas: but it was admired by 
the Victorians. 
Accordingly, we find that clear thinking was very 
rare at this time. The tendency of the uneducated man is to 
adopt an idea on insufficient grounds, without thinking it out 
for himself, and then to cling t o it tenaciously for the rest 
of his life : but at this time this t end ency was as not is eabl e 
in the best -trained minds in political life as in those of the 
vulgar. ".rie cling to the shred of an old policy after it has 
been torn to pieces ", exclaimed Salisbury in despair. In 
the same way they clung painfully t o the political principles 
once/ 
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once received into their minds. Deprived of the guidance of 
these principles) they were bewildered, and knew'not what to 16 
do. They were unable to see clearly what must be the result 
of any given action, and therefore, when left to their own 
judgment, could not decide on any definite course. The "drift." 
policy which led to the Crimean War is perhaps the most striking 
example of this. It is probably no exaggeration to say, that 
11 with the exception of Salisbury, Dilke, and possibly Disraeli, 
no 3ritish minister between 1830 and 1890 ever sat down to, think 
out clearly for himself, putting aside tradition and precept, 
a definite policy in foreign affairs. 
One great cause which contributed to make this state of 
mind general in England was the isolated and insular position 
of the country. It was a merely intellectual isolation: mater- 
ially and politically, 'ít had ceased to exist since the Indus- 
trial Revolution and the great developement of the British 
Empire. "England, which has more neighbours and a larger land- 
I. boundary than any nation ever had before, has convinced herself 
that she lives alone on a little island whose parochial concerns 
are all in all to her, and turns away with contmpt and disgust 
from the affairs of à world in which she had ten times the stake a 
3 
of any other nation." Thiz, is = °H neriod- 
ica yin ry of app eared in an ex- 
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p3re; far -me re--a-essly et3nnect-ed---wi-th-her 
r bas--=sYte-kra-el-e4cep b-een -bef-e-re The political re- 
sults of this will be discussed hereafter; at present it is 
only necessary to draw attention to its effect on Victorian 
mentality. By deliberately withdrawing from the political 
interests of their neighbours, the English people were to a 
great extent living in a realm of illusion. Not only did they 
stand apart from certain developments of the highest ii::port- 
ance, but - a far more serious danger - they cut themselves 
off from all outside criticism and free interchange of thought. 
Just as an only child , brought up at home without companions," 
a:) may become conceited, self -opinionate , and regardless of 
others, the glishrnan, exempt from the criticism of other 
---- nations and rom the necessity of showing some deference to 
their wishes and attention to their progress, developed these 
qualities. It was the danger to which his position had long 
exposed him. The small er nations of the British Isles had 
always had this very natural development checked by the threat- 
ening presence of a neighbour more powerful than themselves; 
but it was easy for the &iglishínan to forget the existence of 
Scotland and 'Wales, and to despise Ireland. These circum- 
stances produced a contempt of foreign nations, a conscious 
superiority and self -confidence, which the foreigner found ex- 
cessively irritating, and which endeu in the Englishman living 
in/ 
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in a sort of fool's Paradise of his own, quite regardl ess 
of the light in which he and his country appeared to other 
eyes. 
Outside criticism more than anything else stirs up 
the individual to analyse his thoughts and examine the real 
value of his opinions: and the lack of it was one cause of 
the stagnation of the political mind in England. 
One is struck by the futility of many of these ideal 
61 
ists, arid the obstinacy with which they clung to their ideas. 
They never saw that by sometimes sacrificing their principles, 
they could gain more in the end. They were incapable of dis- 
tinguishing the real from the superficial tendencies of the 
course of events - the backwater from the main flood of the 
stream. -,'Vas there a weakness in the men themselves that had 
been absent in their ancestors? Such a weakness might have 
been a result of the exhaustion of the nation after the 
frightful political and economic crisis through which it had 
passed between 1790 and 1620, but a more immediate cause was 
the change introduced into politics by The Reìorm"Bill of lí332 
The circumstances which had attended the passing 
of the Great Reform Bill hâd resulted in the confusion of 
several distinct political ideas in the popular mind, and 
even in the minds of the politicians themsely es . 
The Reform Bill in itself was not inconsistent 
With the/ 
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the constitutional theories of the pith century, or with the 
principles of either of the great parties, the Whigs and the 
Tories. It made no essential al teration in the nature of the 
constitution. It drew its leading supporters from the ranks 
I 
'1 
of the orthodox,4they could easily defend their position. 
They could say that they were abolishing the accidental per- 
versions produced by time and neglect, to restore the consti- 
tution to its natural balance: the could say that the con- 
stitution had been based upon the tenure of land, at a time 
when the whole life of the nation was based on land- tenure, 
and that now when the basis of that national life had widened, 
and rested upon personal, and no longer upon real wealth, the 
basis of the constitution should be widened with it. Both 
these arguments were true. It was not in the Bill itself, but 
J 
in the means which were adopted to secure its passage, that the 
seeds of revolution lay. Its advocates in the ranks of the 
aristocracy deliberately sought the support of their political 
adversaries. They allied themselves with the Radicals. They 
put on Radical colours, and fought their fight with Radical 
weapons. It was thug that they obtained the popular support 
which gave them the victory. The Bill was not democratic: it 
was not 'popular' , it was not even Liberal: but it was repres- 
ented to the thinking workman as being all these things, and 
as such it received his support. 
The Whig supporters of the Bill intended to break off 
this/ 
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this alliance whenever it had served its turn, discard. the 
Radicals and their principles, and preserve unblemished in the 
future the old aristocratic system of the past: but they could 
not unravel the web themselves had woven. No, not though they 
would move no further; not though Demos, disenchanted, turned 
to revolution and socialism for the help which parliament fail- 
ed to give. They had thrown dust in the people's eyes - and in 
their ovaa. They had, for a temporary advantage, deliberately 
a7 confounded two things that were as far apart as the poles' -, and 
they paid the penalty in that inextricable confusion of party 
and policy that has lasted ever since. The had struck a bar- 
gain with their master- fiend, and he held them to the letter 
of it. The great stars of the Pleiad, that a child might think 
to hold in his hand, are suns a million miles apart: and so to 
the earthbound gaze of the man in the street, Liberty, Progress 
Democracy, ideals as little connected as these, were gathered 
together in one indisseverable constellation, and this confu- 
sion, attached to some of the most important and universal 
ag_ political conceptions, tended naturally to spread over every 
part of the field of politics. 
The Reform Act had another effect, which already f alt. 
by 1860, and whiuli was doubled by DiaraEli' e Reform Act of 18ô7. 
Politicians had now to appeal to a much wider audience, an aua- 
ience less cultivated, and untrained in correct habits of 
thought. The politician could not address to a monster meeting 
of the working and lower middle classes the speech which nigh 
be successful. w i t i/ 
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with a small company of men educated at the great universities 
of the world. Politicians realised this: indeed, it is pro-C¡ 
.b 
à bable that they over -estimated the change. They began delibe- 
rately to talk down to the level of their audience, instead 
of making efforts to raise that audience to a higher intellec- 
tual plane. The popular meetings which they addressed were 
made up of men who did not want lucid thought, carefully - 
weighed conclusions, judgment, impartiality: they wanted 
something familiar, \yet stirring; they wanted to hear their 
own vague ideas given back to them from the platform dressed 
in fine -sound ing wo rds. They aid not want new ideas, for 
they distrusted anything new, adopting the defensive attitude 
r natural to mankind when confronted with the unknown. What 
they really liked were simple but picturesque phrases - catch - 
wonls, which they could remember and repeat, solemnly and em- 
phatically, without analysing their meaning. They wanted 
speeches that sounded well, but did not make too great a de- 
gland on the brain -power of the hearer. 0 "Thete is no science in which the wholesome ordeal 
of definition is more needed than in politics. The man who 
can discover a phrase by which the desired argument or asser- 
tion is hinted, without being formally laid dove, does far 
more for this cause than the keenest reasoner ".9 
in/ 
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in addition to this, public spe az.ng to &a. large audi- 
ence encouraged ambiguity of expression. The ignorant elector 
demanded a more rigid consistency, was less able to understand 
change and variety. No orator dared to go too far, to commit 
himself too deeply to arxi statement or policy, for, whether 
made in the Commons or on an election tour, his speeches would 
be reported, and afterwards cast in his teeth if he acted in- 
consistently. Yet the stolid and conscientious working -class 
heckler demanded promises: so it was necessary for the speaker 
to express himself in terms which he could afterwards explain 
3ä away. They soon became remarkably efficient at this task. Mr 
Gladstone in particular raised it to the level or a fine art, 
so that th time his most -impreseree orations, when dissected,.,, 
could be construed as 3e aping almost anything that the int ;r= 
rreter wished, like the predictions of the Minor Prophets. 
This habit might be cultivated until it became second nature,; 
and the victim habitually expressed >_imself a;rr obscurely as the 
Delphic. Oracle. ?t.e mode of expression reacted on_ that of 
conception, and thought became as confused as speech. 
The nation was not unconscious of its own characteristics. 
`_Y2. 
It wasV indeed rather proud 4f its incapacity for clear, coherent 
thinking, and reg¡tirded this as one of the solid virtues of the 
English race. This was the practical good sense that had made 
England the most progressive country in the world; mere theor- 




"Art is long and life is short," said an important daily 
paper complacently, "For the most part we settle things first 
and understand them afterwards. Let us have as few theories 
as. possible; what le wanted is not the light of speculation. 
If nothing worked well of which the theory wasvnot perfectly 
J 
3u, understood, ,r e should be in sad confusion. The relations 
of - labour and capital, we are told, are not understood; 5_)x 
yet trade and commerce, on the whole, work satisfactorily) 
(io-the dyer continued to mix his dips by guesswork, and 
the politician to settle the affairs of .urope without con- 
sulting an atlas or a history -boók. 
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ThP4tTimes, quoted by Matthew Arnold, "Culture and Anarchy." 
16. 
The vagueness of cone ep 
S01110 oft ese German 
some o whom were hole 
i 
an é'ssential Rart of G 
loosenejts f expression in 
olars infected 1 ish stud ent s also , 
earted%ädu'rers enough to think them 
otiltivate iem; while 
1 angua Tie 'were labe 
the gra ' - thi 
3 as 
actually strive to 
and precision of the Jrench 
ciel' .' 
Y 1 
ty distinguishing the, chaff from 
tion of the faults of Ge an lite7ature 
the mind 
these influences. 
strong emotions and passionate feel ing cannot b e 
rul ed by political principles. The man who is deeply moved 
by the "sight of suffering, or highly sensitive on the point of 
honour, will not be restrained from action in such cases, be- 
(34-1- 
cause action is contrary to principles of constitutional 
government or free trade. coordingly, the Victorians were 
not* an emotional people ; they were highly sentimental - they 
did not feel deeply, but superficially, and easily relieved 
their minds by talking . This sentimentality tinged all their 
3q literature, art , and morality , producing that distinctive 
character generally referred to as 'Early Victorian' . It was 
a sentimentality of the most vicious sort, for it was senti- 
mental optimism. It deliberately turned away from the sight 
of evil , blinded itself to the truth whenever the truth was 
unpleasant, and "thus to interpose a little ease, let ( its ) 
frail/ 
thows a. weakness eady pre ent in 
glish critics; but Xt was inc eased by 
rr 
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frail thoughts dally with false surmise." It is in this connection 
that its effects must bé noted here. The English, owing-to the in- 
sular conditions already described, have alwaz's 'r_2d a great capa- 
4- 3.city for -self -deception, but this was never Aso great and so general 
as in the Victorian Age. This people, living still in the débris 
of -a vast industrial upheavel, surrounded by- poverty, disease., 
airiliness, which can rarely have been equalled, and with a "submer- 
edpópulation" of greater proportions than had ever been seen be- 
fore in England, were never tired of talking of progress and civil 
isation and the great strides that the nation had made. )3(.' 
"There is no one to blame for this, " said the "Times; describ- 
ing the misery of the East End of London in times of slack trade, --L 
"It is the result of Nature's simplest laws. 
k1 This smug satisfaction was fed by the Darwinian Theory, in 
(2/ 
the form in i hic h it was apprehended by the majority. "Evolution" 
Was t:takenr:td;:mean acontinuous.: and inevitable evolution upwards, 
which had been working since tIle beginning of time, and was now 
at its highest speed. A scientific justification was thus given 
to \iliterary and popular optimism. The spirit even of the greatest 
literature of the time reflected it: on the one hand in the super- 
ficial philosophy and sleek moralisings of Tennyson, on the other 
in-the robust and importunate cheerfulness of Browning. The Vic - 
. torians had no regard for culture other than their own: the rail- 
vial, the telegraph, the replacement of the handicraft by the 
machine, were to them the true tokens of civilisation. Progress 
was estimated in terms of speed, and "better fifty years of 
Europe than a cycle of Cathay," was their wftchword, as they 
Quoted Matthew Arnold, "Culture and Anarchy." 
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watchword, as they broke open the seclusion of the Chinese 
m -pire and forced upon the reluctant\iheathen the rifle and 
the opium traffic. g.ew voices were raised in criticism, save 
in terms complimentary. Even those who devoted their lives 
to the removal of abuses, were inclined to look upon the evils 
which they attacked as accidental and temporary, and made lit- 
tle attempt to diagnose the organic diseases which had produc- 
ed them. 
In spite of its busy optimism, there was no such 
vitality in the nation as had been in the great ages of impe- 
rial expansion or national consolidation. Those who did 
not share this persistent hope and confidence, who thought 
they saw present weaknesses and dangers, whether moral or poli- 
tical, seemed to be overtaken with a sort of despair. They 
felt it was hopeless to try to awaken their countrymen, and 
they accepted the inevitable with a fatal resignation. They 
fled to solitude, not in the spirit of Elijah, but in that of 
Timon. Their remonstrances, if any, were addressed only to 
the select few - to the righteous, not to the unrepentant 
5 sinners. Some accepted the rules imposed upon them, and work- 
ed without hope; some turned their backs, seeking consolation 
in the past. Arnold's 'Grande Chartreuse' expressed perfect- 
ly this 'mild despair' in the intellectual world: 
9=g4aPil b etween two worlds, one dead, 
The other powerless to be born'' 




who accepted the standards of his contemporaries, and paid 
the penalty of acquiescence in the gradual loss of his keen 
vision and sterilisation of his powers. In politics there wat 
no one who comoin'ed the moral force to stand apart from the 
contagious weakness of the age, with the ability to make their 
influence felt. In literature matters were little better* 
Carlyl e' s gospel of power, with its invalid's worship of mate- 
rial strength, could have little healing virtue: the satire _of 
Dicßens and the indignation of Elizabeth Barrett were turned 
against individual abuses, for both had the instinct of the 
practical worker not of the prophet. The most original minds 
of the age, the Brontii sisters, were devoted to the purest 
creative art, and in no single point came in contact with the 
life of their times. 
To these causes which produced the reign of ideas - 
isolation; confusion of thought; the lowering of the intellec- 
tual standard by the advent of democracy; deliberate self-de- 
ception and moral weakness; - must be added yet one other. 
Apart from this intellectual idealism, we must not 
forget the moral idealism of such men as Bright, Cobden, and 
Gladstone. These men were not free from some or all of the 
dualities already analysed, but they were, in addition to this 
men acting under a definite moral i:,ipulse. In this they were 
t'I representative of a large part of the nation, and they intro- 
duced a new element intoi:nglish politics, one which had not 




been there since the days of Cromwell and Py:-ri. They were 
men whose political life was, to some extent, at least, 
guided by their .religious feelings. On certain points they 
displayed the spirit of the fanatic, who will have no com- 
promise, but all'or nothing. 
o study that pretends to give an account- ff-apirn on 
and policy in ingland during the Victorian period can 
ignore what was, perhaps, a greater force in the national 
life than any party ot any individual leader -- -- -tae daily 
paper known as The "Times, and the man who, from 1840 t.o 
1877, was its editor_° -Jchn Thadeus Delane. 
The 3csitium he1aii bzr Tozoith ett 1 
broadi, was unique. It was undermined by the repeal of the 
newspaper stamp duty, through which, in time, a crowd of 
more or less dangerous rivals sprang up. Even before its 
great editor died, its glory was dimmed; it was no more 
than the "Queen Moon', with its "crowd of starry fays', about 
it.: but even then its influence was still tremendous. The 
LCfmost independent of Prime Ministers liked to be on good 
terms with Mr Delane; it was easier to disregard the Queen. 
Part of the importance attached to the "Times "abroad 
was due to the fact that foreigners universally believed 
th.e great paper to be the official organ of the British 
governt. Ministers frequently found their tasks rendered 
doubly difficult by some outspoken leader which had given"` 
offence to some continental government or people. At home, 
however, the influence of the paper was not due to any such 
9 4 
Cobden calculated that before the repeal 4 of the whole 
daily press issued from the"Times "office. 
superstition. It held its supremacy through its old- estab- 
lished position, lack of competition from/rivals with t-:e 
5o same resources as itself, and the extraordinary e$ßiciirncy 
and enterprise of its management. It was the pioneer in all 
modern methods of reporting; it was always first in the 
field, and" almost always reliable. It ddd not express the 
feeling of the country so much as it created and directed 
that feeling. 
ú, 
"The'Times; " wrote TIT Ellice in a report prepared f r `h 
J Lord John Russell in 18.5, "Has become omnipotent." 
Before Delane became editor, the power of the was 
very great. In 1834 "wellington's temporary government was 
driven to make a definite writte}zagreement on policy to 
51 obtain the support of the paper. But the new editor, who 
took up his duties at the age of twenty- three, soon made 
its influence much greater. Twice a Prime Minister was con- 
strained to beg as a favour the modification of the editor- 
ial tone, which was endangering our relations with foreign 
states. In 1852, Lord Aberdeen wrote to the editor, "I Tayÿ-`ì. 
almost say that the question of peace and war is in your' 
hands." 
C 
firrci- as -se-rt -ed..- that,..- ,G.ralwi 11e owed-his- pos i- 
tiorr to -Delans's- -baekin _ More than once the too-well -in 
formed paper dumagedrnatiorialnitterestsiitIn.1854 the Brit- 
',0. ish ultimatum to Russia was read by the Tsar in the° Times'' 
( 
--r- ---i'5;- -Frim. 
_ 
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before the despatch containing it arrived in St Fetersb &rg, 
which naturally did not make that potentate's mood more ' 
conciliatory. 3efore this the paper had created bad feeling 
between the two governments by publishing Russia's secret, 
proposals (January 1853) for the partition of Turkey. Dur- 
ing the war the Russian army repeatedly obtained military 
information from the °Times': 
In 1858, the publicationt'in the paper of Ellenboroughe s 4-8 
despatch censuring canning's Oude confiscation measures 
nearly cost the country the services of one of its most 
able administrators. 
During the American civil War, it was said that the 
b`3 articles in 'the "Times "caused more bitterness of feeling in 
America, and made more mischief between the two countries, 
than all the blunders and hostility of the government 
_ Tr r rem- 
E n s flr v+ . 
t e . . _ ... . _...._. :. rnè agaanst 
-nelane was on times of intimacy with most of the chief 
ministers who were contemporary with him. On first becoming 
editór he formed a close connection with Lord Aberdeen, 
5'4- which lasted till the lat ter' s death. Clarendon and Gran- 
. 
ville were his constant correspondentSi and the secojd 4s71- 
sometimes made confidences to him that may be termed irdis- 
creet. Gladstone disliked him, but allowed Granville to act 
i94-62J1L ;i 1 To ' 6,. 
" 
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as intermediary. John Russell hated him, but several times 
was obliged to seek his alliance. plulerston, after a period 
of disagreement, was his close ally. Derby attacked him for 
publishing secret information, on more than one occasion, 
but when in office followed the general rule. 
The man who wielded so much influence was not, save in 
his own particular line, one of great ability. In the man - 
''. agement of his paper., his efficiency and enterprise were '` 
amazing. As a guide of public opinion, he was untrustworthy 
He subordinated national interests to those of his paper 
and to his perscnal feelings; he frequently misinterpreted 
foreign a runts,, and he was blind to some of the most sig- 
nif is nant elements in home affairs. The "Times- never struck 
out new lines, never was ahead of the agef leometimes on 
doubtful questions it heàged cleverly k 
,, d It was sneering 
J áa-$ep ee3t° nA,.,, Mw :: +.+rw ! cr 
4e-a-1-17-ap - _to ,.:Rrotecs4ai e`rv-It _ wasr..th.a3r©ush 
Ran the --out- vin 
-±1 
he.- .i;i, 
] y 4..4.]. .oM,a ±.L y...ho_sti ie o 
Prussia,, 
"I was aware that mr Delane was very angry that I did not ask to kiss his hand instead of the Queen's when I was ap- pointed to succeed Palmerston; but I would rather not be in office than hold it under such humiliating conditions.'' (Russell, 1866. Clarendon II 313.) 
fter-e 
It, in ,fact, embodied in itself _t~he insular outlook, the blind 
self -sat. eaction, the superficial judgments, the crude andd_ ir.- 
sincere :Methods of thou,ght., the conventionality and sentimental- 
ity, the lack of invagination and foresight, and the ignorance 
V 
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and contempt of all foreigners, which were the worst ch_d;racter- 
istics of the Victorian ao.e. 
It was in foreign politics, as was natural, -- -where the 
representatives of 73ritain came into contact with men of other 
nations and other methods,---hat the weakness of Victorian 
idealism was most clearly seen. 
Betwßen the years l86 and 1878, theKidealistt was brought 
into relations with the greatest practical genius of t7-le age in 
politics: the archtype of the opportunist. t is interesting to 
see how they fared, and how their ; deal Zs . ,guided t %Lam through 
the troubled waters of the time. Safely, it would seeia ?fr3ritainh2 
was rich, powerful, and at peace, and the end of the period saw 
her empire strengthened and enlarged. Tut is there not something 
riere than wealth, power, and peace, to be considered? And can 
the disasters which fell upon the world later be in any traced 
to the effects to the Victorian policy- during this time? 
-3efore entering upon this subject, however, it is necessary 
to give some account of the chief Of these ideas which directed 
the conduct of the Victorian statesmen. 
,,., c 2 
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These ideal may be placed in three classes. There 
are, firstly; what may be called Interfuational Ideas ---- ideas 
which influenced not only the people of Great Britain, but 
had their effect also upon other nations. 
Secondly, there are principles more peculiarly 
British home -made ideas, which modified the policy of the 
British Government without obtaining much, rr- s-omea -ses, 
credit abroad, either because they did not appeal to the 
temper of z oreiia states, or because they were only adapted to 
the special political and economic circumstances of Great Bri- 
tain. 
Thirdly, there were particul ar and definite theories 
formed about the character and policy of individual foreign 
states. 
Under the first heading must be placed at was - 
the ruling political force of the day -- -1 a.tionalism. 
The french Revolution had first given to this idea its over- 
whelming importance. france, always a strongly individualised 
state, had first adopted the idea of complete organic union of 
all territories allied to herself by blood or kindred feeling, 
under Napoleon, and perverted partly by his personal ambition 
and partly by circumstances, this idea was lost)or was changed 
into that of imposing a distinctively french civilisation on 




dormant national feeling of the states threatened, and pro - 
duced the awakening of nationalist feeling in Spain and Ger- 
many which brought about Napoleon's downfall. 
Curiously enough, the success brought about b the 
nationalist revival did not ená in a nationalist triumph, but 
rather in a reverse. This was partly owing to the fact tlt 
nationalism was a popular movement and was not favoured by the 
absolute governments ruling in most of the countries concerned: 
these governments saw that nationalism had formed an alliance 
with liberalism, which they Austria, too 
was the state which had most say in the settlement of 1815, 
2Gs eoit ctq( f T cs7s/to-1,2- 
and Austria was by her own constitution -ioe,i4a...akipa:oit- 
4.115. the principle of nati onalism'e  w-aa rzi -mast f -oiced 
to .Mo.. 
N,ati- oval -ist activities1 continued beneath the surface, 
steadil$ -- reading__.and.._g.rowing stronger4nd causing a series 
of upheavals, at first premature and often unsuccessful, but 
îinally triumphing7in several irportant - -. instances, until 
G./_/% ,s_ecognised by the governments of Eilr®p-e as-a peaitiea;l fact 
J, t- ha- tt,must be ken. -jaato account in their schemes. Great 
Britain was from the first less hostile to nationalism than the 
other great powers. In the years following 1815, it is true, 
('q -the' reactionary government in power* largely shared the feeling 
of the absolute sovereigns abroad, and feared and disliked 
nationalism, as being too nearly connected with their bugbear, 
the Revolution. But the majority of the nation did not share 
this 
feeling, for the healthy instinct of the British people is 
always to take the weaker side and at this time nationalism 
in all its most picturesque aspects represented a revolt 
against oppression. Very shortly, too, the personality of a 
great practical statesmen began to overrule that of the re- 
actionaries, and Canning saw the value of nat ional ism as an 
elevating influence, and used it in his struggle against the 
stifling grip of the Holy Alliance, and his effort to restore 
the Bala ce of Power. 
7 
The Whigs accepted nationalism as a political in- 
fluente, and many of their leaders considered it almost part 
of their duty to further or at least to look benevolently up- 
on nationalist agitation in foreign states. Palmerston was, 
perhaps, the most notable advocate of this point of view, as 
he certainly carried it out more daringly than any of the 
others. Even the Tories were not free from the magical in- 
fluence. first both they and the Court opposed it strong - 
ly. But though the Court remained staunch to its old princi- 
ples, the Conservatives to some extent fell away. `'hough they 
never adopted the principle so whole heartedly as the Liberals 
its influence was so all -pervading that it inevitably modified 
their views and coloured their opinions. They ceased to be 
actively hostile to it, and they recognised it as a political 
force that must be treated deferentially, and that was favour- 
ed by the majority of their fellow countrymen. Public opinion 
in/ 
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in Britain from 1848 onwards, was definitely engaged upon the 
side of nationalism, and the country was recognised by nation- 
alist leaders abroad as their refuge in time of trouble. 
This position on the part of Great Britain is the mor 
extraordinary, when it is considered that the British Empire 
itself was the great negation of the new nationalism. 
The form into which this = - - ° had now 
been moulded was, roughly speaking, the following: Every nation 
has a right to claim that all ike members be united into a 
sing14 state and er a government approved by themselves, and no 
nation has a right to incorporate into itself by force any 
territories inhabited by members of an alien race; teographi- 
cal or political convenience ought not to be allowed to over- 
.] 
(A ride these principles. 
It will at once be seen that the principle of na- 
tionalism in this form ran contrary to the whole course of the 
political development of Europe. In its extremest form it 
might even be said to be a retrograde step in the course of 
civilisation. Europe had steadily advanced through an inter - 
mingling of races and practically every European power had 
been built up by conLjuest and forcible incorporation. host of 
the great nations were of mixed blood, and had been drawn from 
the most varied sources. and , curiously enough , it was the 
b¡most pure -blooded of the European countries, - those in which 
either the Teutonic or the Celtic element most definitely pre- 
dominated/ 
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predominated - that had until this time, shown the least 
capacity for unity and responsible self -government - that is, 
Germany and Ireland. The second part of the theory was of 
course the most dangerous. Had it been always recognised, tht. 
development of Europe would have been checked at its very out- 
set. If the forcible incorporation of territory had always 
been repudiated, most of the great powers of Europe would have 
been to this day a collection of tiny independent states squab - 
bling among themselves. 
J 
'fo This is not an attempt to justify forcible 
conquest: it is only intended to recall, in this con- 
text , that the intermingling of races has been one of the great 
civilising influences in European history, and that it has 
taken place, as often as not, through forcible conquest. 
temporary evil has been transformed into a permanent good; so - 
that it is impossible to state, as a general principle, that 
conquest by force is good or bad. Every individual inst4nos 
must be decided on its own merits, Has the conquering nation 
sufficient vitality to assimilate the conquered, and make it 
part of itself or, as an alternative, has it sufficient 
political capacity to make the conquered race contented, While 
kavi ng / 
t 
leaving it its own local patriotic feeling? On the other hand 
has the nation which fights against conquest by a powerful 
neighbour sufficient vitality and political capacity to make 
a future for it self as an ind ependent power without falling 
behind in the advance of civilisation? Several small nations 
have proved themselves equal to this task - Switzerland, 
Scotland. Others, while resisting foreign domination, have 
appeared incapable of unity and self-government, and so have 
failed to justify their resistance -- -as, Ireland up to the pres- 
M. ont day, and some might add, vol and. On the other hand, 'Prance: 
has showed an unequalled o ap aci ty for assimil ating a popula- 
tion annexed by force: Great Britain a capacity equally great 
for making an alien population contented while preserving thei] 
national feeling - tß.0. Wales,' Scotland, India, South Africa; 
Austria, Russia, and to an even greater extent Germany , have 
proved themselves incapable of either assimilating or satis- 
fying a foreign subject race: e. it. Poland, forth Slesvig, 
(..... Alsace-Lorraine, Italy, Hungary 
n1-- 
even : ohemia.;. .very 
case of foreign conquest should be judged by a consideration 
of the two pe op l e s involved . ..a t-ry- wlri ch ha-s---sh-er ---it 
self incapable as 0 ruling power, unable either to satiaf_ör, 
to absorb its new subjects, should not oe allowed the--unche ck- 
fed_ domination of a conquered race. whose states, on the other 
hand, which have proved their ability to assimilate a popula- 
tion/ 
SR. 
popul t-i-en oreib y annexed; áná s airly e:juamto than- 
selves in civilisation, but less suited to the government of 
inf ,r_ or. _bac ward people , should Y: a fie satisfy their 
natural instinct for expansion by extending their culture -to 
neighbours resembling themselves, than by increasing-their 
colonial possessions among barbarous races. 
The people who, on -the -other hand show themselves 
- incapable of self-government, or unable to develop their natu- 
ral advantages, must inevitably fall the prey of more enter- 
prising and resolute states. To live its liberty and fight 
for it bravely is not enough proof t_lat a nation is worthy of 
independence. If that independence produces only civil strife 
and internal misgovernment, as in Poland in the lath century; 
or the permanent destruction of the natural resources of the 
country, as in North -West Efrica under Mohammedan rule; or in 
the prevention of the entrance of civiling influences and 
the growth of prosperity, as in the Turkish Empire; it is bet- 
7sß ter for all concerned that the territory in question should 
be taken over by a competent, even if alien government. 
when the satisfying of the nationalist desire:, 
of a minority means the sacrifice of the unity or prosperity 
of a 'whole nation, as in the case of Ulster or . iume, common 
sense and justice may have to override nationalist principles) 
. position 
- --of much minorities interfered with the 
1:11401-1 ,ter-y---and political security or the geographical unity of 
a/ 
AS. 
a them r....aatjahas--maz,z-lbsere-to -bi tg tared for to 
them might mean, a permanent weakness that is e; &). 
temptation to war a perpetual source of 
irritat in and litigation. 
In justice to Victorian statesmen, it must be ad- 
mitted that to some extent they were sensible that the new 
nationalist test was not of universal application, for they 
never permitted it to be applied to any part of the British 
Empire. When they were accused of inconsistency in their 
conduct towards Italy and towards Ireland , they replied, with 
perfect truth, that Italy and Ireland were not analagoua 
cases. But beyond this hard line, they were quite tired iscri- 
minating. They applied the nationalist test to t:he circum- 
, 
stances of all their neighbourd without faoubtiA he sitat ion 
"tñë thought that they might-- notetA..,vh per- 
,sect_ consistency in every instance .kept them awake- at' night 
t .! 
It may be noticed that Great Britain was almost the 
only power to ad op p Nationalism as a principle of general 
application» though trance for a time made some attempt to-do 
so. To the foreign states, in whose history Nationalism was 
now playing an iïaportant part, it was not a political prin- 
ciple, but a passion, a recurrent fever of enthusiasm. It 
drove them to action: but they were rarely tempted to consider 




Ge.ernam lisEvarapit did not appreciate the Nationalist spirit 
as shown by the' Frenchman, nor did the Italian admire it in6q 
the case of the Slav or the Greek. A few enthusiasts sometimes 
admitted it, and sometimes necessity imposed it on others, so 
that we find Hungarian, Pole or Italian in an unofficial alli- 
ance against the arch -enemy of Nationalism, Austria. 3ut as 
soon as the Nationalist spirit in any state became the d emin- 
ent power, this almost invariably ceased. The moment the gov- 
ernment became representative of the nationalist party, any re- 
v 
- straint as regards the rights of other nations varnished. They 
considered their own case alone. Hence the frequency with 
which nationalist movements became imperialist movements. 
-70- 
It willfrbe noticed that the new Nationalism differed 
from older forms of the theory, partly in its aggressiveness 
and partly in its hostility to the idea of racial intermingl- 
ing. In the first national wars of Europe, neither of these 
point s were emphasised. The earliest of these wars, the Swiss 
and Scottish wars of independence, and the French revival under 
Joan of Arc, were all three entirely defensive in character. 
v Nor did racial hostility play any part in them. ( , 
.for e.xwmple.,:__.had 
. sh owed every disposition towardts complete 
vn; tr 1.ri 41_ a n ar a r -land l _..pr- ovokec . into revolt by the mie- 
g° -- ~a r- ent--- el- Edwl=i- , The new nationalism, in fact, tried 
to enphasize the divergence between nations in language, ha- 
bits, feeling, culture. 
your/ 
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'J The old defensive 
national wars were not followed by aggressivé ones; their aim 
was to secure the position of the people whose independence 
was threatened: but the new nationalism, wherever it triumphed, 
showed the same characteristics of hatred of its rivals, jest-. 
@,9 lousy, and greed of conquest, and was aggressive in proportion 
to its strength. It foreswore its old creed, and ignored the 
rights of its neighbours. British statesmen had not yet per- 
ceived the why in which these nationalist movements were trans- 
formed into imperialist movement s5SSAa a caterpillar becomes 
a butterfly, and they were, therefore, deceived as to the 
real nature of the cause which they patronised. 
Closely "connected with Nationalism was the liberal 
movement. The two had the saine enemies, the same interest in 
opposing absolute government , and in one respect, on the 
point of self- determination, the right of every people to 
,...choose its own form of government, they were absolutely at 
one. self -determination, it so happened, meant for most of 
the peoples concerned the expression both of their liberal and 
their Nationalist aspirations. The connection is, of course, 
not a necessary one. It is quite conceivable that a people 
might determine in favour of absolute government, or that li- 
beral and nationalist interests might really` be contrary---as 
they were later proved to be in the case of the duchy of Hol- 
stein. In most cases, however, they were identical, and this 
l ed/ 
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led to a .sene ral habit in England of regarding the Liberal and 
the Nationalist movements as one and the same. 
The Liberal movement on the Continent meant something 
different from what it meant in Great Britain. In both cases 
it stood for the negation of absolute government . But in Bri- 
tain the ideal form of government was a constitutional or limit- 
ed monarchy on the strict iiglish model, and the British peo- 
ple habitually assumed that all foreign states with Liberal 
tendencies were moving in this direction. Certainly, the 
English model was greatly admired abroad, and some new consti- 
tutions were partly modelled upon it: but there was also a 
strong tendency to favour a republican form of gorvernment: 
and upon the continent, Liberalism was connected with Democra- 
cy at a ear] ier date than it was in Great Britain. 
There is, of course, no real connection between Demo- 
cracy, whether in its high ideal Corm, "government of the people 
for the people, by the people, or its lowest form of mere mob 
rule, and liberal constitutionalism, The latter is an essenti- 
ally aristocratic form of government. By its careful balance 
of forces, it attempts to prevent any one class or party gain- 
ing a preponderating influence on affairs, but this same sys- 
tem of checks and balances tends to keep a disproportionate 
amount of power in the hands of the more educated classes, in 
theory the best fitted for governing. In both these points it 
is/ 
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is the exact contrary of democracy, which gives the whole power 
unreservedly into the hands of the majority, and carefully ex- 
cludes the government of the intellectual minority who repre- 
:c'c) 
sent the aristocracy of the nation. The British statesmen in 
the first half of the 19th century carefully distinguished be- 
tween liberal and democratic feeling at home, though perhaps 
they were slightly less careful abroad; but as time passed, and 
democratic feeling at home grew steadily stronger, and democra- 
tic theories were continually formulated, their minds were in- 
sensibly penetrated by the influence; it was necessary to con- 
ciliate democracy, and by concessions to it, the Liberal de- 
fences were gradually broken dom. The Liberaal party itself 
slowly came to be regarded as the p whose duty it was to 
further the growth of democracy. preoently an ambitious and 
broad- minded Conservative leader, in order to gain popular 
support, took this duty out of the hands of the hesitating 
Liberals, and did the work himself. The transformation was 
now complete: Democracy, and not liberalism, was the acknow- 
ledged tendency of the British constitution. When the period 
opens, this change was in process, but statesmen of the "over- 
lapping generation" still held the lead in all parties, and it 
was still Liberal constitutionalism that they upheld and admir- 
ed abroad and at home. 
This led them into several errors. In the first 
place, by confusing national and liberal aspirations, they 
formed/ 
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formed the idea that a Ìatior_alist revival inevitably led to 
the establishment of constitutional government on the English 
model. .Zi_s the mati onal ist leaders were frequently Liberal 
leaders, this was an easy mistake to make: But they did not 
allow for the fact that the connection was not inevitable, and 
that though the Rationalist tendencies might be successful, 
they need not necessarily work themselves out on liberal lines, 
but might , while fulfilling their own aims completely, take 
another dir ecti on. This was what happened , for example , in 
Germany, where Rationalist plans were eminently successful, 
but the Liberals were completely defeated. 
Secondly, the British statesmen overlooked the fact 
that the constitution which had worked so admirably in England 
might not be suitable to all other countries, :thich might not 
be sufficiently educated, or have sufficient material security 
for its successful operation, and might, therefore, _prefer to 
choose other forms of government more suitable for themselves, ' 
^ whether more republican in form, more democratic in nature, 
or more nearly approaching absolutism than the English Consti- 
tution. Constitutional government might work badly, and actu- 
ally cause disorder and retrogression, if the people were not 
sufficiently advanced for it. 
Thirdly, they were too apt to consider that certain 
qualities produced by the peculiar circumstances of Great Bri- 
tain, weretthe result of the British form of government. They 
consid eyed/ 
considered that the British love of peace, moderation and ord- 
er were the universal qualities of mankind (with the possible 
were 
exception of the i ?rench) and only brought to the surface by 
the British constitutiofl. Given a government on the British 
model, all foreign states would be equally sedate, orderly, 
and devoted to peace. They did not see what difference in- 
defensible frontiers, imperialist ambitions, inexperience, bad 
laws, or territory unredeemed, could make to this. They did 
not perceive that the British love of peace was chiefly due to 
the fact that the British nation rarely saw any reason for go- 
ing to war. The< had no Rhine frontier to lure them; they 
could satisfy their imperialism 4uietly, as it were sub -con- 
sciously, in the colonies, without trouble or disturbance; 
they had long practice, owing to their isolated position, in 
.peaceful administration; they had no Holstein, no Venia.e, con- 
tinually crying to them for deliverance; they were not com- 
pelled to fight to gain room for expansion, ports for trade, 
or fertile provinces for production. Their love of peace was 
due to happy circurnsance, not to the naturally pacific dis- 
position of mankind expressed through rezresentative institu- 
tions. To consider that the mere establishment of an English 
parliament abroad would confer this contented disposition upon 
r?renchman, German, Italian, Slav, or Greek, was too optimistic . 
The principles deduced from these theories may now 
be briefly stated. 
First, that a people 1;1í.h nationalist aspirations 
63 will, once these are gratified, become a literal constit- 
utional state. 
second, that a country with a constitutional govern- 
ment will pursue a peaceful, and not an a2ressive, foreign 
policy. 
Third, that a nationalist government will favour 
national ism in other countries. 
Fourth, that a British government should be friendly 
to the progress of the national and liberal parties abroad. 
hese principles were distinctively those of the Liberal party 
in Britain; as has been said, they had much less influence 
upon the Conservative party, particularly in the first part 
of the Victorian period. 
In discussing the ideas which have influenced Brit- 
ish policy, the conception of the Balance of Power may occur 
R-/a,_to the reader. The Balance of Power, however, is not so much 
an idea as a fact. It was a fact which had once been consid- 
ered the most important in European politics, and in the kith 
century most British statesmen had based their calculations 
upon it . 1.iany of Britain's and of and' s great wars had 
been fought to preserve that balance, and the memory of this 
naturally had a great effect upon the minds of the Victorian 
statesmen. It may be doubted, however, whether any of them 
knew exactly what it implied. Il'or the conduct of a policy 
QS "> based upon the necessity for a .Balance of Power, requires a 
readiness to face facts, a correct judgment, a detailed know- 
ledge/ 
knowledge of the state of foreign powers, an intelligence that 
can continually shift its ground and follow the changesand 
re- gropping of the forces involved,---qualities that they did" 
not possess. 
Moreover, with the ascendancy of -idealism the Balance of 
Power was falling into disrepute. Unpleasant associations were 
already beginning to attach to itt. It was regarded by many as 
an unnecessary convention, the survival of old days of inter- 
national rivalries, greed for gain, selfish and aggressive 
q. warfare: the days before Liberalism and Free Trade showed the 
enlightened world how wrong and how futile such things were. 
"Does it seem strange," said the "Times" in the midst of a 
frightful ,European crisis, "that we should say we are no long- 
er anxious' about the Balance of Power? .... We have learnt to 
abandon political as we have abandoned commercial jealousies, 
and for the same reason... We know now that there is no surer 
way to the increase of our commercial greatness than through 
the increase of the commercial activity of others. What is 
true in economic is true in political science. We look with 
97. hope for ourselves to the free and healthy growth of our 
neighbours. This is the secret of the policy which has been 
stigmatised as leading to the alienation of our colonies and 
the disintegration of the Empire. It is the principle of the 
/b/foreign policy \lof the present generation." 
The Manchester Scliho,l of politics regarded the theory with 
a more intemperate hostility. Cobden talked of "the old and 
0 oi 
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ghastly phantom of the Balance of Power," while Bright, in a 
speech to hie constituents at Birmingham, used stronger lag- 
guage. "The theory of the Balance of Power is pretty nearly 
qg dead and buried. You cannot comprehend at a thought what is 
meant by that Balance of Power. If the record could be brought 
before you ---but it is not possible to the eye of humanity to 
scan the scroll upon which are recorded the sufferings which 
the theory of the Balance of Power hasp entailed upon this 
country. It rises up before me when I think of it as a ghastly 
phantom which during one hundred and seventy years, whilst it 
has been worshipped in this country, has loaded the nation 
with debt and with taxes, has sacrificed the lives of hundreds 
aq of thousands of Englishmen, has desolated the homes of mill- 
ions of families.... I am very glad to be here tonight, amongst 
other things, to be able to say that we rejoice that this foul 
idol - -- fouler than any heathen tribe ever worshipped - - -has 
been at last throwni-down, and that there is one superstition $q- 
less which has its hold upon the minds of English statesmen 
and of the English people." 
Turning next to the class of 'home -made' ideas, the 
first and most important of these springs naturally to every 
mind - the idea of _Tree Trade. It was not merely a principle 
loo of economics. Its influence upon British home and foreign po- 
licy generally over -ruled every other. Its prestige was ex- 
traordinary. The rigidity with which it was enforced, the 
fanatic devotion of its chief supporters, its universal accep- 
tance in the United Kingdom, the almost religious awe which C° 
_. 17 si wa3 Bright, p. 333 -4 ihestieletik Cobden, p r 3o2. 
surrounded it , and the sacrifices which were made for it, are 
almost beyond belief. The worship of Bacchus did not descend 
with more sudden and frenzied force upon Thebes, and its oppo- 
nents seemed likely to suffer the fate of Pentheus. In a coun- 
try so largely commercial, the great influence of such an idea 
11 was natural, but the narrow and blind fanaticism with which it 
was enforced was unexpected. The careful qualifications with 
which its original inventor had surrounded it were ignored. 
The free Trade of Gladstone was as different from dam Smith's 
40aS hill' s Utilitarianism is from Bentham' soppy the letter was 
unált ered , but the spirit was tran sf ormed . It was the most 
universal and/ inflexible rule , and all other id Bals gave way 
before it. 
ere, haviñr on 
to examine the idea of 
he important pl ace which 
i t . ,gay be left to oe dealt with more fully in 
1 anzther-ehapter 
closely connected with Free Trade was the strong de- 
0,D sire for the preservation of peace which existed among a cer- 
tain section of British politicians. for, although the advo- 
cates of Peace were not consciously insincere when they argued 
the question upon moral grounds, they were certainly biassed 
to some extent by the consciousness that peace was necessary 
for British commercial interests, that war was expensive, and 
that a war which was in any degree protracted and unsuccessful 
might make them lose their popularity with an electorate whose 
livelihood depended largely upon the state of foreign trade. 
uy 
Moreover, the spread of Free Trade principles was held to be 
1o3 -a preventive of war, as it would foster understanding and 
intercourse between the nations, would increase their inter- 
dependence, and in the end, by making each one unable to 
stand alone, would make war actually impossible. 
The moral plea in the case, of course, lay in 
the statement that peace is a positive and invariable 
good, and that war is a positive and invariable evil. The 
devotees of Peace admitted no exceptions to this rule: 
they would not admit the possibility that in certain cir- 
cumstances peace might produce more miseries than war. 
These advocates of peace at any price were men of pure 
°u- ideals and lofty disinterestedness,' but it is undeniable 
that they were ready to sacrifice the honour and the pres- 
tige of their country - - -as mere high -sounding names --- -for 
the preservation of the material comforts of peace; and this 
was in a state/ 
C bden admìtt e, at war, 
necessa Brigh did t. 
ry rare cases, might be 
40. 
state whose most important interests lay among the races of 
the south and east, &ere both honour and prestige were a ne- 
t 
eessary condition of orderly government : and - though let it 
again be stated, 'Unconsciously - they were influenced in their 
wish for peace, by the wish to be economical and to foster 
trade: for some of the most important of them were master 
v 
IaS'.manufacturers. To some extent they imposed their peace policy 
upon their colleagues; but among the latter, the moral aspect 
of the :,uestion was subordinated to the material. Where 
Bright and Gladstone talked of the crime of war, Granville and 
Salisbury talked frankly of the effect on commerce and the el- 
ectorate. 
More generally received than "peace at any price" 
c\4 
principle was the theory of Lon- Intervention. This theory had 
undergone a considerable change since the days of Canning. In, 
its extreme form, it states that Great Britain, as an island 
and sea- power, is not directly concerned in any purely conti- 
nental question, and should not interfere in any quarrel where 
her naval, mercantile and colonial interests are not directly 
threatened.. i ?urther, for the same reason, Britain should keep 
of any intimate relations with foreign governments, and 
should form no alliances except of the most temporary nature. 
Since 1815, there had been a section of opinion 
which wished to withdraw from all continental concerns, leave 
616. 
neighbours to fightVout their own quarrels, and devote their 
country's energies entirely to her own affairs, secure behind 
the/ 
4 . 
the barrier of the Channel and the fleet . This policy , once 
107 a possible one, had become impracticable with the continual 
increase of intercommunication, which was lessening distances 
and drawing the nations closer together. The id eaa that Bri- 
tish interests could not be threatened by quarrels among the 
other European states, or that the Channel was a permanent 
barrier to foreia aggression, was now a mere illusion. -- 
we see eno e r shrii -w-a¡La:t.rorn 
the- in-areased responsibility of int-ernatiörïä,l action,a,nen 
trenching itself in its turn behind the defence of the __tlán- 
tic, with results perhaps still more uríforGuna--te-those 
which attended i° J r policy on the part of great- Britain. 
,,,V. 1 1 Z. eacti on after a greats-- war-p haps accounts in part for the 
attitudes of both powers. 
------ The belief "that Britain should keep her hands free, 
and avoid all alliances save those for a temporary object; Qi 
was very generally received. Scarcely any statesman was 
wholly free from the attracti on of the idea. 7e find contin- 
ual references to it in the letters and papers of the period. 
Britain is strong enough to stand al one : she needs no friends 
abroad : she should keep her hands free so t hat if d anger 
comes she may be able to act in the way she thinks best with- 
out hindrance. ,ieag,.that -danger might - come,_and, 
th -t--- rauzizz tö _a_pól i cy she might find herself w ut a 
fr.-1424:4, ill Europe, was counte ed only by the repeated assertion 
that sh e was strong enou4 t stand a .l. one "¡.11 we could wi sh 
for / 
le) 
for is to keep ,free frort all engagements." 
"Te are strong enough to take care of ourselves ,Without 
alliances---if only we do not waste our force on matters which 
19) 
do not concern us." 
"I a: i bound by conviction, even more than }) r credit, to 
the principle of proLressive reduction in out military and naval 
establishments, and: in the charges for them, under the favouring 
20) 
c i rC?mBtanc es which we appear to enjoy." 
21,) 
"The time for permanent alliances is past." 
kveryone will recall rladstone's anonymous article in 1870, 
with its often- quoted references to "happy En land" protected 
by her "silver streak of sea.* from the troubles of other 
nations. The Times, about the same d<< _ ferred to our favour- 
ed, position with 'f,_liric rous euperio it, and to its effect on our 
neighbours. 
hh 
"Thy don't like our cold -blooded caution, our fortunate 
isolation, our virtuous complacency.... Rngland....has no schemes 
of aggrandisement, and not even the opportunity. She has no game 
'whatever, except just to hold her own.... The time has passed 
When it could matter to England whether any Western power poss- 
essed a few square miles more or less, or the command of this or 
22) 
that fortress." 
18) Loftus, I, p. 100. 
19) Lord Salisbury to 'Lord Lytton, 14 Sept. 1877; Salisbury II, 
p. 151. 
20) Gladstone to T.kusse1L4, . l-tussel-1, p. 422. 
21) -)ilke, speech ta his congtitu#nts, 24 Jan. l876 . Dilke, I, p. 
22) Tim9s, 25.Sept,. 1870, 11 July 1870. 
4q. 
Such confident assertions of the principle that 'iman 
J 
is not strong until he stands alone ", and of the assured posi- 
tion of Great Britain in her isolation, might have been well 
enough, if, when the need to äct`lcame at last, her policy had 
been fearless and resolute; but when the time come when strong 
action was called for, the some men who had supported this po- 
licy were the first to sazi that Great Britain could not move, 
because she had no continental ally, and that her military re- 
sources were quite inadequate to carrying on a war in Europe 
al one. 
In this lay the greatest weakness of the "no -aîli- 
ances" policy . It was a pos si ble policy, if the really grand 
resources of the country had been so organised that they could 
be used in the case of war; but as it was, many months have 
passed before Britain could take military action; and though 
the navy during this time would guard her shores from invasion, 
and might even blockade in part an enemy coast and shell a few 
seaboard towns, still the subject of quarrel could, in the 
meantime be settled over her head by powers who were ready for 
instant action. The ministers who advocateu the "no- alliance" 
policy were quite aware of this; but they made no attempt to 
remove the weakness which made that policy absurd. Two 
courses were open to them: either to put the army on such a 
footing that a moderate number of well - trained men with up -to- 
date equipment could be instantly available for use in Europe; 
or / 
W@. 
or frankly to admit that Britain could not play her proper 
part in European politics without having an ally who could 
help her temporarily until her own splendid ueSanceS could be 
made effective, and so to corne to a serious understanding 
with some foreign power. lieithe r of these courses IrteTe taken, 
even after the danger had been demonstrated more than once. 
That intellectual weakness already described prevented anyone 
from looking the facts in the face, and deciding one way or 
mf. the of er. ad this policy of lion- Intervention really been E $ 
(' J 
followed, this might have had a less unhappy effect; but 
unfortunately it wqs only taken to mean lion- Intervention in 
the way of action. Great Britain was to set a good example, 
to-the less self- denying states of Europe, by remaining 
peaceable, apart, minding her own business, it was said. 
Unluckily Briti sh statesmen did not confine themselves to 
their own business. They thought themselves free, from their 
J Hit 
h7 superior vantage point, to criticise and give advice to their 
less fortunate neighbours. There was, in fact, an attitude 
of moral superiority about the statesmen of the day which mast 
have been trying to the temper of their friends abroad. They 
looked at the duplicity of foreign statesmen - which was so 
general as to be almost universal - as if it had been cheating 
at cards. _tected a. certain person in double dealing 
a, th.e t..a..ene.,fl,,,jlet him down as a scoundrel. They were, of cours( mistaken. The pe coant fo rei gner was merely playing the game 
of/ 
Sl.. (p. 52 deleted.) 
T'2ey were wrong: the foreign statesman was merely playing the 
game of politics by the rules universally received on the con- 
tinPnt, and. `ler c.a.villecï at fin ngla.nd. nn natters of national 
honour he was commonly as sensitive RE the ",ritish statesmen 
thelnselves vHe also, if he found it necessary t . br?dk a treaty, ;; 
excused himself on hir~hly eloral !:!rounds, even as they did :only 
.e could not understand by they expected hin to believe their 
moral excuses; he did not ask then to believe him, as long as 
they pretended to in public : why should they ask more of hi" 
7n fact, the moral superiority of Treat, Sri twin carried no 
we1P.'ri.t whatever an the continent. The foreigner shrugged his 
shoulders, pointed to broken enga.re;nents and contradictory 
actions, the opium War China, 
t 
the deplorable condition ofu iréla:rici, and asked what difference 1,r 
there was between the ooiic :r of -Britain aneL of his own country? 
lie simply put. his island friend down as a hypocrite. . 
53. 
There remains. the *.q third class of poll_t i.cai 
those which attached t0 fore7..,?î Fsta,teS un.cha:ng-t' 
c ifi,racterl.St?Gaúy ,:;yi(i produced. a trcLïÌ.l.ti.ona:! )c11 iC;,V''toWagdlit those. 
- - Ca - ' - - 'G arr - - 1 ^ . ti ` 4 =T s i V 1 1J , 
while certain national qualities and certain broad natian- 
al aims can be, and sometimes are, preserved for long periods,. 
the policy of a state at an given moment depends an. many other 
factors besides these - - -the fare of government, the indìviduaiss 
at the head Of affairs, the condition of the material resource's 
of the country, the moral and intellectual state of the people, 
and so on. Even traditional policies are always liable to be 
suddenly modified, or even reversed, by the position of the. 
countrsr in relation to foreign states. In certain circumstances 
the whole nature of a people may undergo a change. A disastrous 
war may shock a militant nation into a sincere desire ofr peace; 
economic conditions may produce martial ar pacific: dispositions; 
a tendency long dormant- may be given life and activity by the 
influence of a few able men who divine it: and so on. It is, 
therefore, dangerous work to forci a definite notion of the 
character of :any state as a permanent element in politics. 
The foreign policy of Greà,t 3ritain was largely directed by 
certain traditional ideas about four states - - -- France, Germany, 
Russia, and 73elgium. 
The period with which this essay is concerned saw the 
rivalry of France and Germany become acute; it saw the rise of 
a. new Germany threaten the position of France, saw Franc!! 6.!'"e 
54 ( ) 
feeble and vacillating efforts at opposition, and finally saw 
the temporary ruin of France and the complete triuzaph of Ger - 
rnany.vThe struggle iras perhaps inevitable. Trance in 1860 was 
ruled by a man whose declared policy it was to make that country. 
the guide and leader of all the progressiive tendencies of 
Europe, a man whose position at hone depended on the position 
he held in the councils of the European powers. The rise of a 
first -class power in Central Europe, a power far stronger, more 
compact, more virile, than Austria; marching with the leas 
defensible frontier of France, and dominating the territories 
which her trxlere had long desired to acquire: this threatened 
the imperial positon of France, a position which depended then 
less on her actual strength than on the art if ical prestige of a 
great name, and on the real but damaged prestige of a policy, 
which, though inspiring in itself, had not always been consist - 
ently carried out. Napoleon IlI saw that the dread which at 
present. attached to his government, would vanish before the rise 
of a strong united Germany, like a paper uBnbrella in a shower 
of rain. He could not allow Germany to ma'Ke: such an advance, 
without obtaining some compensation for himself: but the 
romantic,. humane, and feeble spirit of the would-be Bonaparte 
shrank from the prospect of a great war, and from any definite 
decision. He continually postponed action, first adventuring, 
then drawing back, and allowed his. position to be steadily 
undermined, until at last his rival could force him into action 
in circumstances 
lo 
specially unfavourable to France. 
For Germany also the struggle was from the beginning 
inevi table . Bismarck! s aim was not only to establish Germany 
as a united state under Prussian leadership; he_ wanted to place 
his country in a position so strong and so commanding that it 
could only be threatened by a coalition of all the Great Pow- 
ers against it. He wished Germany to be secure in herself, 
and to be able to dominate and direct the affairs of Europe in 
her own interest. This could not be if a power equal ly, 
strong., lay on her Western frontiers, even if 
that power was not eagerly competing for a partial control of 
the Rhine, and of important North Sea ports. Germany, too, 
q. and in particular Prussia, had many memories of enmity with 
France, and bitter humiliations to revenge upon that country, 
and these feelings were fully shared by Bismarck. He had, , 
no scruples about war, and none of the sensitiveness that male 
Napoleon shrink from seeing the bodies of men who had died at 
his command. Bismarck was economical and sensible, and had no 
wish for war for the sake of war. He was noriegsherr; but 
he had made up his mind that it was necessary to clear the 
way for Germany by a complete defeat of France, and her remo- 
v la val from the first rank of the powers. He was only anxious 
to arrange that this struggle whould take place in circum- 
stances the most advantageous to Germany and the least advan- 
tageous to France. 





In 1860, when travelling in Germany, Richard Cobden had 
observed that that country was in a dangerous mood. There was 
a general feeling, he said, of "We must have a war with -Prance 
sooner or later, and it is the only way in which we can get rid 
of our internal discords, and swamp the small states under the 
rule of Prussia." It would be the simplest way of attaining 
unity. "If. they are sure they can reckon on the support of Eng- 
land," he wrote, "In case of a rupture with France, they will 
23) 
not be long without an occasion for a quarrel." 
Great Britain was dthus confronted, between the years 1860 
23) Cobden) p. 257. 
1860 and 1871 with the question: France or Germany? Three 
successive crises in the struggle took place, and in each 
case by the skilful arrangements of the Prussian statesman, 
the of Great Britain was practitally equivalent to 
her siding with Germany; for in each crisis Bismarck confront- 
ed an enemy so much weaker than himself that only the inter - 
V J 
vention of a third party could have made the combat equal. 
Great Britain felt, ightl , that neith- 
er she nor any other foreign power had any right to interfere 
to prevent the union of Germany; but Germany's right t o work 
11( 
out her own salvation without interference depended on the 
methods which she adopted. It was for some time uncertain, 
what the aims and characteristics of the new state would be: 
whether republic or monarchy, democracy or aristocracy; wheth- 
er it mould include e_ _ Austria; and, more. significanti 
than all, whether Germany 'should be unified by all the indi- 
vidual states being welded into one organic whole, or by ane 
v 
strong state ta.bing the lead and grouping the others around 
it. 
The first attempt at union failed, and the task was 
y 
finally performed successfully by the strongest of the German 
gradually appeared that the new Germany Prussia. It ,du   
was to be rul ed by Prussian methods and animated by 
a Prussian spirit: Prussia was not to be absorbed into Ger- 
many; she was to impose her oven peculiar qualities upon her 
fellow German states. 
As/ 
1 
As soon as it became clear that Germany was to be 
unified by Prussia, and that Prussia considered herself free 
!3:- to adopt means which were reacti ona.ry and atavistic , the situ- 
ation was al tered , and Germany's right to move freely and 
without hindrance from outside was no longer unquestioned. 
So long as her action was confined within the limits of the 
front iers of Germany , Prussia might b e left to carry out her 
policy, even if her methods did not always commend themselves 
to moralists. 'Then, however, she came into contact with 
foreign states, it could not be to the interest of civilisa- 
tion that the public law of Europe should be disregarded, and 
the rights of the weaker states violated, without a protest. 
v 
14. Would t he formati on of a united Germany be so great a b ene fi t 
to the world , if raised on such foundations? There was no 
indication that, her ob ject for the present gained, Prussia 
would change her method s. 
I "The same art& that did gain 
A power, must it maintain ". 
and there was every prospect that if she found her policy 
successful, she would be the more inclined to cling to it. 
The importance of the rise of this new Prussian -Ger- 
man State was due to the f act that it introduced a new clement 
into politics. What that element was has been expressed in 
various catchwords: The State as Power; Might is Right; 
!Z. Bismarck's own poetic "Blood & Iron ". It was, in fact, not 
new in itself; it was - 
. The sirnpZ+Z ORR 
he,t they should take that have the power, 
And they should keep who can. 
This 
a °theory- ert all states have acted ont at times, and 
Prussia in particular had long ago made it her own. But 
never before, not even in the days of the great i'rederick, 
had any state or any statesman dared to adopt and practice it 
without reserve or condition, comprehending it in all its as- 
pects, and de] iberately modelling the whole life of the state 
so as to give it full scope; thereby creating a driving force 
perhaps never equalled before. No one had had the courage to 
make so ,el ear a break with all the restraints of civilisation. 
en-A L "'toil" 
thousand ties, conventions, or weaknesses affected6'- 
moral scruples, religious feeling, the ambition for glory, 
chivalry , r omant is sensibility , the unwillingness of a humane 
man to contemplate destruction, cowardice, incapacity, preju- 
dice; - all the emotions, thoughts and habits that make up the 
minds of men had intervened to prevent a consistent applica- 
tion of this philosophy of state. It was now taken in hand by 
a man of iron strength of,:chwacter, of a mind empirical and 
unprejudiced, and of unequalled political capacity; a man al- 
j. most as free as if he had not been mortal, from ethical and 
emotional restraint s. Bismarck had only one weakness - he 
suffered from a surplus power of hate. 
It must be remembered that even the attainment of 
German unity would have necessitated a revision of the foreign 
policy of Great Britain. power as strong as united Ger- 
many/ 
Germany must inevitably be, could not enter the European fami- 
ly without altering the balance; and therefore all traditional 
policies should have been carefully scanned and corrected in 
the light of this new arrival. But if such G. revision was ne- 
cessary in any case, it was much more necessary when the policy 
r of the new state was teeu 6u bd such as has been described. 
It must be remembered then 1860 the position of Prussia as 
"the State as Power" was very different from that it had been 
J7t spia q 
even in the reign of Frederick II. Notwithstanding all the 
faults of individual statesmen or nations, the "moral standard" 
in politics had really been raised since then; many advances 
had been made in the drawing up and enforcing of a code of 
international law, and there had been progress in the direc- 
tion of international action to prevent war. notwithstanding 
-+ their often reactionary and selfish aims, the Congresses 
of the period 1815 onwards, had rendered real service to the 
cause of arbitration and union by their mere etdstence. The 
policy, therefore, which had been comparatively legititaate in 
/Z4 
an age of "every man for himself" had now become, in fact) a 
crime against the new law and higher morality of Europe; the 
gentleman adventurer with letters of marque had become the 
pirate. The whole -hearted adoption by a modern state of a 
policy which even a hundred years before had shocked the more 
enlightened minds of Europs, was clearly a retrograde step 
XISe- in civilisat ion: but it had, dy in s o far as the other 
nation s/ 
64. 
nations considered themselves bound by international law, a 
chance of success. :should have beep- faced 
judged by t statesmen who had to deal wit- 
In Great Britain, 
to underst° the new appar 
early in the day they could 
narck' s policy: but as it h 
this policy was seen in act 
methods and his objects wer 
the supreme ability with whi 
In spite of this, British st 
by the ideas which had long 
they desperately clung. The 
nalism, and the policy of the 
will be seen, hampered and co 
were even more strongly influe 
however, these statesmen failed 
tion. It may be said that so 
not realise the tendency of Bis- 
ppen ed, the very first time .that 
On, the nature of Bismarck's 
very clearly shown, as well as 
h he directeu (#fie -w affairs 
tesmen were blinded and confused 
ided their conduct, and to which 
d eas of Son -Int erventi on, 1 atio- 
Peace -at- any -Price party, as 
used their action; but they 
ced by their preconceived ideas 
about iiiranc e and Germany, and -4he relations of those coun- 
tries to Britain. so unable in their state of 
een their desire to see a 
aun- tecl-Germany -; -and their disapproVal of the policy which thin 
Germany seemed to intend to follow. 
It has been already pointed out that the mere ap- 12S 
pearance of a united Germany would have necessitated some re- 
vision of British policy; but the British Government made no 
attempt to face either problem. They did not realise the full 
effect of the appearance of a. new Great Power; nor did they 
and erstand/ 
6A. 
understand the urgent necessity of checking this revival of 
the policy of force at its outset. 
The reason for the failure in the latter case was, 
23 probably, that they regarded Bismarckisn as a very transient 
apparition; they believed at first that Bismarck's authority 
would be of short duration, and that on his fall his policy 
would be abandoned. They did not contemplate that he could 
convert a whole nation to his creed. 
There were two ideas about Germany, rather inconsis- 
tent, yet often held si..,ultaneously by the same persons. 
Roujaly speaking, however, the general public was ruled chief- 
ly )y the one, and the politicians by the other. 
The popular view was 4shat mazr-'ór 6àlled the sentimen- 
tal idea of Germany. The man in the street had a vague notion 
V, 
of Germany as a place consisting chiefly of Biergarten, the 
Black Forest, the Harz Mountains, and the Rhine; inhabited by 
mai. dens with 1 arge blue eyes and ye]. low plait s who spent most 
of their time spinning; and by large stout men with untidy 
hair, drinking out of picturescjue mugs, singing "E in feste Burg 
ist unser Gott ", and "Aennchen von Tharau ", and talking about 
' Freiheit' , and ' Barmherzigkeit' . The Germain of this popular 
idea, in England also, was the 'Professor' of Louisa Alcott' s 
American book for girls, meek, mild, silly, kind -hearted, un- 
practical, unselfish, and untidy. The prevalence of this type 
of German in light English literature Iris extraordinary. In 
literature/ 
ba. 
literature or a higher type the seme Germany appeared, with 
the romantic elements emphasized and the grotesque ones 
smoothed away: as, for example, the Germany of Swinburne' s 
'Litany of Illations' 
I am she beside whose forests and 4vhose mountains 
Slept Freedom armed . . . - This "dark and true and tender" German was compared to his 
advantage with the superficial, fickle renchman) his es- 
timate of i'ranc e being chiefly based on the fact that she 
had three or four times changed her form of government ; the 
fact that she had throughout and with an extraordinary wr- 
sistence preserved her national characteristics and aims, 
was not considered to affect the .juestion. 
wee -sh red -.. by--e -te-d pe -rsor. v e ;n-Fluence,d-hy_the,._. 
Stady-- of -ferro t-are, wh o overlooked the .faon - -that of 
tai --th -ree .greatest n e.S, G -oethe and Schiller had -not associ- 
et,ad_.- themselves with the nationalist revival of Germany, and 
Heixle..:.-- absolutely took the side -cf Napoleon, --aril forsook his 
dit German land for "r'ranz,sisch helles T'ag_eslioht ". 
At, 
/ 5 ll the intellectual classes were impressed by the immense 
benefits conferred by Germany on humanity in most of the arts 
and sciences. Those who visited Germany were struck by the 
ability and superior education of the people. "La Prusse .. 
donnait au monde le spectacle dgconcertant d'un admirable 
développeinen intellectuel, et d'une 4ompiete impuissance 
politique".' It was very natural to wish that a nation so 
gifted/ 
Denie, "Fondation de l'Elnpire All.e2nand," P- 17. 
64. 
gifted should take its proper place in the political world. 
The circle was incomplete without her, and it was inevitable 
that almost exaggerated hopes should be based on her revival. 
"Europe would linger in torpor and become retrograde until 
Germany took the initiative of a policy. All other countries 
would lead Euro p? in a wrong direction. Germany alone coula 
save Europe ". 
/3o 
So general was this feeling that even the politici- 
ans could not escape being influenced by it in their views of 
áó. Germany. They had, however, besides this vague, almost un- 
conscious prepossession, a definite theory about Germany, 
based, as they believed, not on sentimental or emotional 
grounds, but on cold facts. 
This Germany of their imagination was weak, incapa- 
ble of a definite policy or of strong and daring action; able 
to talk but reluctant to do; and always ready to be frighten- 
ed into good behaviour by threats and bullying from Austria 
armor 
or from Britain. This was he case with Prussia; and the 
German states outside Prussia were negligkle . "Bismarck . . 
backed the worst horse of the lot ", said Disraeli to the 
9q. Prussi an ambassad or, "for Prussia is a country without any 
bottom, and in my opinion could not maintain a real war for 
six months ". As this comment was wade as late as August 1864 
it would be interesting to know what, in Disraeli's opinion 
constituted "a real war ". 
21) 
The 
` e .i-r i ̂ 'Sir:, Lyre Evans Orowe to his son. 
66. 
They were áonsi era í3y1 influenced forming this 
4-d.ea.,) by the memory of the Prussian debacle in 1806; and 
the impression was confirmed by the events of 1b48 -52. 
They did not realise hoer much the disasters of those times 
could be attributed to the failure of the leaders only - to 
the cowardice miel incapacity of the rulers far more than to 
v 27) 
920. any essential want in the character of the people themselves. 
It is certain that they very much underestimated the strength 
r A.issw, 
T:c- of Germany, both natural resources, and the ability, de- . 
termination, and fighting power of -r people. They complete- 
ly .failed to realise that the power frittered à.wary by a , rede- 
rick William IV. might become a tremendous weapon when reorga- 
nised and applied by a Bismarck. They made no attempt - and 
this is the most serious indictment against them - to follow 
the development of Prussia between 1852 and 1863, when they 
had their first brush with Bismarck. They were yui to unaware 
v 
3I. of the immense progress that had been made in civil administra- 
tion, military strength, and above all, in patriotic feeling, 
during this period. They were unaware of a. gathering of 
popular forces that was strong enough to sweep away the old 
incapable absolute governments. This was not for want of 
warning. Though the government itself made not the slightest 
effort to understand Germain affairs, pp -e- -ef their ne- ,;4 L4 
LenQfirsorne : agents interested themselves and attempt- 
'. 
ed to awaken the ministers to what was going on: but it was 
in vain. 
The uTiries &; later on, attributed tie' failure to the 
facia that. the revolution was "conducted by democratic meth- 
ods borrowed from France and inspired by too much of the 
shallow presumption an4 flitter social jealousy which came .. rorthe same. quarter..' ) G4 ,wne. ; , ì1Ï6 °. r 
a, 
When British statesmen at last realised that the 
4 mill and incapable Germany of their &màg.inatiof 
v 
was really 
making an effort towards unity and was going to establish 
herself as a great power, they were pleased, and followed 
her progress with benevolent interest. 
There was a general feeling that Germany was, out 
of all European states, chosen to be the ally of Great 
Britain. The supposed bonds of race, and similarity of 
habit and tone of mind, had their influence upon popular 
opinion. "The Germans, are a branch of that race which is 
destined to people and subdue the earth," said the"Times" in 
1870 "Were even our old Saxon blood not 'thicker than 
v 
33 water; we could not remain Unconcerned spectators of so un- 
affected and undemonstrative an expression of patrc&étism, 
It is done in the style we s ould ourselves deem most nat 
) 
ural and most becoming." 
"Our true alliance," said Sir Charles Dilke, "Is 
not with the Latin peoples, but with men who speak our 
tongue, with our brothers'i merica, and our kinsmen in 
Germany and Scandinavia." 
al "4a, mg .,-,4 
The princip# reason, however, for the s beeerxn 
was that Germany was believed to have no interests that 
could clash with those of Britain. v She had no navy, and very 
3fß little sea -coast. Her trade and manufactures, as far as 
competition was concerned, were neglige ;ble. As several 
ARgt 
German Wiberal leaders had been converted to Free Trade 
Pit ke 
n an electoral speech, VSOmP,I p.1o4, 
vS 
r 
Trade principles, and as Germany had not then a very high 
protective tariff, these judges jumped to the conclusion 
that a liberal united Germany would become a great Free 
Trade power. Then, too, it was said that the .6ermans were 
peace -loving, and not quarrelsome and aggressive; no evid- 
ence was ever produced for this belief, but it still persist-- 
ed after Prussia had provoked two wars, the first with the 
full approval of the German people as a whole. aye find 
31!. Clarendon writing in 1866, "I can't believe in. Germany go- 
ing to war," and in 1867, "Nevertheless I believe in peace, 
for Prussia will never attack France," itiAllat this time imCoWty 
solemnly warned Bismarck, "I tell him that if Prussia is 
JJ 
prudent peace will be preserved; but if she goes too fast 
with the southern states I will answer for nothing... I am 
t3Y 
quite sure, however, from his language that he will give no 
encouragement in that direction." There is something piquant 
in the idea of answering to Bismarck for the peace 
of Europe. 
Then Germany had no interests in the east, and no 
colonial interests. Therefore, having no-grounds for quar- 
reling with Britain, she was destined . to be her "natural 
ally," 
Liberals and Conservatives vied with each other 
in pressing the idea of the "natural alliance." In 1878, 
after a friendly message Dram Bismarck, Lord Odo isse11 
communicated to him this reply from Salisbury, the foreign 
3Vl C.ova,1 J .310 L7 1iai F« (i) (ii) F.O. France, ío6'7, 
6.10-,67. 
( iii) Mamawailiam.Clarendon, MINA p. da 
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secretary "There are no countries who (si o) have so few rival- 
ries and so many objects in common and therefore there are none 
between whom understanding ouAht to be so good. we are indeed 
the only nation north of the Alps which has been able to look 
with unmixed satisfaction at the position to which the German 
31) 
Empire has attained." Two fears later Salisbury wrote "On the 
sound rule that you love those most whom you compete with least, 
Germany is clearly cut out to be our ally. Even. our ancient 
friend Austria is not so completely free as Germany from any 
plans or interests which cross our own -- -for the present.. Matt- 
ers will, of course," he admitted, "Have changed if it should 
ever enter Germany's head to deeire-Copenhagen or Amsterdam. But 
from his dreams to reality there is a long step /and intermediately 
we may in all things cultivate Bdsmarck' s friendship without f ea. . 
As late as 1887 Dilke wrote: "Little harm. to English. inter- 
ests has been done by Germany since she became the foremost of 
the continental powers, and few occasions of serious difficulty 
33) 
between the countries are likely to arise." 
Stanley, coming into office in the middle of the Austro- 
Prus sian War of 1866, wrote that he could not see that the es- 
tablishment of a strong Power in Germany would be either a 
menace or a detriment tou B.ritp. in, whatever it. might be to other 
pointers. 
31) To Odo Russell, 10 April 1878. Salisbury Il:, p. 242. 
32) To ()do ]gssell, 14 .ran. 1880. Salisbury Il, p. 373. 
33) "present Position of European Politico," p. 55. 
/4 
High hopes were formed of the benefits that would 
3q. accrue to Europe when Germany took her rightful place. 
"What untold heights," said Mp .er, "Of civilis- 
ation may not the world attain to with a German Empire pre- 
ponderant over the destinies of Europe, if only there is as 
much wisdom in the upper stories of the building as there 
311 
has been valour and self -sacrifice in the lower." 
"Those who rebel against this (the military sup- 
remacy of Germany)," said the Times "Would do well to ask 
themselves whether the military primacy, which must needs 
belong to some one power, may not be most safely entrusted 
v 
kO.to Germany,...a people which, by its history, its geograph- 
ical position, its educational progress, and its domestic 
character is of all continental nations the least -dangerous 
to Europe." 3) 
The great romantic historian of the time wrote 
(:zr "ö the ;rew, "Bismarck, as I read 
him, is not a person of PNapoleonic' ideas, but of ideas 
quite superior to Napoleonic; shows no invincible 'lust of 
territory; nor is tormented with 'vulgar ambitions,' etc; 
but has aims far beyond that sphere; and in fact seems to 
me to be striving, with strong faculty, by patient, grand, 
1L and successful steps, towards an object beneficial to Ger- 
mans and to all other men. That noble, patient, deep, pious, 
and solid Germany should ,be at length welded into a nation, 
and become Queen of the Continent, instead of vapouring, 
f 
vain -glorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and 
y 
35, 
Tim , ¡7 
ty3 
over -sensitive France, seems to me the hopefullest public 
°41-3i;) 
fact that has occurred in my time." 
Perhaps, however, the English feeling can best be 
made clear by a quotation from Lord Augustus Loftus, a , gen- 
tle_n.an holding a distinguished position in .the diplomatic 
service, and referred to by Disraeli as "our goosey- gander 
at Berlin." 
4P. "Airy tb<ia= t 3nPt "s aylt-Iiir4'iAtiguiEttua4, writing of the 
conclusion of the Austro- Prussian War, "I wrote to Lord 
Stanley that I could not view with any dissatisfaction or 
fear of danger to England, an increase of power to Prussia. 
She was the great Protestant state of Continental Europe. 
She represented the intelligence, the progress, and the 
wealth' of Germany. we have, I said, nothing to fear from 
her. She will become a power of great importance in main- 
taining the peace of Central Europe. She will gradually ad- 
vance in a constitutional system of government, and she will 
43. play the part' of a moderator in Europe. we have much in 
common with her -- ---our race, our religion, our mutual inte- 
rests are all interwoven with Prussia, and our politìbal in- 
terests should be. identical. why, I continued, should not 
Germany be allowed to constitute herself as she likes, and 
as Italy has done? A strong Germany will always look 
to E ngland for moral support, and 1111 naturally seek the 
544'19) 
alliance of a great maritime power. 
What should be done if the situation changed was 
.37 
361rCarlyle's public letter, 18.7.74. - 
l. 
J-p( $1, tl'1crn. 
ltt 
4 
never discussed. That if, once a strong power, Germany y 




upon the friendship and naval aid of Britain? What if . she 
should decide that she wanted to be a great commercial power 
and have a colonial empire and great foreign trade? What if 
her liberal leaders were re- converted to protection, or 
others should take their place? 
At bottom, we find that all these considerations 
were subordinated to the great idea that the new Germany 
should act as a counterpoise to, and support Great Britain 
against, France and Russia. 
"I have always," wrote the Duke of Argyll to max 
Willer in 1888, "Been heartily in avour of. it (German unity) 
-4 -3$) 
as the best check on France." 
It may be said that ever since 1Fì15, British states- 
men had lived in a condition of chronic nightmare about that 
Franc', or Russia, would do next. France, being the nearest, 
gave them most frequent distress. In the eyes of most British 
statesmen, the whole European system should be arranged as if 
France were a sort of mad bull. 
The British idea of France, lige the British idea 
it. R ,-__ mo,,_ .L W-A,,.61 of Germany, dated from d had note been corrected since. 
6s) A z ...- 97. 
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France was regarded as a firebrand, always ready 
to pick quarrels, and always on the look -out to attack her 
4(0, neighbours at a favourable moment. The French were said to 
be vain, fickle, superficial, touchy, intoxicated with the 
idea of gloire----"a. restless army and a people instinct 
with military spirit." The pursuit of gloire, in any other 
age, might have awakened a sympathetic response in England; 
but the Victorian age, with its Peace -at -any -price policy, 
its commercial mind, its love of comfort, and its 'esleyan. 
morality, had no fellow -feeling for the intense sensitive- 
ness of the French in matters of national prestige and 
honour. 
Now on what grounds was this view based, that France' 
Ì is the country which always disturbs the peace of Europe? 
Even granting the fact (open to question) that France had pro- 
voked the Great War which began in 1792, was it to be supposed 
that she had not learnea a lesson in 1815? If Prance had set 
out -to conquer Europe, she had been prevented and punished by 
a coalition of all the European states against her. She had 
only been saved from pillage and partition by the. generosity 
of two politic enemies, Metternich and Wellington. She had 
' 150 
lost the flower of her manhood, and the physical health and 
a strength of her people had been permanently impaired. She 
had lost too, by this time, the unearthly fire of 1789, which 
had carried her barefooted and untrained recruits to victory 
at Valmy. Was it lively that she would make again the attempt 
in which the Great Napoleon had failed? 
During the period 1815- 1860, France had done nothing 
`Tirnes; 8.1.7o. 
to prove herself guilty of the aril. tendencies ofewhiàh she 
f 
was accused. The only prenchy which had pursued a dis- 
honourable policy and one likely to disturb the peace of Eur- 
ope had b e en e-1y-arf.t.exw deposed by a popular 
A. revolution. For the one great European war between 18115 and 
1889 - - -the Crimean War - -- Britain was equally responsible, and 
in that war France had Bought as Britain's ally. Moreover, the 
English people had been so eager for war that their govern- 
ment had äcarcely been able to hold the popular frenzy in 
leash, and the national poet had celebrated with triumph the 
news that 
t, 
The long long canker of peace was over and done; 
while in France the Emperor had had to justify himself and 
persuade his people to every forward step: but England had 
llreakr forgotten this. It was knownvthat there was an old 
V 
p, traditional ambition in France to acquire Belgium and the 
Prussian Rhenish provinces: but France had made no war on 
eit :er of these points. She had acquiesced quietly, and coop- 
erated in the work, when in 1830 Britain had stepped between 
her and her almost fulfilled desire, and procured the neutral- 
isation of Belgium. In 1859 she had declared war on Austria, 
in a cause which Great Britain had aways advocated, and in 
which several British statesmen were ready to declare war 
themselves; and she had done a great service to the world in 
the constitution of the Italian kingdom, taking as conpensat- 
L ion the two half-French provinces of Savoy and Nice, which 
voted in favour of the transfer. She had had two revolutions, 




It was true that the relations of Britain with France 
had been generally friendly, for during mbit vf°-thìstDeritrd 
the two-istates .were allies; but the histOgy of the alliance 
is unique, and one wonders that the French endured it so long. 
2) While it 
lasted, France 1pYally supported Great Britain in all her 
aims *aehome and abroad; wk4le Britain used the power that 
the alliance gave her to checkmate or hinder every plan formed 
by France for her own advantage. Marier stated this ideal very 
clearly from the British point of view. 
"As long as France restricts her action to legitimate 
objects (as in the creation of the Belgian kingdom in 1831) 
we go heartily with her and stand together as the represent- 
atives of western Progress versus Eastern Reaction, but the 
moment she shows the cloven foot and attempts to .:assert her 
claim to a privileged pcsiton we at once throw our weight on 
S'3. the side of the Northern Powers, and make her feel that... ve 155- 
wouldn't stand any of that hunbug:X It is most interesting to 
watch the kind of clock -work regularity with which the process 
goes on. During the Belgian negotiations we step in some five 
or six times this way ----so that England becomes the regulator 
by which the -expansive force of France is utilised beneficialy 
and productively, but always kept in check whenever it threat- 
ens to become destructive.... The peace of Europe was maintain- 
ed for nearly forty years by a cordon sanitaire being traced 
round France, three -fourths of which was of iron rigidity, the 
Li.. remaining fourth being elastic and so fashioned that she could J 
take all the air and exercise required for hhe g eod /hf her 
health. The Northern powers treated France like an incurable 
and dangerous maniac; we treated her like a person on the 
whole sane, but subject to dangerous hallucinations, and re- 
served to ourselves the power of falling back upon the hand- 
cuffs and strait waistcoats kept in store by the Northern 
Powers." 
Perhaps never had Britain displayed herself to so 
much disadvanatage as during the three successive "war scares" 
of 1848, 1851, and 1860, when Europe was afforded the spect- 
acle ofv a first -class power in a. state of frantic excitement I57 
and terror at the prospect of invasion from a 4.i.glzbnur who 
had not moved a man or a ship for the fell purpose attributed 
to her, and one of whose chief objects was to be at peace with 
her island Arighbour. At this time the alliance was nominally 
in force, and Palmerston wrote, "T must own that it looks as 
if those who direct the policy\of France were banking up their 
fires in order to be ready to start against us... The conclus- 
4 ion I come to is, that the English government ought to accept 
15F 
'as if seriously tendered every assurance of determination to 
maintain the Anglo- French alliance, and at the same time to 1. 
push on our own defensive preparations just as if we believed- 




In the meantime French soldiers and sailors had stood 
Y ̀ Mor i e - 1') Palmerston toélane, 5.59, Dasent's Delané p. 324. / 
/I 
side by side with British in the Crimea and at Navarino; 
France had invariably cooperated with Britain in the Eastern 
Question; she had offered mediation in the Don Pacifico affair 
and endeavoured to turn Palmerston from his insane and reck- 
less course therein; she hadVshown every sympathy during the 
5 -f- Indian Mutiny, which offered the best opportunity if she had 
had any hostile feeling to Britain; she had sacrificed her own 
preference for Protection to sign a one -sided commercial 
treaty with Britain( in which she made many concessions, and 
got in return only the rights conceded to all other states; 
c- id.z4Z 
she had given Britain full support during the Trent -r 
%,,.; +ti +_ 1,44- -..St.tiy.,e4 and helped to prevent a war. Cobden, 
the apostle of peace and international cooperation, had found 
his most sympathetic friends, not in England, not in Germany, 
but in France. 
SB, The alliance was open y said in Britain to be the best 
Way, not only $fg (restraining France from going to war, but 
Dfopreventing her from making any gains of territory or in- 
fluence itt.hòmey -o r : ab road: Great Britain was to be free 
to make what territorial acquisitions she pleased dutside 
Europe; but France, whose aims were chiefly European, was to 
be strictly kept within her bounds, and even her colonial 
gains were looked upon with most jealous eyes. Such an alli- 
ance, undertaken with such aims on the part of Britian, could 
not imply any real sympathy or understanding between the two 
5q peoples, and the war ett444444eier of 1860 showed France clearly 




Whil e this distrust of France and her aims was some -' 
what unreasonable, at the same time British statesmen over - 
estimated the resources of France as greatly as they had under- 
estimated those of Germany. It is hardly necessary here to 
recall the awe with which they regarded the unfortunate Louis 
Napoleon, - so much weight can a name and a glib tongue 
carry. But the damage that had been done by the Great War 41s- 
France and the condition of disorganisation, weakness, and 
dry -rot, into which, by 1860,, *me falling, was ti knoVflt 
I,o_ nA eat.Brttái-ne, , As late as 1866 and after kßniggratz, 
Clarendon wrote deprecating the "mania for Prussianizing our 
Army, . . . . feel very convinced that there is no army 
in Europe to be compared with the French drmy, , especially in 
all its internal regulations ". It may be objected that the 
French believed the same thing; but Bismarck knew better; and 
if the British Government regarded L'rance as a dangerous neigh- 
bour it was their business to be accurately informed of the true 
state of her army and her administration. 
Perhaps no influence had so great an effect in sowing 
(01 hate and distrust of France in England as the°Times': Through- 
out this period, the policy of the paper was consistently 
anti -French, and the country and its governments were the 
objects of repeated attacks couched in language of unrestrain- 
ed brutality. 
In 1847, when the relations of the two states were 
critical (owing to the span ish policy of Louis Philippe, which 
11,22 
78. (79 deleted) 
helped to provoke the revolution of 1848), Lord Aberdeen was 
obliged to make a personal appeal to Delane. "I cannot regard 
without serious apprehension," he wrote, "The persevering and 
senseless rancour with which the French government is attacked, 
and uspecia:llyr M. Guizot, unquestionably the most friendly ta 
England, and to English interests, of any French minister sthce 
the restoration. t believe his policy aid sentiments to be 
still unchanged, but nations and governments, as well as indiv- 
iduals, will at length resent repeated insult.... From the great 
influence which you exercise over public opinion, I have freq- 
t (; Lt- 
went lyr told you that I thought the pease of the two countries 
42) 
would be naterialis affected by the course you...pursue." 
The change of government in France brought no change to Mr 
13elane's views. In 1853 he visited Paris, and becafte imbued with 
the idea, which he never lost, that Napoleon hated Britain, and 
that, to keep his doubtful hold on the nation, he would enter 
upon an aggressive policy and try to make himself master of ur- 
ope. This view decided Delane's first attitude to the aspirations 
of Italy, and in 1858 Palmerston was obliged to appeal to his? as 
43) 
Aberdeen had done. 
The defensive armaments, so often urged by the Times, and 
undertaken by Pa.lr_:er4st.on, were directed against France. "Ever 
since the Emperor gave the first sign of abandoning the allie 
English people, we have lost no opportunity of recomm- 
endine defensive .preparations nor have 
42) Aberdeen to Deld.ne, 12 July,1847. Dasent' s'?3elane, I, p. 154. 
43) Palmerston to .i)elane, 5Dec. 1858. Dasentls Delane I, p. 305, 
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we been behindhand in exposing the 
Pero r, whom we thought, and still 
J 
friend and á most dangerous 
enemy, 
demerits of the French Em- 
think to be, a suspicious 
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Tf5P1: 
rear of Russia was less perpetually in the minds of 
British statesmen, because that country was further off. It 
was a periodic , not a chronic , ailment. But it was equally a 
tradition, and equally it was left uncorrected by experience of 
the new world. Nobody seriously sat down to consider whether 
Y 
the possession of Constantinople by Russia would really be the 
irremediable disaster Lit- s said to be. Nobody ever took the 
trouble to find out the fact that the babz. Balkan states were 
not quite so ready to fall into the arms of Russia as was be- 
lieved. No one ever suggesteu, that there was an alternative 
policy to that of bolstering up a rotten and barbarous hohamme- 
dan state and r,k ing a permanent enemy of one of the greatest 
European powers by closing her natural outlets to the sea; or 
that it was possible, bÿ supporting the sell powers, to avoid 
both 
0,` yelane to Mr Pot t er, 6..9 . ?as ent; I) p.310. 
51. 
both the danger of aggrandising Russia and the shame of being 
the accomplice of the Turk. 
Hitherto Austria had been chiefly looked to by Bri- 
tish statesmen as a balance- weight against the influence of 
Russia or of r'ranc e, as the case might be: but Austria was 
very inadequate for the position thus given to her, especially 
after her L. losses in 1rí59. So the watchers in London 
turned their eyes all the more eagerly towards the rising pow- 
er of Prussia, and the prospect of a United Germany, which 
should take Austria' s place . 
They overlooked two possible difficulties. One was 
.f() that the weight of the new power might be so great as to upset 
the bal pic e alt ogether. It might not. only counter -balais e 
'ranc e, but overweigh her and even usurp her place. It was 
here that the policy followed by the new state became of the 
first importance: Tilley might (Tj.1., .Co,,,t) exchange King Log for 
King Stork. The second danger was, that the new power might 
not share their aiew that Germany and Britain were 'natural 
In /91(G / 41d4. Chu*cti4 said t ú4.c allies' . 
t% df- 4/.4,,,a4se/ iiad ,ó to c:,s.s. "natuaa f all/ f_3/ cm4/rIf 7v otc cnake 7íl a4P4L 
o ul d- 
e 
jiu. a'javi a-7 ; " ut E. 
I 
lama' í3' ?sot crzc*s % f -S" 
u-t? -----This 1dcaa,_ i 31--.a .,+ , _t.. a+ . ,a 
There still remains a small but influential body of 
opinion in Britain to be considered - that of the people who 
understood the real strength of Germany, without understanding 
the 81^.8 .4 effect of Bismarck's policya,on that country. This 
41.1.100111.11galanale.-n,aw.., 
132. 
party read.y laes éi sdus.s8.d.., included all the clear- 
sighted friends of Germany, who admired the good and great 
qualities of her people, were impressed by her tremendous re- 
sources, and ardently desired to secure for Britain an ally s0 
Dare 
-' °1 valuable. VEgitane ablesttwas Robert Morier, attache at 
the British embassy at Berlin. It also included those person 
of German blood and nationality, who could exercise some con- 
trol on British policy. Of such the leaders were the Queen, 
t.1 
the Prince Consort, and 'above all, Baron Stockmar, the,jtut or 
¿DA V 
The influence of taut a positions 
the 2ueenS and of a mind so lofty, so pure, and so powerful 
as Stockmar' s, was of course tremendous. The effect was 
great on every statesman who associated with Stockmar, or 
Who , (éwe g- .aama came into contact with the 
"(3 , '.Zueen. 
Where this party went astray was in their wrong 
estimate,of the power of Bismarck and all that Bismarck stood cr 
for. As has already been said, they believed arnamdk would 
not remain in italtiv long, and that his influence would be 
shaken off by the Liberal government which would follow him. 
They could not attack Bismarck, even when they detested his 
methods, because, after all, Bismarck was doing for German 
hi rn- 
unity -what no man h4i4 done before, and to attack, was to 
i4 hinder Germanpro.gress. So, at least, it sebmeù 'to Morier. 
'.the Queene, took another view, the romantic vié'w of a woman. 




thatAshe wished absolutely to fight Prussia, holding that 
the German cause would thus be better served. Even she, how- 
ever, was dazzled by Bismarck's success, and once the events 
which had offended her were past, she preferred to acquiesce 
in his policy for the sake of its result. Neither Morier nor 
the wueen contemplated the fact that the spirit of Bismarck 
would become so pervasive and powerful that it would infect . the mind of the whole nation. The intense disgust felt by 
these friends of Germany for Bismarck's methods made them 
wholly misjudge the man himself. Even so keen an observer as 
Liorier could write of him in 1866 as "a straw floating upon 
the current of public opinion" . 
17 
Principal Grant Robertson' s illuminating study of 
Bismarck contains a very striking description -óf Germany 
standing at the crossroads in 1u60; hesitating between Bismarck 
and the Liberal Leaders, who showed each their own path of 
progress, the one to the Power -State: the other to the Liberal 
. Constitutional Monarchy. He believeid' a s Germany's friends 
then believed, that the country was capable of a wholly diffe- 
rent development, and that her fate at this moment trembled in 
the balance. This is true; but is not the divergence between 
the aims and methods of the two parties slightly over- emphasim- 
rsed? The -point of view which represents the Liberal party as ,. 
an innocent Little Red Ridinghood walking in the dangerous wood 
of international politics, and intercepted, deceived, and fin- 
84. 
arrd----`z-rra-.rly gobbled up by Bismarck as the\wicked wolf, is drum4 
a :tic but exaggerated. When it is considered how rapidly the. Lit.- 
eral elements in Germany assimilated Bisni rck *sm, we cannot 
avoid the conclusion that. they had already some innate t endencieS' 
in that direction. 
"It is singular," said the Times in 187''?, "That Prussia made 
more fri nds in Gerraan:r by Thippel and Sadowa than by all her in- 




Mommsen, en the highest example of German intellect at that 
time, who was at first a Liberal and an opponent of, Bismarcies 
policy, in his old age recanted his views and came to the con - 
50) 
elusion that he had been wrong in opposing Bismarck. 
"De 1850 á 1870, ce qui nous frappe, ce n'est pas /a viol 
ente des ambitions prussiennes, c'est l'inanité des résistances 
qu'elles sculvent., l'absence de conviction avec laquelle les 
ennemis les plus fougueux de Bismarck le conîaattent. Dans seri 
rêve agite, la 'ralikyrie appelle son Siegfried." 
51) 
This is borne out h'- the history of the Slesvig -Holstein 
question. Undoubtedly the policy of Germany therein was less 
unscrupulous than that of Bismarck: but she showed exactly the 
same greed for territorial gains; the same disregard. for the 
rights of nationalities when not German; the same indifference t 
international law and treaty obligations; and the same capacity 
48) Tines, 23 Dec. 1870. 49) Strictly speaking Momm- 
sen was a Holst einer of Danish descent. 
50) $e- expressed his change of views in conversation with Sir 
11Hamsay; l do not know if he ever did so publicly. 
51) Denis, p.33. 52) Cp. B.eust's statnt that if he had 
asked for Jutland in 1864 Germany would have backed him. Beust-: 








@ unit history of Germany also brings some evidence 
in favour of this view. Apart from the truly lismarckian 
policy of the Great Elector and the Great Drederick, apart 
from the selfishness of Prussia's conduct before Jena, 
must be remembered that Prussia was the one state in 1813 
which was- wholly animated by the spirit of revenge. The 
J 
policy of Austria and of Britain towards Prance had then 
shown the wisest moderation and generosity; the ruler of 
Russia-piquant situation! -- -had been animated bymi vague 
romantic dreams of freedom and human happiness: it was Prus- 
sia who had clamoured for the sack of Paris; it was Prussia 
who wanted to dismember France, and take from her the most 
devoted of her provinces; it was Prussia whose policy was 
most completely dominated by the desire for territorial 
acquisitions; it was Prussia who 
4( Stockmar (son of the Prince Consort's tutor),, a devoted 
Liberal and enlightened politician, wrote to his friend 
Morier in 1871, "I maintain that hatred is a delightful, 
though unwholesome, drink." Morier IAMOR II) p. 244. 
c yEr 
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who had showed the most complete disregard for the future peace 
of Lzrope. 
Surely all this indicateà that there were certain 
c utilities of the / -on- which predisposed to an acceptance 
of Bismarck's policy, and which he divined and made use of/ 
(j In spite of this, however, there were admirable ciu41- 
ities in the Liberal party, and these it was that attracted and 
absorbed the attention of the British friends of Germany. 
united Germany in which Prussia was mergeu, a Liberal constitu- 
tional state governed by the voice of the people acting through 
representative institutions, was one to attract all the best 
hopes of the Victorian idealist. From the sentimental but shrewd ; c -o-re a 
, to the just, keen, and 
enthusiastic diplomatist who was already the béte noire of the 
2or ei gn Office, all Germany's British friends wanted and aée-ept- 
ed a Liberal solution of the problem. They hated Bismarck's 
methods; but then he was doing the work they wanted done; and 
0 .2 so they influenced Great Britain, so far as they could , in 
favour of Bismarck's policy . Th4s even the more enlightened 
friends of Germany must be blamed for blindness, and for igno- 
rance of reality. They were absorbed and misled, partly by the 
romantic idea of Germany, partly by Liberal tendencies, and 
partly, they also, by fear of . rance. 
The British distrust of i'rance centred in the nervous 
dread that _Liana e might attempt to annex Belgium; and this dan- 
ger was regarded as a full justi fic`ati on of the feeling. But 
if/ 
$1. 
if we consider the relative positions. of France, Belgium 
(3 and Britain at the tune, was this morbid dread justifiable? 
Was it still necessary that Belgium should be the turning 
point for British policy in Europe? The days were gone 
when the Netherlands were the sole market for English trade 
and the policy of those days might have gone with them. ös 
Dilke said later, why should it be more dangerous to Britain 
if France possessed . ntwerp than if she possessed Cherbourg? 0, 
Why we might ask in the light of to-day, was it more danger- 
ous that Prance should possess Antwerp than that Germany ahoulc 
possess Heligoland? Granted that it was dangerous that the 
81.A- Netherlands should be held by an enemy of Great Britain, still 
if some friendly support had been offered to France in lb30, 
it would have made France the sincere friend of Britain, and 
by satisfying her legitimate aims. in E`urope, would halm made 
her less touchy and quarrelsome in the Mediterranean and 
Colonial questions. 
It was the fashion in England to speak as if the 183 
desire of France to acquire Belgium was in itself reprehen 
ibis, but why should this be so? If the wish to unite all, 
sharing the sanie language, and in part the same blood and 
E5'. racial tradition, was praiseworthy 
Germany, it could not be condemned 
in the case of Italy and 
in France. France woul d 
I' 
be , 1uite unjustified in making 4 war to annex Belgium; but 
was it reasonable to say that if she made an arrangement to 
acquire the provinces peaceably, this was wicked, immor- 
al 
$3. 
immoral, and dangerous to Europe? In 1830 the inhabitants of 
the South Netherlands were, generally spe aking, pleased at the 
idea of yjoining France. They had once already lived for a 1cA- 
considerable time under French government, and no tradition of 
hostility divided them from France, as in the case of the 
8L. Dutch. They were naturally eager to share 
v all the advantages 
of belonging t o one of the most powerful and civilised nations 
in i urop e. 
In 1830 Belgium was not atelitut arc' o . ection 
of provinces. By 1860 these provinces had made some progress 
towards a coherent individuality, and they had, therefore, 
41,44 
become attached to their artificial independence) aiLitey would 
certainly not have submitted without a struggle to a conquest 
by fore es iced with vëry' differmat eyes 
upen- zac u«a s d pe c.sfaal =..:tightening- _. ...ties 
that"alrëäây ian tèd tï- str -Wtt'h °he`. -French nation-in- feeling and 
$q. eh During all this period, however, France made no 
threat to the independence of Belgium in spite of the nor 
horrors of King Leopold. France a was anxious to keep on good 
terms with Britain, and she also began to see that, in the 
event of danger from the Last, which seemed more and more 
probable, a neutral Belgium would be useful to her. This was 
the point which Great Britain failed to realise about the 
guarantee of neutrality. In the case of war between Prance 
arh Germany, which was becoming more and more probable, it 
was Germany, and not France, that would see her interest in 
breaking/ 
v 
breaking the guarantee. France had every interest in seeing 
that guarantee preserved, for a neutral Belgium covered her 
least defensible frontier and protected it from all attack; 
while Germarw, in any attack on France, would find the Belgian 
railways and Belgian roads invaluable. mug tO 
u ie a map ; aft -that is an mpl o elat- 
popa3:ar,-.srong>Càbinet 
France want pd to attack Germany, 
pn the other hand, if 
-Ma7Préf`P'r"not to have 
the strong fortific- 
ations where her frontier marched with Germany would he the 
best base of attack; and she would naturally wish to throw all 
her strength into the coveted Rhenish provinces, and seize and 
hold them. Germany at this. time was so far removed from Great 
Britain, had so small a sea- ccast, and so small a sea -hone -t 
trade, that she was almost invulnerable by Britain, and could 
be much less careful not to offend here but France had a great 
mercantile fleet to protect, a long sea -coast exposed to Brit- 
ish attacks, and if she were involved ' ire a war with Germany, 
go.and Britain joined Germany, she would be caught betweenttwo 
ehemies: so that France had much more interest than Germany 
in not provoking British enmity by violating the Belgian guar- 
antee. 
The real danger of avterritorial guarantee, of course, is 
not that one of the _puaran teeing powers Should break it, but 
that only one should keep it. When there seeme4 to be, in 187e, 
a possibility that France and Germany, with the tacit consent 
of Russia, might agree to repudiate the Beigiánoluàrsfltaa 
Treaty, Great Britain felt herself helpless, and her repres- 
entatives decided that in such a case she would not be bound 
GÌ, to fight in defence of Belgium. She would have fought, with 
Germany as an ally, to keep France out of Belgium: whether, 
at this date, she would have fought, with France S as an ally, 
to keep Germany out of Belgium, is not quite so certain, for 
at a later date British statesmen publicly expressed dentim- 
ent s that could be interpreted as meaning that in these cir- 
cumstances they would not fight, and it is well known that 
the German government remained under this impression till the 
0- final outbreak of war in 1914. 
{ -e-conr3-rderabie. eride-nce, .then, that 
q. ie °- --3-n AheviFictorian period---was---dictated 
. ,i-en-f-or-t he -i.nt-eres..of ..,4e}g,3tkrgi---tha32-L4y 
the-t-rttnwt--dis+-rrrst--af-APr, a.nee,n. .a. .a.i stru st, xot.--EOr3ple-tre3y 
jus tif- ttebls---hy- fr-aeta,) 
I£1 
The various principles which directed British policy 
acted more or less strongly on individuals and on parties 
according to. their temperament or to the circumstances of the 
moment. The wish for peace, for example, acted very strongly 
Igo on Gladstone, and very slightly on Palmerston. John Russell 
was Very sensitive to all these theories, and Disraeli was 
not greatly affected by any of them; except in so far as they 
G3, influenced him indirectly, through their hold on public opin- 
opinion. There is a certain rough division of parties, however) 
which may be said to coincide with the influence of different 
classes of ideas. 
On the whole, the power of idealism was greater, and 
more steadily exerted, over the Liberal Party than over the 
Conservative. The latter made some slight attempt to preserve 
the old traditional foreign policy: that Britain wkeuld take 
a bold part in the transaction of continental affairs, and 1?I 
that she was the chosen champion of the Balance of Power. The 
influence of this tradition gcted intermittently, and not on 
4 -all the Conservative leaders. The younger Derby, for example, 
steadily tended throughout his career towapds a policy ' ofllnon- 
intervention and peace; and he ended by joining the Liberalsb 
The two greatest Conservative leaders, however, Disraeli and 
Salisbury, were neither of them of the normal English type, 
and were less affected by the ideas of the day. One was by 
race and character a foreigner, the other a peculiar and soli- 
/92. 
ta,rr nature, not, in sympathy with the dominant tendencies of 
the age. Both were affected by these political ideals, but 
they.were, on the whole, more anpirical in their attitude, and 
( ,more open to new impressions, than their Liberal contemporar- 
ies. 
u L.Thaoldeala which.hâd -most influence on the 
Conservatives were those which attached to the characters and 
functions of particular states. The bulk of the party distrust- 
ed the Liberal movement abroad as too democtatic, and Nation- 
alism in their eyes was tarred with the same brush, though 
9'11 
they were eventually constrained to pay some lip -homage to Iq3 
both. Disraeli was quite ready to make a tool of democracy if 
he could do so, but the Jew had no sympathy with nationalism. 
IÍ1 #10erby on these points took more the typical Tory 
v 
GL. view. Salisbury, perhaps the most original thinker of the 
leaders, was less independent and foràAb3.elin<;.adtdon thaniin 
thought. 
The Liberals, on the other hand, were the true chil- 
dren of the new age, whose creed it was to interpret and give 
force to the desires and necessities of the new sovereign 
power - --the English middle class. They were, therefore, moss 
sensitive to the pdinciples which expressed the views of that 
AL 
class - - -the wish for the maintm±Enance of peace; for non- inter- 
vention in the, affairs of other states; for the spread of the 
limited. liberal constitutional system of English government, 
'`l -and for the su.Ceess .-of the nationalist aspirations VI 
rota rnr athe le -- ,enthusiasm-in..that .class The po .-io Of 
peace, though already felt in the days of Palmerston, gained 
immensely in strength as soon as his militant personality was 
removed f roh political circles. The Liberals, however, were 
influenced as much asi4f-rxrt m -- haTr) the Conservatives by 
the traditional theories about Belgium, France, Germany, and 
Russia.. This party was chiefly interested in home affairs, and 
found' it much simpler to take 
r9s 
their ideas of the condition of Europe ready -made. They were 
in this respect more prejudiced, more ignorant, and less open 
q . to new, ideas, than their political opponents« 
an 
c3 
For the full developement of the principles of peace 
on- intervention, we must turn to what the Germans called 
"Manchesterthum." It was unfortunate that this 
a .;E ..1,,...r_Pe r never actually directed the 
councils of the nation. It was always strong enough to influ- 
ence the course of affairs, to act as a drag or a stimulus as 
the case might be, but it never obtained full control of the 
government or was in a position to apply its principles con- 
sistently over any considerable period. Its two greatest 
gq.leaders felt this, and one always, 
v 
and the other for a long 
time, refused to hold office dn.: ;any government. 
The Manchester school was the only party that could 
have carried out a definite and original foreign policy. They 
may have been mistaken, but they had the courage of their con- 
victions, and they did not shrink from consequences. Only in 
their hands could the principle of Hon-Intervention have re- 
ceived its t4 application, because they were free from other 
prejudices "and other. influences. They put peace before any 
other consideration. whatsoever, and they wem1 not trammelled 
by any considerations of self -interest, prejudice, or jealousy 
loaof -any particular foreign state. Under their guidance Britain 
would have taken up a position at least dignified and consist- 
ent, and .would not have exposed herself to acCúsations oaf 
meddling, hypocrisy) cowardice, and greed. She would not have 
cringed to powerful states and bullied weak ones. She would 
not have broken an engagement with Deftmark and withdrawn 




been ready to fight America and Russia, in the interests of 
commerce and imperialism. 
As things stood, however, the Manchester school only 
io. exerted enough influence to hinder or nullify any attempt on 
the part of other parties at a more energetic policy, and 
while they weakened the government at moments when strength 
and resolution were needed, they failed to restrain it from 
preaching and meddling. The death of Cobden in 1865, moreover, 
deprived the party of the leader who had really given it its. 
strength and reputation. 





in outlook, and of the more prejudiced and rigid 
on the other hand, had perhaps the meirderpttaioriP64. 
4 and original intellect of any 
British statesman 
v 
10 ,9..of the Century. The two were equally disinterested; but Cobden 
was far less fanatical than his friend. He admitted that at 
times, though rarely, intervention might be justifiable, even 
necessary, and. while strongly condemning aggressive wars, he 
was practical enough to advocate strong defences at the prep- 
5 
ent moment. But.he would have no impudent meddling, and no 
moral encouragement given to minorities abroad, when it was 
not intended to give them material support. His opposition &Iv 
íntexvention had been consistent and bold. He had. protested 
against the Chinese opium wars, the Don Pacifico incident, 
the quarrel with Japan, the Crimean war, and the encouragement 
103, ofVPolish, Hungarian, and Italian revolutionaries. But he had 
"I would, if necessary, spend one hundred millions sterling to 
tr. maintain an esistible superiority over France at sea."( ,o 
J.hussell, 2:41V60. 644-e(p. 501.) \44 G,t cCw,n, 
zoa 
with equal fogtce denounced the distinction made between diff- 
erent states, the friendly neutrality offered to the ambitions 
of one, and the jealous opposition made to similar plans on 
the part of others. He boldly told his countrymen that Britain 
had long been the most agressive of states, and had no right, 
to make accusations against her neighbours. In his first pol- 
itical writings he had tried to 'prove that civilisation and 
peace would both profit if Russia should acquire Constantin- 
ople, and that the old policy of opposing every Russian ad- 
o 
Io!-L. vance in the East was wasteful and blind. In the same way he 
had protested against the persistent opposition to France, and 
in each of the war Scares had mocked at the prevailing excite- 
ment and deplored the "resolute and one -sided determination 
to throw all responsibility on our neighbours, to presume the 
worst, to construe everything in :that sense, to take credit 
-ST tion 
for perfect blamelessness." In the midst of the indignation 
in Britain at the annexation of Savoy and Nice, he had made 
his famous speech: "Perish Savoy!---though Savoy will not 
perish and will not suffer gather than that the government 
ioof England be involved in enmity with the government and 
people of France in a matter in which, we have no concern what- 
ever." s9 
ys 
The principle of non -intervention, if consistently 
applied, might have led to ultimate disaster, but at least it 
Cobden 
5b ,. 
, p.495. * Speech, 2.Y.60. 
OZ 
96. 
a dignified and disinterested policy. only the , anchester School 
was prepared to adopt it whole- heartedly and sincerely, and to 
apply it without prejudice. For this reason its leaders were 
respecte abroad, even by those who disagreed with them,, and 
Cobden was perhaps the only 3ritish statesman who;se accession to 
power would have been hailed with applausë in every foreign cap- 
ital, for all knew, that though they might not hope for assist- 
ance from. him, they would at /east obtain justice. 
In this way the various parties, _wtth their various motive_,1 
and ,aims, saw grow up in ,Central Europe ,a new power which domin- 
ated and overshadowed the ether states of Europe; a power 
against which, her own rulers admitted, she would be helpless 
in case () }f a struggle.; a power whose cormadning position had 204 
been built up by, a. deliberate violation of all the rules of 
public law and morality; a power whale domination rested, by her 
own confession, on force. 
This was a strange reflection for the Victorian idealist, 




THE SLESVIG -HOLSTEIN QUESTION, f 6 ̀ -1864. 
I. 
The little nations of Scandinavia were living at 
this time in a state of calm and self -complacency which was 
not unwarranted. Here democracy was approaching, not, as in 
most of the states of Europe, in a series of violent convul- 
sions; not complicated, as in Great Britain, by cruel Indus- 
trial conditions, but with a natural, healthy, and gradual 
growth. Enjoying already a government superior to that of 
trIttatof their neighbours; with a population simple and indus- 
trious, intelligent and patriotic; their rulers taking the 
first steps on a path of wise and moderate improvement; proud 
of their noble heritage of history and literature, and still 
basking in the autumn sunshine of a grand efflorescence of 
the arts; the three kingdoms regarded themselves with a 
natural satisfaction. Yet it was this northern civilization, 
so pleasing and so unaggresive, that was to be the first vic- 
tim of the new gospel whose prophet, from his closet in 
Berlin, was now surveying the face of Europe. 
There was a weak spot in the Scandinavian system, 
which for the last thirty years had hindered the progress of 
Denmark 
qQ: 
Denmark and drained her strength. The endless and vicious 
complications of "the Slesvig- Holstein Question" were ever 
v 
a trouble to the chancelleries of Europe, and at the moment 
when Bismarck became the first minister of Prussia, the pro- 
blew had reached a point where it was ripe for the: inter- 
ference. ew hand. It was a clear case of the time and 
the place and the loved one all together: The Duchies were 
ready for Bismarck, when Bismarck was ready for them. With- 
out entering into all the dreary controversies which maddened 
and bewildered the politicians of the day, it is necessary 
to take a rapid survey of the events which led up to this 
situation. 
The Danish monarchy was a quadruple one: its 
sovereign was King of Denmark, Duke of Slesvig, Duke of Hol- 
stein, Duke of Lauenburg. The status of each of the four 
countries was different, and that of the three duchies was 
a matter of controversy. The case of Lauenburg may be taken 
first, as it was the simplest. It had been given to Denmark 
in 1815, as compensation for the cession of Swedish Pomerania 
to Prussia. The Danish title therefore rested on the Vienna 
Treaty, and Lauenburg followed the Danish Crown. Its inhabi- 
tants were German, and it was a member of the German Con- 
federation. It was an endearingly placid little duchy, per- 
fectly satisfied with Danish rule, but attaching itself 
contentedly/ 
contentedly to Germany when transferred. We may dismiss It 
with a blessing. 
Over the position of Slesvig and Holstein contro- 
versy has raged for nearly a century. So inextricably corn- 
plicated is the legal and political history of the duchies, 
that either side could make out an excellent case simply by 
emphasizing certain facts and slurring over others. There 
is, however, one point which has never been contested; from 
its first existence, Slesvig was a fief of the Danish Crown, 
while Holstein was a fief of the Holy Roman Empire. 
lea 
Slesvig was originally 'an integral part of Jutland, 
and was separated from it, and created a fief of the crown, 
in the 13th century. In the next century the Counts of Hol- 
stein, by intermarria -e, succeeded to the Duchy of Slesvig, 
and when, nearly a hundred years later, the Holstein family 
became extinct, Slesvig escheated to the Danish crown, and 
CAmi w1 
the King of Denmark1inherited the lordship of Holstein, 
which he continued to hold as a fief of the Empire.` 
f 
In 1721 tane whole of Sle,avig was incorporated into the Danish 
`f crow7IaTd guaranteed by France and 3ritatn. In 1806 the Holy Roman 
Empire ceased to exist, and the King of Denmark dec -fared Holstein an 
allodial possession of the Danish Crown. In 1815, however, the new 
German Confederation was farmed, and the King of Denmark joined it 
for the Duchies of Holstein and Laauenburg. The aggressive spirit 
shown by Prussia had alarmed him, and he hoped to protect his Geri .n 
provinces from attack by joining the Confederation himself: but the 
consequences of the step were disastrous for Denmark. 
Its immediate result was the first formulation of the 
"Schleswig-Holstein theory." The laws of the German Confeder- 
ation obliged its raeIi'! r.`j to give their Subjects a constitu +.ion- 
-- ----an Obligation which most of them ignored. The King of Denmark 
at .this time was Yrederick VI, the kindly old autocrat whose 
flaming heart Imk i one of the Danish Nine in Andersenl s tala, 
and who, though very unwilling to limit his own authority, 
immediately' began to frame a constitution for Holstein. He was, 
however, under no obligation to give one to clesvig pr to Den- 
mark Proper, and did not intend to do so . From this sprang more 
than one .result.. On the one hand, the Liberals of Flesvig were 
anxious to share the constitutional government of Holstein. On ¡ ' L 
the other, the nobility of 'bath duchies were seriously alarmed. 
Between 
the nobles of Slesvig and Holstein existed a connection 
known as the "nexus socialts, " consisting of certain private 
privileges, chiefly rights over some conventual property. They 
'''ere alarmed it the severance of the government of Holstein 
from that of the rest of the monarchy might interfere with-the: 
"nexus socialis ", and also lest it mid h` lessen their political 
influence, which had hitherto been supre'ae. The Equestrian .Order 
employed as paid secretary; Dahlrlann, a MecklenI: urger, a profes- 
sor at the 7Jniversit7 of Kiel, who exhumed from the archives 
of the Duchies a charter, granted in 1460' by" Chris "?an I to 4,itie 
Sles4ig_ arnd.H.olet.ain. This document stated that Slesvig was to 
have a Diet of Tes' own, ttr awn system of Jutish law, and that 
only native Slesvigers were to hola high office; Holstein was 
also to have her owrr Thiet, her own 'German law -code, and was to 
be administered b;r a native Holsteiner. They were to have a 
common council and rent, and they were to "remain forever 
414 
together undivided." enigmatic clause, according Dahl- - 
mann, established an "indissoluble ti between the two Duchies. 
It is possible, however, that it was intended to man only that 10. 
neither of the provinces was to be cut up into sMaller fiefs, 
which were disliked, as conducing to feuds and disorder. 
Certainly, as they were to have separate Diets, distinct codea 
of law, and separate administrations, it is difficult to sen 
in what the "indissoluble tie" could consist, as the mere faòt 
of the common council and .regent hardly constituted one. 
But whatever the meaning of the clause, one thing is cert- 
ain: it was never observed. Slesvig and Holstein for several 
centuries led a Protean sort of life, divined in every possible 
Cr "forever both of theca undivided. "--- "ewich tosamende 1angedelt. 
" 
way;' halved, quartered, and criss-crossed: but only once, for H. 
the space of a few years, did they find themselves "tosamende 
ungedelt." 
The second document on which Dahlmann' s Schleswig -Holstein 
Theory was based was the so- called Constitution of Valdemar, 
which contained the expression, "Item Ducatus Sunderjutiae 
(Sleevig) regno et coronae non unietur nec annectetur ita quod 
unus sit dominud utriusque. " Of this document it need only be 
said that it does not exist, and that the only evidence that it 
ever existed is a reference in a letter written a. century- later: 
',t that thisV"j7alieaar" was a usurper who dispossessed t]î, rightful I i 
1 
king, was a child under age, and is not usually included in thß 
list of' authentic Danish kings: and thict, even with all respect 
to Valdemar, his constitution was hr the 19th century a little 
out of date, as it onl.,r stated that Den.Tnark and Slesvig should 
not have one lord, and since 17.1 one lord had reigned in both, 
recognised by the native Slesvigera, by the concert Of Europe, 
and by Germany itself. 
7evert eleessi Dahlinann held, that he had succeeded a in proving 
that Slesvig and Holstein were united by an indissoluble tie, 
connected with Denmark ?roper onlyi-by a personal union, and that 1(1 
to grant a constitution to Holstein and not to Sleevig would 
oe a violation of the indissoluble tie. The forilai re -union of 
Slesvig to the Danish Crown in 1713 was a difficulty, but Dahl - 
manu got over i by simply denying that this incorporation was 
legal. 
The opposition of the nobles would probably hpve come to 
/0 9 
"4.1:74/ 
little; but T)ahLnannt s theory was eatrerlV seized upon by the 
Liberals, as At gave an opportunity to obtain representative 
institutions for both duchies. The.Charter of 146ñ was disin- 
terred from the dust of four hundred years, ardent professors r !Li- 
vainly ransacked the Archives for the mythical "constitution of 
Valdeiiar, " and the Liberal party in Germany took up the causa 
of their brothers in the '?orth. 
These Teutonic necromanöers, in this raising the ghosts of 
the past, would have been highly annoyed if their opponents had 
followed their example. Had the Danish rrovernrient proposed to 
revive the provision of the Charter of 1460, that only nat ii e 
Slesvigers might hol &office ii. Slesvig, and dismissed the crowd 
of German arxi Holstein officials who flourished there 
107. 
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the Schleswig- Holstein party would have been seriously dis- 
Mrer444"4Aftal #.4 &I 4444444144 
pleased. Again, if , t -°be#,. -ers 
80ae-- -de-o-tarerl 
_?..an independent state, she would have to be an independent 
state mulcted of Altona and about one -fifth of her present 
territory, for these districts were allodial possessions 
of the ianish Orownt and had only b-en joined to the old 
duchy of Hols e :+ -i - - - - 1806. This also would 
have seriously displeased the followers of Dahimann. (;m47 
as will be seen later, the German revival of feudal laws 
had- a-t -.-ea- logical consequences not more agreeable-4o -them- 
selvsa. The fact that none of these consequences were ever 
seriously considered by either side serves to prove the 
artificiality of the Schleswig -Holsteiner Party's contention. 
Since 1460, the map of Europe had been re- modelled; new 
states hae- arisen and old ones vanished; the balance of 
power had shifted; Denmark herself had changed her whole 
nature, and been transformed from a hybridielective- feudal 
monarchy into an absolute hereditary one. When every state 
in Europe was consolidating her position and discarding the 




The Danish kings, however, did not take up this 
position. The controversy was still in its infancy, they did 
Ait 
)z-not regard it as a serious danger, and their policy for nearly 
thirty years was dictated by dynastic, not national, interests. 
True, Frederick VI, in a rage at the opposition, scrapped the 
constitution which he had just signed, and continued to 
govern all his dominions absolutely; but both he and his 
successors were ready to make large concessions to keep the 
Schleswig- Holstein party content. Several administrative 
connections between the two duchies were established, and 
Denmark Proper paid more than her share of taxes that their 
burdens might be lessened. Efforts to spread the German 
lßnguage among the Danes of Slesvig were countenanced. The 
------ > , 
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prosperous 4 and the 
Frederick VI. and Christian VIII, dreaded the German support 
of Schleswig- Holsteinism the less as it was of a wholly 
private nature. It was confined to th4iberals, and the Diet 
of the Confederation, which represented only the various 
governments, had definitely repudiated Schleswig- Holsteinism. 
When the theory was first formulated, the Holsteiners had 
appealed to the German Diet, complaining that the Charter of 
1460 had been violated, and in the light of future events 
the/ 
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the reply of the Diet should be carefully noted. The claim was 
dismissed, on the ground that "the alleged Constitution of 1460 
was. not existing in acknowledged-vigour, " and the representative 
of Prussia declared eiphatically that "Slesvig does not belong 
to German federal territories" and that therefore the Diet had t C} 
no right to discuss any question bearing on Slesvig. This w .as 
in 1823. In 1830 the obligations of Denmark towards Holstein 
were. f ulf filled, and consultative representat ive institutions 
were established in all four parts of the mana,rchy -- -the two 
duchies, Jutland, and the isles. 
There was another influence than that of Aiberalism, which 
had already played some part in the question of the duchies, and 
which from this time forward began to dominate the situation. 
This was the rise of Nationalism as a political factor. 
From 1850 to 1830, the desire fax a strong, united Germany, °!, 
that could take her proper place in the JL'ouncils of Europa', 
slowly spread and grew stronger among the German r.,e ople. Only 
in the little self ish absolute governments, each playing for its 
own hand, it obtained no influence. It was closely associated 
with the Liberal aspirations which the /onfedera.ted governments 
desired to repress; while Prussia, and still 
still more Austria, each holding subject races by the strong 
hand, dared not trifle with the idea of nationalism. Met - 
3o.ternich dominated the Confederation, and Metternich's policy 
was, by waging war on Ña.tionalism andjiberalism, to suppress 
for the time the revolution which he regarded as inevitable 
in the end. The smooth old trickster was too much attached 
to the ways of the past century to attempt to control the new 
spirit and use it for his own ends as a stronger man was after- 
wards able to do. 
The Germans of Holstein naturally shared the as- 
pirations of their fellows; they were eager to strengthen 
the tie that bound them to the Confederation, and, with the 
aggressive spirit common to 19th. century Nationalists, they 
were eager to impose German culture upon Danish Slesvig. 
For, as the aims of Germany became more definite and distinct, 
Slesvig became more and more the centre of interest. Germany 
needed more than a strong central government: for what would 
be the position of a united Germany, with no navy and only 
a few miles of sea- board? What use were the Pomeranian ports 
if Denmark held the key to the Baltic, and dominated Hanover 
and Frisia? Liberal Germany looked with avid eyes upon the 
Peninsular coast, with its excellent harbours East and West, 
and above all, the jewel of the Baltic, Kiel. The supposed 
connection/ 
connection of Slesvig with Holstein took on a new importance. 
-cti--1-ine-an-s--ket-- u s en courage t Te ers: theÿ . 
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The German governments made no effort to throw cold 
water on these hopes. They were not so destitute of patrio- 
tism as not to appreciate the gain to German sea -power if 
Slesvig were to join the Confederation; and besides, the 
matter could be used as a safety -valve for ìational- liberal 
enthusiasm: the more the opposition was occupied with Schleswig7 
Holstein, the less time and attention had it to spare for 
revolution at home. 
The French revolution of 1830 gave a great impetus 
to German propaganda in the duchies. But national feeling 
was not confined to Germany; and 1830 had its effect also 
upon Denmark. The two races came to grips in Slesvig. 
The population of Slesvig had been originally pure 
Danish, with a slight,' sprinkling of Frisians, but for 400 
years the Dukes of Gottorp and other potentates who ruled 
over the whole or part of the duchy were Germans, and they 
had imposed upon it a superficial German culture They en- 
couraged immigration; they appointed German bishops and 
. pastors ; *h-o-pveached German -sermons- to- pious-but - puz lad 
Ummeongregattonsi they filled the administration with 
German 
German officials, and made an education at the purely German 
university of Kiel the necessary qualification for every 
important post.' By this time almost the whole of the no- 
bility of Slesvig, and most of the southern districts, were 
German in speech, and to some extent in feeling. As the 
members of the Diet were drawn from the noble, official, and 
professional classes, the Danish peasantry of the north and 
middle districts, who formed the majority of the inhabitants, 
?';, could not make their voice heard in it, and this fact explains 
the generally anti -Danish policy of the Slesvig Diet. 
Shortly after 1830, however, the Danes of Denmark 
Proper began to realise that a systematic attempt was being 
made to rob them of their fairest province. The government, 
it is true, still ignored the grievances of Danish Slesvig; 
but by private efforts the "Slesvig Association ", whose object 
was to counteract German propaganda, was formed, and soon 
succeeded in re- introducing the Danish language into about 
120 parishes in which it had been abolished within the last 
five years. Dahlmann found an antagonist in Orla Lehmann, 
4. a Slesviger, and an agitation was begun to make the Diet 
more/ 
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Towards the end of his reign Christian VIII made 
a personal tour in Slesvig, and discovered that he had been 
entirely misled as to the character and feelings of the popu- 
lation. He altered his policy, and for his last years de- 
finitely favoured the effort of the patriotic Danish party 
now becoming known as the "Eider- Danes ", from their declared 
aim of a united Danish land with the Eider for its frontier. 
By this time the attitude of the German states, 
also, was changing. So powerful had the ,national- liberal 
r-f' movement become, that it could not fail to have some slight 
effect even upon the most reactionary of the governments. The 
issue, therefore, became a clear one. On one side, the German 
national ists/ 
NOTE on he NATIONA TY of SLESVIG. Consul Ward reported on 
this po t to the itish Governmen in 1863. He made inves- 
tigat ns in some f the middle d tracts, and, though himself 
an a -sent Slesv -Holsteiner, wa obliged to admit that though 
the ounger pe le spoke Germa y preference, the older 
ge eration sp ke bad German ar good Danish, but were ashamed 
o speaking banish, as they ad been taught that it was vulgar 
and drew from this the conclusion that the Danish Government 
was quite unjustified in maintaining that ,these districts were 
Danish i blood. But it óertainly proves that the Germanization 
was ver recent;:the older generation had never bee `able to 
acquir the German which their children had been t ght at 
school. Even in the sóuthern districts, the popul tion must 
have been largely Danish in blood, and could eas y have been 
reclaimed. It must be remembered that the "Ger n" speech of 
South Slesvig was not modern high German, but mixed low 
German dialect. A typical example of German ethods in Slesvig, 
after the Danish government had put a stop o more crudely 
forcible methods, was that the Diet of Slesvig offered. extra 
PSY to every school- teacher who would give his class German 
lessons. 
11 
nationalists wished to draw Slesvig into the German Con- 
federation. On the other, the Eider -Danes wished to in- 
corporate it with Denmark, and in order to do this were ready 
even to abandon Holstein if necessary. The significance of 
the °Schleswig= Holstein Theory" was obvious; in the hands of 
the German party, it could be used to sever Slesvig from 
Denmark and unite her to Germany. The o4 efl 
of Holstein tl had no attraction for 
Germany, for it left her without control of Kiel. 
Ill- fortune attended Denmark, for at this point 
matters were complicated by a disputed succession to the 
Crown, as intricate and doubtful as every other aspect of 
the question. 
The royal house was dying out. The only son of 
King Christian had been twice married and twice divorced, 
and was childless. He had now formed a private connection 
with a third lady, and absolutely refused another royal 
marriage. After his death, who should succeed? 
Cn3rnrnl a Éìiid- s : 
v 
,3q . had- originálly been-ele, tive. Al-d"iPfer6ñt-dnee--111-t-he 
first half of the 17:t .century-ra 
were all made hereditfarr .) 
The succession to the Danish crown had originally 
run in the male line only, but by the introduction of a law 
known 
known as the "Lex Regia", it had been extended to female heirs. 
This law only referred to Denmark Proper. Alow the heir in the 
female line was Prince Christian of Glücksburg, grandson of 
the Landgrave of Hesse and great- grandson of Frederick VI 
of Denmark. (Its-claim-was derived from his mother, who, 
with --the tether princes of Hesse, had resigned all her rights 
o. t-a. r1im heir - -ink. the_. direct 
-tire -erown of ° 3enma But was he also heir 
to Slesvig and Holstein? The Schleswig- Holstein party con- 
tended that in the duchies the male succession only obtained, 
and that the rightful heir was the Duke of Augustenburg, a 
Holstein descended from John, younger son of Christian 
III of Denmark. 
They contended that, on the death of Frederick VII, 
Christian should become King of Denmark, while the Duchies 
would separate from the Danish crown and be ruled by the 
Duke of Augustenburg as independent DWSv it) 
Whether or not the male succession "obtained in 
L-I. Holstein dependsvon the status of that duchy as a fief of 
anti, 
the Holy Roman Empire, can only be settled by antiquarians. 
A 
For the sake of simplicity we may accept the German view in 
this case. The matter of Slesvig, however, was much more 
complicated. The Danes maintained that the law of succession 
in/ 
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in Slesvig had been assimilated to that of Denmark, when 
Slesvig was annexed to the Crown in 1721. It was indubitable 
that both the Slesvig Estates, and the Duke of Augustenburg 
of the day, hsd taken the oath of allegiance to the King oft' « 
k.Denmark, swearing, "to remain faithful and obedient to him 
and his Royal hereditary successors, secunde tenorem legis 
regiae ". The Schleswig -Holsteiners contended that this was 
not sufficient to alter the law in Slesvig; the Danes held 
that it was, and as it was impossible for either party to 
prove the exact significance attributed to the words by the 
persons who employed them in 1721, they came to a deadlock. 
But even granting that both duchies had the male 
succession, the Augustenburg claim was not proved. The 
tugf, ft.cs;,,,olita. k!i ,re., 
c 6.1;;LeNw ,,U 
sovereignty of Denmark had only been made hereditaryin "the I°o- 
year 1660. Primogeniture had been introduced in the GetteTT, 
.' The Augus- 
tenburg line, however, had parted from the royal house in the 
16th centurÿ, and its first representative had died in 1564, a 
considerable time before any part of the monarchy had become 
hereditary. Slesvig, as a male fief of the Crown, would on 
the extinction of the male line of Frederick III, escheat to 
the Crown; Holstein, now that the Empire no longer existed,' 
would most probably do the same; and-by --fie -e-x-t netion-of 
male 
See Genealogical Table P. 
male--dese-end-ant-e--oß .on 
ste.A--f+ottowar1 ' utama-ticelly-reeT-thou-gh-n<40- 
v 
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The artificial nature of the Augustenburg claim, 
Jhowever, did not prevent theS1lesMg- Holstein Party and the 
German nationalists from supporting it. The Sleswig- Holstein- 
ers saw in it an opportunity of strengthening the connection 
between the duchies; the Germans saw a chance of detaching 
Slesvig from Denmark. 
The King of Denmark in whose reign the claim was 
first made, Christian VIII, did not at first take 
seriously. He had loaded the Augustenburg family with bene- 
fits, and believed they were loyal to the Crown. It deter- 
mined him, however, to settle the question of the succession, 
and 
A 
put an end to discussion. he discovered that 
Augustenburgs had systematically deceived him as to the 
condition of Slesvig. -fisr decided to act at once. In 1846 
issued Letters Patent, declaring Slesvig in- 
separable from Denmark; and that as the case of Holstein 
A 
was doubtful, an arrangement should be made so that it might 
not be separated from the rest of the monarchy. 





e shower of protests, from all the re- v 
,e- motest relatives of the royal house - Augustenburg, Oldenburg, 
3 
lücksburg.* Holstein petitioned against the Letters Patent, 
(A(.4, 0,-4A y J 
dnd the Danish lion, now rampant indeed, put aside the law 
and refused to receive the petition. Holstein complained to 
the German Diet that her rights were violated and the con- 
stitution overridden. The Diet, roused from its perennial 
doze, drowsily rebuked her frowardness, and sent a polite 
protest about the refused petition to Copenhagen, Denmark, 
encouraged, vent further; abolished the newly- invented 
"Schleswig- Holstein Flag ", dismissed a few high officials, 
in Slesvig, and accepted the resignation of Augustenburg's 
brother` but her difficulties were only beginning. 
At the opening of 1848, two events occurred which 
changed the face of affairs. Christian VIII died, and the 
di'* ̂ mac, Frederick VII, ascended the throne. Py two qualities 
the new king endeared himself to his subjects - he was much 'Y7. 
more Danish in feeling than his father, and he was a Liberal 
and wished to give his people a large measure 
of self- government. The late king had left prepared a new 
constitution, which was intended to conciliate and reconcile 
the/ 
qksPrince Christian of Glücksburg repudiated his father's 
Protest, and acknowledged the King's right to settle the 
succession. 
The Prince of Noer, who had been Çovehre4hMc in slesvig. 
12 0. 
the various sections of the state. It preserved to the 
provinces their local assemblies, and established a parliament 
prole~ monRr. ohyi h.au.ing a deliberative vote on 
finance, law, and police. Holstein and Slesvig had between 
them 26 members in this Rigsdag, and Denmark Proper 26. 
Frederick VII signed and published the constitution in January, 
1848. 
It pleased no one. Holstein'instantly declared it 
an attempt to incorporate herself and Slesvig, while the 
Eider -Danes said that the German minority was given an un- 
fair preponderance in national affairs by the distribution 
of seats in the Rigsdag. Probably the opposition would soon 
have subsided had outside events not interfered: but in Febru- 
ary the Paris Revolution set all Europe ablaze. Governments 
a were overturned,and busy and excited parliaments sprang up 
like mushrooms; the astonished world saw Metternich a refugee 
in England and Mazzini supreme in Rome. 6-Rev-olutiori" 
ha4--44-a 1-.-t-tie-- heydayy l 
-on---$-t_rtp-le- change-___took p1aC 
In Copenhagen, national feeling became irresistible, and the 
Eider:Danes carried their policy; Holstein sprang into re- 
bellion; and in Frankfort, the ruling power was no longer 
the moribund Diet, but a new "national assembly" of the 
hot/ 
r 
hot -headed devotees of the Liberal-National-party, all crying 
aloud that their German brothers be delivered from the Danish 
yoke. 
0- Holstein made the first move. The deputies of the 
two duchies were called to meet at Rendsburg, and about 60 
of the total 92 actually assembled, and submitted the follow- 
ing demands to the King:- 
(1, P at the estates of Slesvig and Holstein be immediately 
convoked to decide on a constitution for a united 
Schleswig -Holstein.) 
_____._--- -/ 
2. That Slesvig immediately enter the German Confederation 
9 
3. That the people of the duchies be armed, electing 
their own officers. 
A free press, and other constitutional rights. 
These demands left Rendsburg on March 21st, and it 
was possible to expect a reply by the 24th. But without 
-:. waiting for this, on the 23rd, the Prince of Noer and a few 
others constituted themselves into a revolutionary Provisional 
Government, and sent off a request to Prussia for armed assis- 
tance against Denmark. 
Meantime, on March 22nd, the inhabitants of Copenha- 
gen had presented a petition to the king, asking for a change 
of ministry. The king consented. The ministers resigned, 
and were succeeded by a more democratic cabinets t 
1421X at +o To this fell the duty of replying to 
the 
the Schleswig- Holstein demands. It promised that Slesvig 
should receive a democratic constitution, and that Denmark 
would give her loyal support to the new Frankfort Assembly 
f,9 in its effort to establish a unitedjiberal Germany, while 
Holstein should be an independent German federal state; but 
it absolutely refused to allow Slesvig to enter the German 
Confederation, and pronounced her indissolubly united to 
Denmark. 
By the time this reply reached Rendsburg, Holstein 
was in insurrection. The Holsteiners themselves did not admit 
this; they declared that they were not in rebellion, but 
were defending the king, who was acting under constraint, 
against "the Copenhagen insurgents", and the change of ministry, 
(which had taken place without so much as'a broken window), 
was immediately christened by the Germans "the Copenhagen 
Revolution" . We may suppose that the King of Denmark was 
scarcely grateful to his loyal Holsteiners, when a Prussian 
army crossed his frontiers, and the Diet passed a resolution 
incorporating Slesvig with Germany.` Slesvigt t ael anked 
-fie. 
aei.ghbaw -- for -rnot4141kg, boa peasant conscripts joined 
their Danish units without orders, often bringing with them 
as prisoners the Germanophil officials who had tried to prevent 
them. 
It is not needful to give a detailed account of the 
war/ 
war. The Prussians and Holsteiners together largely out- 
numbered the Danes, overran Slesvig, and even invaded Jutland. 
Denmark, however, appealed to the European powers, and under 
-pressure from Russia and Great Britain, Prussia consented to 
an armistice, and finally - after the Danish fleet had blocka- 
ded her coast - to a peace. The rebels, though still supplied 
with Prussian munitions and led by Prussian officers, were 
now quickly swept out of Slesvig. Rut Denmark could not 
follow up her victory by a descent into Holstein, for the 
peace treaty with Prussia had included a clause by which 
Denmark bound herselfVto apply to the German Confederation 
to restore order in Holstein, instead of doing so herself. 
Nt4 o Dan 8o-iAier dared cross- -the-frontié; 
This flung the unfortunate little state into a 
whole series of new difficulties. She could not pacify Hol- 
stein herself, and several months elapsed before she could 
induce the German Powers to move. At length a mixed force 
of Prussians and Austrians entered Holstein to restore order. 
Possibly they did so. But once in, the difficulty was to 
get them out again. They settled down comfortably in the 
duchy, and refused to stir until Denmark gave her consent to 
certain demands which they pressed upon her. 
These/ 
It 
seems certain that the expression 'pourra réclamer' in 
the treaty was understood as implying an absolute obligation 
on the part of Denmark. See avi4. Gosch, Denmark and Geeltarry 
_sin WmParR, Appendix. 
These events had occupied some three years, and 
during this time, the political situation had gradually changed. 
The premature and feverish outbreak of liberalism in Germany 
had subsided: the liberal leaders had shown themselves un- 
certain and incapable. The National Assembly gradually faded 
out of existence, in the manner of the Cheshire Cat, leaving, 
not its grin but its voice, to the last. Soon reaction was 
in full swing. The old governments were restored in every 
state, and in this St. Martin's Summer of absolutism, the 
leadership of. Germany fell naturally into the hands of the 
arch -tyrant, Austria. Prussia, having brought herself into 
universal contempt by irresolution selfishness, fell 
into the background. Thus chance had brought Denmark face to 
facevwith a new protagonist. Austria had had no\original 
concern with the Holstein revolt, and the demands she now 
made curiously differ from, and still more curiously resemble, 
those of the German nationalists. 
Austria, of course, did not care a straw about the 
nationalist aspirations of Holstein, and it is not to be sup- 
posed that her cultured and intelligent statesmen had any 
illusions about the nature of the "indissoluble tie ". But 
Austria was intensely interested as to the form of government 
to be established in the two duchies. Denmark had now one of 
the / 
the most liberal constitutions in Europe, and it was all - 
important for Austria to prevent this constitution from 
being re- extended to the duchies. A German population, on 
the very frontiers of the Confederation, enjoying all the 
privileges of a free and democratic government, would be a 
pernicious example to the German states, where despotism had 
been restored. Austria's traditional policy was the negation 
of liberalism, and she'could never permit this. 
Denmark, in the meantime, was very unpleasantly 
placed. The other great powers were tired of the matter, 
and would not listen to her complaints. She had just emerged 
from a war that had lasted several years. One of her provinces 
was occupied by foreign troops, and she was deprived of all 
its revenues. 't was In addition to this,:'absolutely neces- 
sary for her to obtain the consent of the powers to some 
settlement of the succession to the throne. In the circum- 
stances, therefore, Austria and Prussia (for the latter now 
followed in Austria's train) were able literally to starve 
her into submission to their demands. 
The Austro- Danish negotiations, together with the 
treaty afterwards signed at London, ended the first phase of 
the Slesvig Holstein Question. All legal and political con - 
Cc,troversies were swept aside, and a new and definite foundation 
fo /V 
for future developement was laid. It is then necessary to 
understand clearly what the settlement of 1852 was. 
It was double in character: it consisted, first, 
of the private arrangements made between Denmark and the 
German powers, which were not embodied in any official docu- 
ment, but existed only in the form of dispatches exchanged 
between thezrespective governments; and second, of the Treaty 
of London, an authentic international engagement and part 
of the public law of. Europe. 
The significant portion of the Austro- Danish cor- 
respondence is dated December, 1851, and January, 1852. Den- 
U mark first expresses her intention of taking certain steps to 
oblige her "high allies ", as the German powers are euphemibrt44ty 
termed. She undertakes:- 
1. To gövern Slesvig and Holstein absolutely, with the 
assistance of their Estates, until a representative 
constitution for the whole monarchy be prepared, 
again with the assistance of the estates of each 
province. 
2. Not to incorporate Slesvig. 
3. To preserve the "nexus socialis ", etc., intact. 
4. To abolish the administrative connection between 
Slesvig and Holstein, so far as it existed before 
1848. 
5. All this will only be done on condition that "the 
Federal Diet abstains from any and every pretension 
to anvauthority over or in regard to the Danish 
Orownland Slesvig". 
. Details of the proposed constitution are given. The 
navy, customs, and post office, War, Finance, and 
Foreign Affairs, are to be in the hands of ministers 
for common affairs, responsible to the King or the 
Rigsdag; certain local financial, commercial, and 
legal affairs,are to be in the hands of a minister 
for Slesvig and of another for Holstein. 
Austria' -s reply commences with some fatherly advice. 
She is "of opinion that a plan of organization, overburdened 
with representative estates and with ministerial responsibility 
L3 - would cause no less - nay, perhaps much greater difficulties 
to the Government ". She goes on to say that she expects the 
King of Denmark "to preserve, by appropriate arrangements, 
to all the various parts of the country, the portion which 
belongs to them as members of a whole, in which no part is 
subordinated to another ". She demands "the maintenance of 
separate political and administrative institutions -in the 
different parts of the country, without prejudice to the 
combined government of common affairs in the centre ". She 
hopes "that the Danish Government will perhaps not give an 
exclusive preference to those institutions which have been 
04-bestowed upon the kingdom of Denmark Proper in recent years" 
- i.e., the new democratic constitutior of Denmark must not 
be used as a model for the proposed general constitution. If 
Denmark will accept her version of the Danish offers, Austria 
will sign the Treaty of London, guarantee the Danish Succession, 
and 
and evacuate Holstein. She then states how she interprets 
the Danish despatch. She agrees to most of the details, and 
in particular she consents to the complete separation of 
Slesvig and Holstein. She approves the intention of preserv- 
ing the provincial estates, and of establishing an "organic 
and homogeneous" constitution for common affairs. All her 
4 concern is that this constitution shall not be of a too 
,ibera.l nature. 
Denmark accepted the Austrian dispatch; and it was 
thereupon assented to by Prussia, and by the German Diet in 
a federal resolution. Holstein was evacuated, and Austria 
and Prussia signed the Treaty of London. 
The Treaty of London had reference only to the 
Danish succession. By it the great powers recognised the 
integrity of the Danish monarchy as a necessary constituent 
of the balance of power in Europe, and recognised as heir 
Prince Christian of Glücksburg. This gentleman was the only 
Li .candidate remaining in the field. The heirs in the female 
line, the house of Hesse, had resigned their pretensions in 
his favour, and the Duke of Augustenburg had forfeited what 
'rights he ever had by his share in the Holstein rebellion. 
As a precaution, he also was induced to resign his claim, 
the statesman who conducted the negotiations with him being 
Otto 
Prussia assented to these views, laying particular emphasis 
on the last point. 
129. 
ntto von Bismarck. Augustenburg was generously treated: though 
his Danish estates were forfeit through his treason, he received 
the sum of £400,000 as compensation, and in return he declared: 
"Te moreover promise, for ourself and our faraily, by our prince' - 
ly word and honour, not to undertake anything whereby the tran- 
quillity of His Majesty's dominions and lands might be disturbed 
nor in any way to counteract the resolutions which His Majesty 
might.t.take ih reference to t'he...successio.n Of all the lands 
united under His s Ma j,esty' s sceptre, or to the eventual organis- 
7) 
at ion Of his monarchy." 
v 
The Treaty of London was signed 'oy six "xerruan states-- - 
Austria, Prussia, Hanóver, Saxony, i "'urtemberg, and Electoral 
Hesse. Bavaria, Baden, Hesse -?Darmstadt, Mecklenburg, and Saxe - 
Teimma.r refused to sign. The Diet was not invited to do so. 
Immediately afterwards the Ting of Denmark abolished the 
"Lex kegia, " assimilated the 1a17 of succession in Denmark proper 
to that of the Duchies, and declared prince Christian of 
Slesvig -Holet ein -Sonderburg- G-lizcksburg his heir. 
7) Six yeLo's after the money had been paid over, the ?; 'uke' s two 
sons protested against the renunciation, and declared that as 
they had been of -age at the time the words "our family" did not, include them. There can be no doubt, however, that in 1852 the 
European powers regarded the Duke's engagement as a definite renunciation of all claim to the succession, binding an himself* 
and all his descendants, and that his sons must have been aware 
that it was so understood. 
IIb 
130. 
It has been seen from this ac cou?jt that the settlement. of 
1852 made no attempt to grapple With the real difficulty of 
the situation. The succession was only one part of the Danish 
question, but it was the only one to which reference was made 
in the Treaty of London. Apart from this, the position of the 
duchies was left unchanged, and all the vicious anomalies of ter 
past were preserved. Holstein still held the double position of 
a ! er!an and a Danish territory, and the rrerma n Con.f edera tiori 
still had the right of meddling with Denmark's internal affairs. 
rn one respect, matters were changed for the worse: Denmark 
was now under an obligation towards Germany with regard, not 
only to German Holstein, but to the purely Danish province of 
Slesvig. 
The reactionary and unimaginative character ofthe' London 
Treaty is surprising when it is remembered that the same mind 
was responsible for both this treaty and that which had created 
Belgium a few years before. Though the London Treaty was actual* 
ly signed by Lord laimesbur'y, it embodied 
,;_ 
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embodied the policy of the late Russell- Palmerston government. 
But the moods of Palmerston were incalculable. From the 
beginning he had found the Danish question a bore.` He was 
enjoying himself too much, writing indj.3creet letters to 
France and quarrelling with Prince Albert, to have time to 
spare for that dull and troublesome Baltic problem. The 
quickest way to settle things was to finish off this stupid 
succession affair, and for the rest - magic word to English 
ears; - compromise: There have been far too many territorial 
'°D changes in Europe lately; we can't have the atlas turned 
topsy -turvy. 
Every earnest and unbiassed observer could by this 
time see that there was only one solution that had any chance 
of success; to use the surgeon' S knife. Definitely to 
separate the duchies: to give Holstein in full sovereignty 
to the German Confederation and allow Denmark in return a 
free hand to incorporate Slesvig and reclaim its partly 
Germanized population - in 1852 this might have ended the 
quarrel. There were still ten years to run before the new 
statesmanship began its course in Prussia, and in those ten 
'\(2. years, with all friction removed, Denmark and Germany might 
have become resigned to the situation. Without the spirit 
of German nationalism, and the private agreement of 1852, as 
his 
See the curious tale in Malmesbury's "Memoirs of an ex- 
Minister", p. 181-2. 
his tools, Bismarck would have found it a harder matter to 
force a war on Denmark, and harder yet to make Austria act 
0? with him. 
-Wee such -a solution possible? The Eider- Danes had. 
few-illusions, and wou d--nut` have hesitated at so desperate 
---- remedy; they c -have forced their policy on the king. 
Germ l -h'ave been ready enough to -accept Holstein -, -and 
__ve.sti- -e --of- excuse to meddle -with-Danish- affaj ßu.1-ä 
^f 14 have bee ~eft to her -,--- Nationalism wou1 - -- have --no- 4ev-ance 
The opportunity to settle the Danish question by 
international arbitration was lost: but Denmark was left de- 
termined to settle it for herself. While the government of 
the day made an honest attempt to cope with the situation 
as it stood, and fulfil the engagements contracted towards 
Germany, there was growing up among the people a deep con- 
viction that the state of affairs was intolerable, and must 
be ended at all costs. Had Germany 1oval1y accepted the 
1 .loyal endeavours of the Danish government, that government 
might have succeeded in carrying its policy through in spite 
of popular opinion: but on the contrary, the one object of 
Germany and of the Holsteiners was to hinder and to counter- 
act the efforts They had no desire for 
a/ 
a peaceful settlement in the duchies. They wanted to keep the 
raw wound open, that at any fortunate moment they might have 
excuse to cry again, that the iè- be their arbiter. 
The first proceeding of the Holstein estates was not 
encouraging. Holstein, like Germany, was experiencing a re- 
Ito- action, and the estates passed a resolution affirming that 
the only way to obtain satisfactory results was to re- intro- 
r 
duce absolute government in all parts of the monarchy. 
route- proceed :61-esit- fit , 
t,.he i- ou,g --c ar- The Danish government, 
however, if it owed a duty to Germany, owed one also to the 
Danish people, and the helpful" suggestion of Holstein was 
not adopted. 
The administration of Denmark was now in an extra- 
ordinary condition. The original very democratic constitution 
was in force in Denmark Proper, whereas the duchies had lapsed 
'if. to the old law of 1831. Thus it happened that the govern- 
ment consisted of three ministers for Denmark Proper, who 
were responsible only to the Rigsdag; a minister for Slesvig 
and one for Holstein, responsible only to the King; and four 
ministers for coiaron affairs, responsible both to the King 
and to the Rigsdag. Denmark was therefore quite as anxious 
as Germany could be to establish the common constitution 
agreed/ 
C\)4 , 
Ihe C{ecmang 111 ThcDuch;Qs Could have11ed 1or ¢ happe Vncle the sce0.re oa 
,Ddn shw16 buL''l'wAs 1'halv11iey sHouid submir-So anY \enq, ti.oThe kk)e- 
ec:, tl.ISl\ ?ttia S s o aax,rnpn (E1. yo() Iti)ol+ke ru b;s brothpv . iseNérs Y01.1).-) 
agreed upon. But many difficulties stood in the way. For 
example, it had been promised that the new constitution 
should be drawn up with the help of the provincial estates: 
1g but the estates of the duchies had only the consultative 
rights granted in 1831, while the kingdom had a deliberative 
right under the last constitution, and thus would have had 
a very unfair advantage. Again, it would have been almost 
impossible to get the i.beral Riksdag of the kingdom to 
curtail its new freedom, and yet that must be done, if the 
constitution was to please Austria. It was therefore deter- 
mined, after several failures, to ignore the estates, and to 
prepare a constitution without their assistance. In 1855 
the final draft was ready. It left the provincial estates 
much as they were, except that it gave them a deliberative 
TQ vote on the points where they already had a consultative 
vote. Church, education, justice, and certain financial 
matters were completely under their control, and for common 
affairs a new rigsraad was introduced, with limited powers - 
it was partly elected and partly nominated by the king, and 
had no initiative in legislation. The chief author of this 
scheme, Schele, was himself a Holsteiner. 
Slesvig and Holstein each obtained a degree of 
self- government far exceeding anything that they had previously 
possessed/ 
possessed, and their influence in the direction of common 
affairs was equally extended. It might have been supposed 
0 that Holstein and her friends would have been pleased by this: 
far from it. The constitution -makers in Copenhagen found 
themselves assailed with a storm of abuse, and Schele was 
denounced as a renegade. It is unnecessary to specify all 
the complaints of the German party, which were of the most 
frivolous nature. In the end, after Holstein and the Diet 
had rejected áll the concessions patiently offered by the 
Danish Government, the Diet finally, in 1858, declared that 
the Constitution was not valid in Holstein and Lauenburg, 
on the grounds that it had not been submitted to the approval 
of the Holstein estates, and so was contrary to the agree- 
ment of 1852. Denmark at last revoked the unlucky'constitution, 
as far as the German duchies were concerned; and laid it, 
and also a new and much more iberal charter, before the 
Holstein estates for their amendment. Holstein refused to 
consider this offer, and demanded the restoration of the old 
connection with Slesvig.- Then they drew up their ideal 
constitution: the connection with the central government was 
to be reduced to the most slender tie possible, while Hol- 
stein and Slesvig were to be closely united; Denmark was to 
continue/ 
1 
N' 'J) This would, of course, have been equally a violation of the 
Agreement of 1852. 
It b. 
continue to pay two- thirds of the common expenses, but each 
of the duchies was to have an equal voice in expenditure. 
At the same time Germany formulated her demands. 
The Danish Government had, as has been seen, engaged itself 
to give the four provinces an equal influence in common af- 
fairs, and had given each duchy a number of representatives 
in the central assembly, in proportion to its population. 
Germany, however, interpreted the clause as meaning that the 
vote of each duchy should be equal to that of Denmark Proper 
- that little Lauenburg, with her poor 50,000, should have 
the same authority in questions of war and peace and national 
expenditure, as Denmark with her 2,000,000 souls and she 
demanded that until the constitution was altered in consonance 
with this principle, no law affecting common affairs was to 
be passed without the consent of the Holstein estates. (T-he 
C man _m-i-ne try - --- was praet-iearty-t -eontrol- all the affairs 
at-the-Danish monarchy. Needless to say, this idea was ab- 
solutely repudiated by Ministers Hall, who was now at the 
head of affairs in Copenhagen. 
So the Diet stormed, regardless of the protests 
of the Danish and Dutch Plenipotentiaries: Holstein consist- 
ently rejected every proposal of any nature whatever that 
u- was laid before herVby Denmark; and Denmark found herself 
deprived of the revenues of Holstein, unable to pass a 
single 
single law on common affairs, and threatened with another 
federal execution if she did not immediately comply with 
Germany's demands. She therefore decided to try her luck 
with a new constitution. 
In March, 1861 she presented to Holstein a Charter 
granting a free press, freedom of association, Habeas Corpus, 
and responsibility of officials to ordinary tribunals. No 
German state had a constitution so liberal or so progressive. 
Holstein refused it with abusive language, refused to propose 
6 any alternative, and sulkily said that there could be no 
peace till Slesvig was a part of the German Confederation. 
Germany herself was determined that the principle- t f- represen- 
Cation according-to-population must be set aside' Meanwhile 
a second subject of complaint had roused acute feeling through 
all the Confederation.. -T- 
7s was what was known a "Danish oppression" in 
Slesvig. After the rebellion of 1848, Denmark had taken 
measures to punish the leaders of the German party which were 
too severe to be approved by the Western Powers, though 
Germany, in view of conditions in Poland, could not logically 
. protest against them. No one had been executed, but there 
had been floggings and imprisonments. This time was long 
Past; but since then, pro -German officials had been dismissed, 
and newspapers and public meetings which advocated the annex- 
ation of Slesvig to Germany had been sternly suppressed. 
Danish 
Danish. had been reintroduced into a number of schools and 
churches in the Mixed Districts, and this had probably 
happened in some parishes where the language chiefly spoken 
was German. ¡Apart__ om._the fact that Danish is a simple 
langueetri -w _iC2r can Ùe ieafhed y a German or an- Englishman 
in afew m .t his was exactly what the Schleswig -Holstein 
Kq. Party had done 
v 
in Danish villages a few years earlier; and 
therefore ought -not -to have been termed "oppression" by 
them: but it is peculiarly irritating to have your own 
weapons turned against yourself. 
Germany had no more legal right to interfere with 
the 1)overnment of Slesvig, than France would have to 
interfere with the British administration in Quebec: but an 
incident in the negotiations of 1á5l -2 had given Germany 
a chance to manufacture such a claim. In accepting the 
Austrian terms, Denmark had sent to Austria, as proof of her 
willingness to fulfil her pledge, the copy of a public pro - 
v 
e clamation, which declared the King's intention of taking the 
constitutional steps demanded by Austria. The proclamation 
also contained references to other affairs, and included an 
expression of the King's desire to give "equal rights" to 
his German and Danish subjects in Slesvig. Seizing upon 
this clause, Germany maintained that Denmark had thereby made 
this Promise to her and so had given her a right to inter- 
fere upon this point.) Thata had never been any mention of 
this/ 
13.4. 
tia 8- question- -fie - -- terms - proposed -by Austria and accepted 
by-- Denmark, nor was the demand one which Austria was likely 
to -- .bring forward; and on the chance reference to it in the 
Dalli$11-----Proelamation rested the whole German claim to inter - 
i. It proved, however, remarkably useful to those who 
were directing the policy of Germany. Ijt was a point unim- 
portant in itself, .but which could be used 'with the most 
po-waifu1 B.ffaat-in-arousing popular feeling) On constitutional 
and dynastic matters German feeling was divided, but on this 
point all were united. A nationalist crusade could be raised, 
almost at a moment's notice, and political and military 
ambition could always shelter itself under the cloak of 
QO racial feeling. Soon in a thousand German tears were 
being shed for the oppressed Slesvigers. In other countries, 
too, the question was skilfully pressed upon the attention 
of the government I rnt -Britain feeling could a' t_.be 
- le- Napol constituted_ 
156"diAT ="Inp f of ñ tTö t In both these 
states Germany used this weapon -with- e-f -eot. She implanted 
a thorn in the conscience of. the British Liberal leaders, 
which, by rendering them doubtful of their own consistency 
and less sympathetic towards Denmark, did her infinite service. 
The/ 
auded the renaissance of Italy could not 
CO. but- feel, that if. the German allegations with regard to 
op rassion in Slesvig were true, they were, in supporting 
Denmark, running contrary to their own expressed convictions; 
and their Danish policy became so much the less whole -hearted 
4i!!!_were-4403.2_ 
t 
btfu .. , .e, whether Germany had not 
rig4t--on her--sfde-reen-ten 
aegem ent s of 1551- i-tiad--noa - . - - - - A nd _--.o.t_this 
hat-- the const itutional.--en- 
point-Germany's case was cent airily --mush -- st-rongej 
The significance of the steps taken by Denmark 
between 1852 and 1863 had been much debated. Germany at 
the time, and German and other historians since, maintained 
Q`-'.that they amounted to a repudiation of Denmark's obligations, 
and to the incorporation of Slesivg. But Denmark and her 
friends averred that none of the constitutional schemes 
brought forward during this p ̂ riod involved or even tended 
towards the incorporation of Slesvig. They all left Slesvig 
with local institutions, legislature, law -courts, and executive. 
They also provided that Slesvig send members to a central 
9Y 
Parliament Or R igsraad to decide on common affairs; but how 
else could the national government be carried on? "The-I-ink 
441hieh ac the - reoer t-- Constitutjon-, - -- unites Austria 
and llung&ry i -el actly of the -same nature. Is Hungary on that 
account 
14f . 
Q3. account` incorporated into Austri It ¡is precisely the tie 
which unites Ohio and Pennsylvania. Would it be correct to 
say that Ohio was incorporated into Pennsylvania ? "* 
''Lich side is correct in its estimate of the Danish 
legislation? We must at once reply, Germany. frm"errtm-Ur 
th Uments of the Dana, - .n spite of the fact that the 
various constitutions on the face of them preserve Slesvig's 
independence, Germany was right when she maintained that Denraxc 
had UroKen her pledges, and that the Danish incorporation 
of Slesvig had begun. All the draft constitutions tended to 
Q4- this, and in that of 1863 it was certainly the object of the 
Hall Ministry, even if publicly denied. The key to the whole 
matter lies not in the position assigned to Slesvig but in 
that assigned to Holstein. Now in almost all the proposed 
schemes Holstein, ) owing to her own refusal, was not 
represented in the central Rigsraad. Any constitutional con- 
nection which included Slesvig and excluded Holstein must 
inevitably, by sheer force of gravity, draw the two Danish 
countries together, and widen the gulf between them and their 
German neighbour. The German minority in 89m6k Slesvig 
would soon be absorbed, when all their interests and ambitions 
V.shouldturn naturally towards Copenhagen. More, it is almost 
certain/ 
Salisbury, Essays) ? . /J6. 
certain that Danish statesmen were fully conscious of this 
tendency, and had indeed this for their chief. object. In 
self.- defence, they denied this. But it was an open secret 
in which the whole Danish people participated, and by 1863 it 
was frankly admitted in the newspapers, though still dis- 
claimed by the government. 
Now it is a dangerous thing for a small country 
to break a promise to a big one. What induced Danish states- 
,fin men to take this perilous and doubtful path? 
They were forced into it -one --may- -answer by 
q(c. Danish public opinion; ,'ut they shared this opinion in 
full, themselves. There was, in fact, in Denmark an extra- 
ordinary unity of feeling upon this point. King, ministers, 
and commons, were animated by the same desire. Nationalism, 
after all, is not confined to Germany; it was showing itself 
quite as strongly in Denmark; and in this Danish statesmen 
found their justification and their support. 
A conviction was growing up in the breast of every 
Danish man and woman that the situation was no longer to be 
borne. If Holstein meant the German connection, Holstein 
G°1. might go; but not for any consideration on earth must Den- 
mark continue to allow to a foreign state the right to meddle 
with her private affairs. Denmark had contracted engagements 
towards/ 
towards Germany, but they were engagements which should never 
have been signed, and which no patriotic Dane could keep. 
BY them,¡ Denmark was fettered hand and foot. While every 
European country was consolidating its position, strengthen - 
ing its organisation, and drawing closer the bonds which 
united its people, Denmark alone was to remain weak, disunited, 
defenceless; hampered by an unworkable system of government, 
and obliged to submit to the dictation of a rich and power- 
IQ ful neighbour. he muet make no attempt to reclaim her 
Danish subjects take into'her heart-her-lost- province, or to 
-obliterate the old artificial local boundaries. The Unity, 
which was the cry of half the races of Europe, was forbidden 
to her - and this by the decree of a foreign power: Moral- 
ists-have decided that on an individual an oath exacte by 
ce is -- -not binding; the same excuse is denied to a nation, 
Denmark and Germany were, in fact, in the precise situation 
described in the third act of. "Hernani ",A`1.n this case Her - 
nani determined not to commit suicide. ,antleman 
qq. was correbpöndingly annoyed. 
There were men in Scandinavia who clearly under- 
stood that the key to the situation was to be found, not in 
any treaty or agreement of the past, but in the hankering 
of Germany to possess Kiel. German politicians themselves 
be2'an/ 
began to admit frankly, that no step taken by the Danish 
government to fulfil the engagements of 1852, however sincere 
it might be, would now satisfy the Confederation. The Baltic 
ports, and not the good government of the duchies, was dear- 
est to the German heart, it was said. And so in the North 
'D.the idea grew up of the possibility of a counter -balancing 
state on the Baltic - a united Scandinavian state which would 
re- establish a Northern sea -power perhaps more formidable 
than the empire of the Vasas - a state strong enough to defy 
Germany. This idea, deprecated but insidious, was whispered 
all over the North - all over Europe. Russia was alarmed; 
Britain was alarmed. In Stockholm the prudent Manderström, 
in Copenhagen the enthusiastic Hall, secretly weighed the 
project. One man flung himself into it heart and soul. 
Hamilton, Swedish ambassador at Copenhagen, urged upon his 
government the wisdom of a close alliance with Denmark, and 
oI.it seems that he regarded this as the first step to a Scan- 
dinavian union. 
These schemes were not yet acknowledged by any of 
the governments concerned; but they showed that Denmark, in 
adopting a strong nationalist policy, might count on support 
abroad. They showed, too, the strength of popular feeling. 
Any government that deliberately ran counter to the Eider - 
D ane/ 
144. 
Eider -Dane policy, and tried to fulfil the demands of Ger- 
many, would have short shrift with the Danish people when 
it carne to election day. 
We have now reached, indeed slightly passed, the 
year in which this study is supposed to begin. The situation 
in Denmark and Germany in 1860 has been described. Immediately 
afterwards, it was essentially altered by several events. 
The formation of a united Italy gave the signal for a new 
outbreak of Liberal Nationalism; and shortly afterwards 
European Liberalism suffered an irreparable loss by the 
death of Cavour, the only Statesman who was the equal of Bis- 
marck in perception, capacity, and courage. Cavour had 
adopted liberal principles where Bismarck rejected them, and 
if, as is very possible, the two had been pitted against each 
other, what a battle of the Titans would have ensued: We can 
Picture that bland beneficent countenance, with its pussy - 
103.cat Machiavellian air, in opposition to the grand aquiline 
head of the Prussian reactionary. But the premature death 
of Cavour rid Bismarck of the only man able to outface him, 
and depriveaLiberalism of its great leader, at the very moment 
when it was gathering its forces for a new struggle. 
At the same time, the death of the King of Prussia 
called to the throne a new sovereign, in whom a mixture of 
weakness 
144 
weakness and obstinacy* made him an admirable tool in the 
hands of the man who presently became his first minister. 
1()b-The way was now opened for a change of policy on the part of 
Prussia, and she found herself facing a crisis. The Liberals 
expected the king to give way to them, and make Prussia a 
constitutional monarchy on the English model, which would 
soon merge in a new united Germany of the same type. King 
William found himself forced to choose between thus abdicating 
his absolute power, or making a determined stand against the 
growing strength of liberalism. For a time he wavered; a 
constitutional crisis made the decision instantly necessary. 
The king faced the thought of abdication) of death at the 
v 
ßo5. hands of a revolutionary mob. To him, in this aow3. of 
somewhat exaggerated despair, came a diplomatist, a known con- 
servative and reactionary, who had never held a ministerial 
post, but who told the king that he was ready to fight to the 
last, preserve the royal authority intact, and smash th4iberal 
oppòsitiOn. The king yielded to the stronger mind, and an 
astonished Europe saw Otto von Bismarck suddenly promoted 
from the embassy at Paris to the first office of the Prussian 
state. Slowly, imperceptibly to the outside eye, the lead- 
ership of German affairs shifted: Austria, the Diet, the 
Liberal leaders, became equally insignificant. Bismarck was 
uflthering/ 
`t 
or, as Syb-1 says, his "rare combination of firmness and 
flexibility of mind" ( 
., 
es°°-Deti s 4i 
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gathering the reins into his own hands. 
This new development coincided with a resolve on 
the part of the Danish government to make a bold stroke and 
carry the Eider -Dane policy at all costs. It coincided, too, 
with a growing impatience on the part of the British govern- 
ment to see this troublesome dragging business settled. A 
crisis was rapidly approaching for all parties were eager to 
end the uncertainty. (It is now necessary to see who were 
the_British leaders whose duty it was to deal with the situ- 
ation. 
148. 
The Cabinet of London was at this time one of the most, 
brilliant. ever seem a veritable Ministry -of -all- the -Talents. 011. 
The wise had been sceptical as to its long life, for this very - 
reason. It included nines eminent in ever:, branch of politics, 
but in foreign affairs the most significant were those of the 
Prime ,'sinister, Lord Palmerston; the :Foreign Secretary, Lord 
john '_nussell, now _Lord }- ìussell; and the President of the CoTanôi7 
Lard Granville. 
These gentlemen, known to their contemporaries as Cupid, 
Johnny, and Puss, were in foreign affairs the guiding influences 
of the Cabinet. The others, on such questions, were mostly con- 
tent to range themselves behind one or other of these leaders. 
No-of the'' riree were veterans of politics - - -- children of the 
old aristocracy, and survivors of the European mar: but, as we 
read of their express and rr nifold energy, it is hard to realise 
this. These greybeards kept some spice of eternal youth. Watch- 
ing- them, one is reminded of the terrific Massinissa, or of 
olò Penda 
swinging his battle -axe on the red !.Vinwedfield, and one feels 
that England was a political Never -Never -Land, peopled with 
Peter Pans. 
John Russell was the younger of the two. His is 
a name great in British history, revered fb -4hose -- who-- -rerr- 
ee -- -ita for purity and nobility, and appealing to the com- 
mon mind by some more earthly qualities. Be was plucky and 
obstinate, the sickly little gentleman, with his pale face and 
great forehead. He was conscientious; capable of self- sacri- 
v 
":3 fice. But he was, perhaps, of all living statesmen the most 
incapable of the conduct of foreign affairs. He was able, 
for one thing, to see that there may be two sides to a question, 
and this is a dangerous quality for a statesman not dowered 
with corresponding steadiness of purpose: and Lord Russell 
was as changeable as a weathercock. He was at the mercy of 
every fresh opinion that entered his receptive mind. Also, 
being of an extraordinarily active and meddling disposition, 
he was in the habit of acting immediately under each new 
influence, before giving his thowhts time to settle and 
LL mature. "Johnny always loves to do something when to do 
t3 nothing is pruden " a friend wrote of him. And /his policy 
was therefore apt to veer and tack and stagger like a rook 
flying against the wind. 
Neither/ 
bc.1 CI own d.rr, 14$1 ) Clarendon to Cornewall Lewis, 24.16.62. Merxire^n., p.265. 
Neither had he any conception of minding his own 
business. He believed he had a duty towards his neighbours; 
the time was out of joint, and Lord Russell, decidedly, had 
been born to set it right. His position at the Foreign 
Office gave him an unrivalled opportunity to interfere with 
other people's affairs. Benighted foreign governments should 
at least no longer err through ignorance. (le-would show them 
the- better wa) He could not understand that foreign states- 
men might not always be ready to receive his advice in the 
spirit in which it was offered; but such was the case. All 
the European powers, when not forced by circumstances to 
cringe to their wealthy neighbour, repudiated the kind in- 
terest of Lord Russell with coldness - nay, even with rage 
and contempt. This was partly, perhaps, due to the language 
he frequently employed. He was in private life the most 
tactless of men; and he had picked up an occasional practice 
(0 . of Palmerston's of addressing foreign powers in the same 
manner as Imperial Rome might have used to some petty Asiatic 
client: the combination often resulted in an unparalleled 
insolence. 
de-sharedy-tree-, one of the most serious defects -o 
-stategaan ii -in -- foreign affairs. He had been trained 
in-a-- school-whose attitude in such matters, when°not -un r- 
the 
the influence of some specially able individual, was one of 
Drift; and he was now. almost incapable of following out one 
line. - of thought, or of drawing up and holding to a definite 
scheme- , - -He, like so many other Foreign Secretaries, was most 
.Ì at -ease when waiting for something to turn up, and found it 
easy to let accident decide his course at every doubtful 
moment. 'e attitude was not incompatible with a deference 
Finally, Lord Russell was an adept in the favourite 
amusement of the White Queen. This lady, it will be remember- 
ed, could believe six impossible things before breakfast. 
Lord Russell, at seventy, could believe almost anything that 
suited his convenience. In this way he protected himself 
from some memories that might else have been rather unpleasant. 
Joined in office with this man was the strange in- 
dividual who for many years had been the Enfant Terrible of 
Europe. Palmerston was his old self still, incalculable as 
ever. Time had not staled his infinite variety. But the` 
Passing years, and perhaps one or two regrettable incidents, 
had slightly blunted his pugnacity and sweetened his temper. 
And notwithstanding the debonnaire courage with which he bore 
his eighty years, he could not keep all his old barbaric 
energy. In his prime, flashes of genius had alternated with 
fits/ 
fits of lassitude and levity that made the first shine more 
brilliantly. But no man can afford deliberately to neglect 
his own powers; and Palmerston's laziness and wastefulness 
2 had tarnished the brightness of his intellect and keenness 
of his perceptions, just as much as old age had lessened his 
2, 
energy. He could still see more clearly than many of his 
contemporaries; but not so clearly as once. He could still 
conceive a strong and determined policy; but he no longer 
had the mere physical energy, or the rollicking self -con- 
fidence, to carry that policy through single- handed against 
general opposition. 
These two represented Morier's "overlapping genera - 
tion ". Granville, the President of the Council, was a man 
of the younger set. In comparison with the two octogenarians, 
10 he was a mere boy, having completed but some fifty summers, 
which had, indeed, left him/Some of the endearing chubbiness 
of infancy. Yet he had long attained a sobriety, a sedate 





political changeling. Malignant fate 
.14A- 'L k.14A- ,..J lw G L ,,,t, J4 , f 
orn-* little Lib- er -al "', when all the 
tendencies of his nature were in another direction. His 
cautious, tenacious, and unapprehensive mind would have made 
him a strong tower to the most rigid and narrow section of 
the 
the Old Tory. party, - --now almost extinct=--had not fortune, 
in. playíufi mood, directed trie stork to the stateliest of 
0 .Wig mansions. As it was,_ though he adopted. trie-Liberal try 
princplea,. rie was at heart a, pure Conservative, if we regard- 
these two parties as representing not merely -trie temporary 
tendencies. of the day, but the deep- rooted criaracteristics, 
of the mind. The imptiïse of the true Liberal is revolu= 
tionary- - discard the past-, and anticipate trie' gusts of trie 
future.. The impulse of the true Conservative, is to preserve - 
wriat has been gained, and face the future witri a "bear the 
ills we' have, than fly to others; that we know not of ", 
rather tnan any more hopeful. attitude. Granville, as has 
1 &. been said', was compelled by his environment` to adopt the' 
t` 
` 
leading Liberal principles.; but, once' adopted, he clung to 
them with a conservative obstinacy, and imparted to them a 
complete rigidity and permanence. He himself was accustomed 
to say with pride, that he had' been a convinced Free Trader 
before leaving school, and that rie had, during fifty years, 
never in the least degree modified his opinions. This was 
his attitude on most points; he did not correct his early 
impressions- the experiences of his life. In foreign 
affairs, his: pu icy was directed by ideas formed in the days 
13, of his boyhood, 
Conscientiously devoted 
1'4. 
to his party, he constituted himself a brake on the 
wheels of Palmerston and Russell. He possessed a fund of 
tactful. and unassuming obstinacy that made him a formidable 
foe. Where Russell found any sort of action better than none, 
Granville invariably preferred an attitude of non-inter- 
ference and cautious observation. He was a strong advocate 
of the theory that Britain should hold aloof, and allow her 
neighbours to settle their differences among themselves. 
It must be acknowledged at once that never had 
1,4, Britain a premier and a-foreign secretary more primed with 
good intentions, They wished well to all., Theytwanted to'`' 
preserve tne alliance cefr France; to foster tne growth of a 
united Italy; they smiled paternally on the- aspirations of 
Germany towards unity and liberty; they wished to all peace) 
prosperity (within reasonable limits))and a constitutional 
government on the English model. But,. with the natural 
preference of old age for the fireside,,. they deprecated aÏI 
violent action in the attainment of these ideals. Their 
wish to preserve peace was in fact so intense that, the wish 
i 'being father to the thought, they nad not yet realised the 
strength of the forces which were now making for war:` To'i 
the peace- lover, the idea that any statesman can deliberately 
choose to make war an essential factor in his policy, is so 
repellent/ 
repellent that the first impu.lse iá to reject it entirely. 
d- p ße°3 .,: c xrg --a-# nee 1843 ,L, 
the position of Denmark, and the position of Britain in 
supporting the Danish cause,. had been very favourable. Russia_ 
and France had both acted with Britain. Germany had been 
disunited in herself. The government of Prussia had. been 
IL.weak and incapable, and that of Austria inimical to the 
Nationalist movement in Germany. 
X By 1861, all these circumstances had changed,. The 
British government was at a: disadvantage in that it failed »-`_' 
to: realise how great: was this.cnange, and what had caused it. 
6v 
e JJ 
The central point in the whole affair was, of 
course, the establishment of the new regime in Prussia. 
This had met with universal disapproval. It had 
long been hoped that the new king would put a Liberal govern- 
ment, in power. Instead, rie had chosen a man,: of whom it was 
. only known that he had handled some minor diplomatic matters 
capably, and that he was a hardened reactionary. Otto von 
Bismarck was already unpopular with thinking Germany. The 
British government was disappointed at this 'failing away of 
King William, and was inclined .to. dislike and despise the 
new minister. It was. not believed that his ministry would 
last/ 
4 w1tL 
last more than a few months. He was a blunt,,outspoken, 
blustering sort of fellow, who, though he could be very 
attractive wren he liked, was also capable of vulgar humour 
and overbearing violence. At times rie would talk with 
crude' directness upon subjects which were alluded to by his. 
J 
If fellow- statesmen only by delicate insinuations. Sir Andrew 
Buchanan, British ambassador at Berlin, found this habit 
unpleasant, and he did not yet perceive that Bismarck's 
frankness migntvbe assumed for a purpose just as much as'c - -) 
the too great: politeness of some'of his neighbours.. For 
Englisrimen, the duplicity of the continental mind was 
personified in the suave and graceful figures of the 
generation, Metternicri and Taileyran'. They vaguely -felt 
tnat-a manso rude as Bismarck often was,simply couldn't be 
telling lies. The truth was,. that Bismarck had attained an 
artistic mastery over the lie never equalled by Metternich. 
He suited his manner of lying in every case to the taste of 
his audience. He lied, too, with the abandonment of the 
true'artist, without fear of the consequences:; so, long as' 
it served his turn for the moment,. he had not the least 
. 
objection to being exposed jn th- e=e - - -=x ure. He did not desire 
to,preserve a reputation for truth -telling, for ne was con - 
fident in his- own powers of deceiving again in the future; 
As/ 
1 
As yet, however, the British government did not regard him 
with any suspicion. His character of reactionary carried with 
ao . it a taint of violence and reckles;gness, and they did not 
think that such a man would have either the ability or the' 
patience to carry out a long-continued course of deception. coq. 
Bismarck could, indeed, be both violent and reckless where he,, 
thought it adviaabl -; but both these qualities were admirably 
controlled by his cool and keen intelligence. 
rev rte sóvereign u 16s 
office depended4iii4 who was obstinate and self -willed enough 
to be capable of giving him considerable trouble, especially 
as he possessed what Lord Napier, with unintentional felicity, 
called "an intermittent conscience," which was apt to awake 
at inconvenient moments. - ismarck had already established a 
personal ascendancy over the king's mind which he took much 
pains to preserve, managing him by methods a little resem- 
.hling those of Sarah Jennings with Queen Anne. He was, with 
all this, throughout the Danish trouble, involved in a con- 
stitutional crisis of the highest intensity at home. He was 
distrusted and despised by 
by the German governments,, and he was detested by the :ìber:ais.,; 
and especially by the Prussian Etiberals;. They refused him 
supplies., and he disregarded the law and took what he, needed_ 
He could count on no quarter from the Liberals if he failed. 
DelicateH as was his position at home, his 
difficuities::were even greater abroad. He had several tasks 
to perform. 
He had to transfer the leadership. of German affairs 
a3. from Austria, the Diet, and Prem the Liberal leaders to him- 
self. A cfiberal solution of the Slesvig- Holstein problem was 
above all repellent to him. He had rather, he said, let Den- 
mark incorporate, the duchies.. Such a solution seemed very 
possible now, with the flood of National- Liberal enthusiasm 
rising to high tide, and' almost directing the decisions of 
the Diet upon this point. 'ut meant that the 
duchies would be united under the Duke of Augustenburg, and 
that eventually-they, and Prussia herself, would be merged in 
a new United Germany, a constitutional parliamentary state 
°(-1-. like Great Brit n. Bismarck, the reactionary, would be 
flung aside, and Prussia, the strong military monarchy, 
would have lost her most essential characteristics., and broken 
away from all the traditions that nad made her great. So 
Bismarck must make sure that when the attack on Denmark came, 
it should be by Prussia as a% European power, not by the 
German Confederation. 
Next, 
Next, Bismarck dared not allow the three powers 
wnicn had. acted against Germany in 1348 to act in concert now, 
He must detach Russia from trie western powers, because, like 
the other great men who made Prussia, ne dreaded the 
v' 
;'.hostility of Russia above all things. 
Thirdly, he must if possible separate Britain and 
Franca, for he could not risk a war with both - hardly even 
with one of them. In any case, he must deceive, Britain; 
France could probably be bribed. 0f Britain he had the 
greater dreaç.; but of his power of blind -leading her he was. 
sufficiently-assured) 
Russia was already on bad terms with the Western 
Powers, owing to the Crimean war; but this had not led to a 
corresponding rapprochement with Prussia. It is true that 
during the war the Prussian government had refused to take 
4)(0 any steps against Russia, and had indeed, snort of joining 
in the war, done all in its power to assist her; but the 
neutral's part is a thankless one': he is usually mistrusted 
by both sides; and the conduct of Prussia had been appraised 
in Petersburg as merely due to self-interest and timidity. 
Bismarck, however, had been ambassador in Russia since then, 
and nad used his opportunities to form a personal friendship 
with the Tsar and his. ministers. 
gippwrwrw-. 
16 
With France, the difficulty would be great. From the be- 
ginning of his reign the central object of Louis TTapoleone s 
, Ipolicy had been to secure the British alliancd. He believed 
that the enmity of Britain had caused the downfall of his 
great namesake,' and he did not intend to make the same mis- I 
take. He thought to secure the friendship of. Britain by supp- 
crting her foreign and colonial policy; he would then lend 
his aid tomeetablish the unity of Italy and of Germany, and 
as payment, he dreamed, would receive the f ront i er of the 
Rhin e,(Yr_1 
her own free will 
he would take the 
ag, flown ideas were more or less vague; he might have to be 
satisfied with less ; but the fulfilment of even a part of 
them, he believed, was conditional on the friendship of- 
Britain. 
His anxiety to secure this ally had just been most clear- 
ly demonstrated. The cession of Savoy and Nice- -to France, 
though by-vote of the inhabitants, had produced a chorus of 
execration in England. palmerston, who had just come into 
office, deliberatly poured oil on the flame, and was fully 
supported by the °Times. The prime Minister told the public 
that fifty thousand Trench troops might be landed on the 1' 
shores of England without a moment's warning, and brought 
forward an elaborate schemet'of new armaments, which he openly 11-7. 
stated to be aimed at hour immediate neighbours across the 
Channel." 
Cobden had been engaged in negmtiating the commercial 
Belgium, on the death of Leopold, would of 
drift into union with France. After this 
lead in a general disarmament. These high- 
treaty with France, a treaty to which the Brappror had con- 
sented, not because he had been converted to Free Trade, but 
because he wished to conciliate Britain. The position 
of the British envoy was made painful and difficult by the 
action or his government. 
"In the midst of myvlabours upon the details of the French 
(,.tariff, in which I had every day found greater proofs of the 
honest intention of the -wrench government, 11/observed a con- W. 
stant increase in the military preparations in England, which 
completely falsified my promises to the Emperor. And now we 
were daily threatened with a proposal for a large outlay for 
fortif ications. _ 
) 
.if the latter scheme were ann- 
ounced, I should feel disinclined again to see the Emperor.', 
"Pepple speak of it, 114 added a little later, "As an in- 
dication that out court and aristocracy are inclined to renew 
the policy of 1 792, by forming another coalition in oppos- 
1, itton to France. They say that the inspiration of our policy 
in arming and fortifying comes from Berlin and Brussels through 
the British court." And, comparing his own experiences with t 
the of the signing of the French commercial treaty in 
1786, he wrote, "You will not read that in the midst of these 
negotiations Pitt rose in the house and declared that he 
aPPrehended danger of a sudden and unprovoked attack on our 
shores by the French king; that (while history told us that 
we had 
84, 000 men voted for our navy to the 31, 000 in prance, 
J 9.anhi dwlst we had 15o,000 riflemen assembled for drill) he, 
Mr P1_tt, pursued the eccentric course of proposing that the 
nation should spend tent/millions on fortifications, and that ' 
162. 
he accompanied this with speeches in tr.e _louse,' in which he im- 
puted treacherous and unprovoked designs upon us on the part of 
the-monarch with whom his own plenipotentiary was then nego.tiat- 
ing....Palmerston had not one hostile act against us to allege 
against the sovereign with whom I was, with his sanction, mego- 
14) 
tiating the Treaty." 
With all this, Britain was spending £15,000,000 on her navy) 
against the at;6,000,000 of France, and Palmerston overlooked the 
fact that if France had really wanted to "humble and. punish Eng- 
15) 
land" she wouldvhave found a much better moment to attack three t' 
years before, when all available troops had been sent to India. 
Yet in spite of this extreme provocation, 'Tapóleon had carried 
through the treaty, against commercial opposition, and purely 
with the object "to strengthen the friendly relations of the 
French and English peoples, and to rive the world an assurance 
16) 
that he did not contemplate a career of war and conquest." He 
and his ministers were renerous enough to interpret the conduct 
of Ialmerston as an electioneering manDeplvrel and two years late 
they gave ritain such hearty diplomatic support in the Trent 
affair as was decisive, iiny.theya inìothef good judges, in pre- 
venting- the Horthern States from declaring war. So stubborn a 
determination on the part of France to cling to the British alli- 
ance_ seemed to augur ill for 3ismarck's hopes; yet, by peculiar 
circumstances, both his objects -- -the separation of the western 
Pavers, and their alienation from Russia --- -were effected simul- 
taneously. This was not due t imar6Va efftrtStalonQ ;+ halsce 
15} 
14) Cobden to Bright, 
halm, p 391. 
4 Feb. 1861. Cobden, p. 513. 
16) Cobden to Palmerston, l0. Tuly =1860. 
Cobden, p. 499. 
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3 prnYexb- a -expression, he had the deviliS ovm luck. 
Bismarck's chief ally in the matter was Lord Russell. 
Lord Russell was unconscious of the fact; he was, in truth, 
an angel unawares: but hadiBismarck dictated the policy of 
Great Britain in the Polish crisis, it could not have suited 
his purpose better. 
That most unhappy country had at last been driven 
into a general revolt, the immediate cause of which was the 
arrest and expross dispatch to Siberia of several thousand 
Polish youths who had taken part in a political demonstration. 
The disorder which followed gave the Tsar excuse to revoke 
3Lthe constitution, the one wretched rag of compensation which 
the Treaty of Vienna had secured to the once glorious 
Commonwealth. There had always been much sympathy in England 
for the oppressed Poles, and the newspapers now with one 
voice burst into a sort of commination psalm against Russia. 
Private individuals raised funds and freely promised help to 
the revolutionary leaders. Russell shared to the full the 
indignation of his fellow -countrymen. He found himself in a 
Position where his denunciatory powers might have full play. 
Russia was putting down the insurrection with all her usual 
methods; with fire and sword. Russell hastily applied to 
Prance and Prussia to join him in a protest against the 
action of. Russia. 4-.1. ght °Rueae-il's character, it may 
bed 
be- d-that-he really hoped Prussia would accept his invita- 
tri-ert-: 
He was of course disappointed. For Prasstaato 
/i 
sign the protest was to sign her own death -warrant. She held 
Posen, as Russia Lithuania, by the strong hand. Her own Poles, 
not yet in revolt, were trembling in her grasp with sympathy 
for their Russian fellows. Add to this, that the demand came 
at a moment when Bismarck was straining every nerve to gain 
fl(the friendship of Russia. He not only returned a refusal to 
Britain, but he immediately made an agreement with Prince 
Gortschakoff, by which he gave whole- hearted support to 
Russia's policy and arranged for the mutual extradition of 
political refugees: the Russo- Prussian frontier was for the 
time being practically abolished. Bismarck might therefore 
thank Britain for an opportunity to give Russia an addition- 
al proof of his friendship. 
France received Russell's proposal very differently. 
She had always been peculiarly interested in the fate of 
Poland; she was also anxious to act in concert with Britain 
wherever possible. She eagerly joined in the protest, and 
Austria, ever ready to check -mate Russia in Poland, signed 
it also. 
Gortschakoff received it good- humouredly; He was assured 
of Prussian support. He politely told Lord Russell to mind 
his own business, and continued his massacres and floggings. 
The/ 
The Poles, at the information`/that the western Powers had come 
to their aid, revived, and continued the desperate struggle. 
Russell continued to act with an energy which 
delighted equally the French and the Poles. He now presented, 
for the approval of France, six points, which were to be 
pressed upon Russia; they included tree. restoration of the con- 
,/ 
Li-astitution, and a general amnesty; and the language in which 
thè dispatch was couched was not that of counsel, but that of 
command. The demand was such as Russia could never accept. 
It was, in fact, an ultimatum. France began to make prepara- 
tions for war. 
Prince Gortschakoff was distinctly annoyed'at the 
language used. His refusal, this time, was curt. There was a 
burst of enthusiasm in France, and the Poles held out gallant= 
ly. Lord' Russell, however, was quite unaware that he had 
issued an ultimatum, and that he was expected to go to war. 
I The British government sympathised with \the Poles, but did not 
dream of such madness as going to their help with armed 
assistance. Neither country nor Queen would stand such 
quixotry. R.Qa4411.was seriously hurt at having his excellent 
advice flung back in his. face. He sat down and penned another 
dispatch. His language was peevish and his tone injured. He,. 
salved his feelings by viciously remarking, in conclusion, 
that in his opinion Russia had forfeited her treaty right to 
Poland, 
The / 
The British ambassador at at Petersburg, Lord Napier, 
a prudent man, took the precaution of showing the dispatch to 
Prince Gortscriakoff in a private interview before the official 
presentation. The Prince's comment was suggestive. "You had 
better not submit to me tnat last sentence ", ne said. The 
letter was accordingly returned to London; Her Britannic 
Majesty's Secretary of State deleted the offending words, and 
the Russian minister now condescended to receive the curtailed 
dispatch. Lord Russell turned his facile pen to other 
subjects, and Russia, enraged by their protracted resistance, 
qq 
' e her undivided attention to the Polish rebels. 
J( 
.J 
The state :of public opinion in France may easily be 
imagined. Th4t country, so sensitive upon the point of honour, 
nad been exposed to an unexampled humiliation. Great Britain 
L3had initiated the whole affair, carried it through with the 
loyal support of the French government, and then left France 
in the lurch. The Emperor tried to cover his defeat by pro- 
posing a general conference on European affairs, at which the 
Polish question should be settled by all thé powers, and those 
of Italy and Denmark discussed.. But Lord Russell was still 
out of temper, and he sent a rude refusal to nave anything to 
do with the plan. Deeply wounded and bitterly resentful, the 
Emperor regarded the matter as a personal insult. M. Drouyn 
de Lnuys, who had always been on bad terms with Palmerston, 
' °4fHe offered tc withdraw his troops from Rome if the,.,.0 
majority at the Conference decreed it. (Cowley, 18. x:63. 
FO.Prance, ].498.) Q$) C This action was taken in secret 
understanding with Prussia arid Russia, though thos pow- 
ers accepted. See footnote, p.168 . (5 L 
Cowley , 
63, P.e.v.rance, 1499. 
i4?'. 
ß-u-- shared his master's feelings to the full. As yet, Lord 
Russell was entirely unaware of the way in which the incident 
was regarded in France. Tt is possible that he really did 
not feel the full humiliation'to which he had been himself 
subjected and he was certainly unaware of the shock that had 
been given to British prestige throughout Europe. He knew 
that the French were touchy and excitable, with queer 
exaggerated ideas about foreign affairs; and he smiled in- 
dulgently at their frenzy of indignation. They would soon 
talk themselves, quiet, and cool down. 
Others, however, both at home and abroad, were not 
so blind to the true state of affairs. A few men in England 
knew what had happened, and so. did every continental states- 
man. The Anglo- French Entente was broken. The two great 
western Powers whose concert imposed a law on Europe were 
now divided, and he who would "let loose the dogs of war" 
might do so with little risk. The well -wishers of both 
countries were troubled. "You ask my opinion about Lord 
Russell's' answer ", the Q,ueen of Holland wrote to Lord 
Clarendon ,/ 
Lkuy 
(a°)1 "M. Drouyn de 
' does not conceal his conviction that 
the Danish question must end in hostilities. I hinted 
that whenever H.E. had nad enough of his ill- humour 
with us., we should not be long in setting it-to. rights; ", 
(Cowley. 25y121. 63.ín a&e1499) . ) 
Prance will é i.r. ritat ed if the Congress is re- 
fused, but this will not mattcr to England, though 
it may to the continental powers. (Cowley,14. 41.63 
F.O. France, 1498. ;'Uk,(,, 
1'8. 
Clarendon, "I must candidly express that I think it deplorable. 
Wo It is the death -blow of an alliance which ought to have 
dominated the world, managed the affairs of the continent, 
assured us an era of peace. It is over. England wishes to 
forget that the Emperor has been her faithful' ally, that he'- 
helped her in the "Trent" affair, ... You answer him with 
scorn. You deeply move and insult public feeling in France, 
always ready to turn against you ". 
The effect of the incident on the public opinion of 
Europe had in truth been "deplorable ". It must be remembered 
that the policy of Palmerston had always been a militant one, 
and within they last few years incidents had occurred in which 
the action of himself and Lord Russell had been indeed violent 
and over -bearing. A South American republic: had 
been threatened, bullied, and abused for an insult to the 
British navy, which, on investigation, turned out to bé purely 
imaginary. A Japanese town had been levelled to the ground by 
British naval guns, in retaliation for a private crime-com- 
mitted in another district, for which the Japanese government 
had offered all reasonable compensation. Europe had still a 
vivid memory of the Don Pacificó affair. But in all these 
k cases:., and others also, the adversary had been a small or a 
backward state. Now, it was said, for the first time the 
s- uprb_L__ 
Clarendon. uì.11. ÏD .286 
sa -d 
&ortschakov also regarded the refusal in this light.. He 
Napier that he hoped "H.M. Government would not be in too great a hurry to repudiate the existence of a common atti- tude of resistance to the ascendancy of France in connection With the question of a Ctj ngrese --- -a combination which had N'aDontaneously grown wp, and whit. ww naturally founded on 0 mon inte.re:t_." 7aie.r 18 :CA: F.G. ) xssia 658. 
superb "Roman Citizen" found himself face to face with a 
powerful, an equal foe, and he had shown himself no more 
than a bully. His bluster had ended in ignominious, 
collapse, and he had swallowed a cruel insult as meekly as 
a child swallows a pill. Palmerston had hitherto been dis- 
liked, but respected. Now he was feared no longer. The 
threats of Great Britain were only threats, and Lord 
Russell's moral lectures only English cant. 
The Polish affair, and trie consequent estrangement 
of France and Britain, took place in trie summer of 1364, at 
the same time as the Danish crisis. was maturing. Tne 
coincidence was a matter of pure luck for Bismarck, but he 
handled it as only a great statesman could. The National - 
Liberal party had proved its worth by favouring the cause 
of the oppressed Poles, and he might have Helped to recon- 
cile them to his ministry by joining in the protest of the 
Western Powers; but his keen eye saw that to sacrifice the 
friendship of Russia to buy the friendship: of the Opposition 
3 at home was sacrificing the substance for the shadow; He 
could manage the Liberals; he could never manage Russia. 
Eut, although no one could better profit by such chance 
good fortune, Bismarck was not the man to rely on luck 
alone. He had already formed his own plans for the 
separation of the Western Powers, and ne continued to 
develope them while taking full advantage of trie Polish 
quarrel. 
l0 
quarrel. lin order to describe Bismarck's Russian policy, it 
nas bean necessary to look far ahead. We must now return to 
the opening of " Ls Ministry, and follow tne course of 
51 events in Britain, in France, and in Denmark itself, before 
the Polish revolt brought tne Danisn question to a crisis. 
In the case of France Bismarck followed the plan 
of bribery, which ne afterwards used so skilfully on several 
occasions. True time the bait which ne oniony used was a 
slice of the Rhenish Provinces of Prussia. Not that ne 
would ever nave Handed over an incn of German ground to 
France; but he believed that by the mere suggestion ne could 
sufficiently dazzle Napoleon to retard and confuse His 
action. a oft- elr"been said that tne'° taracter -c . 
5a, -a mystery; Bismarck, at least, nad the -=-k -e 
r cpc_mc tn 1 rather liked ï,i ti r7 T . r- ;ve- çt.e. 4 c. .c3y?Jl o, and wa--, 
view. 
As to Great Britain, Bismarck nad two plans in 
Even before the Polish incident, he relied upon 
the essential weakness.of almost every British government- - 
the extreme unwillingness of a wealtny and contented 
()3)ß 
commercial nation to enter upon a European War. Just as he 
dangled Rhenish Prussia before the French Emperor, he 
'4 t. 
dangled the idea of Peace before the British ministers. He 
He also made attempts to sow ill -feeling against 
France in Britain; for example, he told Wodehouse, when 
the latter vì,ited Berlin in December, that France was 
secretly proposing to Russia a conference on Denmark 
from which Great Britain was to be excluded. 
(wodehouse to Russell, 13.4.2.63. F.G. Denmark, 306.) 
90 
assured theirs \that Prussia did not want a war, and that the 
German Diet was the real representative. of the war party. He 
himself would do his best to restrain the Diet from any mili- 
tant action. Re was, he said, town between ]fis desire for peace, 
and the sense of his duty to obey the Diet as a member of the 
German Confederation. He did, in ver,' truth, use his influence 
to re +engin the Diet, for he wished that if any armed attack 
` 
on :)enmark were made, it should be made by Pruesian troops 
acting independently, and no:t by Federal troops under the 
orders of the Diet. 3y this conciliatory policy he was le to 
keep the 3'rit ish government in happy ignorance -,ent il his own 
plans for a Prussian attack were matured. Al!_ the while, with 
infinite care and patience, he presse upon them the idea that., 
anxious as he was personally for peace, the strength of publie 
opinion in Germany, and above all the unreasonable and a gress- 




resides his scheme of deceitring 3rit in until action upon!" F4"1- 
her part became difficult, he 1vae aware that he could count upon 
a strong opposition in that country itself to any militant pro- 
jects on the part of Russell and Palmerston. It was not on the 
Parliamentary Opposition that he relied, for the Conservative 
leaders sympathised with Denmark: but he knew that there was 
24) ?robably nothing would give greater. st rength... to the two 4 eat German powers than the feeling that Great `'ritain and 
France were disposed to act as mediators to give the % / / %, /f/ T;etion of the r)uchies an impartial consideration." Cowley to 
i' 6 Jan. 1864, P'.n. France, 1499. Etc, etc. 
172. 
dissension in the, Cabinet, and he knew 42.ern-eart.ain_saur . 
that the Queen, was 
devoted to the cause of Germany, for the King of the Belgians 
had assured the Prussian royal family of this. German in 
blood and in character, Victoria had been even more closely± 
drawn to that country by her marriage, Prince Albert had 
5t imbibed the principles of the German Aiberals, and he was 
related to, and his brother was on affectionate terms with, 
the Augustenburg family. Stockmar had tutored both Queen and 
Prince on the' question, and victoria ,regarded it as a holy 
legacy left to her by her husband. She and her brother -in- 
law had adopted the views of the National Liberals:. the Duchies 
should become a little independent state, ruled by an 
Augustenburg dynasty, and a member of a new and strengthened 
German Confederation-4 This point of view was of course most 
offensive to Bismarck: awe pct- are-preferred-that, -the 
5N 
it#-thr-$enmafl. ut the Queen was not aware of 
this, nor indeed did she' as vet believe that Bismarck had 
much influence' in the matter. So long as she acted: as a 
check on the policy of her ministers, whenever it became 
aggr.essivej 
-hr- Seep, for example', Ilealip.phe Gladstone, p. 736. "She spoke' 
of all this with intense earnestness', and said she con- 
sidered it a legacy from him ". 
(90 1°S./1igicl,cito Lord Torrington, "1 would plage my honour that 





.aggressive, she served Bismarck's turn. She had her own party 
in the Cabinet, having found a strong ally in Lord Granville) 
y;. n 
.ie had always been a favourite of hers, since he had replaced 
the insubordinate and disgraced Palmerston in stormy '51.(j110 
pert- the-Troy emeirt's o1` Rus'sel'l' -and. 
.2.41.1fite-fstarr) 
LMr. Puss's methods were unassuming, but very adequate. 
5g Johnny and Cupid made strenuous: efforts to evade his pervasive 
influence. He would quietly remonstrate in Council, and then 
relapse into silence. They would take silence for consent, 
sneak away, and take the proposed action. Then Mr Puss would 
present a written protest, strictly moderate and correct, and 
the dispatches which nad been sent would have to be cancelled. 
A quiet hint about "Her Majesty's views" was introduced, when 
necessary, with effect, for everyone knew that Granville was 
in constant private correspondence with the queen. This 
explains the extraordinary devious course of British diplomacy, 
especially in 1864, the contradictory instructions and can- 
.] 
foelied dispatches which puzzled harassed ambassadors. 
Palmerston had been the person chiefly responsible 
(01)'" See BliAmmoofteschar Granville, mmio. 1. Chap. O: "We are, 
alas, deteste4 in Germany... The Queen asks the Cabinet 
to be firm and support her ". "Sne would be prepared to 
make a stand upon it, should it even cause the 
resignation of Lord Russell". etc, eta. 
 9? r 174. 
for the Treaty of London, and he and Russell regarded the pre- 
servation of the Danish onarchy intact as essential to the 
peace of Europe. The consequences feared from te bree.'k- p of t'ee 
Monarchy Were not quite those which might be expected to -day. 
They did not fear the rise of (ermany as a naval power; no one 
took this to be a. sericus possibility. Even Lord Robert Cecil, 
while clearly pointing out the natral aspirations of Germany, 
28) 
mocked unmercifully at her power of fulfilling them. People 
still remembered the collapse of Germany in 1850, and the sale. 
of her fleet by public auction. what the government really 
dreaded was the rise of a great sea-power in the form of a 
TTnited Scandinavia. _lt was fully expected that Denmark, if de- 
prived of the Duchies, woule join herself to Sweden -Norway, and 
in this way formidable might soon dominate the north. 
This was f equeit y urged by Paget., the British Âratbassadar at 
Copenhagen, who believed in the growing pov-er of Pan -Scandinav- 
ianism. If this danger did not materialise. Denmark as a naval 
Power Would. cease to exist, and in this case the control of the 
Baltic would fall to Russia, and this was even more repugnant to 
the -.ritish government. 
When, therefore, they urged the importance of the preserv- 
ation of Denmark, it was not from wee. fear of the ?ncreaeed 
Power of Germany. Taaglellooked, mostly, with a vague benignity on 
the German struggle for unity. They were hugely contemptuous of 
the weakness, confusion, and futility that her champions had 
hitherto dieaPlay d, but all the same they wished her well. 
8) See his "Danish lúchies " in Historical Essays. 
24.9j "It is impossible that the establishment. of two strong mari - 
e Powers,Prussia cane the one side,Scandina.via. on the other, at 
e entrance of the Baltic, can be otherwise than prejudic ial toy /
46, 
t3ae --fie . .: .1d , 
stare- 
. Germane once_ took her pro9er place. 
Britain would no longer need to depend on the unnatural French 
lu- alliance to preserve the peace of Europe; she and Germany to- 
gether would hold the other powers in check. hose who 
8e-1-#-e vec -- e-rme ny -s- f ut ure..agÀe -d rtua -; -- tho e'e- -who b e l i e v e i. - 
Germs î ett- 14- never - Je- a, -great_ power- ad no -fet rtrf --a °ga n 
..EWs -- might- -ma-ke 
Trie ministers who believed in Germanys ;future were 
chiefly those who had come under the influence of Stockmar and 
of. the Prince Consort. Outside these, trie most clear- sighted 
of Germany's British friends was a young attache at the embassy 
in Berlin, who had a peculiar affection for that country, and 
who was the ardent friend and disciple of the National Liberal 
party. This young man saw what few saw. He had spent years 
D 
in Germany, and the strength of some of the forces: that 
were working there, even if ne underestimated that of others. 
He was convinced that Germany would shortly be, not only one of 
the great powers, but the greatest on the continent. He dis- 
liked and distrusted France, especially Napoleon III, of whose 
ability he had prebterly an exaggerated idea, and he considered 
that the salvation of Europe lay in a German -British alliance. 
For/ 
29) (ctd.) the interests of r =reat rìtain. " This is Paget' s most 
definite expression that he may have feared Prussiakas well 
as Scandinavian influence. Paget to F.!?., 3 Feb. 1864, 
F.O. Denmark, 343. 
 
For this object he began to work with an almost fanatical 
-enthusiasm. Fortune gave into the hands of this young Mr 
Robert Morier a considerable influence on the course of the 
Danish question, .._as will shortly be ¡earl, . How critical was 
tÌie time in the history of- Germany has already been pointed 
out. The whole future of the nation was to be decided; she 
stood at the divergence of two paths, the one that of Liberal 
Nationalism, pointing trie way to constitutional parliamentary 
government, giving to every man his rights; the other that of 
the traditional Frederician policy of the strong military 
monarchy; the policy of big guns- trie policy incarnate in trie 
J. 
(qperson of Bismarck. The fate of the influences which had 
governed the spiritual life of the European nations for 
o.. 
nearly half a century was in the balance; for só'strong was 
the new power, standing "where the brook and river meet "' that 
as she chose, SO she could impress her choice upon the mind 
of Europe, At the moment it seemed obvious to everyone that 
she would take the way indicated by the National Liberals. 
So -Mr Morier believed; it was liberal Germany that had won 
his fond attachment; /ft was pberal Germany that he eagerly 
desired for the ally of Britain. (He-wa - 
' I had this ( prophetic frena;y) almost to the extent of 
maniá in regard to trie Schleswig- Holstein,uestion...for 
the three years preceding 1863 ". "Devoting myself to one 
idea of this kind (the Anglo -German Alliance)..." etc. 
etc,. JamaliiWalymamPio Morier, V. 1. 
iyg. 
appointe ci . when,. a,a = heéheught -adatr$nt of --B-ismarcr-and 




Surely there must have been in the National Liberal 
party, with all its lofty aims and high enthusiasm, some 
essential weakness;- or how was it that those aims were so 
easily defeated, so soon forgotten, so completely submerged 
by the Bismarckian policy? Looking upon Germany in 1860 and 
1872, what a change is here ! Where are now the ideals of 
((1 .the past? Save for a few choice spirits, the nation is 
ready to bow down and worship. the man, who, ten years before, 
was detested as reactionary, absolutist, militarist. 6eß 
Succe `3t e; sueceas;-- -© 411ght must have been trie hold 
QMMOthe lofty ,iberal principles 4\424-nation that could be 
so completely dazzled by a few years of military and material 
f54- 
success, however brilliant. A people so easily led, so,help- 
less in the grasp of a dominating imperial mind, could never 
bean ally to be relied upon and preferred to all others. 
Surely some tendency to this blind worship of material power 
`lounderIay- and weakened the purer aspirations of the German 
mind. Thy Bismarckian theory of "Blood and Iron ", hase 
appeared and reappeared in the history of North. Germany; it 
alone made Prussia the country she is. Even in 1860, some 
one/ 
1pq. 
one might have asked, does Prussia really mean to break with 
.. 
VJ 
the past ?: Is the unification of Germany really possible on 
these new lines? But no doubt had yet entered the mind of 
0 Robert Morier: E the meantime trouble had been steadily 
growing in the matter of the Danish Constitutìonm. ̀' 
The London Treaty, as lutisaltveady been said, had 
v 
rit been signed by Austria, Prussia,. and four of the smaller 
German states;.. It had not, however,. been presented to the 
Diet, which therefore was not bound by the treaty; while 
Austria and Prussia were bound as European powers, but not as 
members of tne German Confederation. 
Their public obligations ran contrary to their duty 
towards tree Diet; and they now began to show an 'unusual i & 
deference to the. wishes of that institution, whose' desires 
f 
they as a rule. rudely disregarded. Tile four small powers x' 
simply repudiated their bond, and, in common with those Ger- 
7a.man states which nad not signed it, denied the existence of 
the treaty, and airily referred to it as "tile London Protocol 
Bismarck did not wisn to provoke the Western Powers at present 
and so made a show of deference to his treaty obligations. 
He. said heenad no intention of breaking the treaty; but at 
the same. time he declared that Prussia nad only signed it 
in, consequence1fof the private agreement with Denmark in 1851 - 
21/ 
Hamove i, S°n , %l VuhX" r Nee., 
r 
18e. 
18 -2>& triat as Denmark nad broken tnat agreement by trying to 
incorporate Slesvig, Prussia and Austria were ipso facto re- 
'131eased from trie London Treaty. 
The British Government denied this. The agreement 
Of 1851 -2 had been a strictly private affair between Denmark 
and trie German powers, on matters affecting Danish internal 
government. The Treaty of London was one between all trie 
great powers, and a patt of the public law of Europe. Austria 
and Prussia had Signed it unconditionally, and had thereby 
incurred obligations to the other signatory powers,whicn 
their private quarrels with Denmark could not in the least, 
affect. Britain,. for example, had known nothing of the secret 
engagements, and However much sne might disapprove of Denmark 
Yu- breaking her promises, srieVcould not allow that this released 
Prussia from her obligations towards Britain. 
The British government, therefore, based their 
policy entirely upon trie Treaty of London, and contended only 
that this shouzd be fulfil -led. They did not give any support 
tof Denmark in her nationalist policy. They occasionally 
pressed her to fulfil: her engagements to Germany, but as none 
of them had ever nad time to study the question, they were 
really not sure whether Denhiark had fulfilled these or not. 
Most of them had never read 'the text of the engagements. 
iS`. This was a perfectly reasonable attitude to take up; 
It/ 
=ra t the Rr i ta st-m-iftwi ag®... 
-Y1,12 ;osition a little by ignoring all other 
9a .i iarat-i -and_.giving ..the r whole -f acted support to Den- 
-mark trio- question of the constitution also. But stial 
,-policy based entirely upon the fulfilment of the Treaty of 
London was a possible and a definite one, and gave some 
prospect of success, as long as it was held to with determin- 
ation. In the year 1862, however, this policy was suddenly 
abandoned by Lord Russell, who entered upon a course 
directly contrary to it. 
^(6. It should be understood that on one point the 
British Government hadvalways been vaguely uneasy. The 
sympathy aroused in the united Kingdom for the' German 
nationalist movement has been described. It was by no means 
general, but it existed, and it was felt by the miniatera 
themselves. If Holstein and Slesvig were really German - 
then 
Zsdplisi9), why, Germany ought to have them, oughtn't she? It 
was awkward for a British government - always the sympathetic . 
friend of oppressed nationalities -- to be in this case on trie 
side of tile oppressor. For Russel' and Palmerstoü, with 
their past record, it was a particularly unpleasant position. 
Ìf. They writhed at the occasional thought, that they were being 
inconsistent andvfalse to their principles. Palmerston 'H 
laughed the accusation off; but to the more sensitive Russel: 
it/ 
it brought real suffering, 
i. t t.ri t1mpns o r r. 1 . -e ¡ren t1LClied 
$ -.tLG1.1 -i 4 
vkaa- Germans_ia -Sle r gt The rumours of Danish tyranny- spread, 
and were enforced by the personal reproaches of the Queen. 
Lord Ru3sellts distress increased, and can be traced in trie 
growing irritability of his letters;. he asked for murex in- 
1g formation - reports, reports! The re-Arts came, and while 
those of Mr Paget were enthusiastic for tae Danes, those of 
Mr. Ward were equally so for the Germans, and the Foreign 
Secretary was as uncertain as ever.. 
It was in trie year 1862 (while Bismarck was still 
ím 
an unknown quantity), anitthis state of mind, that Lord 
Rus3elk was summoned to accompany Queen Victoria upon a visit 
to her brother -in -law at Gotha. He-found himself there 
surrounded by the Liberal leaders and the champions of the 
Augustenburger; in trie very stronghold of German Liberal 
Nationalism. It seemed to the bewildered old gentleman that 
'P for trie first time rie was learning the truth about the 
problem that had confused him'so long,. Possibly he was not 
insensible to the flattery of being converted by a Grand 
Duke and a Queen. Certainly the atmosphere prepared his mind; 
for trie influence of the able statesman who now obtained the 
mastery/ 
mastery of it. Mr Robert Morier had been detached from the 
embassy at Berlin to act as Lord Russell's secretary. He 
seized his chance. For a few days the young attache dictated 
the foreign policy of Great Britain. An extraordinary change 
Y 
o. appeared to take place in the views of Lord Russell, and the 
political world Was startled by the famous "Gotha Dispatch ". 
"Lord Russell is getting us. into all sorts of com- 
lications . . v" wrote Lord Derby to Lord Malmesbury, "What 
_i &i- ; 
on earth does he mean by turning round on Denmark, and taking 
3íi 
up all' at once the Prussian views about the Duchies ?" He 
added that the dispatch was "extraordinarily offensive ". It 
was, in fact, a complete reversal of policy, and was expressed 
in Russells most impertinent and dictatorial. style. It 
proposed to Denmark, that "Holstein should have all that 
Germany demands for her ", (he did not specify Germany's 
fl demands,, and indeed that would have been difficult, as they 
had never been exactly formulated) that Slesvig should be 
completely self -governing, and not be represented in the 
Rigaraad; and, in fine, that the affairs of the Danish 
1f0=ß. 
monarchy should be conducted by" four independent assemblies. 
of. equal authority, all of whom were to nave an equal control 
over finance: while,. as a fantastically delightful climax, 
the Danish army was to be reduced to its strength in 1841. 
The fórm of the dispatch hinted, that if these terms were not 
accepted,/ 
sa 31 0 6aGm4. 1 e 62 . 
l4 
accepted, Denmark Could not count with the same certainty as 
J 
t2 before upon the friendship of Britain. 
The most curious point about this curious affair is 
that Russell took the dispatch quite seriously. It did not 
strike him, either that his scheme was an impossible one, or 
that in proposing it to a' sovereign state he was offering 
86,&. 
that state an insult.. Fe who was in truth the "onlie 
begetter" of the document was not so deluded. Morier, as he 
afterwards confesoed, saw that the dispatch was drawn up; in 
terms that Denmark could not possibly accept. He then 
arranged that the dispatch be first submitted to the German 
Q.powers, and exercised all his influence that the terms should 
be accepted by them, for, as Denmark was certain to refuse, 
he wished Germany to have the credit of assenting though he 
was aware that the terms would not have ratified her. The t'(î- 
two countries were thus posed for Lord Russell's benefit, 
Germany as gonciliating and pacific, Denmark as determined 
on a quarrel and rudely rejecting the brilliant solution 
which he had offered her, and which he regarded as entirely 
his-own invention. Poor Lord Russell 1 his feelings were 
seriously hurt, and he probably never quite forgave the 
gu-.Danes:, for their refusal. He returned to England, morally 
convinced that Denmark had broken ner pledge to Germany, was 
o resin_/ 
- 
Yor Morier + s part in the dispatch, aeo 
P1 oxiOu 
Westir4m4 
Chap .I S . 
oppressing the Slesvig Germans, and was so obstinate and 
unreasonable that there was no dealing with her. Probably, 
also,. Morier had impressed on his minesome idea of the value 
of Germany as a friend, and her danger as an energy. The en- 
forcement of the Treaty of London nad become, to him, a 
rather unpleasant duty; but he still meant to hold to it, if 
possible, - especially when he came once more under the 
influence of the more strong- minded Palmerston. 
6S' He did not see that he had irreparably weakened the 
position of his Government. He had, in fact, practically 
abandoned the strong position once held. He had admitted the 
German contention that if Denmark did not fulfil her engage- 
ments to Germany, she could not/claim that the great powers 
were bound to enforce the Treaty of London. 
The Danes had been wounded by the terms of the 
dispatch, but they were as far from apprehending its full 
significance as was Russell himself. Denmark had put up with 
a good deal from tier patronising; and tactless friend, but only 
because she had not trie slightest doubt that she could rely 
on that friend in the moment of real danger. Had not British 
statesmen protested a hundred times that the integrity of the 
Danish monarchy was essential to the balance of power and 
Ec3. 
the peace of "Europe? Russell, after this outbreak, appeared 
to relapse into calmness- again, and both he and Palmerston 
were/ 
rderssorsm,lhe ed%4L m6klislerSa,d \60- IVM s r®r-cn hA" U eu- 
tterney m\uriouS V6 -the Dal\ h44Reacmgrgeop cause ,ag,eracoura « evet-rnafy u ?6r1 oRt wich Denmark t\ae1 ves- rlect ï Ce 6taj obsecVdbv le." 
10. 
were: pledged to trie London Treaty. Trie Danes realised 
however, that the British lion was already flickering his 
tail with impatience, and that they could gain nothing by 
protracting the affair longer, and they believed that they 
V could find no: more suitable moment to "take arms,. and by 
opposing, end it ". Something must be done. The latest 
claim of Holstein was that no law should run in any part o 
the monarchy unless: it had been voted by. the estates of the 
duchy - in'other holds, that "the administration of the `1'. 
whole monarchy would vast in therStates of Holstein". All 
the laws and the budget for the year were therefore submitted . 
to her, and she simultane-ous;ly rejected them all, adding the 
pleasing intelligence that "it was impossible for the Danish 
government to draw up a. project for a common constitution 
k with which they would be satisfied ", and demanding a return 
to the state of affairs of 1848. The deadlock was worse than 
ever.. Would it not be bettér to make a bold stroke for a 
wholly Danish solution? when could a more favourable` 
opportunity be hoped for? 
This object, to which the next steps of the Danish 
government were due, was at first concealed; but later M. 
Hall_, the Danish Premier, frankly avowed it to Sir Augustus 
Paget. "His Excellency went on to observe that although a 
war with Germany would undoubtedly be a misfortune now as at 
any/ 
AV. 
''q any time, trie present moment was perhaps, as favourable for 
Denmark and as unfavourable for Germany as any that would 
occur; that it was impossible for Denmark to live under a 
cóntinual menace of hostilities; triat Sweden was with her; 
that trie -oublic feeling of`'Erigland, France, and Europe in 
general was roused in favour of Denmark . H.E. con- 
tinued, the question rust be settled by an appeal to arms, 
it-. riad better be so now, and rie felt convinced, ñe said, 
A5.OS) 
that Denmark and Sweden would not stand alone. . " Long. 
before, this, Mr Lytton had written from Copenhagen, "'I can- - 
J 
go not . . disguise my general impression, that trie apparent 
languor with which the Danish Government continues to follow, 
with only fretful protest or grudging submission, that 
stream of events which seems now to be hurrying this country 
into open conflict with the Federal Power, is in &great 
measure caused by the conviction that Denmark is a 
geographical necessity in Europe, and that in the event of 
renewed hostilities with Germany, England or France, or both 
these powers together, will be compelled to defend in arms. 
the integrity of the monarchy. However well founded may be 
J 
Gi 
this conviction, trie effect of it on the minds of the Danish 
ministry is, I think, to be regretted ". 
Thi3 
Page:t to Lord Russell, 14 l-e.1863. F 0. DQRCnark. 3 oy . 
6t1,-) 
ÿtton to Russell, 11.3:.65.. F.O. 1124mat10,., 3014 . 
f 
This oe-lief of the Danes was not without foundation. 
It rias already been shown that voa had tosits. strongest hopes of 
a. close alliance with Sweden. 5iirer had also received encourag- 
J__s,l t` . 
ing messages from France. But - relied chiefly on Britain, 
and Britain was definitely pledged to support.., in spite of 
Russell's recent falling -off. As if to give a further 
guarantee of this, a marriage, was now negotiated between trie 
Prince of Wales, and the 'daughter of Prince Christian of 
Glucksburg, trie heir, according to the Treaty of London, to 
'U the Danish monarchy. 
esides this, trie general feeling of Europe, appeared 
to be on Denmark's side, It was not yet _known that Russia 
was pledged to Prussia. Italy was intensely hostile to 
Austria, and therefore, in this case, to Germany. Holland 
followed Lthe Danish movements with trie iMiestelpi sympathy of one 
similarly situated (37) 
LA r- -rsgei de-- these- pawetee....i,t.- ivat ... be a.dmi..tisd-- ..t"hat 
e- aß-1 - t e,-° -- te- -3 an. :eia-gone araetit--wa t 
A In the winter of 1862-5, when heir plane wee laid; it could 
not be expected that they should anticipate the Polish crisis 
43.wriich was to destroy the grounds for most of these hopes, to 
shatter trie concert of the Western, powers, and to bring 
" Prussia and Russia into trie closest union. 
In regard to Germany itself, however, there i 
lesse 
L " 
i No oru cx nno K 0 ,, çd, wu, ad Lunw 
igq. 
less excuses for the mistaken calculations of the Danes. They, 
like others, let Fismarck out of th°e4 -p-laus altogether -! but 
more than that, they greatly underestimated the strength of 
Germany. They acted as if she were in the same statté'as in'r 
1848, shaken by the conflict of revolution and reaction. They 
ignored the vast material and moral advance she had made 
qu_ s;ince that time. They ignored the fact that Prussia was 
arming, and was distributing to her men a gun of a new and 
superior type. one cannot avoid the conclusion, that Denmark 
never seriously believed that matters would come to open war. 
She made no attempt to put her defences: in readiness, and ner 
army was unprepared. 
F .- 
(n-t_ 
-pat had/ «r 
believp,,,that Prussia would retreat before determined 
action on the part of Britain and France together, and that 
hostilities would never actually break out. But she relied 
too.confidently'on this, and too much disdained the prepar- 
ations going on at Berlin.T 
.smi arck did not want to fight Britain; but Bismarck 
was assuredly getting ready to fight somebody. 
Apart from this fundamental mistake, the Danish 
policy was carried out with some ability. The Eider7Dane: 
ministry now in power decided to begin. its campaign in the 
spring/ 
spring of 1863. The Ring's health was giving rise to some 
anxiety, and unléss a conflict was to b3 deliberately pro- 
voked, the constitutional question must be settled before 
his death. Hall did not wish to be viJlent or unreasonable. 
He wished to conciliate Germany as far as possible by 
following the old EiderDane policy of abandoning Holstein 
to German influence, and accordingly, on the 30th of March, 
a Royal Patent was issued, which separated Holstein from 
Denmark completely, save for the dynastic union. 
Had Germany really been actuated by an unselfish 
desire for the welfare of Holstein, she could not have 
asked anything further for the duchy. Holstein was given 
complete autonomy, and' her financial position was eminently 
117 
satisfactory. Short of actually in so many words offering 
to cede the province, Denmark could not have said so frank - 
. q ly that she was willing to give 
v 
up all c'laini on Holstein in 
return for a free hand in Slesvig. it was a repudiation of 
the engagements of 1852, but it was also an offer at com- 
promise. 
If the.Patent had proposed to incorporate Holstein 
and depriveil her population of civic rights,' it would not 
have been received with more indignation in Germany. The 
administrative benefits conferred, the offer, as it 
practically was,. to resign Holstein, were both ignored, and 
governments, / 
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governments, people, and press concentrated on the point that 
the Patent involved the incorporation of Slesvig - which, in 
V 
qpractice, though not in theory, it did. The Diet met and at 
ònde demanded the withdrawal of the Patent, on pain of a 
Federal Execution in Holstein. 
Bismarck tried to throw oil on the troubled waters. 
He was not insincere; he did not wish events to move too fast. 
The Danes nad pointed out t.ha , as Slesvig was not a German 
province, a federal execution undertaken on the point of the 
incorporation of Slesvig amounted to an act of war against 
Denmark; and a war. provoked by thèvDiet at this moment would 
Rq enrage Europe. War must not begin until. Prussia was ready to 
act; until it could appear to be entirely the fault of Denmark; 
and, until Britain and France could be bought or frightened off. 
Bismarck, then, did his best to prevent the Diet from taking 
this extreme action, and for a time was successful. 
It was now that fortune so signally favoured him, and 
in summer, while correspondence relative to the Patent was 
flying all over Europe,ocCu re d the Polish incident, with its 
consequences. of a rupture between Britain and Franco, and 
shock to British prestige. The relief for Bismarck must have 
\0Obeen immense.. The situation was completely altered, and in 
his favour. He could now rely on the friendship of Russia, 




than this, Pi,gumosWers- nllappily unaware. of the extent 
of the change. erl ^3 believed that France was 
only temporarily estranged, and were quite ignorant of the 
Russo -Prussian understanding, and conti nued, ndeed until well 
on into 1864, to believe that they could persuade Russia to 
act with : -.them. There was in fact an almost crildlike con- 
fidence on the part of the British ministers; they seemed to 
0 
lo( believe that all other powers must be willing to forgive and 
forget the past as soon aS they wished to "kiss and be friends 
Even they, however, could not be altogether blind to the fact 
that some change rad occurred, though they could not define it. 
They felt that for some reason the danger of war had increased, 
and they became almost hysterically anxious to avert it. Yet 
they nad olipm41414modpnleir weaponÇ. They did not see that 
Bismarck, and indeed all Germany, wanted a war, and that the 
fear of the Western Powers was all that held him in check; and 
IOathey deliberately threw away the chance, of concerted action 
with France_ 
Their initial mistake was to suppose that Bismarck 
had the saine desire for peace as an absolute good as they had 
themselves.. Bismarck was destitute of that quality that makes 
a man regard anything as in itself good or desirable. To him, 
peace was in some cases preferable to war; and war was in some 
cases preferable to peace: it was a matter of convenience. TO 
the 
Lk( 
thee. point of view that regarded war as a crime, he was a 
stranger.. ea knew-that there -are times when war is useful; 
i c3 a -#-, -- e- awry; a3- --be the e a s-il -dray out- () a- 
t-±o-nj--- -the only- way -- to- -safeguard the life - 
4 the 7n ei) He would never have made war 
out. of wantonness; that would have been extravagant; but he 
would not hesitate to provoke one if he thought the game 
was worth the candle. T -it;a1 attitude-of mind, 
w cir _. -one of Eismarckf s. most striking qualities, the 
Bzl- .-- mintat.ers had not yet realised,; 
Ltt is curious that the representatives of a nation 
which had so consistently and pugnaciously. defended, its 
rights should have: eo strongly disapproved the eagerness' 
of foreign peoples to take arms for theirs. The way in 
which, for example, British statesmen continually-pro - 
tested their desire to see Venetia Italian, i.nd as con - 
tinually deprecated any attempt to regain it by war, must 
nave caused some amusement to their Italian contemporaries, 
for it was obvious. that venetta would never. become Italian 
except as the prize' of: war. The idea of a nationalist war 
as a holy war,. a thing to be desired in itself, was wholly 
foreign to the well -governed and tolerant minds of trie 
Victorian ministers; They did not realise that tnere,werep 
actually young men in Italy and in Germany wrio longed' to 
die/ 
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die for their country far more intensely than they theinaelves 
had ever longed for a seat in the Cabinet. Yet it was their 
business to understand that such a spirit existed in Germany, 
and that it was made stronger. and more: sinister by being 
allied to a spirit of conquest and to racial hatred. The 
capacity for hate is one largely lacking to the EnglishL t,,(- 
character, which is quick to-forget the past, and generous 
in admiring the good qualities of an enemy. A long period 
of depression and humiliation had, however, strongly develop- 
ed ed this capacity in the German mind. There can be doubt that 
British statesmen underrated the German hatred for Denmark, 
as tney afterwards underrated the German hatred for France. 
Besides this, a war undertaken for the purpose of 
territorial expansion was peculiarly repugnant to them. The 
acquisitions which Great Britain steadily continued to make 
in all parts of the world were made against the will of the 
tcM 
government - sceptical though foreign state eMight be of this, 
It was the fashion of tine day in England to regard colonies 
as undesirable encumbrances, troublesome and expensive. In 
X07 Europe, no temptations, of this sort were offered to Britain. 
Her ministers failed to sympathise with or even to under- 
stand those less fortunate nations whom geographical circum- 
stances. compelled or tempted to a policy of aggression. 
Italia. Irredenta - the Rhine Frontier - United Germany-- - 
these were words: which unlocked, not a cave of treasures, 
but/ 
but a very Pandora's box of troubles. They did not realise 
how far national entnusiasm could :be kindled by such phrases, 
and that men might actually prefer to conquer their desired 
at the point of the sword. To them, a war on the part of 
L . Italy for Venetia was reckless and blamable; a war by France 
for the Raine was lunatic greed;. and a war oy Germany for 
Holstein was equally reprehensible; (a. war for Slesvig did 
not yet enter into their calculations.) It shook the whole 
fabric of their political creed. Till now, France had been 
the aggressor, the trouoler of the European dove -cots, They 
did not wìsn to consider Germany in this role.. They wished 
Germany to remain they blameless, safe make -weight to France. 
Tne wish is father to the tnougnt. They continued 
to blind themselves to the true aims of Prussia long after 
i oc the rest of Europe was awake . t o them, France, Sweden, and 
Denmark herself were at least aware that the question was 
no. longer one of the status of Holstein and Slesvig in the 
Danish :monarchy, but whether those ducnies were to be Danish 
or German.. Had the welfare of Holstein only been in '- 
question, the offers of the Danish government would not have,i 
been so uniformly and passionately rejected; some attempt 
at compromise would nave` been made. Both Denmark and 1Y. ` - 
Sweden to put this before the British 
government, and some of Britain's own envoys did the same. 
"The/ 
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"The Flesvig- Holstein question ", wrote Mr Gordon, 
Ho "is the one subject with regard to which German unity is a 
c3 
reality ". and Paget reported, "One of my German acquaintances. 
observed the other day to one who reported it to me, that no 
sacrifice, no concession, no fulfilment of engagements on trie 
part of the Danish Government would now satisfy the German 
governments nor arrest trie movement in Germany; that what 
Germanÿ>'looked to and was determined on was the dismemberment 
of the Danisn monarchy, in order to place trie duchies of 
Slesvig and Holstein,: with the ports belonging to them,. in the 
J 
lip hands of a Prince (be he whom he may) devoted to the interests 
of Germany". This was confirmed by the fact that the eldest 
son of Duke of Augustenburg)who had renounced his claims to) the 
sovereignty of the duchies, awe declared that he himself was 
not bound by his father's renunciation, and renewed his pre- 
tensions, the Diet refused to acknowledge' the Treaty Of 
6 
Lon4on, and began to consider , tclaimst r-, 
an act which Denmark declared to be an unjustifiable inter -Ir 
ference with her private affairs, as even the rights of the 
Confederation over Holstein did not give the Diet any authority 
l'a to settle the question of the succession. It was clear that 
a Federal Execution in Holstein, undertaken by a government 
that refused to acknowledge Prince Christian's right to the 
Danish Crown, would amount to an act ' war. 
But/ 
id B lie boo 
Clordon. r 
I g 3. 
But the British government refused to aet: upon 
these warnings. It is true that they began to bully and 
threaten the smaller German states; but they continued 
"hope that C de Bismarck would effectually promote the work 
of peace "; They did not realise that since the Polish affaiz 
affair their threats f action were- merely laughed at, 
v 
'3-though Sir A. Malet warned them that the Diet did not believe 
in the possibility of British action. They made no plans 
about what they would do if their warnings were disregarded. 
't. y..c atinuazi...to -- r-a : -f.o ..paac) and. put pressure on Den- 
mark to withdraw the Patent of March 30. The Danish Govern- 
ment tried to convince-them that Germany was determined on 
war; that concessions on this point could only avert an 
outbreak for a short time; and that, according to their 
views, it would be better to provoke the conflict at once 
`16 
and so put an end to an intolerable situation. But Britain 
J 
IIU- continued to believe in the possibility of compromise. 
The Polish debacle had already had results 
unfavourable,to Denmark in the Baltic -. Russia was dropping 
gentle hints to Sweden, and accordingly Sweden began to 
make, excuses to put off thee final signature of the' alliance 
with Denmark. Hamilton and the King were still friendly, 
buhe prudent Manderström/ 






Manderstróm was growing a little cool. \ At the same time 
Russell began to feel the unpleasant consequences of the 
rupture with France. He wished Francet to join him in his ̀`f l 
protests.against trie üerman attitude to the Treaty of 
London; but M. Drouyn de Lnuys replied, with a malicious 
V 
lit'.pleasure, tnat France was certainly not going to expose her- 
self to another humiliation such as she had received in the 
case of Poland. She would join in no threats and protests, 
unless she got an absolute guarantee that Britain was ready 
to go to war to enforce them - 
en then - it was not an affair that concerned 
France directly; the Emperor was not at ease about the 
Nationality question. France would not move without some 
inducement. 
Russell then redoubled his efforts: to persuade the 
Danes, to withdraw tiffe Royal Patent. This was for a long 
h1 time refused; the Danes pointed out that the4Patent 
practically embodied the advice given by Russell himself, 
before his visit to. Gotha. ,!e--av3 -ige -t 
=.Qer:cinn be- forte-- -ihey_ 1c9..3r..i.e.7-9, At last he made the 
_dist:inct I 
PIf England and France were to address sucn a reminder... 
to Austria, and Prussia,. and the German Confederation, 
they must be prepared to go further, and to adopt a 
course of action more in accordance with the dignity of 
two great Powers: than they were now doing in the Polish 
(lue s t i on." . (l8.63. ) 
"When he ( Drouyn de Lhuys) looked round to see 
who. could be the possible allies of France, in defence of Denmark, he found none that could be counted on... mhe 
question of Poland had shown that Great Britain could not he .relied upon when a war was in the distance." 
(6owleyy 3l.1.63. P.O., France, 1499.) 
(4.r'.0. Zjte . 
distinct statement that thDugh Britain wished Denmark well, 
she would give .her no military aid unless the Pate it was 
withdrawn. The Danes regarded this as a promise that if the 
Patent were withdrawn, and war still followed, the military 
aid would be forthcoming - they at last consented, in 
November 1863, and the Patent was revoked. 
The constitutional question was still to be settled, 
however, and a new constitution was already drawn up, which, 
as was inevitable if Denmark were not to submit altogether to 
Germany, followed the same lines as the Patent. It was a 
liberal and even democratic scheme of government, but it al-me 
abandoned Holstein to German influence, separated it complete- 
ly from the rest of the monarchy, and it allowed slesvig to 
be represented in the Rigsraad, and therefore inevitably 
pointed to its ultimate absorption in Denmark. This con- 
stitution was now ready for signature. The Danish minister 
at Berlin was commissioned to as whether Count Bismarck had 
V 
any objection to its being promulgated - for the Danes were 
beginning to realise that it was Bismarck's attitude that 
was important for them. He expressed no objection, and it 
was accordingly decided that the constitution be laid before 
the king, for signature. 
From this point affairs moved rapidly. The British 
cabinet/ 
cabinet was now frantic with anxiety. The revocation of the 
Patent, from wriich they hoped so much, had had no effect what- 
ever; instead of being softened and conciliated, Germany 
seemed more angry than ever - the threat of a federal exe'cu- 
tion was for the moment suspended, but the pópular outcry for 
war, and the agitation in favour of the Augustenburg claim, 
44 more violent than before. The tone of the British 
despatches was now alternately threatening and coaxing. The 
Diet, once so contemptuously ignored, was in turn abused and 
flattered. The little German states which had repudiated 
the London Treaty were bitterly reproached with faitnlessness. 
A- e- r wfl ei -trily -served to- -annoy then,/ Prussia and 
Austria were, in one letter, cajoled, fondled, and bribed; 
in the next, they were solemnly threatened with war. Russia 
and France were in vain appealed to. Denmark was accused of 
obstinacy and ill -faith. And still the situation was as 
!!:,.gloomy as ever. In their excitement the ministers went 
further than thee cabinet had authorised them, and war was 
openly threatened. The German states were informed that 
their actions would have the most serious consequences to the 
peace of Europe; that Britain would not regard any attack on 
the integrity of the Danish monarchy with indifference, and 
finally, Palmerston, in the House of Commons, declared that 
if Germany refused to keep the Treaty of London, "she would 
find/ 
find that it was not with Denmark alone that she had to con- 
tend ". This speech caused quite a flutter in political 
I,I circles[and Denmark, of course, hailed it with joy, as the 
British government were now definitely pledged to her 
support. Bismarck, however, appeared insensible to the 
Menace. He had now changed his tune, and was protesting to 
Britain that the Diet and the Pberals had .F - got\ eyond 
his control, and that the only chance to preservem his 
master's throne was to yield to their desire for war. This 
picture of Bismarck as a frail craft swept onwards by the 
current of revolution is a very pleasing one. 
The .Danish kings made a practice of dying at 
inconvenient momaatra. Frederick VII'3 chose this moment to 
J la-expire - leaving the new constitution unsigned. 
There was a momentary lull; Christian IX was 'quiet- 
ly proclaimed in kingdom and duchies,, the only opposition 
coming from the professors, of Kiel University and a few 
Holstein lawyers. No one else refused the oath of allegiance 
,Ln spite of these apparently happy omens , the 
new king found himself faced with a frightful problem. He 
was German, and he was aware of the strength of German feel- 
ing; he was convinced that to sign the constitution meant 
wary. But his new subjects, owing to his German blood, 





ministers warned him that an instant revolution would sweep 
him from the throne. The Danish people wer determined that 
( 
the national policy should not be abandoned. 
The king gave way; he signed the constitution. 
The same dreary course was now gone through once 
more. Again the Diet fell into convulsions, again threateneäd, 
a federal execution, and again Britain told Denmark that she 
would give no military assistance unless the constitution 
were revoke d, rary -anerrxrree 
n)e -- fa'de_bit P zaax stox. 
C) B t to revoke the constitution was no easy matter ¡. 
(t--4146-r-itit--feedel---m-ArrIpeeas-ib-1-- Denmark had been 
governed, for the last twelve years, practically by the royal 
authority; but the publication of the constitution had'made 
her. a constitutional a Untry again. The Patent of March 30 
had been issued by the king, and could be withdrawn by the 
exercise of the royal power. But the constitution was now 
the law of the land, and could only be repealed by the 
Rigsraad itself, and that Rigsraad had still to be summoned 
and elected. Any attempt to repeal before the meeting of 
the Rigsraad would be an illegal resumption of arbitrary 
laSI power on the part of the crown, and would inevitably provoke 




ing for liberal institutions. 
Moreovertj 
C 
aget, 18.11'.65. OfVK -10 (.1. 
ó 
"TJpon the decision now to be taken by the king depend 
t 
Qnlv His Majesty's future po ulari ty...but consequences 
in 
a far graver importance affecting monarchical institutions 
this' country." (Paget, 18. ,;,.63. F. 0. Denmark, 303.) 
P 
Moreover, M. Hall was pledged toe the support of his 
own constitution. In reply to the arguments of the British 
government, he pointed out that there was no probability that 
the repeal of the constitution would satisfy Germany any more 
than the revocation of the Patent; and moreover, that Britain 
"offered him no equivalent for the concession we advised, not 
even the certainty that the whale question would be referred 
to a congress ". Denmark had already made many.conces;sions 
J 
IL to please Great Britain; why should all the concessions be 
upon her side? 
The constitution wa.s not revoked, and the Diet 
ordered the federal execution to take place. 
The situation of Denmark had now become frightfully 
serious. i Manderström, was by this 
time convinced that neither Britain: nor France were likely to 
help Denmark, and he decided to break off the negotiations. for 
an alliance, which he had protracted until now. Hilton 
hurried home to Sweden to protest; finding that he could not 
persuade Manderström, he,. considering that his,,:,per al honour 
was pledged to the alliance, resigned his post. 
la r. This loss made Denmark cling more desperately to 
101- 
the friendship' of Britain, and she yielded to the wishes of 
that country - not, indeed, as to the constitution, for that 
was impossible; but when Russell' again wrote that no military 
(4"I learnt from Count Hamilton that the projec of tree.* ty between Sweden and Denmark which only awaited signature to 
°iVe it effect has now been laid aside. Count Hamilton attrib- uted this to something which had passed between Your Excellent 
ñ Ite to the possible exclusion of Sweden from a Conf,erenc It might be necessary to hold respecting the question o. 
$ts ,gs ion if the definitive alliance with Sweden had been 
tPaget 9. 463. F.O.Denmark,305.) 
aid would be forthcoming if any resistance was made to the 
federal execution in Holstein, she consented to withdraw her 
troops and allow the forces of the Diet to occupy the duchy 
01 
without resistance She ,publidly protested, however, that 
this was due only to her desire for peace, as the execution, 
being undertaken upon the point of the position of Slesvig, 
I. was illegal. In the meantime, the Prince of Augustenburg 
was proclaimed Duke in Holstein, with the countenance, and1 
even the encouragement, of the federal troops. The German 
states refused to receive the envoys of King Christian, and 
the Diet refused to admit his representative to its counsels. 
Bismarck now began to show his hand.. He had long 
beën preparing the Prussian army for action, and he suddenly 
threw off the cloak of moderation, declared that the con- 
stitution was contrary to the engagements of 1851 -2, and 
A:oaks/lad that if it were not withdrawn before the 1st of 
1.101 January, 1864, the forces of Prussia and Austria would enter 
Slesvig. 
It will be remembered that Bismarck had seen the 
constitution before it was published, and not only "did' not 
object, but, on the contrary, spoke in a sense to lead to the 
conclusion that the measure of the Danish Government was in_ 
accordance with his.viewl' 
"Z replied that Denmark would at all events have a better 
Chance of securing the assistance of the powers alluded to by 
retiring beyond t_} 2izhits of the Confederation." (Pagéet ; rep1yi 
to Hall 10. i: ` F 0 D . 53. F ?rnark 305. ) 
"No itng which had passed in the negotiations with M. de 
Bismarck could lead to the belief that he objected to the con - Btitution in question... All that had passed had been with 
respect to the Normal Budget and respecting this everything g
which 
M. de Bismarck had required had been fulfilled." íraget, 18.1-1163. F .O. Denmark, 304.) Nom. 
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The Danish government, in response to British 
appeals, now made a large concession. Hail resigned; and a 
new ministry was formed under Bishop Monrad and the able 
diplomatist Q,uaade. The new ministry was equally Eider Dane 
in Policy - unless it had been composed of foreigners it would 
)30- have been difficult to avoid this, as the whole Danish nation 
was now. Eider Dane, and the Holstein leaders had refused to 
form a ministry when appealed to by the king - but it was not 
pledged to the support of the constitution, as was Hall. A 
conciliatory answer was then returned to Prussia.. It was 
impassible to repeal the constitution before the date named, 
as that would involve illegal action; but the government 
would instantly summon the Rigsraad, which could be assembled 
by February, and would lay before it a proposal to repeal. 
They could promise nothing more. 
Iii Bismarck replied, and so did the British government, 
that this was a mere pretext. if the Danes desired, they `. 
could easily find some legal loophole, by which the con- 
stitution could be withdrawn by the required date. The fact 
that this would almost certainly produce a revolution was 
ignored.. The Danes complained that Bismarck excused all his 
own actions on the grounds of "popular pressure ", but when 
they did the same,. called it "a mere pretext". But Bismarck 
was never troubled by accusations of inconsistency. The 
British 
21)5 
British government, equally easy- minded, now for the third 
time refused military aid,unless the constitution were rr7 
I? .repeal d. The Danes might by now have become sceptical about 
the "military aid ", which progressively withdrew before them,1 
like the end of the rainbow: Itut gloomy as the situation 
appeareç., they could not bring themselves to believe that 
Britain would break her public pledge, ignore two treaties, 
and abandon Denmark to her fate. Not even the' presence of a 
special envoy from Britain could convince them of this. Lord 
Wodehouse, an ambitious but incompetent young Englishman, 
had been sent first to Berlin, to moderate the fervour of 
Bismarck, and now to Copenhagen, ostensibly to attend the 
funeral of the late king, but really to enforce trieVwith- 
cirawal of the constitution by these threats. 
He failed in both cases. Bismarck merely remarked 
that " Germany would never be on good terms with Denmarkis 
long as the present democratic institutions of Denmark were 
maintained ". While in Copenhagen, though he definitely 
threatened that Britain would desert her ally, the harassed 
Danish ministers only repeated that they could not in honour 
/ -- 4 Tne Treaty of London, and the Treaty of 1722, in which 
Britain guaranteed the Gottorp portion of Slesvig; this 
was evaded by the.Britisri government on trie pretext that it 
di not guarantee the royal portion of that duchy , but only 
the Gottorp d. portion. 
V Palmerston told M. de ,Rille that "un grand pays comme la 
scie pouvait la rigueur `e conduire en 'ologne CO rvne bon lui 
sefbls,it,mais qu'un petit paye devait respecter ses engage - r1ents, 
et que le Danemark, en manquant aux siens, s' expo sait à. soulever la reprobation de l'Europe, et s' attirer sur lui les 
Ill's grands dangers. M. de tille qualifiait d'outrageante pour 
p ,nenark la comparaison que Lord Palmerston avait cherche a,* eta})lir entre la position du Slesvig et celle de la _Pologne. T1 Be rrsontrgit, fort blessé...'+ de la Tour d'Auvergne, 25.1.64. L "a ori iines2. Sc e a.lo Russell l ,-, ,,,'L, kie s, n 19 i-2,°`.3 f=-. ó.Dunrr,u.a- iv -2qq 
ae6. 
go beyond their promise to summon trie Rigsraad. 
The interval passed; and, 
empummet the Prussian Unlans appeared upon $ bordersgf 
Sles W tt; 
Denmark sent a last appeal to London; srie called to mind trie 
many concessions she had made at the wish of Great Britain, 
last of all the evacuation of Holstein, which now placed -" -'(r- j 
her at a great military disadvantage in face of her enemies. 
The reply was a cold denial that the British govern; 
ment had ever promised military assistance to Denmark. Sir 
Augustus Paget reported the delivery of the letter, in terms 
which may ire called concise. 
"In obedience:to Your Lordship's despatch of trie 
19th instant, I nave read that despatch to Y. Q,uaade, and 
have given Aim a copy of it. His Excellency made no comment, 
a 
either while I was reading or when I delivered to him the 
cop}r" Pq) 
''Blúeloc,k.` so,sr-ss-kr .rb ,;) c, . Lt.. . 
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The British government had made no promises. They ":-4 s 7 
had only said that they were not indifferent; that the peace 
of Europe was endangered; that Denmark would fight alone. 
They had persuaded Denmark to humiliate herself, weaken her 
moral position and sacrifice her defensive frontier by con- 
cessions, not by promising to help her if she did so, but by 
saying they would not help her if she did not. It was not 
their fault if Denmark (and indeed Europe) had misunderstood 
these statements. 
It soon appeared that the difficulties of the 
1 statesmen were not over. Surprise was now the order of the 
day. The first shock was giventbv the Prussian needle -gun. 
The Danish army, inexperienced, ill- armed, without food, 
without shelter either from the Baltic winter or the ceaseless 
bombardment, without even being able to return the enemyts 
fire, as the needle-gun outranged all theirs, yet managed to 
hold their first defensible position at Dybból until it be- 
came a heap of rubbish, and then made good their retreat to 
the island of Alsen. But all Slesvig was now in the hands 
of the enemy, and the issue of the combat was obvious to all, 
'whether to panic- stricken Copenhagen, or to the two unhappy 
oldmen in London. 
The second surprise was the policy of Prussia. She 
entirely/ 
10P . 
entirely repudiated the control of the.Diet, declared she was 
acting for herself, not for Germany, maintained that the 
outbreak of, war had cancelled her obligations under the 
London Treaty, and announced finally that she would compensate 
herself by annexing territory. Russell and Palmerston at 
last awoke to the fact that there was no question, as they 
had innocently believed, of a Schleswig- Holstein under Danish 
suzerainty; not even of. a Schleswig- Holstein with an 
'. Augustenburg duke entering the German Confederation. The 
prospect which they had to face was that of. a Slesvig and a 
Holstein as the provinces of Prussia and Austria. 
Between the completeness of the Prussian success, 
and the revelation of the Prussian duplicity, Russell and 
Palmerston were almost stunned. Bismarck had already won 
Slesvig; what then should ail him at Jutland? What(was to 
keep him from swallowing all Denmark at a gulp? At this 
rate, the Prussian flag would float over Copenhagen in a few 
i 
weeks. Bismarck had chosen his time well; the winter ice still 
4 prevented the Danes from using their fleet, Which he could 
not have hoped to meet, and blockading the German coast as 
they had done in 1848. 
209 
e-.1 ;c 
The danger was now seen to be greater than 
tikesi -nag supposed, and tr.k.eF could not help feeling that some 
sort of' action was necessary. For a moment it was touch and 
go whether Great Britain would not join in the struggle after 
all. How uncertain was the issue may be judged by the fact 
v 
5. that on January 30th Russell actually informed the Prince de 
la Tour d'Auvergne that the naval squadron lying off Lisbon 
had:Lbcen recalled, and that a British army corps was to occupy 
Copenhagen, 
emirsien arnc -- conc-e&sIonb Wì ileó i to was .stil 
414144.01-t--63---b-e.- . the Prussia of _ 18.48,._...í.t._: w lci._ have _ been-zurak 
a .t_ e . country- :to +o 'NoW l'that 09- 
the needle -gun had been seen in act 1on,many, even of the 
friends of Denmark, hesitated, where before they had been 
(. confident. The old difficulties, too, remained. Half the 
Cabinet and the queen, who still imagined that a settlement, 
in favour of the Augustenbbrger was possible , took the side 
of Germany; and now, less than ever, did Russell and Palmer - 
ston dare to enter upon hostilities without allies. The "Times" 
throughout the crisis used its influence strongly agianetuteitro 
At first Delane had taken the matter very lightly, writing,in 
November, " t Schleswig- 74 is to be settled in spite of 
the effervescence of r-ermans and Danes, but it will blaze on 
'hile, t daresay, " and he had, for a time, favoured sending 
l the fleet V t + to Kiel, believing that nothing more than threats 
V°ould be necessary. But when he saw that there was a serious 
21O. 
risk of war, he used all his influence tó prevent it, and Palm - 
erston wrote to complain of the "German tone" of the paper. 
The real tug of war with Granville and his supporters now 
began. While the Prussian army. was overrunning Slesvig and Tut - 
land, the 3ritish leaders had to face three different tasks t' 
First, they tried to persuade Prussia and Austria to consent to 
an armistice, and to submit the whole question to a conference; 
second, they began to search for allies ready to act with them 
in case of war; and third, they endeavoured to induce the Cabinet 
opposition to permit at least a naval demonstration in favour of 
i)errniark. 
Bismarck did not intend to be forced into an armistice be- 
fore het was ready; and on one pretext or another, without actu- 
ally refusing, he postponed it until Dybból had fallen and his 
position was secure. 
As to allies, the most obvious wast- Sweden. She had already 
offered to land 30,0o0 men in Denmark whenever 3ritain nave the 
Word, and she was bus-- preparing her rjavy, under the direction 
5oL... to 
of France, for action in the Baltic. Italy also was eager to 
seize the chance to attack Austria in Venetia. Neither Italy- nor 
Sweden, however, was strong- enough to act alone, and the Cabinet 
had already decided, "after Nuch dej.iberation, that...they should 
offer to assist Denmark b- force only in case France should join 
51) 
in an w leaders, for that purpose." The t o   r however, were 
50) France offered to supply her with warships if she were not ready in time, Les Origines, 7 o, 518. She had been acting under ÿrench. instructions all winter, anti had told Denmark that "France ould cone to her aid "in the spring." Pagtt to F. 0. ,12 Dec. 186 
F16 
Dec.1863, 21 Dec.1863, F.0.t enmark, 3r)5. Also Jerningham to 
51) 
6', 1 March 1864, F.0. Swederi, 338. mss ell, Life, p. 402. 
 
all 
without hope that Russia might be persuaded to join them in 
some military demonstration, and that in this case the Cabinet 
might consent to move without France. While vainly exercis- 
v 
ing ail their blandishments upon the stony front of M. Drouy 
de. Lhuys, they carried on similar operations in the Nevski 
Prospekt. Gortschakov, the old dandy, airy, cajoling, court- 
eously impertinent, was as impervious to their efforts as the 
French minister. All keen observers now guessed that Russia 
must have some sort of understanding with Prussia, but the 
British government still continued to be pathetically confid- 
ent in Russian goodwill. Sweden now laid before the 'British 
ministers, and later published in the English newspapers, 
documents which purported to be recent Russian despatches, 
which, though perhaps forgeries in form, contained an essent- 
f ial truth. Their were said to bevcopies of letters from Gort- 
schakov to Bismarck, in which Gortschakov promised to hold 
Sweden in check with an army corps in Finland. The British 
ambassador, Lord Napier, while contesting the authenticity of 
the letters, admitted that Gortschakov's answer to the state- 
Wf 0.') ment concerning Finland was evasive and unconvincing. But 
this did not make much impression on the home government, and 
liapier continued to ply Gortschakov with proposals for joint 
action. The most serious of these was that both governments 
Should send a naval squadron to the 'Baltic. Gortschakov re- 
TUBed without concealing that he thought nothing would bring 
r *rent Britain to the point of fighting. As months passed, and 
the British fleet remained in home waters, - -- "Resistance if J. 
'°. Russie. 65,. 30. L b 4, Gord s-itatSokd de103c1e 
eliéved -4-he áesralck-es Lueve Letlui0ecèslfie9 
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banished from your vocabulary," he said, dismissing the argu- 
ments of Lord Napier with a flirt of his hand. 
Russell and Palmerston had hoped to serve two ends by the 
proposed naval demonstration. If it led to nothing, it would at 
least gloss over the fact that Britain had deserted Denmark in 
her extremity; but It would probably lead to an exchange of shots 
withtGerraan forces, and the7r hoped that by this means Granville 
and Co. would he dragged into war before they were aware of it.. 
Granville was far too wary to fall into the trap, and steadily 
opposed the advances to Russia. In February Russell again anno- 
unced to France that a squadron was to be sent to Copenhagen im- 
mediately. Pac ïf i c assurances from Prussia, however, and probably 
Cabinet opposition also, changed his view, and the orders were 
54` 
recalled. Ilk April, Palmerston threatened to the Austrian ambass- 
ador that he would send a naval expedition to the 3altic; ,if 6-1/(s)°. 
Germany did not at once consent to an armistice; and on another 
occasion he informed Austria. that Britain would not permitItthe 
Austrian fleet to unite with that of 'erman-r; but in both cases 
a cool and pertinent remonstrance from Granville brought him to 
heel. The venerable Cupid found that the methods with t,01.ich he 
had long baffled Prince Albert in bygone days were quite vain 
with 
' r Puss. That gentleman, with admirable persistence, comp- 
elled the Prime 'Minister to eat his words and swallow -one humil- 
iation after another. Palmerston dared hot dismiss half his Cab- 
inet to plunne t into war without an ally . So, though the melting 
of 
the ice had now released Denmark's fleet to sail over her owr 
äark rolling waveriier supremacy was o my temporary; the British.. 
'351)) Ita;ier 
-. ------ --- - -- 
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to %'.0.,29 July 1364, F.C. Russia, 660. 
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Also 
Noe° dAuver.gne, 21 Feb. 1864, Les Origihes 1To. 232. See 
s X34, 239. 
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atlyet lay idle, a.nd soon Austrian ships of' war were riding 
proudly by the little Prussian gunboats in the Baltic. 
In April, Sir Augustus Paget cagne home on leave, and strongly 
pressed upon his government the necessity for a militant policy; 
but again Granville and his supporters refused thbir consent. 
CPS) 
"Mon eollegueeme dit," wrote Dotézac,French minister at Copen -- 
hap?eh, "a titre tres con:°_ identiel, nue, perldant son sejour V 
v i Ve.y yee. 
Londres, il avaa.ittconseille l'envoi d'une escadre dans le Baltique 
et. d'aller jusqu' á, une déclaration de guerre, si la Prusse et 
IL l'Autriche voulaient attenter a l' inté rite de la ?Fonarchie. 
Lord Palmerston et le Comte Russell etaient de cet avis,raais M. 
Gladstone et les autres membres du Cabinet Qnt repousss invin- 
h 
ciblement toute resolution de cette nature. 
In the meantime,Bismarck,havin` gained all t-yiat was necessary 
fór the moment, at last consented to an arrriist ice, upon the, most 
favourabLe terms for his country: Denmark had to give up the 
most part of hikr naval` gains, v,Thile Prussia kept all that she . had 
von by land. .ritish influence was again exerted to induce the 
Il panes tb agree to these terms, and the Peace Conference so ,long 
desired at last met in London. 
There was now no question of upholding the Treaty of London; 
and indeed Frahce -had informed the government that she would he 
no .party to pressing it . upon the German powers. The only person 
' "'ho still hoped for even a purely personal union of the Duchies 
with Denmark lrras Christian 1X,who as a German prince had no 
reeling for the interests of Denmark, and would have sacrificed 
(69 
47 
l, S.. ?.rigines, o. 57í3. 25.r64. 
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them without scruple to serve his dynastic interests and pre - 
serve á purel ú nominal sovereignty over the Duchies. 
v 
The programme of France,which was supported by 5vreden, and to 
a large extant by the Danish goverment, as distinct from the 
king,tivas a modification of the Rider-Dane idea. 
Slesvig was 'CO be partitioned, 
the north and the mixed districts being incorporated in Denmark, 
the south in Holstein: Holstein and Lauenburg were to be created 
Affi*e- a new state,under a sovereig a reea:nle to the inhabitants, 
and which was to be neither that of Prussia nor that of the Duke'' 
of Oldenbur__ (the candidate who had inherited the claims of 
v 
Russia) . France pressed King Christian to agree to this plan, and. 
was not without hope of obtaining the concurrence of Austria. 
Iñ public,sh.e advocated the holding of a plebiscite: in 
private,$he mas a little aiiixious about this expedient;for she 
wished the new Denmark to have a strong military frontier, and 
Bhp was a little afraid lest 7lensborg, and some of the mixed 
districts,might muster a German majority. 
The- British government had probably- no more than a vague. wish 
to save.as much as' possible for Denmark. As to the frontier, 
t'_r1Ty ap-reed with the French ministers. In one respect,however, 
v he two governments were in corlplete disagreement. France was 
dabbling,we. 
can hardly tell how deeply, in PanScandinavian 
scllmes 
with Sweden. Britain was greatly alarmed at the idea of 
,Scandinavian 
union, f earing t h .i.t it would create a new naval 
rower in the north, 
@Keen Irictoria,and those who were influemed by heriviews, 
wished 
to see both the Duchies,under the Duke of Augustenburg, 
. 
enter the German Cc.nf ecieration. This wa the 1r islz of the Confed- 
eration itselfp --r etre.T:Iv c,TZTri+: '-te , _ a . _.. 
i + 4 + ; f - -1 e l - - c Y a in li J u t a l a n d 7 r -Germany al e ó «a . 
;Try) 
A ?russia,it is unnecessary to state,favourednone of these 2S7 
prcpòsals. Russia iltwietly supported Prússia,while outwardly 
]Vine her adhesion to the various ri t ish and French proposals. 
Gortechakoff had before this time told Tiisrriarck that he might 
hpye to send ships to join in a 3ritish naval demonstration in 
the 3altic,whereon Bismarck "had responded, "W_ii care nothing for 
ships that will not fire upon us." This incident is typical 
the relations of the two powers at -t-. ererreeÁ. 
The Conference sat from April 12th until June 22nd,and accom- 
plished nothing, save to show the helplessness of the neutral 
V 
powers before the determination of Prussia. No det&iled account 
Of its sitting's need bf given. The negotiations broke down upon 
the question of the frontier line. Denmark Was now ready to 
a- l)atá.on South Slesvig,and consented that the frontier should be 
draym at the line of the river Schlei,but she refused to give 
up any dt trict predominantly Danish. When Clarendon,'rho with 
Russell was 3ritish Plenipotentiary, pointed out that this might 
result in the loss of the whole duchy, Q,uaade merely replied that 
t 're Were some conditions to lsThich Denmark. might jive her con- 
sent when the situation had become desperate,but *h.ith until 
2. 
then Would he. ciishcnourar)le. The Prussian Plenipotentiaries,on 
their side,refused to consider any 4.ine further south than that. 
° Aperrade; and on this point the Conference broke up. Clarendon 
at the last proposed arbitration,and,Possibly with the idea of 
ZO. 
mollifying France,would have suggested the .Fnperor ''Tapoleon as 
arbitrator. Bismarck said he was willing to submit to arb itrat- 
ion,but would not pledge himself to accept the decision of the 
arbitrator, and as ro one else saw any utility in the scheme 
under these circumstances, it was abandoned. The ruthless deter - 
mination of the Prussian delegates made an extraordinary impress- 
.. ion on all those'`vresent. Clarendon broke out in pa's- sionate dis- 
Fust: ":7e n-e veux ra mais rien avoir faire avec cet hornae 
sens foi ni loi qui s'appelle M. de ;Bismarck, ni celui qui est 
g4vjullgre I --4. e heel* erg;i- 
Denmark renewed the war, still clinging to the hope that Britai 
could not stand by to watch her destruction after x.1.1 that had 
passed;; and indeed this delusion had been 9}iareá by prance and 
Sweden. But it was soon abandoned, as the drezegy struggle 
fought out to its inevitable end, and the yet drearier peace nego:- 
ti&tions followed it while Russell. and Palmerston continued to 0-4 -1. 
V,. scold. and to do nothing.. Both government and Queen had so wil- 
fully) blinded theras.zlves . to the Schemes of Prussia, that the;;' 
could still receive with surprise the news that the Duchies had 
been ceded,not to the Confeder.ation,'ut to Prussia and Austria. 
As for the Prince of Augusten urg, after "strutting and va.Vpouring 
d. little longer, he diappeared to that Limbo -like realm where 
âis inherited princes Wander. Bismarck, in deference to King 
illiams prejudices, interviewed him in order to see if he would 
consent, to hold the Duchies ELS steward for Prussia; thinking 
himself strong inthe. support`;of Austria and the Confederation, ZC, 2, 
he 
r °fused,hnd was contemptuously dismissed. Bismarck wrote to 
31ri,tiin and to rrance,demanding their congratulations for his 
7197 . ir 
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"moderation," and Russell soothed his conscience with reproaches. 
"L'Attitude qu'a prise aujourd'hui l'Angleterre á votre 
égard," said M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the Danish envoy, "est 
tristement curieuse; elle vous accuse d'obstination eV di in- 
(i' 
gratitude." 
The Manchester men were jubilant. 
"It is evident that our years of preaching on foreign policy 
and non -intervention have not been without-leffect, " Bright 
not sat efaction ±nrhiat journal, 
t, 
- 
"We have achieved a revolution in our foreign policy," said J1.4` 3 
Cobden, HOur Foreign Office will never again attempt to involve 
us in any European entanglements for the Balance of Power, or 
for any dynastic purpose. Henceforth we shall observe an abso- 
lute abstention from continental politics. Non- intervention is 




envoy in London) l4.Y.64. 
>4ag 333 Bright o date given. 
5 Michel Chevalier, 5.1 .64. aleeiiwgeiM/ Cobden. p 
'Despite the excuses with which they afterwards salved their 
consciences, Russell and Palmerston were not really i.sentible 
of their obligations to Denmark. In December i863, Russell had 
written to his colleague that an invasion of Slesvig by German 
troops "would, in my clear opinion, entitle Denmark to our 
59) 
active militar s.nd uavai support." 
it .has already been shwa what. obstacles prevented them 
u r . . ..__ - .__ 
from following this policy. On. the one .hand, the opposition led 
by Granville and supported by the Queen; on the other, the lack 
of a strong ally on the continent. lt. would have been impossible 
in any case to persuade Russia to act with them; France could 
have been induc ed to move, but only at a price. 
The break --up of the Franco- British alliance-was the necess- 
ary condition of the success of -Bismarck's policy, and when this 
happened, it was at the very moment to suit him. The coldness`" á' J 
caused by the Polish affair and the refusal of the conference 
had for the remainder of the year 1863 prevented all joint 
action by the Western Powers. The first impulse of France was 
evidently to withdraw from all friendly intercourse with Brit.aint 
this passed, but she was still determined not to join in a war 
a,ga nst Germany unless with a distinct guarantee, first, 
59) Russell, Life, p. 401. (Italics Russell's.) 
- 
consented to cede a foot of German around,but he dangled the 
bait teriptinr lyUbefore :Tapoleon. The Emperor vas áazzled, and 
J 
i .coquetted with Frusia.,but all the sane he vv,-ould have preferred 
the alternative course,for, in spite of its dangers and uncer- 
tanties, he. was ä.itacned to the British alliance. 
T e French solution for the Danish problem 17"as decided, though 
the question was co:n)licated by the impossibility of Opposing 
the German nationalist ::±ovement,1 cavrae to do so was contrary - 
to. the .aperor' e declared views on Nationalism. lt wits natural 
to n to the only reasonable solution, the Eider -Dane Policy. 
FEgnc e 
oî,ct-11, 
proposed to give Holstein and Lauenburg to Germany,and to estab- 
lish a Witted Scandiiavia,or at least a strong Denmark including °2-450- 
v 
all or part of Slesvig, as a counterpoise in the Baltic to the 
growing power of Germany; Napoleon wauld want a lawyer' s fee for 
arranging this Battlement- --if possible, something on the Rhine, 
but if /necessary he would be content with a "moral" :gain: that 
L6 
is to say,the cession of Venetia to ttaly0 . 
If adopted by Britain and France in union, this plan had Pt SavvLe. 
."11344.4ita:u1e chance of success. The military situation was 
f avouraole 
: F4anc e would have flung her forces anz.ins t the Phing; 
2115 . 
Italy would have attacked in venetia; Sweden was waiting the 
word to land an arr r in -Denmark; Britain could have stint a 
small force to Denmark, and her fleet could have at once 
blockaded the North German coast. Austria would have had to 
withdraw her attention from slesvig in order to face Italy, 
who was so anxious for war that her ambassador in Stockholra 
had instructions to watch for the slightest sign of a move- 
ment on the part of Sweden, and her pugnacious little king 
iad even declared his readiness to take on France and Austria 
simultaneously, if the former showed any disposition to 
chane sides. 
on the other hand, it is improbable thatt'3isÑarck igiarrere 
14 could have lured Russia into another war with France and 
3ritain, and it is probable that if Bismarck had seen the 
two latter powers reall , united, and had been offered Hol- 
stein as a gift, he would have preferred this peaceful solu- 
tion to risking a general European war. He would never have 
consented to cessions on the Rhine; but if war had not actu- 
ally broken out, France would probably have been prepared to 
accept the "moral gain-----the cession of 1Tenetia e- 2.t.a 
/ 
-- 
8.13 a fair equivalent. And 3ismarck could be generous with 
his neighbour's property. 
The prospects of success for`-the French plan being soV fair 
why did the British government so unhesitatingly refuse it? 
They 
I 
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were well aware of the wishes of the French government,for, 
though no official ofiers were rqadefrtt first, strong hints were 
given, or suggestions offered th.roug ±l unofficial channels. 
?tapo:! eon, a.s early as Ì)ec erir er 1863, grac of 1?.l _y insinuated his 
designs on the lihine to Lord Dufferin. 
"He was constantly talking of the great results which the bona 
fide .Ni]ns._lish and French alliance might have producedtaud.as E. on- 
iitEintlykt of the extreme improbability of that alliance being 
able tc survive this last shock to its cordiality." ( the British. 
Cow ;ess refusal of a C , V see above, p. 16% ) "He ha.d hoped that, 
onde the Congress started, England and prance night have settled 
all irksome questions their own way and after al:L,he did 
-o-t see how the acquisition of the Rhenish provinces by France 
could injure us, and that undoubtedly if there had been a Congress, 
some slight modification of the northern frontier of France, to 
the extent, perhaps of the extradition of a fortress here and 1 
have been sub jetted to its consideration. But all 
this, in such neat and delicate language that no English can 
-(4;00P) render its subtlety " 
fig To Clarendon, `<apoleonv Later said that hs would not fight for 
Denr>lark,as that question was not generally understood in France, 
Ànd that if he did `"ight, he would be accused of doing so for 
other motives. The significance of this is obv? ous, though we 
cannot tell how far Clarendon comprehended it. 
At the funeral of Freierickkll t Fs4.9,..r.lreFFleury, the French 
special envov,who was known to have secret instructions from. 
'le T11perial master,virtually told Lord wodehouse that France 
'7/ Ij 'J, 
41;12:C...l¡d,witMNi Duff er i. n., -p . 1'36 . 
._ -------- 
had adopted the Eider-Dane - - - 
_-- Fleury had been stensibly 
_-----__...._ 
` , withdraw «7 ì make 
5'(' 
sen o :avise Denmark to i_  the cons .,it.u. ion al. :mz__e
v 
a concessions to Germany, but both Paget and ' Ode,'Ouse suspected 
that privp=.te1y he had given_ contrary counsels. 
"The idea of these gentlemen, ̀t" (the MAW-Danes) "the Gener &i 
(Fleury) "remarked, 'is the One to which we must ultimately have 
recourse» 'What is to become of Holstein ?' ? replied. 'Holstein 
will fall to Germany.' 'And Kiel ?' 'kiel might be neutralised.' 
The language of the General reported above indicates perhaps 
the mode in which the Emperor would like to see the difference 
(G3) 
between Germany and Denmark finally settled." 
M,Drouyn de Lhuys, though too dignified to make the offer Open- - 
v 
y Without encouragement, had made the_ position of Franc P clear 
in his interviews with Cowley. 'is continual protests that 
ranee would never iaceept an,, increase of territory were 
obvious hints. 
"The most curious part of this cony r: ation, " Cowley wrote 
ïat?r, "was an assertion of Drouyn de Lhuúrs that he had 
'J:`ren me to understand that the cooperation of France might have 
been obtained by an intimation from Her ]a j esty' s Government 
that some material svi moral- advantaa_ would necessarily. 
&t7e...to her in the ev*nt of her taking up arms. Now 
0, Denmark, 306 . ur 
ro " O. 
1 
, odehouse ri.Wï.1Gi1. IZ. 
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. 
Now M. Drouyn de Lhuys has on the contrary in his conversations 
d 
L'1. with me invariably asserted that it was a calumny to suppose 
that the Emperor entertained those plans of obtaining the 
Frontier of the Rhine which had been attributed to him ". 
4 / One can understand how M. Drouyn de Lhuys must have longed to 
(.throw the ink -pot at his head) for the attitude of France had 
been clearly _utl .ra-tood by -- aH-tti1e-British -ministers.,, ,and . 
. how ey__himself written four months earlier that France 
was eager for war - "They can now, hardly even for the sake of 
decency, conceal their joy," because war has begun. "It is 
.curious to observe at the same time the vexation caused by 
the seeming determination of H,M;taovernment'not to give material 
assistance to the Danes under present circumstances. . . 
The conduct of Great Britain is condemned in terms not very 
agreeable to English listeners. It would almost seem as if 
some French plan had been defeated by the passive attitude 
of H.M. Government ". And he goes on to speculate, that France 
would have intervened in such a case, and proposed a partition 
between Germany and Scandinavia as the solution, with, of 
course, some reward for herself. 
There seems to have been a point when Russell was 
almost ready to consent to the French terms. In February 
1864 he proposed to Palmerston a French alliance, on these 
terms; 
S?. 
An offer of joint mediation; if the German powers 
404 F. 0 .1('á('1(Q.1530 . 111914. CA3Th're-L5to 17°. 
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refused this, 3ritai.n 
t6 iyid. a squadron to Copenhagen, and France an army corps'to 6D 
theniihine; further measures then to be arranged. This practic- 
ally meant that France viould. be allowed to take at least some 
the districts coveted b,r iapoleon; Palmerston perceived this, 
anc1 so refused Russell, s plan, on the grounds that such gains 
wóuld.be dangerous to Great 3ritain, 
For some time effo rts continued t; be made to induce Prance to 
join in protest or demonstration; bUt it was clearly understood 
Wit the Ccctuisìtions on the Rhine would not be permitted; and 
so France doggedly refused all cooperation. She pointed out that 
the brunt of the war would fall on h er, as she fought on land, 02.6 ,1 
while 3ritish operations would probably be confined to ,he sea; 
she could not risk such a struggle without compensatio__, 
At the same time, she tried to be conciliatory: she hinted that 
she would be content with the cession of Venetia and. t'.1e neutral-6 
v 
isation of some Rhenish districts; possibly even with the first 
qcne. There is no doubt that France believed that the oblig- 
ation of Great :Britain protect Denmark would force her to 
er the "ar, sooner or later, upon the French terms, and she 
Continued to give secret encouragement to Denmark and Sweden. 
V Ia February, Co leer adhr is ed L a Tovernument to avoid even a naval ` 
demonstration, as that would give France all she waa_ ted, and 
because while peace was preserved there always remained a chance 
eat France would change her mind, and onsent to cooperate upon 
British terms.}`) 
F-vociftes- 
wl t F oM Ig(-.Fd..a,c.,`,"24- ° ' 
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It was,hov,Tever,w} ile the Conference was sittinm that the most 
(.definite proposals were :lade b :,r France. On the 5th of June Count 
Randerströrn was horrified by - rumotir ±that a confident ía1 gagg- 
estion was about to be made b - Russia that the whole of Denmark 
should enter the German Confederation. Such a step meant the 
destrixction of vanish natiànality,but it was fe-red that`'the King -U 
eras so. anxious to retain his title in the Duchies that he would 
wish to acc -épt this proposal. Frantic telegrams flew from Stock- 
holm to -London and Paris, and Drouyn de Lhuys, as- much alarmed as 
Manderstr.om, immediately wired to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne 
V 
that France was determined to oppose the plan. 
"Je vous prie de_ porter cette information a la connaissance de 
Sön ccellence 7.T. le Comte Russell, et de lui dire que la France 
serait dispose unir ses forces de terre et de rger á, celles de `'-'4 -. 
la Grande- Bretagne pour emp cher l' accomplissement d'un pareil 
projet,si telle 'tait la pens4e du Cabinet de Loñdres." 
The rumour vas a..4extce contradicted b:T Gortschakoff, but in the 
meantime Russell had sent a reply of the utmost importance. 
"England," he said, equally clsapproved of the reported scheme: 
"rßaìs,i',prás l'opinion de Lord }-tessell, elle ne saurait prendre 
ll.engageraent de t' opposer avec nous, par la force, á l' accpi plisse' 
nient du projet russe, que si, nous etant mis préalablement d' accord 
avec elle sur la frontiere a tracer dans le Slesvig, et cette 
frontiére. une fois accepté par le Danemark nous consentions a 
::::7t6 
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Drouyn de Lhuy6 Teplie 'i t h definite offer of French 
assistance for Denmark - - -at a price. It ìs. much -,sore, difficult, 
he sa7rs, f o r France to join 1n such a war then forrittirrenttC She 
SI cannot limit her action to a naval demonstration. Is she to 
plunge into a war with Germany in order tc save 5, 000 more rien 
for Denmark? "Devant une eventualitede cette nature, l'An -.ie -. 
at terre serait --elle disposer a nous preter un appui illinite? Le- 
Gouvernement de sa. Maj este, en demandant au grënds Corps de 
` U Etat leur concours, aurait a keur expliquer pour quels avantages '2-OC:" 
le sang de la France va couler. Le Cabinet anglais riousinettrait- 
il a marne ±e repondu cette question, la premiere assurement que 
sous serait faite? Pour nous,Prince,notre pense ne s' est. jasais 
A l # arretee sur ce point. Si nous etions. guides par des vues arn- 
v 
io.bitieuses,nous eussions peutetre cherche a mettre u-.' profit Air 
i 
Q occasion presente, en nous trF.i:ca.nt une plan de conduite propre a 
les satisfaire. 7.Tais nous 5ormues demeures. strangers a cet ordre 
de considerations, et nous nous demandons si le Gouvernement 
de sa Majeste 3ritannique' aurait a nous pifpposer quelque corm- 
binaison politique que nous offrirait un dedommagement a nos 
sacrifices." Loyd Russell,he continues,thinks that to threaten 
Gernna lY ' ill be enough. But will not such a threat arouse tion . 
3.1 feeling against- the neutral powers, and produce a strong move- 
rient to resist them9 After the Pó3.ish ìncicient,words, if 
4 not followe f ll  by act ions ovin be fatal to the dignitzi of the 
powers, 
This offer was not accepted. A polite reply, ignoring the con- 
6? 6-) 
-8 made and accepting the French note as a\ refusalLdefifl1te °h 
2071 , , ; 0.6761i; 
,,;)leas the only result. Even now,however,Fra.nce iitd. 
not abandon the idea. Her raters were waiting only till tie vb 
Con less 
shot la break up---an :nt full;V expected-when, they 
beii ved,3ritain leoulcl be forced to take up arras for Denmark. 
Franc e, too, in this oa,s e, would i) e free to act in a way which 7'ías 
at present id , ficuit.Accordingly,v, e find Droueyn de Leauys 
1-9 ericing toe la Tour d' Auvergne, as soon as the failure of the 
t`o t tress 
eras iknown,t-hrt the situation is now changed, France 
con Less 
could no± fight as:ain st nat ionaii sr:1, bu t new that the 
tas proved unsuccessful, she is no lo_iger opposing a nationalist 
taove,aent if she opposes Prussia, and Austria. -- -the war is no leg 
longer a nationalist war,but is threateni 4e trie independence 
of DenraFeek and is being waged for territorial aggrandisement. 
"Vous ne saurions assure-uent envisager aired indifference de sem- 
i 
blables eventualites ?tee devoir du. rsmavernr a nt de I ' :ì - 
Pereur envers la France serait de rie pas deposer lass ar:res, he 
3. goes onv to say, considering the possibility of war, "sans reclarner 
pour prix de ses sacrifices,des corapensations qui pourraient - 
arrene n t r des changements importants iians les üeliìnmta,tio__s ,erri- 
tori.les et par consequent aussi des moaifiatu.res dans les con- 
ditions acte l ,es de l' quilibre génedralig" France does not wish 
to enter into such ar enterprise un l - e ss ' b e absolutely nec- 
essary,;and Drouyn de Lhuys does not think c i.rcuras tans es, grave 
as they are,will oblige her to leave the neut.ralit;; she desires 
to, keep. if Britain declares war on Germany, she will have the 
moral support of France,and France will place no obstacles in her 
'a °, and will take 1 ritl;en engagements to this effect if so 
(.1 sireCl 
_n' 1 ri:n'.g 
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On the 15th of July 3dlle reported a conversation with 
"one of his collegues" of the Diplomatic Corps. "Il n'y a 
encore, selon mon interlocuteur aucun rapprochement réel entre 
b les Cäoinets de Paris et'ld'ici,V et l'on continue à, se defier 
un peu l'un de l'autre. il m'assure que le cabinet Anglais n'est 
pas encore tout -a -fait rassur@ que la Prance n'a pas une 
entente secrete avec la Prusse touchant nos affaires, tandis- 
que le Cabinet de Paris craint toujours que-en cas d'une grande 
crise européenne l'Angleterre ne finisse par se ranger du cote 
des ennemis de la France. Cette defiance mutuelle paralyse et 
continuera malheureusement paralyser our l on gt er ps encore 
toute action commune des deux Cabinets. 11 faut enfin ajouter 
qu'a la fin d'une session parlémentaire orageuse les hommes 
t , d' t g_ , ß V / . z7' a, An l ais sont fati, x s et `peu disposes a lier de nouvelles 
relations politiques." 
"fie cannot with justice complain," wrote Clarendon, the 
3ritish minister whose attitude towards France was perhaps the 
most generous. "He (Napoleon) has the .same right as ourselves 
to pursue an independent course, and to think only of the in- 
terests of France; and he is even now not throwing us over as 
4 letters ..lat.#.ese-- e. . . , +e t°he _t.i' _. , ni 'n a` ` G . 1: ...(. 
i4,) /,L(`.f-J 1:1"".,, 
)33. r , q -z /,i ,/ - 
as we .did him, when in the midst of a, negotiation we publicly 
declared that nothing should ever make us go to way, for :Poland. 
Há was frank enough on the subject with rae and said t=eat, in the 
L7'3 
l,q present peat eful mood of the Frei:sh `recple and the Corps 1 egis- 
latif he could not go to war for a question that did not touch 
the dimity or the interests of France unless there was a pros- 
pect of compensation held out; and as Europe in- general -- -and 
England in particular ---- would he adverse to any such compensat- 
ion, he must he specially cautious not to he accused of provok- 
ing a war that would lead to it. He could not therefore join 
us in using even the language of menace, for he must be prepared 
v la to act, up to his threats, and to have an army öf 200) 000 men ) 
in the field in order to be ready for anything that TJnited 
German.r mip.ht do. 
) "The only fear of the Prussians is a good understanding 
between England and France, and we must try to keep' p a sem- 
blance of it even though it should not really exist. The np eror 
would not dislike that France and &igland should together have 
the credit of -settling the vexed Danish question; but he would 
like much more to see us engaged single -handed in hostilities 
wit7a rieman r, as that would make him master of the situation, 
iL and hQatire, only how v vs e ven ly knows  n he would then pee his power or into 
Which scale he would throw Ills swo.rà. " 
1 
ktpl- Clarendon to Delane, Desent ' s Delane, II, p. 102. 
237. (pp 238 -24e deleted) 
We have therefore unmistakeable woof that France made a 
definite offer to 3ritain, and that this offer was not accepted, 
because the price to be paid for it was considered to be too $ r 
high. 
Had the government declared war on the f Z rst invasion of 
Denmark by the ,erman powers, they would have been able to count 
on a certain amount of support from the parliamentary Opposition 
and from a considerable section of opinion in the countr7. The 
i.' r feeling in favour peace among the mercantile classes, later very '9:11(i 
was not organised r definitely expressed until the simmer of 
1864. The Conservatives at first. declared themselves so much in 
sympathy with Derirna.rk and against Germany, that even when the 
progress of the war had damped their enthusiasm they could not 
_ n t- . -. 4.544e4j0, whole- heart edly 
have condemned d. militant policy. The government would therefore 
have been in a strong position as regards Cabinet mebcaliion,. and 
11OE.t of the malcontent ministers would probably have hesitated 
to carry their otposition as far as resignation. 
1n 1864, therefore, Britain was for the first time con- 
fronted with the question---France or Germany? The dread of 




"England is as powerless an the Continent as she is.presum.- 
ing," wrote the Prussian Chief of Staff, in the brief lull that 
1) 
A ` r V»-- 
followed the Danish u'ar 
Int_.:.ti .oDanish question the men who guided the policy of 
Great ' ritain had been dealing, to a large extent, with an un- 
known quantity; but this excuse was now gone. The events of 136:3-4 
had made clear, not only the aiìmt of 3i snarek, but the methods 
by which he intended to reach his ends, and the richness of the 
resources on which he could draw for support.. In 1859 3ismarck 
had been in ]oncion, and, in his charming soft voice, had enter- 
tained a noble assembly with an account of how he meant to unify 
Germany and establish her as the chief power in rurope. His 
2arers were much amused by the recital - --all except one, whose 
mind, as much that of a poet as of a statesman, _detected the 
ring of truth in those silky tones. "Take care of that man," 
said Disraeli, "He means what he says." 
Tow that scheme., outlined in an English drawingroam, had 
begun to be carried into action; but no one seemed to remember 
that conversation, or draw from Lit conclusions as to the future. 
lie one asked, "That powers, now Denmark has been swept away, 
stand in Bismarck's way ?" nor answered, "Austria, because she 
Prevents Prussia from getting control of Germany; France, bec- 
ause she will oppose (Germany's obtaining a dominant position in 
%ro p e. It 
It was not only hat they took for granted that Austria. and 
Prance were far too strong to be attacked; but they s imply re- 
rQpltl6 to his breather Adolf, 24 (T'nce. 1865. "oltke^,I1, p. 125. 
.9. 
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fused to 'cont e,arla.tP a future so unpleasant. Clarendon' s atti- 
tude was the general one: they dici not want to have anything. 
tore to do with . de -3isr'i rck. T`uch as they disliked hirn, they 
did not fear him, for they regarded hire as li +tle -.(lore than a 
successful gaì'Thler. They did not even trouble to learn horn to 
spell his name, but continued with lordly itdifference to 
address their despatches to "73isaark." They turned their atten- 
tion to home. affairs, and waited for Prussia to settle down 
again. 
It is difficult to decide whether this refusal to face 
facts was due to .coral cowardice or mental incapacity. Probably 
both causes played a part. Deceive .themselves as they might, .'44f 
both political parties were uneasily conscious that they had 
c 
now showed to the "nest advantage; and neither dared to contelrl- 
plate what the -y should do if faced with another sic h problem 
in the near future. The Liberals never admitted that they had 
2) 
made a mistake. The Conservatives, however, had fared the best. 
`,her were in the safe position of critics Afv./i / /// /,41 % w,hej 
2) zsseil's "}recollections and Suggestions contains absolutely u_ no reference to ')enmark, and in his surrey of his foreign Policy the Danish question and the events of 1863 -4 are omitted.. 
3, 
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can be wise after the event. But even they had some unpleasant 
memories. They had, óriginally,been in favour of strong action. 
(s) 
Derby, especially, had greatly sympathised with the Danes. 
pith the advent of the needle -gun, however, their views underwent 
a change. A war with Prussia no loncer appeared in the light of 
a mere rì Grit c. (T.eT eu4 enssiirefl "fl } c IcYiiT ee 
t r- -tec #ie t) They could not risk being called into office 
pledged to a war, to which the queen was opposed, when the 
eoenky was armed with rifles that could outrange and outf ire . 
the British brand. Fortunately they had never definitely pro- 
nounced in favour of a declaration Of war; they had been 
cautious, and Disraeli, who was nursing C ambitious plans,. 
had never wanted to fight. But from this time on they were 
careful to base all their attacks on the Government on the rt-ouind-- 
that the Liberals had got the country into a position where she 
must fíg.ht an unnecessary war or be dishonoured; not on the 
that the government ought to fight, and was afraid to do so. 
They covered their retreat skilfully, and convinced themselves 
and others that they believed in the rights of Germany, and 
so were unwilling to undertake hostilities against that 
country; but - . nfoz°tr 
;- -°-a.. w 
2- 
°f parties, 
as o ther incident 
of this in future, and, rather than face the troublesome 
task °f YJr elf ántinp its .recurrence they tried to forget_ the whole (3pß - -s t*:3 - - -- 
`! _ks .tar1 Ñren.ctori,- .nd, .St. - e.t sla. 
G. 
L1{10 
affaire a5nd, Convtnceci that the sole :mistake had been the strong 
language used by 7,o:t3 kussell, they set themselves to cultivate 
a diplomatic style soft, conciliatory, and carefully non-- coininitta.l. 9. 
,r;:lcy.<..? 3- i ::1.±i'fll?'frt*ti't° :1-4g-cryrt. 
. - i ., - . . . .- ._ . -TJ'.`'.i_°'gY".p(3'`f.°-i{F.'("* 
4314C,lcitf,-1, 1111 , r.Kt;'.t undell-,5"*Q444. 
'Ir:ortkrdwrzy r 
go one regarded :Bismarck as a permanent factor 
(le -P-r. (.153'i a; 
in politics. They knew his unpopularity in , aric:i the 
strong forces arrayed a,ralnst him there. They lookF'Ci. f G?"'+;eird to 
the victory of the Jiberai party, and the establishment of con_ 
atituttonal ;;overn:!ient,wlth its party s;'stert,anci consequent 
,t..enrtsts:4 Cn Trtg444. 
chang.e of .'liniStrlefi, as inevitable. :Bismarck Wier"' sti11 t :rì 
an adventurer `n'ho had seized his Chaince to fish in troubled 
waters. _He was a raacttonary, a "throwback" to. the old marauding 
FreiherrAn, ;îis a;1c, tis tors, who had introduced the methods of 
feudal disorder into ?nodern tt:nes, and snatched,by sheer luck, a 
t9lrlpOrS,ry success. It Th,ci.s the daring of his po.liCy,?:lot its 
aeUth,forasiC,'nt, and that had impressed their mincis. They 
attributed the success which was due to his genius, to happy 
Circumstances. Then,and for some time S.,f'tal`;;*aCil's,'3isìilarc?t SPemÀ.cj 
to the ,majority of :British statesmen Ns a .rec kless,.ciashing 
firebrand of a man, not a cautious plotter. Cons ider, fo r example, 
the o -stlrnate of his character anti policy given by Dilke more 
tnan tUfen F, r ( 5) , years later. 
---__ 
I' 
'144 ";121.e nere ephemeral symptoms of :iSnarcklß(, " Mrrler,14nt. 
cT 
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"To ascribe to him the astuteness of a Machiavelli, or even of 
a TaIi yrr,,;ïci, 1s to rive him credit for, or perhaps`the discredit 
of,a quality he does not possess. His strength is the strength 
of a loan who knows what he wants, and. 1r ]1o, s.lav ing in years past 
played very boldly for high stakes,ha,s happened to win, and 
:Having won is strong enough to hold his on Since that 
victory" (1866) "he has been supreme in Auropeland in a position 
to have little occasion for' the use of cilploraatic artif ce... a 
Perhaps.... through the growth of the military power of Russia 
and of Prance, andthrough the recent revelations of Austrian 
military weakness,Prince Bismarck wil:L be callèd upon'to make to, 
more serious diplomatic efforts than he has ever yet had 
occasion to .put 'forth ? rince 3ismarck, as is, indeed, usual 
with -him in great affairs, never held in secret any different 
language from that of which he nade use in public." 
.f' 1,`ï ' , #+''+S : . '-n._.isGrl+i- ;w--.-L-á 1-3-=--;t 2 ; _ 1 T1 LF3f3-?` -t 
L .11 not =,e -S=1 1(7, If 
rû;iL:1ît,1<; i<i'eas .iapr,?..Cì2?nt 1.1.-i64. -3.34"i's,Znt-e-rnrt,ln7 ? -r'K)-tie. 
g 
t ::?J?. :7ïF3tiTl'.y,T`' "'Tt`;tl`r''C created on the. , -.1 :( (3 tì .._' 1 ., 1 a_1 i f, ( L 1 
atnbassador. at 3er:Lincixiiipm had op4)ort3.1 ,Zties of observing ;4}-/: 
more closely than the home government. Lord 7iapier, a good-. 
natured and gossipy- gant.le:aa.n,.wú.s evidently struck the pF:rso33 - 
ality of the Prussian statesì:lan,for he discr-isseñ it rim/ many 
long rara,):Lin despatches which recall the lntlocen+, prattle of a 
child; though with ail his Bìl 1nte8B hC now and then hits upon a 
truth which appears to have escaped Sir Charles ,Dilke 
"As for Count de 31sï!1arek /lf he we to be judged solely by 
v'That he says he would inspire an. impression of reckless siibitlon 
scarcely qualified by any calculation of danger or comparison 
or advantages. It would,however,be erroneous to estimate the 
Prussian minister Vv. _rîi5 talk. He a.1Liee with inte.àperate. sy)eC= 
ulations and utterances a sound political ju(_grnent and a warra 
(6 ) attachment to his country."44. 
"The chimerical teMperament of the ,1liinis ter may inspire him 
. t N«puh k F G,21.0a: TuussArel / 
248. 
with many strange transitory notions and speeches which will be 
heard with amazement and which will probably leave not a trace 
7) 
behind." 
Of the quarrel between Bismarck and the Liberals, and hie 
illea.l action in the Prussian Chambers, 8) TTapier 
wrote¡è *I do not blame T . de 3is^iarck for not resigning now... for 
I blame him for those previous errors of judgment, times - those 
indulgences of an erratic and / verbearing temperament, .which 
have deprived him now of the means of doing right. The conduct-. 
of _'. de Bismarck at an earlier period has made it difficult for 
him to control the King, and impossible for him, I fear, to con- 
' 
trol the opposition... He does not fear God like the King, and I 13, 
cannot assert that his conscience is very delicate, or that he 
would stick at an act of usurpation if the interest of Prussia 
was at stake; but M. de 73ismarck with all his faults of temper 
has an intelligent generous aspiring mind, he has no absolute 
aversion to 3arliaments, 1 am certain that he would sympathise 
as heartily with the ouse of Commons as an .Triglish Bounty ,: Tory 
meaner would do, it is not Parliaments absolutely but the Prus - 
g) 
sign Parliament that he dislikes." 
"I ar'i bound to add that 1 cannot vouch with confidence 
either for the complete sincerity or for the consistency of T. 
de 7iismarck. It is 'possible that he was disguising his real in- 
tentions under a mask of raoderation...but I think he expressed 
his real sentiments at the moment." 
io) 
to P.O. 14. Oct. 1865 . F.O. Prussia, 5" 8j 
1 
Concerning, supPlies. 
9 'anier to F . . 10 9;;éar 1865. F.O. Prussia, 574. The same 21 A-nril 1865. F. O. Prussia, 574. 
ILL 
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1855,hS.d rti S';Lli more vague conception of t!143 i.1n1sterls alms 
er 
and character. he,refers -to tspfr?,.-^-knesS 1'7.12.ch almos+, anounts 
to a failing," and seems to have i)a.Lievr=d that Bismarck had no 
object beyond estahlighing a fe,t so11(i,autocrâ.tic little Prussia 
oll lines which the Great _+lector might have conceiveci,for when 
the war with Austria was over,he speaks of "changes which. Count 
4 
ismarck in his most elated moments never anticipated, and which 
have taken both him and the Prussian nation ,r surprise. Indeed 
60 great and so unexpected, " he goes on\ to say, "!lave been the 
Success of the Prussian arms that it is not unlikely to form an 
sabarri.ssïìient and even a danger to the political s,rsteìi which 
(iD 
Count Bismarck is amtng to establish." 
Mcrler, too, a man of a very diff erent stamp, actually spoke of 
3isn arek, in 1366, as "a straw floating upon the current of public 
opinion, "and though he described him, about the same time, as "clle 
Y 
of the most sinister of f'iTures that h.s ever .r)e.en painted. on 
*2-ie canvas of history," he see)Zs to have still regarded him as a 
noliticsl plrate,a-.tort of Richard 111 who would have his brief 
hour of triumphant crzIne, and fall before the irresistible ad- 
vancing forces of enlightened slbere,lisra. 
There is something pathetic in that conviction of the most 
high-minded men in the British political worl(:1---:men like ]iorier 
and lon---- la,.renr ±ha.t C oi'role t y success could never attend any- 
so immoral. as the Lo Lic; r of 731s"1ar ck : that right must 
1 'r1ul2;jn ii7 ;_1e enCt, an(i that "blood and iron" having ruled awhile 
must pass at,,,a,.r before the stronger forces of justice, liberty, 
a.;ld Peace. , `The first success of Bts>íl.rck'a .oLicT had thrown 
pVel`.rjlF`llJln 
, iri to a strani-fr: confusion. IRIrLS this new Germany; an 
*lb i ., ¿i..fO.r)r>. 




ene'v in the mask of friend, or a friend masked like an enemy? 
The easiest was -as to forget all npleasant incidents, and 
remember only that they were at least to have a Strong Prussia 
to hold Fmnce in check, and that the means b :r which this 
result was Obtained was not their business. "L *hatever be the 
result it is satisfactory two reflect that the interests of Eng.. 
lancare not deeply or directly involved,"---this is the parrot - 
cry,of the diplomats, as the second phase of the struggle opens. 
Those of finer moral perceptions, however, were tilled with 
regret. To gorier and his friends it was as if the country they 
loved had soiled her panà;he. Marier eagerly repudiated, for'. 
Ger.anft, 3ismarck' s policy. "The one thing for Which, therefore, 
more than all other things, I conceive Bismarck ought to be cx- 
craLca, 1s nib '1ttV .t.liG Il.7 t,llc a -tjrk: ub f !lib u.ai a., .o wrJ L. .aa` 
dividuality on the political canvas now unrolling before «]urope 
so utterly disfigured the true outline of the picture, that not +7t 
only public opinion, but the judgment of wise and thoughtful 
12) 
men, is almost sure to go wrong." 
The sensations of these,.rnren, as they saw their dreams of 
a strong and united Germany being made real by one whom they 
despised/ 
12) :°:orier, 11, p. 71. 
25f. 
and ,'',IO;P Methods .'1t):.' execrated' painfully confuse(l. The 
first impulse r"as to deny °3is:1'clrck' s success ---to say trie,t In 
"'RS really hindering, not heaping, the cause. He was "incalclzlablÿ 
injuring.. Prussia's position in Germany to the great detriment of 
Europe. When looked at by other eyes than those blinded by 
,uccessfiil diplomatic gymnastics nothing can appear more hope- 
lessly poor .gild unfruitful than the statesmanship o`' Prussia in 
Germany for the last six months, or \.ore worthless than the cash 
in hand when compared with the giga. -tic profits which she might 
have :made out of the chances which the last twelve months have 
placed into (sic-) her power." So .Morier wrote to Russell in 
(t 
March 1+-165. eater `s le endeavoured to persuade 
himself that. Bismarck's success, now unmistakeable, was due to 
rr7duall.t aban(Io ̂ nine his old aims gnu 1nethods,and - 
a8optu ti-hose of the Liberals. At present, howev?r,Morier 
still leaned to the view that 
. 
3ismarck iras courttnfr disaster, 
A 
and that his appearance was a transitory one,tnr;_luh IQlght y)oSslñly 
hinder, possibly help, the ood. cause, 'out which could not perraivn- ¡ 
ently- tf cet it r t n t ,e1 .::Y- 3ì ̂ i L'c, :oAri~r °Y`; . i a. '.+ ' 
e9*3.:ze ofl ï 1 Q í'-1 q (1 
A.4A,)--actp; ,.,_te Jun ifgT... . . 6-Hs-r3a,ry 
----a f 1 .....y.i}?--._ar r?.yr ; '_ri r- 1F{.^.--. n-=- saw t r3443^ ALYIa 
31f-"Rqntc-:i`{7-`,."Aol,l-t---f±rTht I n5}41. 'int: si l 4 f ttl' +xlü. `:_ 11 s , - 
4-rá- rmi.-rrt.rti- r F.-3 tt sh: I r i. - t) r;--+i-ti i`' 
r 
"The despairing feature of the :natter fr ! a the violent .. _ ; 1.. 1s I.e tri 
conflict of '1.2r brain and my hea.rt,nly heart being all of it with 
6 7m.PrOAIÒ.57. Private letter, 3r - 
Z52- 
these people, and 'njr brain altop.ether on the other side. i-riare 
sfj,zr it will seem inexplicable to you, t:2a.f, knowing 3l.smarc,'!C as 1 
do,any portion of me, still less my brain, should be in the camp 
he has stamped out of the reluctant,peace- loving Pr tssian 
earth to carry out his policy of Violence and wrong. This u+ill 
appear all the more inexplicable to you when you reflect that I 
log 00 
alive been heryttrriiig the last twelve months and have had every 
opportunity of cc)n1rincingrnyself of the perfect ipyalty and 
honesty of Kensdorff' s policy well, notwithstanding all this 
I ß,n1 profoundly Convinced that the complete victory of Austria 
in this war....would be the greatest misfortune that could 
happen to Europe generally., and to Germany, Italy, and Austria in 
particular This work of consolidation" (of Germany) "can- 
9s9 
riot take place otherwise than through and with. Prussia hence ,?3- 
however condemnable the springs which set in motion the actions 
of Prussian stià.teslìleri,any increase of power and any Success of 
ili) 0h.) Prussia remains a clear gain to Germany." 
a'14.r 0-f.--r7-.343-;râ-t.jial.(:f}--4P*r 1:17771r17.7 .141 s - _) ) Li V ;j-;°-f!*44e*?-ak.m -.f-.,-..wt, _.A# 
(to- _ . -K?: fttn44,r) -Another, and a larger 
- 
oodg of political opinion in 3.ritain decided to ignore :3isìriFìrcti6 
sins because t-,er thought a strong Prussia (they scarcely be- 
lieved as vet in a strong Germany-) vTould serve the interests of 
3ritâin. a c,i in re?;rdin* 731G ',( _,ck as an el1ti,-AnAr.l 
phenr,npnon-_-"thifi 
season s daffod " --who r1iE + 1 a lit t ed 
}Ile short reign without serioits }"iíLr,-n being done. 
rrIb $± Vienna. ` P;lorier to j ,1,.Jt ,ad;r Salisbury, 24.*. 6. Tr 1,T] P. 6,g. 
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British government `r'er° willing to let bygones 13e bygones---1-' `4. 
their really must be bygones. All should be for, iven, if the 
erring one i &ould now return to the fold --- -but there must be no 
attempt to repeat these undesirable escapades. That would reopen 
the whole question,which was what the. Liber.4.1; Lroverri;nent dread- 
ed. They had weathered the parliamentary crisis brought about 
by their mismanagement of Slesi ig- Holstein,better than might 
have been expected, owing to .he headlong eloquence of Palmerston, 
and they were still in office: but t_lo - could not stand another 
shook of the salve kind, ,1 --1ad--` 3so- 1ved. to be more - cEàutiott's 
t t +,3yr r k3-ey-< Y-'e£ erred. to hay e no ,;e-.Cd for -ea-li t =tan All 
their influence with Prussia, t7aerefore,was directed to pressing 
L 
upon that state the need for careful going. Prussia, they urged, 2s. 
should be content to consolidate what she had Frained,and run no 
further risks. These counsels iv eraa4 ' more frequently offered, 
When it became clear that Prussia and i'"ustria were likely to 
squabble over the spoils of war. 
"The true policy of Prussia is now to secure what she ha 
galned, to be satisfied with moderate advantages, to avoid great 
adve }1tlres and to close an account which at this moment exhibits 
a satisfactory b lance in her favour!" s vr 
It 'iras not that they had, even now, any real fear of Prussia 
herself. 
The swiftness and completeness of her triumph had been a6, 
attributed to Danish weakness rather than to her own strength, 
and though their Opinion of her military resources had gone up 
113 c . ; - 1 7.x.65. O :Prussia 
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with a jump, they still regarded her as infinitely inferior, as a 
military power, to Prance, and even to Austria. The reports of 
the military attachés at Paris and at Berlin did not counteract 
this impression, and the military attaché at Vienna, as far as his 
knowledge of the state of the Austrian army was concerned, might 
as well have been in Pekin. when, in April 1865, Prussia 
declared her intention of making Kiel a naval 'case for a new s7. 
Prussian fleet, Lord Napier reported in a tone of patronising 
contempt, on the country's military and. naval resources. 
"If the proposal of the Cabinet of îI:. de Bismarck be dis - 
cussed simply with a view to proximate and practical utility it 
1G11t be condemned. The Prussian army is far from perfect, the 
'soldiers are ill -fed and ill -paid, the land defences of Prussia 
are incomplete, t'1e railways of Prussia are in need of 
and state assistance, the civil functionaries of Prussia are 
insufficiently remunerated, the educational institutions of Prussia 
an starred, there are many crying necessities for which the 
credit of the state mig ht be equitably involved and beneficially 
devoted.... 
a.1 . fore 
- o as t _ 
44).et1-1 e war f i e-mtt--on 
4,41g.ea:.e of the-f-ancy 
44'44e--and. spciAnt 
- dtk-try; 
-e t ard4---a.t-tsaok.--a- 
°°ptSrsu r'_ !a-lc-1. cap tur:-tlie 
There is H. 
Ad 1)\T some, ?nthtx-- .E.*-' 
of 
coneir att itune to Prussia, therefore, was still one 
his 




itios- -this tirne at the expense of us-tria or the s German 
states----by the aid of an alliance with France. Nanoleon 111 
^.ould thA-.-,,+,hezr fea.red,usQ the impetuous and. inexperienced 
Prussian minister as a tool, t o be flung, aside v''-nPn all was over. 
Aizstria would be crushed, Prussia. duped and defrauded, and ?rance 03. 
:ts;vu Wretift, 
_ -------- --- - - - - . lt would be left 
must be re'aemoered t_nat they estimated the capacity o 7 apoleon 
much more highly than that of 3ismarck. He was still to them the 
mysterious and Machiavellian figure of the coup d' état and of 
isTaVeasa&z 
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"I learn," wrote Napier in October 136N, "From a respectable 
source that M. de Bismarck ha.s addressed a private letter to one 
of his 'collea;,ues in which he describes a conversation with the 
Emperor of the French. The Prussian minister relates that he 
broached to His Imperial Majesty the project of the annexation 
of holstein, and. that the ui .peror listened to hie a.rguement (sic) 
with benevolent reserve. we can imagine the eccentric volubil- 
ity with which M. de Bis ?aack would develope his sanguine 
schemes, and the covert irons and silent amusement of the subtle 
sovereign." 
%ring to tali 
scene t 
gov erilae nt 
carious reversal of parts, exemplified by the 
described 'oar the imaginative Lord 7\Tapier, the home 
-tale ..%f/Y,W..-. 
-:. and 
aiu._ w cc..a-> 
4' Ord -..a to /6-0-1 s.smarck 
content and quiet, and so deprive -iapoleon of any chance of mak- 
ing his own profit from iuropean disorders. During the first 
3e^. 
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bart of 1865, therefore, vee fina that 3rlt 15h despatches nsselme a 
raaarkably friendly tone towards Prussia. There were no more 
reproaches and rebukes. 3is:iarck was informed that "Her Majesty's 
iovern3uent has no other view in this affair than to see Germany 
united and powerful and that the eventual settlement of the 
Duchies should be such as would leave Austria and Ge mant! satis- 
L 
fied,and Prussia invested with those local rights and privileges, 
which might be legitimately requisite for her own interQs$t/anci 
400' 
the coiculion defences" 
-i. 9 .N 
tiTi_-4. Bismarck was quick to turn the change of sentiment to 
his ov,m_purpo5es. Sir Andrew Buchanan reported from St Peters- 
burg, "1 have reason to believe that Prussian diplomatic agents 
i- 
to represent Her Majesty's Government as indifferent 
to the future disposal of the Duchies of Slesvig and Holstein 
and that Count Bernstorff reports ",'our Lordship to consider the 
annexation of these Duchies objectionable merely because such a 
measure nj1Ltt encourage an aggressive pclicy on the part of 
Z 2-a7,Lnireftruir 
France." ']Ieanwhile ljusr looked eagerly to the day when the 
Slthvtg- Holstein question should be, at long last,f inally settled, 
and any pretext for French interference with German affairs 
r`"ov. cl: and it was, therefore,with growing uneasiness and dis- 
pleasure that they saw that question drag on, month after month, 
er 
ga. 
without any definite agreement being co.ne to, and indeed,with an g3, 
incteaHi,lg 
asperitir and irritation visible in the relations of 
the 
+'^'o Great German Powers. It could now be seen that Prussia 
wanted full control of both Duchies, and that she would not. 
%lssiá.577, 17 `3.'1351,1% . `.y.1Sa.678 - 4 
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permit any prince to suecee re without h1sr sur- 
rendering his sovereign rights into her hands. Austria, on the 
other hand, favoured the August enúurg claimant , for she counted on 
thereby. obtaining the support of the minor German states. The 
Augustsnburg s :accession, in fact, was the. only hope for Austria. 
She could not continue to occupy and administer the Duchies in- 
definitely,arnd the possession of- either or both tbf them would 
by nerely a burden to her; but if she withdrew from the joint 
occupation,without seeing an independent ruler established them, 
sqe was simply giving permission to Prussia to seize both the 
prolinces, and would find herself in the position of having :Made 
a war in order to give Prussia. an expensive present. Austria 
'oeEan to see that she had made a foole,of herself, and kechberg, 
7%, 3ismarckts admirrna,nd liais dupes ̂ 'as dismissed, to be suideeded rif 
the honest though not brilliant llenstiorff. )4a*awii -aade a 
sincere effort to come to an agreement with Prussia, and' was 
ready to wake very large concessions;but Bismarck blocked every 
'Proposal on one excuse or another, at the same time accusing 
Austria, at one time of had faith, at another of *he wish to force 
a war upon Prussia.. 
j-4-- 
3G 
;tt ; ---tr---*,- ' .. r tA t c nt , i r .e-ars as to that-A*, -P " 
S ÿ, 
' twhils 1f3. y- t Yr.á ,_.t3o p o s-t<pc-n.M : G r 1 s 1. E; 1 ) ,, fi 71 --6`A"143^44) ci*r9...11ë 
8.1711711.1`1±tiOW -Au stria into tk3.(:il 1 1 1BS.. 81 rSeYht:re. = 
11 )111_0444. Wa10 l.%.t.., I left Hi ExcellenCz under the l,tprc:sslon that as long as no ' 
external agency on the part of foreign gove.rin;aents or on the 
Dart of the Diet is int.rotiuced) t}1 e direct relations between 
z51, 
Austria and Prussia are not likely to be seriously affected by 
what, has taken place I am persauded of the pacific inclin- 
ations of M. de 7,3israarck in this nic tter....an(i 1 believe that 
barring external intervention the relations of lie two Cabinets 
aight for a .length of time ne continued in this \provisional 
state undistur ed,yet we ought riot to be blind to the dangers 
which might be raised by irritations from without.... lt cannot 
'oe to the interest of Prussia to bring French arms and French 
influence across the Rhine. On the other hand it seems demon 
strable that the Prussian government has, even in regard to 
Austria,as cogent Igotives for coIiin, to terms as for keeping the 
question open. - --It is the fashion here to say that the longer 37 
the settlement of the Duchies is de:la: red the more the views of 
Prussia will be advanced." TTapl' er, however, sloes net agree with 
this. "No doubt also Austria ?night )'' by an unlucky conjunction 
in her foreign affairs be driven to 7)wrehase the neutrality and 
alliance of Prussia by large concessions. The inclinations of the_ 
plulation of the Duchies will not, however, alone determine the 
question. As dong as there i an Austrian corporal or an Aust- 
in Slesvig -Holstein all the popular wishes in 
the world prompted or supported from Berlin or by the force of 3 
circumstances will not annex the Duchies to Prxseia,nor is the 
expectation of disturbance in Europe a safe or just basis for 
.political calculation. Europe iS remarkably quiet.-----Austria 
may not experience any perplexity on the side of *Hungary or 
Italy for vars to come. what figure would the Prussian Cabinet 
cut uni' joint r e prolonged and pacific /occupation of the Duchies, 
valnl.'. whistlinn for a political storm to expand the sails of 
260 
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their ambition? They would offer a spectacle of disappointment and 
defeat. The Prussian Cabinet has made high pretensions and has 
aroused great expectations.... These pretensions and these suc- 
cesses are now a,t stake. If the Prussian minister be moderate 
and practical he may secure much of what he has aspired to and, 
obtain credit for wisdom as well as for courage, if he grasps at 
vast and hazardous aims he may possibly succeed but he may not 
improbably sacrifice his own increasing reputation the credit of 
his Sovereign and the interests of his country. Fortune will not 
be nailed to any mast, she has been remarkably constant to 
:Prussia for the last two ? rstt but e may possibly be on the 
(l!' V 
point of passim to 1Iienn 11 
39, 
Lord Napier's epigram,atic and metaphorical style is not always 
easy to follow, but the drift of his remarks is clear. He thought 
3ismarck was postponing a settlement until . uropean disturbances 
made one more favourable for Prussia possible. He was so far 
right in this; but he did not understand that Bismarck intended 
to make sure that there were disturbances, and that he would not 
be content to wait in hope of them. 
In the late surmner tension became acute, and actual rumours of 
v'ar began to fly about, including one peculiarly horrible tale-- - 
iz., that Prussia was making overtures to Italy for. an alliance. 4I. 
The 13ritish government, therefore) were correspondingly relieved 
711.1en the meeting of the two sovereigns and their. ministers at 
Gasteein 




settlement. These hopes were 
when t Convent ion of (Tast ein was published. T -91 " 
liv a showed on its face that it was not likely to be long- 
and was , :in fact, said to be only a provisional arrangement. 
1 ?.,g5, F.O. Prussia 594. 
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was (12.440-14 too good to be true. Prussia, fresh from a great 
litary success, and an even more impressive diplomatic triumph, 
consented to an arrangement which left her, in possession of 
esvig, indeed, but with that province separate:. from her by an 
trian Holstein, which would cripple any attempt to develope 
new province and the Prussian naval power. On the other 
nd, Austria was saddled with a Holsteinruseless to her, and 
parated from her other territories by the length of Germany. 
t the slightest concession had been made to Zibere.1 public 
inion in Germany, or the wishes of the Duchies themselves. 
chlesviig- Holsteinism" had received its deathblow. As for the 
rince of Augustenburg, Prussian lawyers, burrowing in the 
hives, did not take long to prove that his claim was entirely 
thical, and that Christian IX had been indisputably the legal 
it to both Duchies - -- until, of course, he surrendered his 
vereignty to Prussia and Austria after the war. 
Indignation was extreme on the publication of the Convention. 
rieks of agony arose from the "Coburg Clique ", and Victoria 
SO enraged that she was ready to declare war on the spot. 
Germany,too,ha.tred of Prussia rose to fever -heat: but it was 
the Duchies themselves that the greatest consternation was 
Whatever may have been the object of the Schleswig - 
olsteiri Party, it may be confidently stated that it was not 
n`laticn to Prussia. And now the Duchies, whose indivisibility 
ad been 
so solemnly protested, were severed unscrupulously by 





The British representative in Berlin was first informed of 
the Convention by the honeyed tongue of Bismarck, who painted it in 
such roseate hues that his victim actually conveyed to him the 
official congratulations cf Great Britain, ---- and thereby earned 
v 
a sharp rebuke for placing in an awkward position !mord Russell, 
vìho had already penned what Benedetti used to call "une depnche 
comminatoire ". This document, sent as a circular round Europe, was 
not tc be presented to the foreign governments officially; but 
ö 
v 
as it was published in the press it caused a good deal of 
comment, for Russell had expressed his indignation and disappro- 
val in nuite his old manner. 
"It might have been expected that when treaties were thus 
annulled the popular feeling of Germany, the wishes of the 
People of the Duchies themselves, and. the opinion of the majority 
of the Diet so explicitly put forth by Austria and Prussia in 
the sittings of the Conference of London would have been recog- 
nized in their place. In this manner if one order of rights had 




people moult: have' been set up, and that title might havre been 
received with respect and maintained with a prospect of perman -- 
grce,-- ---But all rights, Old and new,ir} ther founded on the 
solemn compact of sovereigns or on the clear expression of ethe 
popular will have been set at nought })y the Convention of Gas - 
tein/ and the dominion of force is the sole power acknowledged 
or regarded.----Violence and conquest are the bases on which 
alone the partitionin4Powers found their agreement. - -- -Her 
V 
:,iajesty's Government deeply lament the disregard thus shown to i7- 
the pri iciples of public rirhtpand the legitimate claims of a 
people to be heard as to the disposal of their own destiny." 
Unsatisfactory as the arrangement Was, it seemed to have re- 
Ailed the danger of war for the present. Soon,hotr.;ev;r,t}1e 
aria is h government were azain alarmed by {i / suspicions 
that - isma.rck was on the point of concluding a secret treaty 
I. 
with France, in order to win : apoleon's support for the annex - 
ation of Holstein also to Pru.ssiarin return for the cession of 
the ?thenish provinc:es to France. Lord T:apier,however, n th.ough 
W 
of " romantic disposition, of altogether blind to what was `'-°` 
going on before his eyes, anti he did not believe that Bismarck 
Would sell the Rhine for Holstein. "It would be unjust to 
suppO6e 
" he wrote, "That M. de Bismarck would lightly relinquish 
the ?moine provinces of ?russia for the sake of Slesvig -Holstein 
`.... .l can well believe that M. de Bismarck would coast emplo.t e 
a °light rectification of the Rhine frontier in exchange for 
french (sic) connivance in Slesvig -Holstein but nothing like a 
consirie,,able 
cession of territory. ln the fertile imagination 
of i1. 
rie 3ismarck scheires for territorial redistribution have no 
4nunt_ often been revolved,but 1 am satisfied that' if he has 47. 
2124 
contemplated the partition of Rhenish Prussia between France 
and some German state it has been in exchange for the consol- 
idation of the `mole of North Germany under the Prussian Crown 
not for the acquisition of outlying dominions which he believes 
he can secure on much cheaper terms. My own impression i. that 
Bismarck will only promise to respect the wishes of Holstein 
and pos, 'bly cede back North Slesvig,but he might not keep his 
car 
'promis . " 
This is not an altos* ether had forecast of what occurred: but 
the British government had not yet allowed the consolidation 
of "North Germany to enter into their calculations. However, 
the existence of a secret treaty was persistently denied by 
Drouen de Lhuys, the winter passed with perfect tranquillity in 
Gemnany, save that 3i srmarok and the Liberals were quarrellling 
in the Prussian Chambers ; and the a arra gradually died away, 
7nA/Mts 
Other yua; s called attention. The Turkish 
&apire was RS usual in a scrape, ana events in the Danubian 
principalities were pointing to revolution. At home an impor- 
tant change took place in the government. Lord. Palmerston died, 
Lord ktssell became Prunier, and his place as Foreign Secretary 
°as filled by the Earl of Clarendon. 
The change was, to all appearance, not a favourable one for 
Prussia. Clarendon was a man of no very striking ability or 
force of character, but one who charmed all "Tho knew him by the 
ioftiness) turitntind sweetness of his disposition. He had felt, 
almost 
as much as Morier, the cruel disappointment when the 
Polley of Bismarck had disgraced the high aims of. the German 
, r), p a 7 " , _,c21.1 3 . F 5 . 
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Liberal party: but he had not the vitality, the recuperative 
power, of the younger man, and he had forgotten Germany for the 
abhorrent e 
moment in his of Bismarck and what 3ismarck stood for. It 
is a curious and almost tragic spectacle to observe the resentN 
ment and desire for revenge which animated this high- minded and 
over -refined old man, from the moment when he flung his passion- 
ate "Have a care how long this will last!" at Bernstorff when 
the London Conference broke up, and through the ensuing :ears, 
when he fought his second, losing. fight with Bismarck. Clarendon 
stood, perhaps, in the moral elevation of his character, above 
most pf his colleagues; but, as the prospect of war drew near, 
none of them watched with such burning eagerness as he to see 
Prussia made to pay for what she had done. This apostle of 
peace was almost hoping for war. :ben as he made his proposals 
for a reconciliation of the enemies, his suppressed excit eint . 
burst forth in strange indiscretions and contradictory state- 
ments. From the signing of the rastein Convention, the attempts 
of the Foreign Office to soothe the susceptibilities of Prussia 
cease; there are no further assurances of sympathy and friend- 





Shortly before the Convention of Gastein was signed, and while 
war was in the air, Mensdorff had confided to Lord. Bloomfield 
that he had ha.d warning that Prussia was making; secret approaches s4. 
to Italy for an understanding in carne of war; "and though he 
uas not an alarmist, he must admit matters were becoming each 
more serious, and Austria must be looking to her interests.." 
The idea of a Prusse- Italian Alliance was sufficiently start- 
ling to !rake: 3ritish statesmen incredulous of its possibility. 
It was a very obvious step on the part of Prussia, and yet, to 
tre]n it as so peculiarly horrible! Nothing coulfi be more 
natural than that the two states which had a quarrel with Austria 
should come to a mutual understanding, but the sight of Michael 
ana Lucifer as brothers -in -arms could not have been more 
astounding. Confusion! Whither was this spectre of 'Ia_tirìnalism 
'- :adinig a devoted British Public? Lie simplest thing was certain - 
ill to turn one's eyes away from this distressing spectacle of 
"oung Italia seduced by the n'endish boor, and refuse to credit 
ossibzlity. 3i -s. is.what Russell inclined to do, :out-he. 
-`rtrieless unpleasantly perturbed: 
The first hint of a. ssi>l Prusso- ̀Italian rapprochement 
cants in May, 1865, when Elliot, British minister at Florence, 
rote to his r'overrunent, "the Prussian minister at this court has been 
instructed to show the wishnsfrhibegovernment to 
put the rela- 
tions of the two countried upon a footing of .greater 
intimacy 
than has hitherto prevailed between them. Count Usedom 
is person- 
ally most favourably disposed towards italy,but his government 
have not till now appeared to share his sentiments." 
There was, however, as yet no real dread in London of an 
Anetro- Prussian War, and probably no importance was attached to 
later; 
this information, butAwhen a crisis seemed imminent, and was post 
- 
poned by the Convention of Gastein, such rumours became more in - 
'Tr Ferries who,was officiating 4 
- 
g
during E11iot's absence,reported that Usedom had said to him, 
that if Prussia and Austria went to war,he would "not advise 
s7. 
this government to st ir,because the war, if confined to the 
question of the Duchies,wouL-. not : st long. Austria would be 
sure to yield very soon to our demands, peace in Germany would be 
quickly restoed, and then Italy if she had taken the opportunity 
of this quarrel to attack Venetia would find herself exposed 
alone to the vengeance of Austria." fíerries,however,was not 
convinet,a of Usedom's sincerity,and added, "It appears however 
that cc r1unications in a different sense were made - --I ari unable- - 
to say exactly when - - -by the Prussian legation here to the Ital -s1. 
ian government. - - -I more than once tried .to ascertain in what 
light General la Marmora viewed the state of affairs in Germany 
hut t always found him reserved and unwilling to .say anything 
bTrond merely commonpiace remarks... This morning 1 found Gener- 
al la Marmora much more communicative than on previous occasions ..., s 
4114 Rs he broached the subject of the recent dispute between 
uetri ---- a and Prussia I took the opportunity to ask him what. line. 
F23) 
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his government would have been disposed to take,;a e a . e and whether 
any endeavours had been Ya -i,1e by Prussia to persuade him to take 
part in the conteste It would have been very difficult,he rep - 
1ied,with a strong e)tiphasis on those words,for Italy to abstain 
from doing so. He then told me that Prussia had indeed made 
overtures to which he had replied that if a definite proposal 
were submitted to the Italian Government they would declare 
their intentions " ?tea Marmora went on to say that he would 
have cortSidereu F ;13 a necessary ;3ec urity "pan undertaking on the. 
part of Prussia not to lay down arms until Italy had obtained 
the cession of Vrenetia.." Herries believcd that the coolness and 
caution of la Marmora had g iven offence to Prussia,afid caused 
some personal feeling against the General. " "I have often been 
struck by the \jtterness of his" (1?sedom) "criticisms,his eager- 
ness to find fault with the present ?ntni.sters for all they Rave 
done %ind. all the7 have left undone, and the very sli ?!Ming - - -I 
flight a,bnost say contemptuous - -- manner in which he has spoken 
of them" 
During the winter a lull came, and the alarm about Italy was 
almost forgotten in ., ondone It was the general opinion that a 
peas p.u1 solution would be the ultimate result, partly because 
bD. 
3is aarck would not really dare to go as far as a declaration of H. 
War., and. partly because Austria was earriF st17 9.nd sincerely 
desirous of peace, She had, during the first half of l8ó5, swam.- - 
open one insult after another in the meekest manner. _Sven :8is- 
marck's abrupt announce:!ient' that he was goirg to turn the port 
of Kiel (which wás supoöaect ;o be in the joint control of the 
two governments) into a Prussian naval base, had been passed 
with o;r a protest. 
-43-6747/ NV0u4 4F0, 11 q.a11 1óJ. Ó, AtG.1 73, 
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"Austria seers ready to make any concession rather than ad- 
opt a course that might lead to a, serious complication, " Bloom.- 
field had reported in April 1865. ï :`ensdorff was very hopeful, 
and was convinced that .isnarck would not push matters to ex- 
tremity; though just before the (astein meeting he had become a 
little anxious. His continual song was, "Prussia-. was only trying 
how far she could go.... M. de Bismarck was becoming more reas- 
onable... These proceedings were no doubt meant to intimidate 
and to make believe: that Prussia was thinking of supporting' her 
projects in the Elbe Duchies by armed intervention if Austria 
persisted in her present course of resisti2g }these plans, but 
he could not believe Prussia was serious." 
Bismarck's visit to Biarritz in the autumn of 1865, and his &\ 
interviews with 'Tapoleon and his ministers caused a fresh alarm, 
but this too passed off, as nothing happened, and Bismarck's 
own language was most conciliatory. He assured Napier that he 
mad not quarrel with Austria about such a trifle as Slesvig- 
Holstein. "IF she treated him fairly he would adhere to the 
Austrian alliance and would accept the Duke of Oldenburg or the 
prince of Augustenburg or anyone who might be selected under 
26) 
the terms which Prussia had a right to expect." 
These auspicious omens, however, did not long continue. A 
tone of asperity soon reappeared in the Prussian correspondence bV 
25) 3loomfield to P.O., 8 June, 13 July, 25 July 1865. F. O. 
Austria, 684 -5. 
20 Napier to F.0., 2 Jan. 1866. F.O. Prussia, 573. 
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erjce j `acc%t=s e(i of fosteririg Au?Ust enbllrg intrigues in 
the 7U.chies,ani:i the accusation wCO.,G not without base,fO=C the 
:Prince of Au±71stenburg was residing in Holstein and plaining his 
woes to all the 'rTOrlc?. Prussia demanded that he should be ex- 
pelled,a'1d Au-trla replied that she could not turn a German 
prince out of a German province without distinct evidence a.galnt 
3isî11E3,rck, also, threatened to revive the question of f'ederc,.l 
reform in Germany----a fruitful source of disagreement. Rumours 
of war were again in the air: Bismarck was seen to he bent on a 
yuarrel, and the hopes of peace were now founded on the peace- 
loving diSpos7.tion of the !rinF? of PrusSla,17,'ho, it was said,t,TOuld 
never allow ili?ase.lf to be dragged into a war with Austria. The 
governments of thoSe days had a pathetic faith in the pacific 
spirit of this old gentleman, though it in variably proved a 
broken reed, and they eagerly swallozrTed his benevolent platitudes.. 
3iß1li r.c!{ knew- his to ral master better: he was aware that the 
King! s love for peace was as nothing when weighed in the balance 
with his hereditary Hohenzollern greed of gain. ? ' annetit;__Tri_?_lt 
°,'Q IT1- lbraan+ 
Th :i1;-1r.Q,_C?owever,was sufficient to make Russell and Clarendon G6. 
talcs what steps they could think of in the interests of peace. 
TheY politely suggested that Austria should. abandon ":olste in to 
the importunities of Bismarck, .just as a nurse makes a docile 
child give up its toys to a naughty howling one. "1. observed to 
Prince Metternicia, " said Lord Cowley, "that 1 did not see that 
the annexation of the Duchies should necessarily become a cause 
of ur217. 
unless Austria had determined to make it a casus belli. 
Thä 
elaal1 Austrian force in the Duchy of Holstein with no line 
1 
z7z 
of' communication with Austria could not possibly prevent, the. 
forcible seizure of that Duchy by Prussia. It would not be nec- 
essary and certainly would net be politic in Prussia to invade 
or attack Austrian possessions in order to secure the object 
C` 7) í K 1 
'_ich M. de Bismarck had in view..." This rather vague 
speech appears to mean that Austria was to clear out "bag and 
baggage" and make a present of Holstein to Prussia,without any 
a,rrangenent being concluded as to the subsequent relations of 
the two states in Germany, It was rather unfortunate that all 
J' 
ibhe /proposed plans involved Austria's immolating herself on the 
tatar of peace. The Italian -Prussian alliance was a gain in the 
air,and both Britain and France were pointing out to Austria 
how she might make a friend of Italy. l t was all very well, how- 
ever, to tell Austria th -tt it was to her own best interest to 
give up Venetia, and that she would be intrinsically stronger 
without her Italian provinces. To Austria it appeared doubtful 
whether the severance of Venetia. were,not a health -giving Oper- 
a.t;.on,b,rt the first sign of her dissolution, Siie L,Lc,u }.lt 
e --w -4 -.- a-3 -- -t-e -- s- w-- aan-- a-:nauat- -et seI-- e -ie of iik tie 
. She was, it appeared, to hand over 
67, 
Venetia to Italy and Holstein to Prt.,saia, all in the cause of 
peace: but what was she to fret in return" Austria was in no we 
hzshful in stating what she would like: she would only consider 
it worth to cede Venetia, she told treat Britain, if s`?e got 
a lice of Silesia in exchange. 
This Was+.a.11 vary good,but Silesia belonged to Prussia, and 
Bsell `iid not contemplate pu ",tinír the screw on Bismarck. This 
rtance.l'o 170 . I 1-1,,sa0-L) pus, 
2 
213. 
being out of the questZon,rvhat could be found wherewith to bribe 
Austria? How convenient it would have been had Austria been a 
colonial power! There are alwa.:,rs scraps of colonies obtainable. " 
3u t in Europe nothing could be found without infringing some 
moral or political law. Italy (who was at the moment on the 
verge of bankruptcy) had a bright idea, and offered to buy ZTeneti 
for á4o,000,0od?. The 3ri-tiSh JoZTnrnfle?"it,witho'lt stopping to 
demand, "Show rae first your penny," eagerly took up the sugTestifon- 
and mentioned it at "Vienna: but no definite efforts were made 
to follow it up,which, in the light of her later history,we may 
[Ness to have been just as well for Italy. 
°,r° ts'a,s unf ortun atel:T no Co'lp?tit ion among the :linor states 
of Germany for the privilege of being under the protection of 
Austria; a governing power th t Empires was not popular. There' 
was proably only one spot in Europe where a transfer to :'- 
Austria 
ÏI_ 
would have been popular, and that was Poland. 
A'zstria, was the only one of thetpartitioning Powers of 1772 
Which ha,d managed to give its Polish. subjects any measure of 
contentment. The Polas under Prussian rule 'would have welcomed 
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'"*.r1Thtt,9 duch a transfer would not have b een open to the ob- 
Ject ions which could be raised agai! ns t placing   i any other t err i- 
tprr unier U s t7ian rzle,fnr neither the principle of National- 
,. 
lty nor that of elf-dieter?.iina,tion need be outraged by this 
arranál2.,,1+ . they would, on the cont.ra.ry, b e favoured by it. 
plan,hoIPrer , could only have been carried out by Austria, 
Franca, andi Britain uniting with full understa.ndtng to force 
2 74 . 
their demands upon Prussia and Russia, and it might even have led 
to a 'fiuropea:n war. No British minister then living could have 
conte?Qpla.ted such a prospect, and (-*c'r'b . : _ c L_,.:. P 
(;.a4/ab1: -cf the Tr:ne-ra-sity, tac .t, and- s-yrnpathyr--whtr,h- wnuld-_ave 
been +1 eC e Et s wi. ]_";,ir at t: l 1: t, i,1 e t. rj ï^ irOo'n. ̀ Ìr7"117ie`lis,?' zg 1 th 
-4-7 i mà"aa-. 
a.an-e so ?4=) dreamed of offering Au s+, ri a a bit 'o f 
Prussian Poland, any more than they would have offered her a 
planta.t ion in the ?noon, 
t. 
.CczÉkeemo 
It was . . .. . ; ' .-t- crn°-t-=..qe Setxr-'1-teTly-----f-ran ti kers that a possible compensation was looked for. frartTtn, 
rúr'rf'itltfR'F",_* o . uL eretglsyr;,..ey@8" P-r-?'"'SClr!Te''.t-Zm$ . p-A s,.`,,....t.aw.azas 
3eSi°iR-`1ìnd---ii+orzEg.ov.i+3ato.4 t'?+ : tri-r"e---C-r?rp- 
- ,'ne provinc es of = io avia and ß''a1 Lac' -_ia, 
(0. termed t }1e Da.nubian Princlpaliti es ,P 
had had a se)'ti- independent exi -tenue for a few years _past under 
the suzerainty of the Sultan and the protection of the powers. 
Neither the suzerainty of the Sultan, however, nor the protection 
of the powers,had been able to prevent boldo- v'altachia. from 
hein miserably misgoverned by the hospodar,Prince Couza. 
hatters there were rapidly approaching a cris is, and it was 
natural that the possibility of offering the provinces to Aust- 
ria should occur to observers. The matter was Mentioned between /4- 
Lord Clarendon and the Prince de la Tour d'Auverne,French 
ambassador at London and received some sort of va rue approval 
from the 73ritish minister. As soon as the affair passed from the 
realsa of epecula,tion into that of posaibility,however,Ciarendon 
seemed inclined to withdraw his words. y this time matters had 
Dean brought to a head leer diS revolution in the Principalities, 
and the deposition of the troublesome Prince Couza. La Tour 
275 °. 
Auvergne again spoke of a possible exchange to Ciarendon,who 
ow replied that it was doubtful if the Emperor Franz Josef 
uli r*i% e his consent to such a plan, and who appeared to rely 75. 
ather on the idea of the pure lias e of Venetia by Italy. 
Drourn de Lhuys had already approached Cowley about the matter. 
k''hat was evidently at the bottom of his thoughts was the posa - 
hility of turning the present crisis in the Principalities to 
ecount in making some new arrangement with Austria for the 
esáion of Venetia," Drouyn de LhuYs had hinted this to Metter- 
ich,wio had received it with "timidity." "in fact, as 7. Drouyn 
e Lhuys had expressed himself to me, the crisis had come too 
(g) 
oon--- Austria had too much upon her hands." Drouyn de .,hu rs 
herefore proposed a Conference to be held imwnediately. ("rre"st 
3ritain agreed,though she at first sup?. -rest ed Constantinople as 
the place where the Conference shpuld be,.held -- -not a very 
uitgtle spot to discuss the arrangement whit :h the French 
:ninister had in mind. ._ j,however 
e, and Drouyn de Chugs wrote at once to la Tour d' Auv ergne 
to Propose a joint approach to Vienna on the siib j pct, which, he 
said,right prevent a -!Tar. 
There is a curious discrepancy bett,.een the despatches of 
3raace and Britain a,t this period. The French pdecords are full, 
ncí ooth Drouyn de Lhuys and la Tour d' Auvergne Attie apparently l7. 
under the belief that the 3ritish government fully shareeitheir 
ho 
PR (-29) 
P e 9 and wishes. The 3ritish records are singularly meagre, and 
all that exist present the cold and disapproving tone of the 
Cawley despatch quoted above. Vo despatch of Clarendon reporting 
his conversation with la Tour d ?Auvergne is to be found, nor is 
prance, 1612.) 21.%.66.` Les Origines, No. 1811, etc. 
Z7. 
any private letter on the subject ?oublishád in Maxwell's "Life." 
t"e cannot therefore let justification la Tour d'Auvergne 
had .for the-despatch w1e he reports f ull ri tish ap pr ovan for 
the plan. It is not until a week later that the Sri t ish records 
offer any further information on the subject. on the 9th of 
March ITigra, the Italian ambassador at Paris, called on Cowley/ 
and suggested that on the meeting of the Conference a, favourable 
opportunity micT_11t offer to settle the Italian question,Austria 
ceding Irenetia to Italy, and receiving some compensation in the 
Principalities instead. 
"I pointed out to rn:\r Italian colleague the little probability 
there was of obtai ninrr under present circumstances the consent 
of Austria to any such sche7,19, even supposing the Porte to be 
prevailed upon to cons Icier it favourably.... Setting. aside ct'ier 
difficulties perhaps still more insuperable,what use,I asked, 
could there he in putting forward auch a proposal agrainst the 
opposition and resistance of the parties most interested 
As ;,.T. de 7,rig,ra continued to press his argument, l considered it 
right to let him clearly understand that whatever might be the 
opinions or wishes of H.M.Governraent in the abstract,he must not 
expect, the slightest support from. them to may( 4rapcsal which 
might be made for the alienation of the principalities from thkrc' 
E ra fs! (s c) Sovereignty of the Sultane" 
., tcki3alïa,re goverxrent r approached Elliot on the sub j ect 
pout the - sa1e ti me as `,,Ta rouy n r 
. . 
s made is advan C s 
. 
nWha+H.r rae' be the difficulties in tî of such a scier. e, it -.5 á 
is considered that all the Powers which have the peace of Europe 
3- 
of Fehrza.ry 28th. 
ïla,.rch 1st. 
ro 
C '.O. k`fi.dhCél :L3rCwQ. fi y h'\-0,-Rdt, 
) 
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at heart are interested in overcoming them, and in finding, if 
possible, a solution to a question which cannot very long remain 
(.3)401%). 
nsettled without great probability of it leading to a wary 
On March 12th the same reply was sent to Nigra and to his 
government. Great Britain would never consent to hand over the 
Roumanian people against their will to the rule of Aus ;r1 F., and 
neither Russia nor Turkey would ever give their consent to such 
(341)(36 
a scheme. It was useless to discuss the subject. Apparently 
France was given to understand the same: for - -- except for a few 
expressions of regret from la Marmora -- -the subject of the 
Roumanian Exchange disappears from the despatches. - 
How is the difference between the accounts of this incident 
given by the British and by the French records to be accounted 
for? If the interview between Cowley and Drouyn de Lhuys was as 
described by Cowley, how did Drouyn de Lhuys draw from it the 
impression that 3ri n would support his plan? And what did 
Clarendon say to la Tour d'Auvergne? Probably only the private` svÇ` 
letters of Cowley and Clarendon could decide this. It may be 
pointed out, however, (1) that in Lord Cowley's despatches for 
the, period 1863 -6, we find on several occasions phrases to this 
effect: "Tg. Drouyn de Nuys said that he had made such-and-such (3h> 
a statement to me, and I at once denied that he had ever done so". 
and (2) that Lord Clarendon's statements were similarly misunder.- 
3Z} R;11iot. 
to P.O., 1 March 1866. P.O. Italy, 83. 34} c;la,rendon 
to Cowley, 12 March 1866, F.O. France, 1602. 3g} "ee above P , and below, p. . 
stood by the Russian aribassadorlsho tly after this., and on an 
occasion of -J.Q-t-,gTeateT importance. 
Taken in conjunction -kith the mystery of the Roumanian Ex- 
change Cowley' s various 
remarks open up an enthralling vistae- 
Fnat would one not give to know the hints that a yi de Lhuys 
may have dropped, and Cowley failed to pick up1 , ...They might 
alter our estimate of French and :British policy..... Sut why 
did Cowley fail to pick up the hints? Tas it intentional or un- 
intentional? ndd he think that he ought to ignore every under- 
hand, suspicious proposal that was not spoken out clear and fair? 
Was his knowledge of french not equal to the more subtle nuances 
of that language? was he growing deaf? er was he-- -for we know 
from himself that he disliked and distrusted Drouyn de Lhuys -- -- `6L- 
merely nasty? ;w s 
ms. -or i t, --r-c- . . _ ttn- ,. r,la NF-e a 
r . , ., . 
. _ .--ctg=t---o f rr anc A. -ir-Arr amiratI"rttrtr-rrí.-a; 31_--wh ca- 
--% t 
must be rerleiClbZr Nd, hov-evar, that we have no account of what-: 
Clarendon, on his side, 3L id, save the French one. lt is possible 
that Clarendon did utter some impulsive expression of approval, 
and that Drouyn de 1 111vs interpreted Cowley' s formalities in the 
lic ht, of la Tour d' Âuvergne' s reports from London. lt is not 
irai)ossible 
that Clarendon seized the first suggestion of such an 
arranz4m,nt 
with enthusiasm, and only after reflection, perhaps 
aft°r 
a discussion in the Cabinet,perceived the objections to 
1t, Absorbed in the effort to counteract the schemes of Prussia, 
he 





below) p ¡ --m' 
l/ 
his country towards Turkey/ and spe-In the principle of '?a t1Cnal] tÿ. 
lt will î)e noted that the British objections to t lhe p1=tn are 
threF, in number: (1) Austria will not be willing to accept; 
(2) Russia and Turkey will _refuse their consent; (3) The Roum- 
anian people must not be handed over to Austria against their 
will. The third of these re:ï.sons was not mentioned to F rance, or 
at least la Tour, if he heard tt, d id not consider it worth w -+.? le 
reportinf. 
The first objection we may dismiss. Austria would natural 
put as high a price as possible on her consent ; but there was no bb 
harm in trying to persuad, and Britain and France, acting to- 
gether, would have a great influence upon her decisions. 
As to the second point, it Was certainly very probable that 
Russia and Turkey would refuse their consent. It was not of 
any importance should Turkey do so. No one, in reality, cared in 
the slightest what the Porte might say,because it was quite un- 
a)le to do. anything to enforce its wishespwhich had been ignored 
often enough already, even in regard to the Principalities them- j`'- 
selves. As for Russia, it might be possible to cone to an arra e 
(3 . 
Ment with her, or it might be possible to override her opposition. 
Certainly it was not necessary te refuse to enter 0,1 the quest- 
ion at all,without trying to ascertain her views. 
As to the wishes of the Roumanian people,upon every other 
Point bvt thie the British government was strenuously opposing 
the Tishes of the Roihaairian people, 
The Exchange project did not imply the handing over of a free 
p°ople into slavery; it was simply the transfer of two mall i
Provinces from the .rule of the Turk to that of Austria. 
T 11ejrand submitted the French scheme to Russia, -mnd was 
1 a"tf:",'- ;1. Y coT~lrx°. a ï. rc f-1f :'ÿ 
Roumania__ -people were beginning to u' e this na le in preference 
to any other---wanted work out her own salvation, and find a 
i 
place among the nations. To do s0, '7'- -_ -L 
te wanted union; she wanted independence from Turkel; she 
wanted a just,unprejudiced and capable prince to pilot her 
through dangerous waters. On all these points Britain,while 
refusing to hand over //i/ koumaniay/ to Austrian thraldom, was 
®7 , 
exerting every effort to cam. her. 
British polic r,had it been successful,Would have condemned 
- ownania to a far more hopeless existence than she could have 
known under Austrian rule. 7,orcie adv :tntaFe must hecesscarily have á °g_ 
accrued to her from the connection with a great European power, 
far more civilised than herself: but had the pis }Les of the 
-3ritis'ri t'oyernlnent been te carried out,Roumania would have been 
divided into two separate provinces, ruled by two native Rouman- 
ian nobles of the same class as the worthless Couza, anti in this 
condition would have remained under the suzerainty of a backward 
and 3iohammedan power, until war or revolution del ive red.,her. 
vA 
allachia had been practically united in 1858, in accord - 
â2'iCe 1 ith their own wishes,by the efforts of .+rance and Russia, 41,, 
and such agànst the will of Britain. 1n the worts of Lord Cowley 
"In order to obtain a temporary triumph over the policy of H.M, 
+o1t that the Czar had- upon written inadmissible uscu a l . verre c Ug1it. He asked his informant if it was "jusciu' a la. m *err L_ ment ou Ko aA, e 48 .venient,mais je n'ai pis obteni* cté réponse_ 
an irnrod 
-aat all Z,cportant persons say that war at present is a Ssi011ity for Russia. (Les n rig ines. 189o.) 
281. 
Government" Russia had "joined inmost unholy alliance with the 
38) 
Trench government" to have Prince CQ.uza established as Hospodar 
of both provinces, which had since t4¡ien been governed virtually 
as one country, and had become deeply attached to their union, 
the strongest s of eguard a, inst foreign interference, whether 
Russian or Turkish; Couza having proved incompetent, Roumania, 
whmcàveil knew that none of her own nobility had the experience 
1. 
or the self- control necessary for such a position, wished to 
choose a foreign prince; a choice which would. not only ensure 
better government, but which would almost inevitably lead in the 
end to independence from the Porte. The policy of 3ritair at 
the Conference was to separate the two newly- united provinces, 
to elect, not one foreigi, but two natives princes, and to 
preserve at all costs the suzerainty of Turkey. face of this 
it is impossible to maintain that the refusal to support the 
Exchange Project ras due to any consideration for the wishes ®ßf 
kouman i a . 
it was, on the contrary, like the rest of their Roumanian 
policy, due to their wish to preserve the authority of Turkey, 
Their object was to weaken the provinces as much as possible, 
anagplace them in a position where it would be impossible far 
there to assert their independence. For this Roumania was to be 
+ore in two, and denied the privilege of good government. 
"I 
expressed dissent, on the grounds that the election of 
4 
foreign prince would be the first step towards the dis solut ion 
of the 
'_urkish Empire, it being certain that no Christian 
4incQ 39 } could long remain a vassal of the Porte." 
39) ro Arley to Clarendon, 27 Feb. 1866. F.O. France, 1613. owl 18667 in the Conference. Cowley to Clarendon, 20 March, 




"The British Government were disposed to oils; t ion the wisdom 
of encouraging these aspirations. They believed that the welfare 
prooperity anti peace of the Principalities would be better served 
by separation than by union," as union under one prince would 
Ca). 
encourage a sprit of independence 
tlse- F77re.. 
"However tempting it might be in the abstract-. :.union under a 
foreign prince must be the first step towards the dissolution of 
the Turkish Empire. For instance, the demands..-.appeared to he 
stson w-of--- 
already coupled with the pretension to have foreign represen - 
tives;...a preten ;on, I added, which wou3.d never be listened to." 
So spoke Cowley to Drouyn de Lhuys. 
The Turkish policy of Britain was originally adopted as a 
check to the advancing power of Russia. 's -a}i -Tra T°selem -t 
e Leen,.lost. sight - -of --in _the-ir- anatety__to- fozlow tradition, 
ktr....bkissia`...w.ou],,d undouhtedly.- ,have- nr-ef rret - to see Roumania ani as 
óvinc e of-Tw rkey - rather than-of - Aust-rra; and Roumania 
Austritt's hands would have b eén ma irmo-re----darrgercnrs kus -s1a- 
What the government really f eared4. ewe ,vTas that in 
taking this one province from Turkey, and giving it to Austria, 
they would give the signal for a general spoliation. Russia 
would perhaps try to upset the Black Sea Treaty, the Balkan 
Provinces were always on the verge of revolution, and Crete was 
in a frightful condition, with Greece longing to go to her relief. 
They feared that they would pull out the foundation stone, and that the whole edifice would come tumbling down. What real use such a deerepit `and feeble defence could be against a power as 
q4, 
Qs, 
rance 161t r C( t 
2ls j- 
solid and terra: is as they imagined Russia to be; and whether 
several t55Eisa sturdy independent 3alkan kingdoms, or a stronger 
and more contented Austria, could not do the work as well, they 
did not stop to consider; nor did they see that Turkey's Balkan 
possessions were really a source of weakness to her, though they 
saw well enough that this v'Tas the case with Austria as to jr eneti)_ 
It may be asked,where was British iuìealism,wrì.ere the 'cult of 
?attonality,when such a policy was adopted towards a small state 
snuggling bravely for existence? Sut the Liberal government were: 




convinced themselves that the Roumanians did not 
really want to be uignited. Moldavia,they said,had been forced 
into the union against her will; 'Liolc.avia was being oppressed by 
Wallachia; they were only helping poor little Moldavia to free 
herself from an unnatural and detestable connection. 
The Exchange Project being. abandoned---for in face of direct 
opposition from Britain it could not have been carried out-- -the 
Conference sat to decide the questions of Union and of the 
choice of a Foreign Prince. 3ritain was the only power which 
wanted to break the union --- -1f we exclude Turkey,whose r pr.es- 
tentative wag literally under the orders of Lord Cowley. :Russia, 
l, 
t 06 
,join..P d these two in opposing a foreig,n France 
.fa ?toured both and made every effort to induce 3ritain 
that eet to act with her, even to the extent of asking $ j tG nomi- 
nate the Prince,ancï promising to support whatever candidate e 
se1Actpda "I Bald 1 was quite sure _fi.i .G-overnuoent woula not 
ungert 
'ake nvicïiol.s or so responsible a task to y  as o make an  SO 
N Buell selection, ' Said Cowley. After this it was harc1.y. fair__ .n ` 
rfiivtsQ, 
2r$3. 
the government to ÿ PT'R i st._ 1ri - < :.i.de that France F s whole policy 
was dictated by the object of establishing exclusive influence 
for herself in Roumania. 
1n the meantime Roumania did not feel disposed to wait for the 
decision of a Conference in which no power save France seemed 
to show any disposition to consider her desires. The Roumanian 
parliament dissolved it r elf, crdered the election of a new 
assembly, a,nd a provisional government was established ,'whose 
first action was to offer the crown to the young brother of the 
King of the -Belgia,ns. This prince having refused, the convention 
transferred the offer to PÌrrnce Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmar- 
ingen,a relative of the King of Prussia. The 3ritish government 
was divided between rage at the daring of the upstart provinces, 
and at what they considered the treachery of France, for they 
Cu3D 
inclined to blame her for the whole proctrA.ing. Their atti- 
tude was one of stern disapproval. 
"My opinion was that the Conference should abstain from any 
active interference.... and should limit its transactions to a 
passive acceptance or refusal of the proceedings of the Provis- 
ional government. If this course waà to be consistently followed/ 
the Principalities would find themselves in a dilemma which must sec. 
eventually forCe them to keep within the limits of existing 
treaties.... :i told His Rxcellency" (')rouyn de Lhuys) "that the 
proceedings in the Principalities,by whomsoever counselled,must, 
if persisted in, restore to Russia all her former influence in 
these countries. This persistence in pursuit of a Foreign Prince 
which both the Porte and Russia. Were resolved to counteract, 
c 
nail. Prince of Hohenzollern had `Q 
b''Qn suggested by Roumanian plotters J in 1865, and Napoleon Ili 
ravi Aven sonie sort of approval. The plan Yeas t: en abándoned, ;.riçi lved after t'±1e B e.g orrine refits ed. ait flej' b0.. l70041 /tge' . Q,- ' 
2B4 
would end in an alliance between then.... r . Drou,;r n de ?.hues 
could not deny the truth of mfr observations. He assured rae that 
the Imperial government had nothing to says to the present doings 
in the Principalities,but in giving me this assurance,he so far if),, 
betrayed himself, as to show that he had been for some time aware 
of the intrigues in progress for the nomination of a Prince of 
ohenzoliern --"i ,maringen.... He attempted to insinuate that he 
had spoken to me on the sub,j ec t, an insinuation which 1 at once 
CO) 4177. 
repudiated." 
"It would be seen that after a time,the Provisional ^ overnment 
findir.M their utter helplessness,wo l(i propose something that 
could be agreed to by the Conference." 
Tine passed, however, and the houm.° ians ignored the dilemma in 
Wh.chlaccordinF to Lord Cowley, they found themselves. The Prov- !"- 
isional roverrment,far from discovering its gutter helplessness "" 
went its wicked way undisturbed. The Prince of Hohenzollern 
accepted. His father and his King disapproved,but he had a 
private interview with 3isnarck, iiinediately after which he left 
his re,iment to spend a nice holiday in owitzerland; appeared in 
Roumania.; and was acclaimed there. The Prussian government re- 
Pudiated him,but Charles had -iismarck' s approval in his pocket, 
and was not alarmed. Cowley and his government began to realise 
that it Was the Conference, and not houma-nia, that was helpless. 
7`othin7 could prevent the Provisional rovernmen t from doing what 
it liked Since too thick-skinned t 3_ it ras   to b _ ,o moral 
cond 








( °t Q-r45 1 6 , : 
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down the -Danube and expel prince Charles by force. -Britain and 
Turkey could not allow Russia to undertake this task, and even 
if public opinion in fi-lurope allowed Turkey to do it, Russia 
would not. The government told themselves that this unpleasant 
state of affairs could not last. "If left alone the whole fabric 
46) 
of a foreign Prince (sic) would collapse of itself." They were 
furious with France. They believed that the King of Prussia had 
pernitt.ed his cousin to go as a favour to apoleon, and Claren- 
don told la Tour d'Auvergne that "The Prince of Hohenzollern' s 
election had been approved by the Prussian government as a meas- 
ure of hostility 41nd offence to Austria and that the King of 
Prussia would not have sanctioned it if he had not had reason 
to believe that his doing so would be agreeable to the govern- 
47)' 
ment of the . nperor. " 
The Conference felt that its position was undignified, and 
thinking that "it could at least withdraw," it adjourned itself 
indefinitely, and eventually faded out of -existence. Britain 
made the best of a bad job, and 'advised the Porte to acknowledge 
Prince Charles, which was in the end done. Roumania was saf e - -- 
48) 
and a Prussian prince was established in the Balkans." 
46) Cowley- to Clarendon 29 March, 1866. F.O. France, 1616. T, Clarendon to Cowley, 22 May 1866, F.O. France, 1605. Principal Grant Robertson refers to the Exchange Project and the Hohenzollern .Election in the following terras: "But the acceptance against his father's wish of the princedom by Prince Charles of Hohenzollern- Sigmaringen (after an intervi with lsmarck) and his rapid de arture for 33ucharest. checkmated the proposal (for the exchange) and placed, to the disgust of Austria, a Hohenzollern 
1e4. 
IDS, 
sent be:\rond the Carpathians in charge of the destinies of a 
Latin race." ('Fmbert90110 ß2o1.Ì With this estimate the present 
writer is not able to agree. The Prince of' Hohenzollern was not 
elected until April 13th,whereas Great 3rítain definitely re- 
' \ to support the`'Exchange Project more than a montai before 
- -her answer being given to Italy upon March 12th, to France upmP 
arch 9th. without the support of Britain the project had no 
real chance of success. Even her passive tolerance would not 
have been enough. It would have required the active influence 
of Britain and France in concert to induce Austria to accept, 
and to enforce the scheme on the provinces themselves and on 
Hussia.lI Turkey k -newn she had the opinion of moth Britain and 
Ruser, arm/ her suie she would have been able to resist the 
plan actively. France .raight, älone,have overcome the reluctance 
of Austria,but France co',.ld not have faced the opposition of 
the whole of Europe in support of the scheme. There is every 
evidence to believe that the French government entirely aban- 
doned the idea when Britain refused consent, and that they were 
sincere in pressing for a foreign prince instead. As -to Irenetia 
another plan was adopted, as will be seen later. Hence 3isrnarckb 
support of Prince Charles was little more than making assurance 
doubly sure. One cannot SW/ that the _Exchange Project failed 
because of the Hohenzollern ±,lection,when it had been dropped 
a'hnanth before, and when the election of the Belgian prince,with 
which Prussia had nothing to 'do,would equally have checkmated 
the plan if it had been still entertained. Cf course Bismarck's 







` In order to follow the Roumanian incident to its close, we have 
passed to the end of April. we must now go bacs to the state of 
affairs as they stood in February and March, when the Austro- 
Prussian quarrel was still developing. 
The ,. failure of the Roumanian project, though not due to the 
unaided talents of Bismarck, shows how near the wind he was sail- 
mg. If it had succeeded -- -and though not a probable, it was a 
possible solution of the difficulty - -- Italy's assistance would 
have been lost ta:::,and on the Italian alliance really depénded 
the success of his plans. He relied upon it to paralyse any ac- 
tion-.on the part of Great Britain and France. What dangers at- 
tended their refusal might have been made clear to the British 
ministers had they been able to see the despatches which Nigro, 
discouraged, was now writing to his chief. "Notre seule esperance 
Cyr -- 
se réduit aujourd'hui a une guerre d'accord avec la Prusse.' 
Clarendon and Russell, though sensible of danger, were not yet 
very much alarmed. They did not believe, for the reasons already 
described, that a definite break would come between Prussia and 
Austria. Bloomfield continued to write very encouraging des- 
patches about the pacific disposition of Mensdorff. But it 
takes two to make a peace as well as to make a quarrel. Lord. 
Augustus Loftus wrote from Berlin that Bismarck was determined 
on war, bixt it was still believed that he would not be able to 
carr,r the Kind; with him. So acute, also, was the constitutional 
cfrisis in Prussia, so deeply hated was Bismarck by the Liberals 
foox, 
r in non -Prussian Germany, that his fall was reasonably hoped 





Still, there were dangers ; and in the third week of March. 
Britain took the important 
sia. This offer was die to 
and of Queen Victoria:, and 
step of offering mediation to Prus- 
the influence of the Crown Princess 
was one of the incidents which caused 
Bismarck's deep detestation of the Princess. Barrai reported to 
Italy that Bismarck was "violently excited." He rejected the 
1 
mediation, saying that the offer should have been made at 
as it was Austria, not, Prussia, that was determined on war; and 
he covered a point-blank refusal by the assertion that Lord` 
31oornfield had made the thing impossible by blabbing the propos 
al to all the neutral diplomats an Vienna - - -an indiscretion of 
' filch Lord Bloomfield appears to have been quite guiltless so 
50) 
Bismarck probably invented it on the spur of the moment.. 
50) it was given out at the time 'that Britain had only appealed 
to Prussia to remember the engagements she had taken at the 
Paris Congress, and ask for the arbitration of a neutral power; 
but it was generally believed, in spite of this statement, that 
mediation had actually been offered, and the Memoirs of Lord 
Augustus Loftus prove that this was the case. The \ambassador 
prints Clarendon's letters, which are worth quoting. Clarendon 
instructed him to remonstrate with Bismarck, saying that "as we 
desire to preserve the most friendly relations with Prussia, we 
I earnestly beg him to pause before he embarks' on is. war of which 
no man can foresee the results or the termination." The appeal 
that Prussia should accept arbitration was there made. To, accept 
At "would reflect great credit on Prussia." If Prussia persists 
in her present course ie will rouse public opinion against her. 
As the great Protestant power of continental Europe, "with which 
'e naturally have kindred fee lings.... it would be with deep Preg!ét that re should see her regarded as a common enemy, be- 
a'lSe a wilful disturber, of the peace of Europe. " (7 March 1866.) On Bismarck replying that he intended no violent action, 
Clarennon. ̀ 1rote to sa)T that he had no wish to suggest Britain sho'ald 
media t e, but that she would if she were asked! Bismarck then 
gave tae reply described above. See Loftus, I, pp. 43--4. 
289 b. 
In the meantime the alliance with Italy was being negotiated. 
While the Roumanian Project was still under consideration in 
London, reports were coming in quickly from Italy, Prussia, 
Austria, France. Among the reasons which Cowley gave to Nigra 
against Austria consenting to the Roumanian Exchange, was "the 
present state of the relations of that Power with Prussia, a state 
which might eventually involve her in war with the latter,when, if 1/c. 
common report spoke truth, the Italian Government had resolved 
to make common cause with Prussia". aThis reason would have 
appeared to most persons to have the very opposite effect to 
that ascribed to it by Lord Cowley, and so indeed, Nigra seems to 
have thought. "M. de Nigra did not deny that this would infalli- 
bly happen, though he fairly enough deduced from my observation 
the inference that the cession of Venetia, VIoulci convert Italy 
into â friend. I merely mention this because it led M. de Nigra 
to say 
290. 
that Prussia had already renewed at Florence the overtures which 
She had made some months ago with a view of ascertaining, the sen- 
timents and inten t Ion s of the 'Italian Government. I asked the 
nature of these ov`:rtu:res,Vhet ler they were suggestive of an a11i -- 
anee or convention between Prussia and Italy, to which de 37.igra 
replied that matters had not gone so far,but that Count "Bismarck 
had received the assurance of General la I'7.arrnora that if' hostilit- 
ies were to occur between Prussia and Austria t_ assistance of 
Italy in the field against the latter would certainly not be 
(50 
wanting." 
Elliot Is reports were to the Scarie effect. "Although General la "e. 
!tarmora is far from being the most eager to engage in a war, even 
-`)lainl.y tells me that if one r'ere to break out between RteViia 
Ptustier. he would not hesitate a day in taking part in it." 
-.ora Augustus ust Loftus, on the other ha.nd,was incredulous) 
after the visit of the Italian negotiator, General Govone (whom 
spells indifferently, Govone, nrovoni, and Gavoni, ) to Berlin. chi 
March 31st he wrote: "whatever arrangements may be discussed be- 
tween Count 3ismarck and the Italian (}eneral, i do not believe that 
e 
King 
of Prussia will enter into or countenance any alliance of 
an offensive and defensive nature with Italy. l believe that Count 
'13marck profits by the presence of General Gavoni s-°- to produce 
an outward shewi-c-) of menace to Austria, and that the object he 
has in view is merely that of intimidation. -gut l cannot think 
that 
there is any serious intention on his part of concluding an 
-Qf;cvU 
'r= and ¿lefensive alliance with the Government of King Victor 
Taanuel, 
. . 
T ,,Ztl 85 
" 
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At this time the tenus of the alliance had been settled, 
shown to 9enedetti, and telegraphed by him to Paris. On April 7, 
(the day r the e Treaty w c ? Sr + "  befo e _., as signed) Loftus ro,e "I cannot 
learn that beyond an exchange of opinions and assurances of mut- 
ual cooperation under certain eventualities any agreement of a 
binding nature has been entered into..." Only by April 28 did he 
get as far as, "This, I think, is a sufficient proof that a per- 
fect understanding exists between them, whether it has taken the 
for of a written or a mere verbal engagement." On May 9 hewrote 
that the alliance was actually signed on 17 or 18 April, but he 
does not believe it has been ratified. On May 26 he reported the 
54) 
tatif ication. 
-o.ng before Lord Augustus was convinced, however, it was 
clear that the danger was real, and 'British influence had been 
employed at Florence to prevent any treaty being signed. It was 
too late, however. The first warning was given by Elliot on Marck 
30, when the matter was virtually settled. "I remarked that it 
appeared very undesirable for Italy prematurely to bind herself 
to any such course." °he was pursuing "an Italian object, which. 
mi :ht possibly in the end be found more attainable through an 
understanding with Austria than by an alliance with Prussia. 
General 
la 'larmora said that his latest information from Vienna 
aid pat tend to enc' urage any such hope... 'Tot the slightest 
overture of any sort or kind had been made to him; adding... that 
if 
`trey Were to be made Austria must be aware that there was n¢ 
:title t °be. lost." 55) 
541 Loftus to 
55)$Ellalort2. 
to .1 
F. O. , 7 April, 28 April, 29 March,1866. F.O. 
P.O., 30 l4arch 1966. F. 0. Italy, 85. 
116. 
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hat a note of ate alarm appears in the 3ritlsh correcpOncz- 
ence, r?n the ;t'rt of . ;r C,.t.:.rendOn tele7ra?)hec3.: "H.M.Gover-.ilent 
advis? that the Italian Government should remain strictly on the 
defensive, Italy has no interest in annexing the Elbe -Duchies to 
Prussia, or in destroying the lnde?oendenue of the minot sovereign 
of Germany; a`7 alliance with 7rizssla upon these bases would make u, 
all the German powers, exceptjrussia, hostile to 1tal- r - - - -7f 
Italy remains neutral she will not be involved in a. quarrel 
whic:-¡_ may eYïr)rac:e the whole of Eüror and be fatal to the peace- 
43+ 
ful progress of the -Italian monarch 
Even after Austria had informed the 'Goverïìiaent that she had in 
her possession a copy of the secret treaty, they continued to 
hope against hope, and when the war had actually begun Elliot 
male another .appeal. "1 . ...alluded to t:ie Importance of keeping 
clear of all engagements with ?runs a,which would have t.T e 
effect of depriving the Italian Government of their freedom of 
action if, in the course of the war there should be an opportun- 
ity of making ao arrangement by which the object of this country 
-. should be attained - -- It might become necessary for Austria to 
°baAdon Venetia in order more effectually to meet ?russia in the 
orth,and Italy should keep herself' free to profit by that con- 
tingency should it arise. - - -An arrangement with ?russia not to 
make a separate peace might have the effect of obliging this 
counrry 
to Continue the war for Objects in "ß.1c)1 It has no lnt- 
ere'tot the risk of sacrificing those which coùli have been se- 10- 
CUQ d. ...M. ,Tac ini said. they made the .. P- ,,ná ,P,ar simply for a nation- 
al- 
object and had entered into no Convention or Compact with 
13rIl a 
in reward to it." T his statement waS a direct untruth, 
'` 1 C L.,L._...e,.n-1 . t. -._. iss.01 
233. 
and it is almost certain that Jtl,cini :dust have known that it was 
such. Elliot replied that la Marmora had led him to believe the 
çontra7y, but Ja.c 1li rPT)eatad that t,r1ere was no more than a 
(3Ì.Aa", 
°7aoral uncierfita%l'''i'lyync/?'.+, p_ 
,, -fVtrYt,.G{ 7.fA<-4'i- CILCF.t 
°I did no t Zonceal £ ,s U .ra- - - < ra r -z------.,_ -_ .,,,, 
/*that all parties in JnTlnd regretted to see Italy_ enm=l 7ng her- 
self in such a war as the present, and that even allong those vhc E9o, 
host freely. admitted the legitimacy of the national determin- 
ation to complete the formation of the kinpriom by the annexation 
of the provinces still wanting to it, the alliance with Prussia 
had lone far to alienate their s:nnpathes: -- that in England 
the war was looked ipon as an unnecessary and wicked w".rü,-', and 
its authors considered almost as public enemies. - - -At the time 
- spoke 1 did not know who Her - a,jesty 's ministers might be,but 
±'lere waS ppo little difference of s?ibject in 
(51) -- 
]ngla,nd that 1 felt slight hesitation in express ing myself." ") 
net, Qiurrt.,, 
.he tone of these rer.onstra_nc; s,''- - in 'accordance 
with the di?nitY of a great power, show the extent of Clarendon's 
b.r!ilderment and distress. 
Thi-t-rüth - was that an al lietic ë h etwe en Pros s i a and Italy 
must make it impossible to offer active resistance to Prussia. 
This alliance once trade, every step that was taken to checkmate 
Prussia or to help Austria was taken against Italy. Bismarck 
had so managed matters that the iniquitous war for furthering 
the amhttions of Prussia was to be also a nationalist war for 
reallging 
the blameless hopes OT Italy, which had been approved 
and encouraged by the British government. Bismarck had made 
mince 
Pie of all the rights and wrongs of the question: Austria, 
was, 
in theiTight 
Italy, 87 II 
Î4 sc.a. 2(» (vbç./ 
o  z 
as regards Prussia, and t iere she had all the s rPIpcìthieS of 'great 
ritain. but Austria was as clearly in the wrong as regards italy 
anti by all their traditions and principles .kussell and Clarendon 
were bound to disapprove of her conduct there. 73oth TTationalist 
and Liberal feeling l6romptfd the iheral governerant 
*he aspirations of Italy. 
if any trace of coolness had ever exist e'ci in their feeling to- 
-to favour 
-anis the new state, it was because trie; b eli ev ed that Tt Italy was i 21. 
too much attached to Franc e. Now, however, even their ant 1- Yrench 
feeling urged t îe: i to forward her albit ions. France, owing to. the 
Occupation of Iiome, was at present much less popular there, and 
Italian statesmen, sincerei-r or insincerely,haa for some time 
pas+, assured -3ritain that only the possession of Venetia was nec - 
ssa:cy to turn them into the stanch al-Lies of j.rit a.in and the ) 
opponents of French ` { 1tS 0. Cl aggression 
' 1th this double "lotivTe for desiring to see Italian unity coil - 
pleted,it will be seen _row awkwardly the 3ritish government were. 
situated once the alliance with Prussia was a fact to be reckoned "4- 
'ith. They longed to see Austria victorious over Prussia,but how 
rejoice in a :Prussian def eat, if it . would leave Austria free to 
turn her arms a Ja?.nst Italy ann crush the new state? That Austria 
"1t racer be freely conceded that Italy has never assumed that 
poslr,ion of perfect independence which is her due as a reat 
3'u r0Pear that and 1 Will add a this independence cannot -be uPeeted from her till the day on which Venetia is included in t}le 
i-talia.n kinrrdoni.... As long as Venice remains in the hands of Austria prance can count upon the italian array as securely. as 
lrpn )ier own 'V11eneiier there IQa.r happen to he a rupture between tr,° 
: ° ;Iapir° this will no longer the e 1.i the ltaliaY, s ; but .1is mil z o , . ue _t c mss.., lerl 1 kingdom is coia7oleted. The ma,nif ¡s t intepes +,'or itnl r 
àixectvn interested." keen aloof from any ryurorrel lit r.1ic- a 
it is n t 
(Elliot. 2 ".. .6E. 
dup 
hair Often reproached them with tizei_ equivocal line of con- 
Pr the `T ;ast, and with their constant tendency to side with tht:I. 
)rather train the " ri tisb Government, whenever the ism rli ïît. 
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naided could sweep Italy off the map was certain; not Garibaldi, 
zzini and Cavour combined had ever been able to make Italian 
Wy 
ws stand unsupported against trained troops ishe 
13 -dependa -le) Then, of course, France would 
ntervene to save her protégé, and . a European war would be kindled in 
twinkling. 
with such ominous prospects before them it appears strange that 
,e government did not seize every opportunity that offered to 
revent Italy from committing herself to Prussia. Their efforts, 
ewe have seen, in this direction had been somewhat half -hearted. 
ney had, to be sure,urged Italy to be patient, and Austria to give 
pVenetia; but what was the use of good advice, when the one 
pportunity of inducing. Austria to part with her transalpine 
essessions had been deliberately put aside? Had any other r:ason- 
131e scheme been substituted for the Exchange Project, their action 
ight have been praiseworthy, but all they had to offer was the 
'oposal that Italy should buy Venetia, and even this was never 
seriously pressed at Vienna, and at the sanie time Austria was being 
encouraged by praises of her conduct in Germany. Their idea seems 
t° have been that if they waited quietly the financial difficulties 
of Austria, which were very great, would incline her to accept the 
tale offer to buy: but in the meantime Bismarck was hurrying 
on his nreparat ions for war. 
of t s -seelin? Zn(1 ff ererro e was really 'due-to tlíb._7"ätâl aptly sisrr 
would 
Liberal government -- -their reluctance to hèlleve that-tli re 
be 
a "Tart and especially their reluctance -to- bel-.ieve .r-. 
ounifued chance to be a divergence between the tWO. Their a.nswrr ha.s 
ecormlY 
been, "PT it till Venetia is ours, and you will see Italy 
intpe one 





,,,.. pr. Italy only kept out of _ , they were b eßlinning 
nconsciously, to feel that war might have its ädVáaâ ésk' Both 
sell and Clarendon would have found some pleasure in seeing 
ssia get '-a thorough drubbing: and Austria had hinted that when 
ussia was beaten, Italy would be rewarded for neutrality by the 
ft of Venetia, while Austria indemnified herself in Silesia. 
act which would be shameful when assented to under "moral 
ressure" from other states would only be gracious in a great 
over flushed with victory. 
r rew persons, outside Berlin, doubted that in case of a \duel 
ustria would have an ease victory over Prussia. Hampered by the 
tee erence of Italy, Austria might have more difficulty in 
tling .natters to her liking; but if left free from apprehension 
that direction, ytl ÿ believed her triumph certain. 
07_ 
No one la`s . 
nLondon at least contemplated a victory of Prussia single- handed 
er Austria, and if the question had lain between the two German 
pov;eT$ alone, some members at least of the\ government might have 
een content to see them fight it out. Their greatest fear was 
that t`' attacked on both sides, Austria, weakened as she was by 
tíaancial difficulties, would be at a disadvantage, and a bloody 
and indecisive war would follow. Both sides would be exhausted, 
nd'ten they paused for breath, France would intervene, and, 
settle 
all the affairs of Europe to suit her own book. On the 
other hand, Prance might still intervene i` Prussia were defeated, 
believed la I , - = n-f - hr- aa- f -e-ess The result they 
pròfit would be the same France was determined to make Ìher own 
8e12e 
tout, of the affair, and she would give Venice to Italy, 
1e Hiine frontier for herself, and would establish her own 
09, 
29 7. 
nfluence firmly in South Germany, leaving both the great German 
owers exhausted and helpless. They regarded every proposal that 
uanated from France with the deepest suspicion, as being intended 
o further these schemes; even if it were ostensibly to preserve 
eace. Even the Roumanian Exchange Pro ject they feared, r--r't 
e used to entangle them gradually in the affair, and lure them 
on to threatening Austria with force if she did not consent to 
he plan. 
oba'nly cola-top 
"ha* e off T-±r? re3 
It also induced them to look with profound distrust on the 
roposal a European Congress }which France brought 
the beginning of May. 
The situation in Germany had now become much more acute. 3is- 
rck was still pestering Austria with protests and complaints as 
oiler conduct in Holstein, and he had brought forward the ques- 
ion of federal reform: a question in which the whole German 
oeral party were absorbed, and which 
must array lsib eral opinion against non-German Austria. 
he &nperor of the French, therefore, proposed that the Congress 
Mould discuss the three questions which were threatening the 
eaee of EuroPe___SVenetia, the Elbe Duchies, and Federal Reform in 
ermany. Russia, France, and Britain, he suggested, should invite 
uesia, Austria, and Italy to submit these question to the 
rbitration of Europe. 
The first impulse of Great Britain was to refuse a Congress 
alto 0` 
Clarendon replied, proposing to substitute a moral 
Protest 'rota Britain and France together against the conduct of 




heck or control occupying the Principalities, are disasters which may 
e near at hand, and which every practicable effort should. be made 
avert," said Clarendon. He then recited the objections to a 
onáress: it could not sanction the annexation of the Duchies by 
russia, he said. "With regard to the cession of Venetia, it is 
otorious, that Austria will not cede her Italian provinces unless 
he obtains territorial compensation elsewhere; but where is this 
obe obtained? Silesia is the only territory she would accept 
n exchange, but that she could only acquire by the sword...Nego- 
iations upon the important points upon which peace depends would 
nfallibl;r fail in a Congress which would be powerless to enforce 
era,.. But it does not follow that two Powers like England and 
ance, peaceful and prosperous at hone, should remain passive 
eetators of a bloody strife in which they may ultimately become 
evolved, and which will at once inflict serious evils -upon their 
0jects...H.M. Government would suggest that England and France... 
ñould Make a solemn appeal to the honour, the Christian feeling, 
33 
of the true interests of the three Powers, should call upon them to /34. 
eeume the status quo,and declare-that the Power which persisted, 
ithout sufficient cause, in provoking an unjustifiable war must in the 
ee not only of England and France but of the whole civilised world, 
Cc,} held responsible for all the calamities which it will cause." 
"I regret..." Cowley replied, "that M.Drouyn de Lhuys does not 
"ell at all disposed to adopt your Lordship' s suggestion that L 
°lari4 and France should make a solemn appeal to the Powers now 




Le position of England and France in a matter- of this kind is 
gsentially different," anc.. he (ilci not wish to repeat his exper- ,n 
(Gi 
nce in regard to Poland in 1.863 
Clarendon, in his reply, was reproachful. "H.M.(overnment would 
t have ventured to offer such a suggestion if they had not been 
onvinced that the Imperial Government were, equally with them - 
lves, earnest and sincere in their desire to maintain peace. 
g felt that there would have been glory even in the attempt to 
cure such an inestimable blessing while there was some reason 
I 35. 
ó expect that it might be successful, when supported by the moral ' 136 , 
hfluence of England and France united for the purpose. Certainly 
dishonour could, in the opinion of H.M. Government, have attended 
e failure of an endeavour to prevent the commencement of a deadly 
lrife which is without cause or justification, bat which may 
ltimately involve the greater part of Europe in its vortex and 
bflict ruin and misery upon millions of people." One .seems to 
lace the hand of Russell in this composition. 
The Goverment, however, now consented to a ConeereS$t, though 
eluctantly. Their chief dread se=ems to have been that France 
»Ilddrag them into a war, pledgingthem to enforce the decision 
ethe Con e+34, by arms, against a recalcitrant Austria¡ or 
Prussia. -- -.they really did not know which, but they were sure 
ranee was up to some mischief. "Your duty, " Cowley was ins Cruct- 
edI will chiefly be to hear the proposals of the French minister 
ßnd endeavour to elicit, in as clear and precise a form as possible, 
hat. äre the motives and objects of the French government n inviting the assembly of a congress ... The importance r 
.. 1616. 
9 
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3no 
annot be exaggerated of leaving no doubt in I.T. Drouyn de ails ' 
ind of the anxiety of H.M. Government not to enter, even by im- 3` 
ication, into any engagements which we should be unwilling or 
able to fulfil.4.. lthough it would be wise and prudent in 
stria to consent to the transfer of Venetia to Italy, compensation 
eing given to her... H.M. Government might be willing to give 
vice in that sense to Austria - -- but should that advice be 
lected, they would be bound no further -- -they could not under- (1,3) - - 
ke to be parties to any coercion." what, for example, was to 
offered to Austria as compensation? Drouyn de Lhuys, who naturally 
not see much use óf holding a Congress if all the details were 
be settled beforehand, answered impatiently that he supposed 
Bone would get up and suggest someehing, or Austria herself 
u1d say what she would consent to accept. Cowley's later 
ports calmed the home government a little, and the Congress was 
cce pted. 
gnat part Prance would play in the coming struggle was certainly 
problem that was exercising the minds of diplomatists all over ati-rw 
rope, but t 3ritish , attached an exaggerated importance 
the state of 'Rind of Napoleon,. and they believed that he leas 
ing his influence, not to prevent war, but to promote it. 
''The truth is that the .Flnperor-- Napoleon fostered the war 'vhen u05. 1 
411., - 
1 °h by Word have prevented i,' wrote Lord Augustus Loftus . 
C reel a ern^ b--e r' 4}eß 12 le .. cLj . jD c , . 
"H.M. Government had arrived at no fixed pinion v.. is }1 Would have admitted of their at once assenting to the roposition that the geographical epined g g position of Prussia was not well 
' or that it was desirable to secure for that power greater 
h :t gth in the North of Europe. Neither were they prepared to say 
bon 
,the national independence of Italy required as an indispensable áltlon for its security that Venetia should be ceded to her ". l 
-" 6 1n `ß f/1 -Feb . -Frrewes, I le o e, to C.lc 18 G e) 5'q 
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he" (-`lapoieon) "had said in good earnest, that any attempt 
on its part " (Prussia) "to extend its territorial possessions 
would compel him to seek compensation for Trance in t he rectifi- 
c' ation of her Frontier on the Thine, it is to be believed that 
even the bold .minister w-±-lo directs the royal council at 3erlin 
would not have dared to engage g.is country in an aggressive war 
in which he would have the greater part of crermany as his irlrned 
it,te opponents in the Eas ±,and the immense military power of 
France threatening him on the t''est viewed ini t,. -pis light the 
peaceful attitude of .prance and her determination to observe 
strict neutrality simply mean that when the contending parties 
shall have exhausted their forces in a prolonged and terrible 
struggle, ranee will step in and take the prey that will prob- 
able fall to her with little expenditure of :men or money, and if 
the res'dt of the present ambitious obstinacy of Prussia should - 
be that she ruins her great industrial prosperity for years and 
has to cede the Rhenish provinces to France, instead of the hege- 
mony of Germany she will have ` "'on its execration, and history will 
record that she well deserved. the retribution which has been 
brought on her by her agg, re SSlv ..and unscrupulous policy." So 
(.05-2.60 wro';e the 3ritish envoy at r)resden 
°I asked the :Prince" ("(atternich) "w,hether he was equally con - 
vificed t'h1 &_t the Trench Tovern?lent would not see, to say the 
least,wjth complacency, a com -elete rupture betwreen the two great 
lerman 'a0''; ers) 4,nß: 1 think that his Highness' opinion coincides 
with mine on this point, that the commencement of hoe tllities 
"111 not overwhelm he French Government w ith concern. " So 
Coi,- l 
-r,ed, 




i A little later he wrote: "As it will possibly be in. his" 
('±apoleon) "power to terminate the war, should it break out, when 
and on ir,irja,t.:ter;ris h? May please, it cannot be a Irl`c.ttter of sur- 
prise,however much it may he subject of regret, -that he will not 
intervene to prevent a war,w'1iCr,. will make him so powerful..... 
He foresees in a zre ÿt German war possible B,dSI=J?tar'es to France. 
It would be well could the contending Parties be induced to re- 
fleet upon this, ere it be too la e." 
When war had actually b e7zn, he wrote =i,4'a in : "I think... the 
.h. peror is sincere in '._is desire to preserve France from the 
calamities of war,and in fact,1'then aerraany shall have exhausted 
both her finances and her amies in the strugg,le.... it will 
hardly benecessary for France to go to v.ar in order to put a 
stop to the conflict. ln my humble opinion the Emperor will 
permit neither of the great German Powers to obtain si c_a an as- 
cendancy as will place the other at its mercy----His object will 
be so to order peace, as to leave them as far as possible on an 
equalitir a,nd kP' D hPni checks on each other." 
Foreign powers there quite aware of the nervous tension 
reigning in London, and all who desired to obtain anything from 
Great iritain played upon her fears without scruple. They had 
long done so, for the national distrust of France was well 
understooà. 
__._ .. . - 
1 . ̀ran 1( I 51) 
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3ismarck was quite ready to let it be understood that he had 
::de his bargain with France and bought her supporti iia- 44- °- 
t el?i$t ,, .te e s,s . on__ 
that compensation was 
arranged for khinewards, and that whoever opposed Prussia's designs 
^i7.ht count on finding France behind her. Bernhardi told Elliot 
then he visited Italy, that "no compensation would be demanded 
rom Prussia itself for any extension it might acquire, but it 
shy no means impossible that France might claim a counterpoise 
n other quarters. It was understood, he said, that England would 
' remain indifferent to the annexation of Belgium to France, and 
&laperor would not attempt to carry it out, but the case was 
forent as req*ard_s the coal and iron districts of' that country, 
the population were not averse to an annexation which would 
',feared by Great Britain in a very different light f rom that of 
foi'nerp and the mouths of the Scheldt. Of the existence of a pro - 
!Nt of this nature M. Bernhardi appeared to have little doubt , 
h to look upon it with manifest satisfaction." 
Italy, as has already been shown, tried to get British support 
°Th °r designs on Venetia by promising that when once that province 
4111 her grasp, she would break off her intimate relations 
i'ln 
France and attach herself to England.. In Elliot's despatch, 
alreair quoted, conveying the request of Italy that Britain would 
Buggort the kournanian project, we find this statement of the senti- 
Ants of the Italian government: "The concurrence of- H. 1. Govern- 
} 






nt is especially counted upon,not only for their well --known 
empathy for Ttaltr,but because the intere'ts of treat, 3ritain are 
directly engaged in:seeing this country take that really in- 
pendent position which tt ourht to hold among the nations of 
rope.- ---- Subserviency to Trance (which, in a greater or less cleg- 
e has been shown by every successive administration, although 
i.ly becoming more distasteful and ailing, to the Italians, 
innot be expected to disappear as long as the venetian question 
mains unsettled." 
Austria,on her part,wa.s hoping for the support of treat 3rit- 
in in the coming struggle, and played on the -3rit ish fear of /O. 
rance by accusing that country of designs on elgiura,and hinting 
t the danger of a Triple Alliance against herself, of France, 
russia, and 7iefore gast ein,1 ensdorff asked -3loomf field, 
That H.M.(ìovernment would do, if a rupture took place.- --1 rep1iec 
that t had no doubt H.M.Governmenl would see no sufficient reason 
for departing from a policy of neutrality,---whereupon he said, 
811prosA tr., + C6`?) the or Belgium were ,hreatened,rngland must move ?" 
`.ater,"Englaand,he said,might desire such an arrangement in the 
?talian Peninsula,but he believed it was doubtful if France sin- ISO. 
cerel,r 'wished it,and he felt certain that if VictoriManual 
thought to extend his power too far, the anpercr ''`apoleon would 
secure an gq,livalent and would also take up a position that would 
leave Italy his vassal. if Austria cold place the least reliance 
on the rT,1aperor ?apo1 eon something might be. thought, of to cone ilia 
ate his views and those of bdher countries,but his word was good 
for nothing as was plainly proved in 1859.... Count Mensdorff 
went ón Itto say that ,ran(; t?,ought to. make vasfais of all the 
a 14 6 4 
a 
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Pourers of Europe; Austria would not submit to such a degradation, and 1s/. 
had therefore resolved to take up her position and defend herself 
against spoliation. The object of the nperor Napoieon,he observed, 
was to gratify his ambition by breaking all treaties that interfered 
with his vlews...lf Europe chose no longer to be bound by engagements 
Id the stro1.gest were to rule and to dictate to the weakest,Austria 
let rely on her own strength, and see in the general confusion that 
ust result from the amb i t i9us, pro f ec is of some Powers, whether she 
ould be a loser or not." 
As for Russia, Gortschakov t ;naate try attempt to calm tb.e 
alarns of the 3ritish government. He had for a considerable time 
ast frequently expressed apprehensions of France turning the German 
arrel to her own advantage. l zssia,he said, was not at all con - 
Irned in the Austro- Prussian. feud: "The dangerous part of the 
lies in another direction: -- -other Governraents may be 
n intro the mélee; France,for instance, cannot be expected to 
Nain quiet when powder is being burnt so near her, and although 
Lis impossible to say which side she would take it would be that 
isz 
Ahic'2 she .considered most conducive to her own interests; nor is 
it easy to imagine that England would look on quietly if Antwerp 
Aire converted into a French port of war." "His Excellency" 
0ortschakov) "said his reports from Vienna gave him reason to 
tear that the demands of Prussia .might lead to a rupture-.... and 
Induce Prussia to seek the alliance and support of France, and he 
-Presumed that such an eventuality would be considered by H.M. Govern- 
ment 
as it Would bu that of Russia, to be fraught with danger to 
the en °ral int (io ) erests of Europe". 
he a matter of surprise,that,with these fears tormenting 
F b. ,1 i 18i." ' .AF c i', Q !o g / . 
_ , 
hem, the government did not snatch at every hope of preventing 
306 
and eagerly accept the Peace Congress as a sign of grace on 
the part of Napoleon. As has already been stated, however, they 
feared that he would so manage the Congress as to obtain all that 
he ;ranted for himself and Prussia and Italy, without actually 
oing to war; and on the other hand, they were now actually con - 
sidering the possibility of themselves entering the war, if it 
came, on the side of Austria, and for both these reasons they 
hesitated to accept at first. 
-the?aoti 




A P W.Ta.Amsa'r - 
The policy of France, during the years 186.5 -6, is complicated 
and difficult to estimate. In the first place there are always 
two threads to follow -- -the official policy pursued by Drouyn de 
Lhuys as Imperial minister; and the secret, and frequently con - 
tradictory policy 1thich was prosecuted at the same time by the fii ) 
Emperor, partly or wholly without the knowledge of his ministers. 
In the second place, the 111nippror himself had not decided on any 
definite policjr: his head was full of plans, now one of which, 
now another, ruled his vagrant fancy: and so both the public 
Official policy, and. the secret "underhand ""policy were doubtful,1 
contradictory, liable to change at any moment. Generally, Drouyn 
de Lhuys was trying to follow out one line of action, while the 
Emperor was in private making all sort of tentative efforts here 
and there, and often embarking, on his own inìtiatdìve, on new 
projects which counteracted the policy first determined on. 
After a time Drouyn de Lhuys would discover that his efforts 
were undermine by his master's mole -like burrowings, and would 
make a desperate cast back to pick up the threads and to pre- 
Serve some appearance of consistency for his government. 
The course pursued by France in 1863 -4 had been neither wise 
nor sincere. Piqued and wounded by the conduct of Great 'Britain, 
644 xt is difficult munict A to decide how far ]à,Iaoleon s policy was cor re- ceived to his ministers. ' enedetti denies having ever rom him secret instructions or private correspondence (Benedetti Chap. 4.) . Yet seems certain that not  it  ern  .. ì .,ha the ministers 
or how always aware in what direction the Emperor was fammgg far in this direction he intended to go. 
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the government hadi taken a..lsne orhich in,,hitppier circumstances 
they would have seen was not the best or wisesta 
Napoleon now began tsee his mistake, and consider what posi- 
tion he would take up with regard to the emergence of the new 
Prussian power, which the conduct of Great Britain and France 
had allowed t drevelope. -Tntil now, the clearest rules tthát -d&s- 
ected his conduct of foreign affairs had been, the preservation 
of a good understanding with ?ritain, and the - support of the 
idea of Nationalism. As to the 3rit ish alliance he was disill- 
usioned. His efforts to win the confidence of that state seemed 
vain, and a coldness had fallen between them. On the other hand, 
if 'rationalism was to lead to the growth of a- huge United Ger- 
many, it was leading him onto dangerous ground. Such a growth 
was bound to disturrb the European balance abroad, and at home to 
lead to alarm and disturbance in France, to láhom the advent of 
of a very strong new power as her immediate neighbour would not 
be' Welcome. Howl should he dial with this rising star? Should he 
hold_ to his old nationalist policy, and give his blessing to 
New Germany? Should he accept the new state, offer a friendly 
hand, and at the same time try to strengthen his own .B npire so 
that it might not be overshadowed? Could he possibly make Ger- 
many the ally of France instead of Britain,who had deserted here 
There were difficulties here. Tas it possible to obtain an 
increase of power for prance---which he conceived as 
an increase of territory - -- without infringing the principle of 
nationality? 
He did not want '--to break with Britain ̀ altoget:ier, by 
annexing Belgium, but, excluding Belgium, there was only Germany 
to 
Cho °se from. Luxembourg, to be sure, was largely French in 
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aoirit at least, but Luxembourg was not very big; to obtain the 
frontier-of the Rhine for prance he must incorporate districts 
chiefly German in-,race and language. Since he must go contrary 
to Nationalism, -why not throw the idea overboard altogether, and 
identify himself with the fears of France, opposing with all 
his strength the progress of Germany? 
His health and his intellect were already failing," and he had 
b always been excitable, fickle, and. Veasily carried away byv roman- 6' 
tic ideas. He 'could not now come to any decision. He could 
neither be sure what was the real strength and spirit of Ger- 
many, nor , "what "was the dominant current of French opinion with 
regard to German unity. He had become anxious about his own 
position, and could not tell how far he would Piave the support 
of the nation in either policy. The loss of the British alliance 
had left him isolated in Europe. He knew not where to turn, and 
as he became weaker-and more melancholy his moods were at the 
mercy of the stronger wills among his councillors and friends. 
He entered, hesitating, on a course of double -dealing and 
chicane which was in the end. to lead himself and France to ruin. 
3/O. 
possible policies for France to adopt: 
She might try to make a bargain with Prussia, *uaranteiting 
to ?sanction and supporall the annexations made by that 
r 
country in return for an alteration of the French frontiers on 
the Rhine, There were tireire1144 objections to this policy 
The first, which was conclusive, was that Bismarck would never 
carry out such a bargain: but Napoleon did not know this.V 
The second objection he could perceive, and , was that, 
even in return for compensation for France, it might be danger- 
ous to allow Prussia to extend her influence in Germany too 
far, and Austria to be too completely crushed. 
She miF t make a bargain with Austria, again getting the 
'-shine for herself, Venice for Italy, Silesia for Austrka. The 
objections to this plan were, firstly, that it might make 
Austria too strong by completely crushing Prussia, and secondly 
that in this case, to obtainVthe Rhine, France would probably 
have to go to war, whereas by the first plan she might obtain u 
it for her moral support f} Prussia: and Napoleon did not 
want another war. 
Prance mir ht remain neutral, bargain with neither state, 
a11ov, 
to fight it out, and when both were exhausted, 
step 
in, and settle matters as she pleased. The objections to 
this plan were that France might make herself detested by both 




that Italy might be defeated and permanently injured before France 
,could interfere to save her (but' this might be avoided by letting 
Austria know beforehand that- if she invaded Lombardy she would have 
'fftght France as well as Italy). The last objection was, that when to 
Napoleon was in a virtuous mood he felt the immorality of this palicy. 
the encouragement of a blood.,i war for his own profit. 
The fourth policy was to make a serious effort to prevent the 
war. As Prussia was the power which wanted war, this policy 
involved a complete break with Prussia. It would require, 
to make it successful, that Austria should cede Venetia to Italy, 
at that Francevshoulci then whole-heart edly support Austria against 
?russia, and let Prussia know it. 
ma objections to it were, first anc: foremost, that Austria did not 
at to cede Venetia, and that it would be very difficult to induce 
ar to do so; and next, that Britain was not ready to support 
,ranee in this policy, and without her support its difficulties would 
reatly increased. The only thing that would deter Prussia 
°ro'r, attacking Austria would be that she understood that France 
'fouls' fight onaAustria's side. Now if France made this 
threat, Britain, in her present state of nervous terror about 
!1 °ium and the Rhine, might take up an attitude hostile to 
rance, and a desperately dangerous situation might arise. 
s1d a / 
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Besides, so long as Britain would not seriously urge Austria, to 
cede Venetia, Austria would be encouraged to refuse her consent 
to this, for she was at present receiving the earnest and most 
2) 
sympathetic declarations from Lord Clarendon. 
Napoleon could not make up his mind to wcdppt any of these 
policies definitely, and to give up the others. In his mosty 
;dachiavellian mood, he leaned to Ido. I; when his conscience was 
in the ascendant, he preferred No. 4; it was in accordance with 
the best traditions of his reign, and if followed successfully 
it would recall the old proud days of the British alliance and 
the liberation of Italy. There were also moments, however, when 
not. 2 and 3 held attractions for him. Finally he made the fatal 
mistake of trying to combine all four plans, leaving open a 
loophole of escape from each. 
Drouyn de Lhuys preferred policy No. 4, or, if this were un- 
attainable, No. 2. No. 1 was abhorrent to him,' for, like a con- 
siderable number of his fellow -countrymen, he could not contem- 
plate a Prussian Germany without uneasiness; and the bribe of 
the }thine would have seemed a paltry compensation for being the ;ÿ 
accomplice of Bismarck, for it would displease and alienate the 
other neighbours of France. The Rhine frontier was in reality 
little bore than a bright dream in France; the French people 
were practical enough to know that such an acquisition would 
only expose Prance to the jealousy and enmity of her neighbours. r e wish of Drouyn de Lhuys, therefore, was to support Austria'' 
azainst Prussia, either by war or by peaceful negotiation, and 
See below p 
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satisfy Italy by getting Venetia for her. 
Throughout 1865, and 
until war broke out, Drouyn de Lhuys was trying to carry out - 
this policy, hindered and betrayed by the Emperor, who could not 
make up his mind to follow it consistently. 
To see how Napoleon attempted to combine-the four policies, 
wejnust return to the autumn of 1865, after the Convention of 
Gastein, and when Bismarck made his visit to Biarritz. while in 
France he interviewed both ,Tapoleon and his ministers. Drouyn de 
Lhu;ta adsured Cowley that flat. importance'`attached to this visit, 
and that the political situation had only been discussed in the 
most general terms. It. ìs -hardly possible that the French mània9. 
ter was speaking the truth; on the other hand, it ̀ seems probable /6, 
that he was not aware how deeply his master had committed him- 
self: for in these interviews Napoleon laid the foundation for 
Policy No. 1, promising neutrality in case of an Austro -Prussian 
war in return for compensation, the nature of which was not pre- 
cisely specified. Napoleon, imagining that he was displaying the 
highest qualities of statesmanship, preferred to 1 ave it in the 
7 tairand not tie himself do w n to Y definite agreemen . This was 
all that Bismarck could desire. The ministers, apparently, were 
pparently no definite proposals for the: fogmt.arf,_the oonipea- 
sation were discussed until ?Bismarck opened the subject to Bene- 
detti in Berline about a fortnight before war was declared. He 
mar have received some private hints about the Rhine from Napo- 
leon; at any rate he said to Benedetti that the French compen- 
sation 
" devraient ?tre prise partout ou on parle francais sur sa fronttre:.6,.. n_an allusion to Belgium, designs on which would 
of course involve a quarrel with Britain. He would rather resign, 
he said than cede Cologne or Mainz, but might be induced to 
make 
some cession on the Haute Moselle, 'perhaps Treves. would 
this with Luxembourg suffice? Benedetti reminded. him that Lux - 
bourg was not No-Maws-Land like "Belgium and certain Swiss cantons 
", but kept the conversation purely theoretic, "ne voul- 
ant pas accepter la discussion sur ces eventualit es, ni lui laisser supposer que ses combinaisons pouvaient avoir quelques 
nuances 
d' e rem examinées à Paris, j'ai rompu l' entretien sur ce het, de maniere de lui faire comprendre que je ne désirait pas 
,, le continuer. et (Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, 
4. 
' . particuli4re. Les Originies, No. 1630.) 
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not taken fully into the Emperor's confidence at the time, and 
L, 
only gradually learnt all that had taken place. 
Policy No. I, according to Napoleon's belief, was quite con- 
sistent with No. 3. If Prussia won the war, he would, he thought, 
be sure of a nice tit -bit for Prance through his bargain with 
Bismarck. On the other hand, Prussia might not win, but (and he 
probably hoped for this) might exhaust herself in an indecisive 
struggle With Austria. in this case he woul4 have saved himself 
from being placed in an awkward position, by having made no def- 
inite written 'agreement with Bismarck. Bismarck would have no 
hold on him, he fondly flattered himself,"- and he would be able t fr 
to intervene, as god from the car, between the. two combatants, 
and perhaps obtain for himself more than Bismarck, victorious, 
Would ever have conceded. Again, the fact that he had pledged 
himself to nothing would leave him free to bargain with Austria 
if he so wished, and connive at the destruction of Prussia, who 
Might reproach him, but could bring1no proof against him. 
Of course this would-be ?.gachiavellian scheming played into 
Bismarck's hands. By trying to combine all four lines of action, 
`tapoleon made each of them impóssible. By- coquetting with prus- 
SIk 
(Policy 1.) and 
to break out (Policy 3), he roused deep 
integrity 
in the mind of Austria, which 
diay Great Britain, which made Policy 
0n the other hand, by trying 
> encouragingf4war 
suspicions of his own 
made Poliuy 2 irapossible, 
4 much more difficult. 
trying to leave the way open for a change of position, and 
.i: refusing to commit himself to Prussia, he ruined his chances 
of obtaining any advantage from Policy I. For if Prussia 
were successful, Bismarck, since _ nt- }ad been signed, 
had only tc repudiate his agreement with France altogether, 
and Napoleon would be left in the lurch. d 
Napoleon if he considered these disadvantages, pro- 
bably, thought he could fail back on Policy 3. But Policy 3 
was the only one of the quartette which was not, andnQ..._ 
¡No possible: it depended on Austria and Prussia being 
equally matched, and the combat ending in a draw. 73ut Austria 
and Prussia were not equally matched, and if Austria were not 
supported by some other state, Prussia and Italy together would 
walk over her. 
-Clues 
Afternniaking his bargain , _ r Tr} with 
Bismarck, ancljol. Fecuring himself, as he believed, on that 
side, '?e,poleon began to grow doubtful and to lean - towards 
Policies 2 4. Throughout the spring of 1866, he alternated 
between these two, and Policy 3, but gradually becoming more 
and more nervous about the success of No. 3' he inclined pore 
and more towards espousing the cause of Austria. His efforts, 
therefore, to induce Austria to cede Venetia - the Roumanian 
Exchange Project, and th eC (Inference - were in themselves per - 
feetlY sincere, and might without risk have been supported by 
Great rita.n. Indeed it is probable that any external support 
vsol1ld 
have litre' enough to induce Napoleon to determine on one 




It, was now that the skill of Bìsmabck's mans,pement 
clear. He must stand or fall by the Italian Alliance. 
T\Tapoleon, pursuing Policy 3, encouraged that Alliance, but 
once it was signed, he was helpless. His first attempt in 
accordance with Policy 4 to prevent the Alliance from being 
signed, to detach Italy from Prussia, and come to an agreement 
with Austria, had failed, as we have seen, owing to the refusal 
of' Great -Britain to support the Exchange Project. Napol eon, 
annoyed, then flung aside this idea for the time b e ind 
went back to 7o. 3. He 
4Win, 14 
up his attempts to win 
et.tto .yeti - cun asradhol- 
c ],,; italy,that, he approved of the Alliance being 
signed, 
over Austria, and crrti- 
This change of course caused Great T,ritain, and to 
some extent Austria, to believe that he had. been insincere 
throughout, and that they had been wise in refusing his offer, 
since he was either pledged t.ó Prussia or fighting only- for his 
own hand: 
Out---6"14, J L+ icJ 
` his estimat e was a wrong.._ >ßxse. If the Exchange 
rojiect had obtained any support from Britain Napoleon would p.A 
have carried out his part of the plan loyally: Policy 4 offered 
more certain and less dangerous advantages than any of the 
others, and it was more` in accordance with his own best 
feelings. 
¡ 
r-e !, in° =1.ecn' 
¡re'nust not forget that he had i\o fee. very real difficulties, 
even 
3 r7- 
even if some of then were due to his o'vn errors. His 
original mistake was the iniquitous bargain with Bismarck in 
186 51. -.ate i-qu itottr°_er er , d _.no t-.._alt o g.ths-p --_- earry 
i-tretrt) It produced the 3ritish and Austrian distrust that 
checkmated his first efforts on the other side. But he had 
also to reckon with the extraxne stupidity, obstinacy and 
ana of ( k conceit Of the Austrian goverr.ient, nespeciallyA ñ bane is Joseph. 
It was a giant's task to induce Austria to part with Venetia. 
AR soon as the Prusso- Italian Alliance was signed, 
7.apoleon became sensible of its disadvantages, and went back 
again to his efforts to save Austria in' spite of herself, It 
is quite pok sible that even' while encouraging the signing* of 
the Alliance, he may not have abandoned this policy. He 
very probably thought that the Alliance would :be useful to him, 
for it would show .Austria how really dangerous her position 
was, and be another argument to induce her to buy off Italy. 
This was quite a reasonable conclusion to come to. Indeed, it 
did play an important part in bringing Austria to her senses. 
She finally consentedto the cession of Venetia and placed thew 
province in Napoleon's hands to be ceded to Italy in return for 
her neutrality. 
It was now that the most critical and dangerous hour 
approached for Bismarck 
It 
ensd®rff Would have consented to the cession sooner if the 
Debar 
had not absolutely refused. 
3 tg.. 
z question of Italy was 
a vital one for Napoleon. It was the one point upon which he 
remained constant in the midst of all his wavering. Italy was 
i 
his child, in a sense ,That he was deeply concerned for the 
welfare of the state he had created is beyond a doubt. The 
influence of his wife, the pressure put upón him by the`- Roman 
Catholic part:-.?-, compelled him to withhold Rome from Italy and 
;e tò' baulk her of her desires. He saw, it must have been with 
painful feelings, that he was growing to be detested in the 
country which he ad so greatly benefited., He eior0.1.r.d: z t 
W gyp 
to compensate Italy and to restore his own 
good fame, by presenting her with Venice%to soothe her wounded 
pridifor Rome. This )gives C. the key to his conduct in 
1866. It was the one definite object of his shifting and 
uncertain policy. 
Once let the war begin, with Italy upon the side 
of Prussia, and ''Tapoleon's hands were tied, He could, if °1` 
Italy and Prussia- were defeated, intervene to save them. But'' 
if Austria were defeated, he could do nothing, for he could not 
fight for Austria without turning his arms against Italy, the 
tcrintiaat 
one thing that he "LIM'd never do. The policy of encouraging 
the Prusso_It,alian Alliance was therefore a desperately dan- 
gerous one for him. If a war followed, his only hope of 
Playing a great and creditable part depended on Austria's being 
victorious. If, on the other hand, he merely considered the 
Alliance 
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Alliance as a means of frichtening Austria into accepting his 
proposals, he should have stopped to consider the character of 
the Italian government. 
The whole success ofJ?apoleon's policy, the whole 
success of Bismarck' s policy, now hung upon the dec is ion of 
thoa government. The Treaty was signed:. and Austria 
had given up venetia. If Italy decided to break the Treaty, 
and take Venetic,, 'Tapoleon had won: if she decided to hold by 
CCSS urn, 
the Treaty and reject thee, Bismarck had won. 
Venetia as a free gift, or Venetia as the possible 
prize of a bloody, doubtful and expensive war: and onl2.r a 
secret a?reement to weigh in the balance! ìrapoleon did not o. 
doubt the result. 
Bismarck knew his man better. He could rely upon 
la garmo ra.` 
It was at t very end of April that the chancelleries 
suddenly found themselves talking about a Congress, at first in 
'5 
a very tentative fashion. .L secret negotiations with 
Austria were then just nearing .success. A few days later rf! 
Was attained, and on May 5th Nigra wired the offer to Florence. 
apoleon held Venetia for Italy, if Italy would give Austria a 
free hand to compensate herself in r .D in case of victory. 
It is probable that the Cabinet of Florence was at this time 31 
the only.oTie in Europe which had at its head a perfectly stm;le, 
u?laf Q gC t a d, direct and honourable gentleman. La\Marmora was 
a soldier and a pairaiot, a sensible and moderate politician: 
he 
3Z,0 
was also under the belief that as Prime Minister of a great 
power he was as much under obligation to .keep his promised 
word as he was as a private gentleman. "Ma premiare impression",,_ 
he telegraphed back to Nigra, "est que c'est un question 
d'honneur et de loyautd de ne pas nous degager avec la Prusse..': 
Sut he was full of the deepest regret that so fair an offer a 
could not be accepted. One chance still offered. The Treaty 
of Alliance with Prussia Only lasted 3 months:'' if within that 
time war had not been declared the Treaty expired. If war 
could be postponed for some two months longer, Italy would be 
free to accept. "Mais, comme le traite' e re.Ile ,Tuillet, 
on pourrait arranger la chose avec la Congres ", he suggested, 
and he begged Nigro, for news about the Congress, which, he 
emphasized, offered the one possible chance of a peaceful 
solution. . 
The next day Nigra again transmitted the offer with 
concessions. This time, Venetia was to be ceded for a simple33 
promise of neutrality, the threat to Prussia being omitted. 
La Marmore, *p reluctantly refùsed( tt CT A - 
When it is remembered that Prussia had six months 
previously brought Italy almost to the point of alliance and 
abandoned her at Gastein: that she had done her best to 
entrap Italy in signing the present alliance on very disad- 
vantageous terms: that La Marmora doubted Bismarck's loyalty, 
and that at this very moment the Prussien legation in Florence 
,vas 
La ltarmo ra "Un Peu de m : 're" ----r 
321 
was ceaselessly pouring out a stream of abuse against La Marraora 
2zt. 
in terns unheard of in diplomatic circles, it will be seen 
how danE,rero>>sly- 3ismarck was venturing, and --how securely he 
counted on the character of the Italian Minister. 
-Finding that Italy could not be. induced to throw her ally 
overboard, Napoleon eagerly seized the alternative offered by 
La Marmora, and pressed on the idea of a Congress. "J'ai vu 
1'anpereur aujourd'hui, il convient que la situation est tris 
delicate. Il m' a dit que, pour gagner du temps, 11 fera son 
possible pour rem+{ttre sur le tapis l'idée du Congrès ". The 
3ritish Government little knew how strained was the situation, 
When they discouraged the plan for a`Congress, owing to suspicions , s^ 
of ?'Tapoleon's motives, and later accepted it with so much 
reluctance. t/ 
A'prelirninary discussion the terms on which the 
9 
Congress was to be summoned etween herself, :Britain, and _. 
kiïssie was proposed by France, and again eretrreirriteet doubtfully 
accepted by Britain. Russia accepted the Congress, but caused 
ß0i °e delay by declaring herself strenuously opposed to any cession 
of Venetia, so that in deference to her feelings the expression 
used in the invitation of the three powers had to be altered to 
the vague term " différend Italien", so as not to compromise 
Gortschakov. Russia was indeed loyally playing` Prussia's game. `' 
(1'11110.0 s correspondence for 1866 -7 -8, 
to La Marmora. "Un Peu de Lumii re" 
1 U n i n v GCS. 1-- . \l, bo l .( r 0 S 
-Bismarck's plans were aggà.n in danger, perhaps more than ever 
before. A Conference would have ruined him. .even if it had 
broken up without success, it only needehat it should drag on 
until the beginning o: Truly, and Italy would be set free to make 
an arrangement with Austria. If it did meet, however, it was 
more likely that some settlement would be made, equally fatal 
to his policy. Napoleon' a idea was: Venice for Italy; part of 
Silesia for Austria; the -Duchies, and some: eimall North German 
states,for Prussia; and possibly a small "Confederation of they'd/. 
Rhine," part of the German confederation, but under French pro- 
Most oL -` trim- tection, for France. were so 
apparently reasonable that it would be difficult to reject them 
in a Conference: yet Bismarck might as well have abdicated his 
position and called in the Liberals at once. For him, for the 
NeW Germany, it was suicide. Perhaps he counted on the possible 
suggestion of a khenish Confederation to rouse opposition to 
France in the Conference, and so give him a chance to continue 
his g -ame. More probably he relied on his lucky star, and hoped 
that something would intervene to Vprevent the Conference. At k3' . 
any rate, he dared not refuses' and so put himself in the wrong 
in the eyes of Europe. He- reluctantly accented. 
Benedetti reported that the King would be glad to accept a 
Conference; Bismarck would not, for he knewniit - rill ruin his 
Plans, but he wí;11,4. not dare to refuse, though he will do noth- 
ing to help towards success. He knows he will get the duchies, 
but ' at the cost of certain sacrifices. Both he and the King 
hold that it is dangerous that the situation as it is should be 
profoneed, as that will tell against Prussia, who is now ready. Ì . 
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i,.o.for war, and this will give Bismarck a hold over the King.' 
Later Benedetti reported that Bismarck had spoken to him very 
strongly of his unwillingness for a Conference. Benedetti warned 
his government that he could not guarantee that in spite of all 
their efforts some chance incident would not give rise to war 
before the Conference met *--- (prématurtinent .) In any case Bis- 
marck would try to force an immediate decision at Paris. Britain 
itad Russia had put pressure on him to accept. 
Bismarck for a moment feared the Emperor was going to break 
4-\' away from the toils`'in which he was involved, and take up an 
40 
honest and sincere policy. He sent a special envoy, de Burg, to 
Paris, to secure a orelikinary arrangement before the Conference 
met, but met with no success. 
is luck did not fail him, however. After a time of uncer- 
tainty, Austria wrote that she could not enter the Conference 
unless ail the participating powers were pledged not to accept 
any territorial aggrandisement. Both France and Britain pressed 
her/ 
(7 )) 
Despatch cf 29. yo. 
r66. 
Benedetti, p. 125. 
te.. 
?rivate letter of 1.4.66, Benedetti) p. 130. 
g, 
Bismarck to Benedetti, 19.66, private, Benedetti Chap. lV. 
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her to withdraw this reply, saying it constituted arefúsal 
as it implied that Venetia could not be given up: as she 
a/ 
would not do so, -&aein--ftftee the Conf erenc e 
-abandoned. Bismarck when the news arrived, leapt to his 
feet crying, "Long live the King.C. 
Henceforward events moved rapidly towards war. 
The refusal of Austria is the more astonishing as 
we know she had already consented in secret to the cession. 
Apparently Francis Joseph felt it dishonourable to do at the 
bidding of a Congress what he had consented to do as an indi- 
vidual act. Perhaps, also, Austria believed that the Congress 
would award her a less compensation than what she hoped to 
r' ' conquer for herself by arms; for at the same time Austria ' <41 
privately informed Frànce that the secret offer of Venetia 
would still hold good. In connection with Austria's refusal, 
however,- a curious incident occurred, which must be mentioned 
here. Russia, one of the three powers which issued the 
invitation to the Congress, used her influence to induce 
V 
Austria to refuse that invitation. - 4Ue -.know that Gortschako% 
encouraged Austria in- her course, cannot tell how far he 
that he told went in his encouragement 
c C am, 
Austria that Great 73ri1;ain -mac would support her in her 
refusal, 0 
On May , discussirg the possibility of a Congress 43 
7/zth Sir Andrew Buchanan, Gortschakoff had said"to the British 
Ala:bassador 
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Ambassador that "the Russian Government agree in principle to 
the conditions which Her Majesty's GOverrnneqt attach to their 
assent to the Convocation of a Congress, and that they cannot 
accept as a basis for such a meeting the cessi ón of Venetia to 
Italy even subject to a compensation to Austria. - t "mile 
therefore they concur in the opinions expressed in the French 
proposal respecting the Elbe Duchies and Federal Reform. - -- 
they consider that the Cabinet of Paris if really, desirous for 
the convocation of a, Congress should abandon a basis for its 
,deliberations which would be declined by England, . Russia and 
(414111 
Austria and render such a meeting impossible" . Gortschakov 
received no definite reply from Sir Andrew Buchanan, and on the, 
same date the Russian Minister said to Baron Talleyrand, that 
Lord. Clarendon was firmly resolved not to enter a Congress 
except on these conditions: 1. No cession of Venetia: 11. No 
annexation of the Duchies to Prussia; 111. No increase of 
influence to Prussia by Federal Reform; iv. No dismemberment 
of Turkey. "Les informations du 3aron de 3udberg" (Russian 
azòassaâor at London) "sont trés précises", writ s Talleyrand. 
lussra) he says, agree&with these principles, and will fight K' 
rather than permit that the Exchange Project b e carried ou_t . 
'ertschakov had said to hire: "Croyez -moi, mettre en avant 
h0. ssion r,e la Vénétie est fermer les portes du Congres avant 
de 1'4 avoir ouverrtes , ... -- " because three Powers at least - 
noáeela) Austria, England - -- will refuse to discuss on this is, Gortscha,kov backed these statements by showing Talleyrand pPatches from B,runno in which Cla.rendon's views were clearly 
t f orth. %a) 
Origines, TTo. v2311,' 1n.5.66. J 
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This information, combined with the extreme reluctance 
at first shown by the 3ritish Government and the coldness of 
. 
gave alarm PL + Lord C ol ey, , a,.su. ---, 
la Tour ci e.au ad, what truth there was in the allegations of 
Russia. La Tour evidently found the incident inexnlicable. 
He wrote back that Brunnow must have attributed too much 
importance to soT:1e words of Lord Clarendon sympathetic to 
Austria; but added, that Clarendon, though still believing 
the cession of Venetia the only war to prevent war, is not now 
(g3) 
quite so decided about it as -one could wish. 
In the meantime, the Sritish Government seems to have 
had no idea of what was in Gortschako's mind, and Buchanan 
4 
seems to have regarded the Prince's references to Britain as ! 
merely one of the spiteful hits which were frequent between eS 
two diplornatti, who never met without squabbling. Buchanan 
was therefore startled when on May 21st Gortschakoff told him 
that he had informed Austria that in refusing to cede Venetia, 
zhe -would have the moral support of Russia and of "England ", 
as thew 
7-111, 
not press her to accept conditions against her 
Buchanan then expressed the hope of his government 
trF:- 1zssia had not really made any such statement to Austriia, 
and lortschako replied that he had certainly done so: 
as he said his reports from England led him to believe that 
'1 Governmen 
eteeion of Vene 
r1gines 2361. 
t looked unfavourably on the proposal for the 
(63 ) ( 
tia to Italy against territorial cornpensat i n" . 
16$66y1(4) (.0.F6Jä698 - 
:---: 25. 
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This statement about British views was then contradicted b r 
the 3ritish Government. 
,,,e t possessing the c..espatches of Brunnow and Gortschakov, 
nor any account from Clarendon of the interview or interviews, in 
question, it is difficult to decide how. the mista'te arose. That 
there was a mistake is certain. Britain, we have shown, was 
anxious that Italy should acquire Venetia, ands had several times 
advised Austria to give up - the province. .It is not easy to 
IL(); 
believe that Gortschakov could ever have really thought that 
Britain would support Austria in refusing to cede Venetia. 
There were, however, several things which gave colour to 
Gortschakov's statement, -and which must have made it appear to 
Austria perfectly convincing, when made by him in such an 
eaphatic manner. 
Firstly, Britain had declared herself strongly opposed to the 
compensation Of Austria in the T)anubìan Principalities: this could 
easily be exaggerated and made to appear specially significant. 
econdly, Great Britain had shown herself extremely doubtful 
and reluctant about the proposal for a Congress. It was well 
understood by everyone that the British government werevdeeply 
suspicious of the ; notives of France/ in suggesting the Congress, 
and that she had accepted in the enci, not because she had r iuch 
hope of a satisfactory settlement, but because she could not .)in 
accordance with her declared principles, refuse to support any 
proposal that, ostensibly at least, made for peace. Buchanan had 
expressed this clearly to Gortschakov. During the negotiations 
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about the Invitations to the Congress Buchanan had protested that 
Gortschakov's wish to substitute the expression "differend Italien", 
for "cession de Vénétie", would cause delay in the invitation 
being sent. iortschakov replied that "Though such an e.pprehen- 
L sion might'' influence H.Í. T, Government, in consequence of the great 6 1 
financial interests in Great T3ritain which might suffer from the 
war, he was not similarly circumstanced, and he theref ore f el t 
that the probability of improving the terms of the invitation so 
as to render them more acceptable to Austria, counter -balanced 
any risk of war which could be incurred by delay. I rejoined 
that he ought however to consider there were more serious conse- 
quences attached to the responsibility of which I spoke, than the 
mere blame which might attend it, as no one could say what would 
be the policy of France if -a war which she had ostensibly exerted 5 2 
herself to prevent, could be attributed to the manner in which 
cg 
her proposals had been received by the neutral Powers ". 
It Was therefore easily to be understood that Britain did not 
attach much importance to the holding of a Congress. 
In the third place, the strong feelin against Prussia of 
Clarendon, and of the queen, anti , s s ell, was 
well known. Clarendon had told France, and possibly others, 
that he slid not approve of authorisin ; Prussia to seize the Duchies, 
and 
though he would not oppose it, he would do -nothing to enforce "? 
sùeh_a decision -in the Congress. He had also made it qùite clear 
to Austria that his sympathies Were with her, ann that he hoped e he would defeat Prussia. 
should 




" of England hair in ° tinfortinatelytid,isregarcled two years ago, 
we had 
ceased to take concern in the Schleswig- Holstein Question, and 
remained passive spectators of the process by which Prussia was 
carrying; out her intention to anntex the Duchies.... I begged 
leave to expr ess my opinion that the course which the Austrian 
.Govervnent was about to pursue in this critical posit ions of 
f 
affairs and the determination of the nperor not to irkeld to 
menace were calculated to sustain the dignity of Austria, and 
6.at at the same time that she would t1 ereb_y be saved from the 
humiliation which she properly considered would be worse than 
Tar, it would tend to prevent irar by gaining for her the public 
opinion of A,urone which would be unanimous against the attempt 
o runs to take advantage of the temporary difficulties in 
which Àustria fo, nd herself placed, in order to secure her terr- 
1 orial ag,FrAnclìse:nent." He then placee-thert7gOod offices of Great 
"Britain at the disposal of Austria. nut we know from experience 
of how little avail such good offices were wgtth the German rTov- 
ernment if We acted singly and had not the support of other 
Powers. ?f, contrary to every expectation founded on coon senses 
the dictates of humanity the of v and , n true interests f cerm.n , 
Prussia should push matters to extremities, the Austrian govern- 
meet, .l said, iraç quite right in assuming that England would pre - 
serve .a strict neutrality but that in desiring that we should 
address something in the nature of a threat to Prussia, the 
- "an "o`Ter,uaent sought to make up partizans in the war, and that -S1. 
1 cool« hold out no expectation that after adopting a policy of W -g) 
5-4 
5J 
nQutrality we sh>>uld depart from our duty as neutrals. 
r)di19rCri0_. 66. 6-talics minè} 
:._ 
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It was small wonder if protests of neutrality coupled with 
such warm expressions of eyiipathy and approval encouraged Austria 
to hope for something more, especially when it was known that 
hóth the queen and the Prince Of Wales were in favour of a militant 
policy. 
then Austria, had suggested that she be indemnified for the 
loss of Venetia by the acgl .isition of the whole or part of 
v 
5 
Silesia, thevBritish government had never expressed dissent or 
disa?Yproval. They had only said that such compensation would 
have to be wrested from Prussia by force, and that Great 3ritain 
eóuld not resort to the use of force herself, and deprecated 
;rolent measures from Austria. 
Taking these facts into consideration, the attitude of Austria 
'oecoraes quite clear, and the effect upon her of (o.rtschakoir' s 
assurances easy to-understand. 
- Austria, like Britain, suspected the motives of France. She 
fp,red,like Britain, that the result of - a Congress would only be 
to.secure a diplomatic triumph for France. France, she thought 
1ou1d use her influence to establish Prussia, firmly in.- the North 
of Germany, restore her own influence -on the },Line and in South 
lerloanY, secure Venetia for Italy, and fling Austria as co.lpensa- 
tion some worthless scraps of territory -- -soxaething -in the 
alkans, too small to- annoy Russia, or at best a mere nibble of 
Silesia. Then, if Austria did not accept these terms, she would 
amised of- deliberately provoking a war. Besides all this, 
if the Congress met, and failed, Austria would be worse off than 
Qa 1'á8 Hoyt. She could not , , in her present financial straits keep 
x armaments "at their war standard all the while that the 
. N!4..t..yt.i.. 
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Congress was sitting, and yet it would be 'dangerous to 'demobilise 
until peace -was assured. 
/On the other hand, if Austria did not enter the Congress, but 
fought the quarrel out, she stool, so she thought, to gain much 
more. She had not been eager for war, but her anger and resent- 
ment were now thoroughly roused by the tactics òf 3ismarck,. and 
s:e was beginning to be al.nost anxious to fight. Italy she did 
not fear: all her concessions to Italy were really offered to 
France, in order to secure Frenchvneutrali ty, If faced with 
Prussia alone, she hoped to be able to defeat that power, and to 
make large conquests in -Silesia. She - nog* hoped also that she had. 
secured France, by handing over Venetia to ?t?apo eon. She had. 
every reason to believe, f rora the utte.ranc es of Clarendon and 
31oòtnfield, 
_ that public opinion in Great -.Britain would sanction 
all the annexations she proposed to make in- Silesia. She knew she 
có.11(1 count -on the support of most of the South Ger:ian states. 
AEni having vindicated her reputation andVecured her- position 
D 
=errs )1v;she would willingly hand over her trol_,olesome posses - 
sLOns - -- Venetia to Italy, Holstein to Prussia. 
Earnest pressure from Gre'at'3ritain and France together would 
nave forced Austria to accept. the Congress. -It was only because 
end Oeliev;l that Sri Lain did not attach much importance to the - 
4n°ress -that 
Et he dared refuse it. 
So passed the last chance of, peace. 
gr) 
It vrxs Tor :iis reason that i:-1 refusing the Congress she rLVetely 
assured France that her offer of Venetia would stand. 
A A.`,N.iJ 
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Bismarck, relthved of his last fears, pushed on his preparations. 
The quarrel now passed into what we may call the Disarmament 
Phase- --' "'hen each state protests its own peaceful intentions, 
but maintains that its neighbour's threatening armaments compel 
-5- 
it to mobilise. Austria, however, ft4-9ggtrire consented tb disarm, and 
even to begin the day before Prussia; rut. here again Bismarck 
,o nd Italy useful, for the day after Prussian complaints ceased, 
hose of Italy began, änd- the subject was revived. Bismarck was 
tour relying on the Federal Reform Question to Five the final 
signal for war. He had a card up. his sleeve with .,Which he could 
tartle Germany and Europe. 
I the meantime the question of war -and peace was being 
debated in London. »hs 
In one respect the situation was essentially different from 
That it had been in 1864. The Queen was ardently in favour of 
ii daughter was about to harry an Augustenburg princeling; 
A n,outi.A. 1+.L+.1ja,.uauatt e.., , 0.4 hi a wi ,I n 
A 
-1 4 y.0 r 1 17 sß}1 C the r o1 
ct-rt d Tkes, ,..L 
?rinse of Prussia, weka1a- the most earnest opponent/ of Bismarck's 
P 1ic il- Artrs+r. Tat ;;olicy had shocked her own constitutional 
trinciples 
i she had always believed that Britain should give 
4riendly support to Austria, and She and the Prince Consort had 
taken the Austrian side in 1859 -60. On March 30th the Queen had 
tent a memorandum to Russell in favour of war with Prussia. Russell 
1e4 refused to enter u- on such a course: firstly, he said,because 
Tgri 




e of Denmark in 1864, and secondly,reca,usA, when Britain 
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lad. once acquiesced in e destruction of Denmark, it remains for 
Germany, which invoked the war, and is strong enough to assist 
Austria to do right, to settle the Duchies in the manner conformable 
to the wishes o'f the inhabitants." This cryptic statement, 
it means anything, appears to imply that the Diet was to get up 
and teach Bismarck his place. 
The majority of the Cabinet, it appears, were against interven- 
lion. Ifs Gladstone ever mentioned the subject in his letters or 
diaries, Lord Morley did not consider the references worth printing, GS 
as there is no mention of it in his "Life ". probably his opinion 
as, as usual, on the side of peace, and he was, besides, much 
r6re interested in the Reform crisis at home. Granville took up 
brie same attitude as in 1864, though his position was rather 
eaker, as he had not now the support of the queen. as,r ho 
-acwaierLitV _. _ a-t? r"itcrs`s-e-1 -1.- 4- 
giowed -g, y - e-. a o-nrTrtt --t. rerxs+_"iv -ee- t.o__a l 
l)urin the negotiations for -the Congress, Russell, fo-r)`the time 
being at least, changed his mind. On May 17th,he wrote to Cla-ren- 
don) proposing, to offer Austria "moral, diplom/attic and if necessary 
;ïlitar ,, aid in .:er quarrel in 'Schlesri.g-Holstei, i, Austria (,(,, 
i!°u1d consent to sell Venetia to Italy for £20, 000, OOO or 
43°)()r)r))000. "This would be a course spiritea,prudent, and hon- 
°urable. Austria is wrong in Italy, right in Germany. We have lost 
eoae reputation because France refused to join us in a war for 
De1114ark,the blame for which the Continent throws upon us, and not 
The 
. Clarendon V 311 italics are Lord Russell's. 
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jt upon France or liussia,v,ho both hunt; rack. we need not take any 
part in the reform of the German Confederation; but in this 
case too Austria is in the ri7ht,barrin`, two or three concessions 
to prussia,«"hich she minht easily make. In cominc to an under - 
standin; with &stria I should endeavour to get back the Isle of 
Alsen and Flensburg for Denmark. In the hands of Trussia they 




At this moment we will not stop to examine the 
pilicy towards Germany outlined by Russell. We need .only say 
that as Italy had already refused`Venetia as a free gift from 
France, she was not likely to -accept it from 3ritain when she 
had to pay Z30,0001000 for it. Had the government attempted 
to carry out`-this plan, they would have foundered on the same 6 
rock as had Napoleon the rock of La Marmorat s loyalty to his 
engagements with Prussia. But the policy was never. nett, 
sanctioned by the Cabinet: Granville would have strenu- 
ta.c 
ously opposed it) any case the Government soon became 
l absorbed in the constitutional and parlia- 
entary crisis at home. 
In the meantime, Austria had had the idea of placing 
e Holstein question in the hands of the Diet, where she had 
a large majority on her side. Bismarck now played his master- 
card. The Prussian representative in the Diet proposed the 
6() election of`-a German parliament by universal suffrage to decide 
t_he question 
of Federal Reform. 
It 
1411401 Clarendon. iri 11 312. 
. .--...-,...,.- 
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It was a thunderclap. The Prince of Darkness had 
appeared in the guise of an angel of -light. By Morier and his 
school the step was regarded as an evidence that Bismarck was 
politically bankrupt. His policy had broken down and he was 
making a desparate bid for the support of the Liberalsíe`' 
was knovm to have had interviews with the Liberal l eaders 
The general opinion was that he would fail in this: he would 
never be able to reconcile the Liberal opposition, who would 
be traitors to fir cause if they accepted his olive branch. to 
"koggenbach came on Bismarck's invitation, and I 
am not sure whether, on his arrival, he had not a secret hope 
of being able "to do some good ". At any rate he went away - 
perfectly désillusionné. He has told Bismarck the truth: 
that he may gain over some Liberal /men and make renegades of 
' them, but that he could not gain over thé Liberal party; that 
he was not the man to reorganise Germany by means of a 
Parliament 
. . ." 
These critics made two mistakes. Firstly, they under- 
estimated the lure that UniVerfsalSuffrage would have, when 
combined With the eclat of a great Prussian victory in the 
field. 
Secondly, they were wrong in believing that Bismarck 
had made any surrender of his old ideas. His Universal Suffrage 
Proposaíl was a trap to catch a Liberal : but it was 
trap, -lt was not an offer at compromise; Bismarck 
,,1 Leader of the Liberal party. 
Morier I I p. 62. 
7/ 
Bismarck did not intend to meet theVLiberals half way, 'rout 
thought he could entice them entirely into his own camp. He 
as fax too clever to believe that in offering \the bribe of 
Universal Suffrage he ran any risk of damaging his own or his 
master's position. No one, as yet, had seen Universal Suffrage 
n operation in Europe. It was regarded as a thoroughly 
democratic measure. .No one as yet was aware, that whereas in 
a small community the operation of Universal Suffrage is 
democratic in nature, in a large community it is nothing of 
the kind. There is, however, every reason to believe that 
ismarek had seen this, and that he knew very well what he was 
bout when he offered it as bait to the Liberals. He saw that 
he control exercised over Parliament by an electorate where 
arreres,l Suffrage exists is necessarily very much slighter 
Ilan that exercised by a more limited electorate. The wider 
electorate is unwieldy, chaotic, incapable (save in great 
rises, when the issue is simple) of united. and disciplined 
action. The vote of the educated politically- minded classes 
is swamped in the vote of the ignorant, masses who are easily 
r+anaged and easily\I brib ed by social reforms. He knew he could 
dandle such. an electorate. 
Ke saw, also, that a parliament sent up by such an electorate 
would bö corupa,rativelir helpless against the government. 
finless its 
` 
control over the government was secured by the most 
rigid and 
comprehensive laws its influence was bound 





Constitution, were of little use; Conventions can be violated, 
_ovever revered and hoary they be, without attracting much 
at,e--:tion. And in Prussia there were not even conventions to 
re the control cf the legislatiree over the executive. The 
a;ae still very nearly an autocrat. die nadì governed for 
Tears past without earl iamentary sanctions and taxed without 
legal authority, and not all the protests of the Chambers 
:_ald prevent this. 3ismarck now wanted to reconcile. the 
Literal opposition at least in part and he Saw that he could do so, 
mitout abandoning any of his ovin authority, partly- by paying 
` the glittering token -money of Universal Suffrarrre -- reforning 
Electorate without reforming the Legisla.ttre; and partly 
by winning' their hearts and dazzlincr their imaginations with 
military and diplomatic triumphs. It was, of course, -a dangerous 
. :°licy. If he were defeated b;r Austria., he and yythe 
but Xoltke -arid Roor, had L" ._- _ e d __ m 
, kn. elr 13"---- -7, c.ild 
b e l i e : : _r te were a 
democratic ri-&-i.c tfni 
Austria the Universal Suffrage proposal was anathema; 
and the Governments of the Southern States detested it almost as 
d?erl`, for the'r feared a Parliament erected by such means would 
bring about their downfall. when, therefore, Austria brought 
t0Mard In the Diet the proposal to mobilise the Federal - 
i °rçe$ 
against Prussia, on the ground 
33g. 
_Zat her reform proposal violated the constitution of the 
'Confederation and the Treaty of Vienna, it was passed almost 
,.unanimously. The Prussian representative than rose and 
"arnnounced that his Government withdrew from the Confederation, 
which thereby ceased to exist. 
V 
Two days later the Prussian armies invaded Saxony, 
Hesse Cassel, and Hanover; and having thus secured the 
poured over the Austrian frontiers. On Tune 20th Italy 
declared war, and invaded Venetia. 
While in London the Reform Bill crisis was passing 
through its last stages, the war was fought out in '3ohemia, on 
Lombard frontier. Italy, as was generally expected by 
all but her` own people, was irmaediat ely and somewhat dis- 
graceflilly defeated at Custozza. But from the 7orth queer 
rumours began gradully to filter. Confidence and excitement 
gave place to doubt and anxiety: vague reports of movements 
,.and skirmishes in Bohemia filled the despatches. igfeli 424M. a Y9' 
few hours of dread and ominous silence: and then, heralded by 
rumours ever blacker and blacker, the news of Sadowa burst 
like a thunderclap on Europe. The war, barely begun, was 
already at an end. The Austrian power had softly and 
suddenly vanished away, at, the first round of / truss ian 
ordnance. \, "The needle -gun is King! " cried the6imes: It was 
not a desperately -fought struggle, as h-.i1 been the case in the 
banish war, where the strongest was victorious by force of 
numbers: it was a shameful and instantaneous collapse. There 
was / 
33(i- 
was no Austria: only the Prussian Kriegsherr, bestriding 
Germany like a colossus from the Main to the Baltic, stood 
supreme as the powder- smoke cleared away. 
Napoleon, who, as hiso seen, had for some weeks 
been relying chiefly on Policy 2, that of an understanding with 
Austria, now found his secret treaty so much waste papers 
V Startled out of his wits by this sudden burst of "Kanonengebrúll 
s 
and wiehernde Rosee Getrabe ", he made a wild effort to revert 
to Policy 3, and on the day after Badowa - the 4th of July - 
he telegraphed to King William that Austria had placed Venetia 
in his hands; and announced himself as mediator. 
This double news created a sensation in London, the 
worst, it seemed, had come to pass, and all their fears would 
be realised, 
"The war is as good as over," Clarendon wrote, on 
Jù11 5th -his last day in office---"And everything plays into 
C93) 
LN.'s hands. He wants a great slice of land for himself as the(` 
reward for having abetted the quarrel. But, " added the noble 
lord With a flash of insight, "Bismarck will only negotiate about 
that with a breech- loader in his hand." Things had come to a 
sad pass when Clarendon was driven to rely on Bismarck's 
Pugnacity. 
"La demarche; d'Autriche," reported la 
who aPpeared to have seen T ondo n through a fog. 
instead 
of its normal pease -porridge hue, "Qui 
Louie Napoleon. 
Tour d'Auvergne, 
couleur de rose, 
fait de 
340. 
1tanpßreur l'arbitre de la situation de l'Europe, a cause tbi 
une profonde sensation. La prestige de la France en est 
consid- 
arable -,lent accru, et l'opinion publique, forcee de rendre ho5age 
a la prévoyance comme a la haute sagesse -de la politique de sa 
Nette, voit dans l'intervention pacifique de l'Empereur, en 
g.Z 
méiae temps qu'un gage certain du rétablissement de la paix, une 
garantie efficace contre l'ambition de la Prusse... On comprend - 
que la Prusse a acquis, dans une certaine mesure, le droit/ de 
se montrer exigeante; on est disposé à croire qu' el? e, sera plus 
encore, peut -titre, qu'elle ne serait fondee a l' titre; mais on a 
peine h admettre qu'elle veuille, en fin de compte, s'exposer, 
en declinant les conseils et les propositions de sa Tiajeste, á. 
94) 
corapromettre sa position vis -h -vis de la France." 
La Tour exaggerated the confidence placed in France's prob- 
ity, but he probably did not exaggerate the high estimate 
95) 
current -in London of the Emperor's dominating position. 
alatever the opinion there;- however, Napoleon himself was 
net long peraitted to cherish any illusions. ;.is position 
94) 7 July 1866. Les Origines, 'To. 2909. 
95,) Drobably only one person was heartily pleased. The telegram announcing 
tt_e Emperor's mediation arrived at Windsor during the 
narriar;e cerf;mony of the Princess Helena V) Prince- -Christian of 
fllesvitr_uolstein, and the Prince of pales left his place to in- 
rom the French ambassador, and to express his happiness to see 
napoleon "devenir ainsi l'arbitre de la situation." La Tour to 
D. de thuys, 5 July 1866. Les Origines, ''To. 2874. 
S' 3. 
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was,. in fact, it hopeless,. He could only save himself from 
a shameful rebuff by enforcing his offer of mediation in arms; 
and that he could not do o _ 
for on the one hand, he could not face the prospect of a war 
with Italy, and on the other, he could not fight Italy and 
Prussia together with his army in the state of disorganisation, - 
4 into which mismanagement and the Mexica Expedition had thrown 
'it. Drouyn de Lhuys vtrertd have taken the risk, but Napoleon 
dared not face it when it came to the point, and he went through 
a week of doubt and change. His first decision, which had 
produced the unlucky telegram, had been to summon the Chambers, 
ßìd fight if necessary,. Drouyn de 1.3euys sent such instruc- 
Lions to the Diplomatic agents,. Next day his courage 
failed him, and he countermanded the. order to summon the 
Chambers. On the 6th, he NriTtIll to Britain and Russia begging 
them to support his mediation "par force ". In the meantime he 
saw disaster closing about him. 
He had taken no written bond from Prussia, and now,. 
3ismarck repudiated the bargain altogether: Not a scrap of 
German ground, he. said, and no mediation unless on Prussia's 
terms, 
Italy, on her side was flung into a passion by the 
statement about Venetia. It was too much, indeed, to ask her, 
in order to salve Napoleon's wounded pride, to submit to such 
a humiliation. She, having suffered a complete defeat in a 
fair field, was now humbly to accept from Napoleon's hands 
the 
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the Venetia she could not conquer for herself: and this too, 
cif when, Prussia having defeated Austria, the coast was clear 
for a triumphal entry into Venice! Italy refused to accept 
Venetia from France, and was doubtful about even consenting. to 
an armistice. Napoleon, desperate, sent off Benedetti to 
plague Bismarck at Prussian Head quarters. On the 13th of 
July, after a week of uncertainty, Bismarck presented his 
terms through Goltz. He would allow Napoleon to mediate, 
on these terms:--- 
A new German Confederation was to be forced, 
including only the Northern states, but these were to be 
completely under the control of Prussia: Austria was to be 
entirely excluded from Germany: the South German states - -- 
Bavaria, Baden, Würt emb erg, and the southern part of Hesse- 
he left alone to f o .id a Conf ederat ion of ¡ 
their own: Austria would cede Venetia to Italy, but otherwise 
be left intact. The large territorial annexations afterwards 
made by Prussia were not all mentioned in these terms, but 
Napoleon accepted them later, as he now accepted the first plan. 
Be dared not cavil at Bismarck's word: and in his róle of media- 
tor he submitted Bismarck's terms to Prussia, Italy and Austria. 
It 11äs noT, and not at Sedan, that the pride of France touched 
its nadir. 
The peác e terms viere very much more lenient than anything 
vhich grope had expected frory Bismarck; it had been thought ' -, 
-that,he would demand the German provinces of Austria,. and when 
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it was known that no cession of territory would be demanded of 
that country save Venetia, public opinion in Great Britain, and 
else where, concluded that this moderation was due to the inter- 
ference of France. They had still before them an imaginary 
picture of Napoleon, a lordly figure, ruling the tempest, and 
3ismarck gnashing his teeth in baffled greed. In truth, 3ismarkk 
had' fought the most desperate battle Of his llife with King 
William and the military chiefs, to induce them to consent to 
these terms. He laid not wish to destroy Austria, far . :saw in 
her a future ally. He only wanted to drive her out of Ge?many, 
and leave the field clear for Prussia. Italy had been promised 
Venetia; but beyond that he had no desire to weaken Austria. 
By this time a conservative government had taten the 
place of the Liberal administration in 1ondonl, It fe l to their 
lot to decide what should be the policy of Great Britain in the 
IÌeW state of affairs abroad. 
344. 
VI. 
In 1866 -3ritain was not in such an advantageous position 
90 
for intervention as' she hast been in 1864. The situation was now 
much more comp nicated. when Italy was drawn into the struggle, 
armed intervention on either side became irnpossibl:. for 73ritain. 
we have seen that, when for a moment the government considered 
seriously the possibility of giving military support to Austria] 
it was only on the absolute condition that Italy should rennin 
neutral and should he given Venetia. This step, however, was 
taken too late, as Italy ,_,as by then pledged to Prussia.. whether 
`ritain and France, acting in concert, could have forced la 
Marmara to throw aside his scruples, ex.- to resign -his position 
as minister and allow himself to be replaced some one not 
cnaitted to the Prussian alliance, is uncertain. 
Apart altogether from the Question of Italy, however, 
intervention between the German powers would have been ,a very 
difficult and dangerous matter. 
The German situation was completely misunderstood by the 
3ritish/ 
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government. It may be hazarded that even the Conservative govern-44-'77 
sent which followed, though more ignorant of details, had a 
clearer general idea of the significance of the situation in 
Germany. 
Russell and Clarendon, and most of the diplomatic representa- 
N 
tives of Britain, persisted in regarding the Austro- Prussian .9 d, 
difference as being mere l y` a quarrel for 
the possession of the Duchies. In truth, the question of 
the Duchies was 6ni: a secondary issue. Bismarck was ma.kin7 use 
of it to force a quarrel on Austria_. He -meant to have the Duchies 
of course - - -but he had a much more important ob j ect Y It may' 
almost be said that the war was inevitable, and that any Gerhan 
statesman, whatever his methods, who had set himself to unify 
Germany, would have hid to face such a v.7ar sooner or later, 
unless a complete change took place in the conduct of Austria. °3 
if Franz Josef had died, and a statesman of gènius hid taken over 
the direction of affairs in Vienna, the struggle might have been 
avoided. The war was fought, not only to make Prussia supreme in 
Germany, but to drive Austria out of Germany: for Austria was, 
in all her real int - rests, an,:ì` in all that justified her existence, 
anon-German state. Austria, out of Germany, might be a valuable 
member of the community of European States; -in Germany, was only 
á hindrame and an evil to Germany, to herself, and to Europe in 
general. 
In this sens 
itable Ù,ar, as It v'as not, in 
def nsiv e war. 
violence which 
94. 
e, the war of 1866 was a justifiable, even an inev- 
f ew wars could be, and as the Danish war was not. 
its essence, a war of conquest. It was almost a 
The elements of conquest, of spoliation, and of 
accompanied it were mere Bismarekianvepisodes. 
177, 
. 
They were the flat -rs in Th ernarck' s policy; the expulsion of 
Austria was its ,justification. TTotwithst= nding its many revolt - 
ing accompaniments, there is no period of his career in which he 
appears in so sympathetic a light, and is so completely the 
na +.c.onal hero. 
34Zorier Vfa,,thP onl',T man in_British diplomacy of suifficient 
capacity to recognise all this. 
"The heart-breaking part of it "is that its aims, as regards the 
anti-Atistrian portion of it, are so thoroughly leç-ri timat e,tthilstr 
the means used are so tho.roug',1y damnable. The presence of Aust- 
ria in sermam r and Italy is\) the fatal bar in the 1-ay of progress, 
95. 
first for Austria, second for (ermany, third for Italy. I am myself 
convinced this .might have been effected by peaceful ans and 
by the mere natural course of liberal develop, nt. Bismarck 
has determined it otherwise. He has had recourse to a brutal y`( 
sutgical operation to effect that which,I am convinved,raight. 
nave been done by diet and steady training. The patient will 
very likely die under the operation. But heartily as I hate the 
operation,I must wish for its success. A signal victory Oli the 
part of Austria ùn the present struggle wouldt throW Europe back 
{ -a 
three generations." 
The 3ritish government were therefore in a. terrible dilemma. 
They must choose between standing by, to watch Austria fcrced, 
into a war which she had tried to avoid, or 
to oiDQSA in arms Prussia,who was pursuing a`highl'y desira,>> e 
Ol)iectItñoug 
-1 with i +,.._ hideo»s and immoral methods. 
I 
The" Were themselves entirely to blame for the awkward position 
___)p. 68. 
in which they found themselves. In 1866 it was impossible to 
fight Bismarck without injuring Germany; 
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but in 1864 they could 
have done so, and not only without injuring Germany, but doing her 
incalculable service. 
Armed intervention in 1864 would inevitably have led to the 
fail of Bismarck Fad his Danish policy failed, .6.8 when sincerely 
opposed by Great Britain it raust have done, his position in Ber114 
.tread . dangerous, would have become untenable. 
The defeat of Bismarck's aimsvin Denmark, however, need have 
involved no injury to Germany. Slesvig, to be sure, would have 
been kept for Denmark; but the possession of Slesvig was not an 
indispensable condition for the security and future development 
of Gerraa ny,xnd,-af-ter- h.er,.-°nav 2.-power- -had; .been- fuller -- sta Ils? 'éd, 
itzisi.e.__lier. too --e t'e--a\ ria-st.ery_.over. - the-Baltic --to 'h-e- de.s_tra, 
.Ole for + Î g ,, -i-frfrer td 61-11, 76 -11e). Denmark, on the other 
`rand, even- if she held Slesvig, was far too weak a power *, 
O threaten Germany. 
The fall of Bismarck would have cleared the wau for the Liberal 
;arty, -The King would have been obliged to surrender to them 'at 
148í He might have abdicated, as he had threatened, in which 
°ase he 1+ould have been succ;eeded h-,r the 'Liberal and intelligent 9°) 
PTO Prince. In any case, absolute government in Prussia would 
.are beer at an -end, and Germany would have been free to develope 
li1°eral .and constitutional lines. There is _'no doubt 
that the accomplishment of the unit' 
attài e 
e- á slower and more gradual 
n d trough "Blood and Iron ", 
°us1y thrown back is not to be 
ication of Germany would 
process than when it was 
bizt that it would have been 
f eared. It. had air easy 
3I/8 
gone too far,before Bismarck appeared -on the scene, to leave the 
ultimate issue in doubt. It would,however,háve proceeded on vera 
different lines. 
Germany would have received a most salutary lesson. She would 
1 
have learned that force and lawlessness were not to be allowed' 
to prey unchecked upon weakness; that the Power -State would, 
sooner or later, inevitably find its neighbours arrayed in arras 
agánst it. The gospel of "Blood and Iron "would have met, in its 
r »14444 & crtc 
very beginnings, the only reply iff -eattA -fi.rr° 3i k °ñ its prog- 
ress. The inborn tendencies of the national ml>laracter towards 
the worship of force and the lust of conquest would have been 
stamped down just as they were beginning to show themselves 
afresh. It would have been well for the world if this lesson had /o/ 
been learnt in 1864, and not in. 191; 
, 
Such a policy was,how. ver, too late in 1866. For two years the 
Pomeranian wizard had been at his incantations, twining the most 
diverse strands into one strong rope: 
Black spirits and white! Red spirits and grey! 
Mingle,mingle,shingle,mingle, 
LIZ,/ that mingle may! 
rood and evil were now inextricably interfused. The hour of 
opportunity was past. All that was left was to make the best of 
bad business, and. hunt for some plan that might in part repair 
the damage done:---- tavé.:Austria from rermany,and Germany from 
herself 
he difficulty about saving A.ustri t4wes that Austria was so fIQ 
un'Illing 
to be saved. Like the elephan t who laboured under the 
Bien that he was a butt iX iy, Austria hae alvìa:rs been a 
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victim to the iCi.ea, that she «'as a German stA_.te,whered.s, as her 
greatest statesman and soldier had seen, her best fortune lay 
to the East. Ta an ûutsider,untrs neled by. prejudice and tradi- 
tion, it might have seemed that on Austria lay - the most glorious 
tríssian of any state in Europe: Austria a , -L - t 
riCúrTi?l t ; - t á nation( ?YG _ ), ? ght have 
preached the gospel of a higher patriotism, transcending the 
bounds of race and language, and attaching her subjects by the l 03 
bond of a common ideal and a common interest: Austriat 
. * ' ap-- the old defender of 
Christendom against the Mohammedan power, might have become the 
champion, the protector, and the- enlightened teacher of the Balkan 
Provinces in their struggle for liberty. 
1 Ö What might not that state have aspired to which could 
draw for /its resources upon the loyalty and simplicity of the 
Tyrol, the courare and vivacity of Hungary, the solid worth and 
enterprise of Germa.n- Austria, the patriotism and imagination of 
r%1eeho- Slovakia,and` the primitive virr.our of` the South Slavonic tates? 
To.t'ne e aims, Austria, for a hundred ands -fifty years, had been r 
"esòlutely bl-ind. In her own sphere she had lamentably failed.. 
er government had relied on force and violence to hold together 
the heterogeneous collection of states and provinces that made up 
thá -pire, and attempt D to conquer the loyalty and affection 
of their peoples. Internral reforms and foreign prestige had 4like been sacrificed in vain efforts to preserve Aust:cia's in- 
fl ce in C=erma.ny¡(v , ixe ..t riaua 
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q; Austria coulu only haire been saved ìn- 1866 by a statesman of 
genius, who was capable of sufficient 'foresight and abnegation 
to withdraw from German affairs. As it was, she had only ioa 
ministers of mediocre capacity, and -.she -was cursed _with a ruler 
to combined all ;7,1., :riost dangerous faults and follies of the 
Hapsburgs . 
In the case in which she stood, therefore, Austria could only 
e saved by efforts from outside. 
/tile situation required desperate sacrifices.. Austria would 
have to cede Venetia, give up Holstein to Prùssia, withdraw from 
":e German Confederation, and turn all her attention to internal 
reforms, financial and political; which were urgently needed. 
It ^gas very late in the day; but determined action might still 
have saved her. There was- .a great deal 'of vitality in the 
&apire yet; as is proved by the fact that even after she had 
open deprived of Venetia, Holstein, and her German position by 
adisastrous war, so incolaplete a reform as the establishment of 
e Dual Monarchy was sufficient to ;preserve her -until the day 
0 f á .tzropean catac >_ ysm. 
It was perhaps too e great ,.' sacrifice to' expect of any 
1 minister of state; but when forced to it -by pressure from 
"itoát, Austria might have been driven to-consent to it., 
Here,then,waa the only passible policy for the British govern- 
, 
ient. if Austria were induced to, make' these concessions, the ioy. 
reä80n for :Bismarck's existence at once disappeared. áie might 
,lave 
be 
kept his- position-- -ver3r would have---but he would oonrniti;ed to a 3.:raf7 constitutional struggle with the opposi- 
tion, ant` would be absorbed in internal problems for a long 
L 
,s5/ . 
014 time ahead. It is well known that 3ismarck .rode to popul- 
arity on the strenrrth bf his victory over Austria. Nothing 
succeeds like success. Take away war and victory, and Bismarck'' 
is left as he was in 1865, the detested minister of a reaction- 
ary government. Germany is free of lustria,but not by his 
efforts; Austria is left a ̂ she was indeed left in 1866, shorn 
of two provinces,but not exhausted by a terrible defeat; Italy 
has Venetia,without any thanks to Prussia; Prussia has had to 
accept Holstein as the gift of Eurnpe in Congress; and the 
prestige of the `''est ern Powers itaruis higher than wince 1863. 
In this case 3ismarck's teeth and claws would be drawn, and 
Germany would have gained praet ibally all that she did rain, 
but withitt . an unrighteous war, and without surrendering ' her 
Liberal princ iples. 
For Great 3ritain,however, this policy was a very difficult 
one. it could only have been carried outL in conjunction with loaf. 
France,for neither country, acting alone ,could have induced 
Austria to agree; and if Napoleon had continued his secret in- 
trigues with Prussia, Treat Britain would have beer. .at a great 
disadvantage. ! "'hen we. remember, however, what large concessions 
Austria made to secure French neutrality, we may guess that the 
influence of France and Britain tot-ether could have obtained 
such more from her; while, if she were obst inate, her financial. 
``tfficu1t± 5 offered a very simple wau of applying the thumb - 
screps. 
°Ire Minn remains to be considered -- -cculd Great Sri a,in + have 
"cured 
the support anc, confidence of France? 
fro hp state of mind of the nperor,his indecision and alarm,have 
. -,- 
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He had beeri`iiz" the past really attached to the British Alliance. 
bents since 1859, and the continued coldness and suspicion of the 
British gover nment,had driven hire to abandon it as impossible. 
The commercial treaty, on which he had relied to win the friendship 
of Great Britain, had hrid little effect. If that country con- 
tinued to distrust all the aims of - France, and to consider the 
treaties of 1815 as the foundation of the European polity, and 
every proposal to revise them as criminal, it vaas'diff icult for Hi 
Napoleon to rely upon her as an ally. The Fraperor, however, knew 
-hcu) 
well that he was,in a very dangerous positionsin 1066 -. It was not 
only ambition and selfishness which drove him to so deceitful and 
contradictory a course: it was also fear, and a consciousness -of 
hie own weakness. If he had known that he could really obtain 
loÿal support" from Great Britain for a policy based on the fourth 
alternative plan, the knowledge would have done much to determine 
lima upon that policy. Drouyn de Lhuys, it, will be rermemb Bred, 
always favonred action on these lines' 
a 
, + _ Ii 
áe had - no ornwa, 
France had been wounded and disgusted by the policy of Great 
n during the last few years. It right have been hard for 
the ao1rernment to convince her of their sincerity: but confidence 
begets confidence. An open and friendly exposition -of the policy 
that 
Britain wished t.oi'pursue, a' request for French support, and 
necessary the guarantee that Great Britain would not oppose 
trance if she took possession of LuxembourG by amicable arrange - 
mnt'l 
would have produced a complete revulsion of feeling 
in Paris. Such a concession would really 
have 
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been a far better security for Belgium -and the hinc, 
140.1... 1_,Q1a_Law.s_ggi;Lpd ) than any threats of war or treaties of 
guarantee. It was the knowledg *e that Great Britain would not 
consent to any such territorial gains on his part, however, small, 
that inclined Napoleon to try to make a bargain with Prussia 
instead. He saw, by this time, that Prussia was bound to'' get 
something, and he naturally wanted compensation. 
Marier, a more devoted friend of Germany, and à more 
enlightened patriot, than any member of his government, would not 
have hesitated to make such concessions to France. 
°That, if there should result from this war grave territorial 
changes such as toLalter very gravely the relative strength of //4, 
the military monarchies of Europe, France should expect some 
corresponding advantages, is so 'absurdly fair that it i.s incon- 
ceivable to one that even that dulles of corniferi, John Bull, 
g -e11 40p4.4, 
. .should shake his foolish head at- it ,-- 
It may be at once admitted that such a policy was not to be 
expected from the Liberal government then in power. Russell, 
Clarendon, Gladstone, Granville, were one an(< <.1,11 so eaten up- with 
fear and suspicion of France. ä e) that they would no 
more Have entered *on such a- course than they would have invited 
the United States to conquer Mexico for them. While they still 
umaáined that the Slesvig- Holstein question was at the root of the 
1 nnan quarrel; that Prussia could be confined to her present 
l itsi that Austria ought to Tor :serve her influence in Germany; 
that Italy would never stoop to make a trea,tywith Prussia; and that 
the Possession of Luxembourg by France would threaten the peace of 
//5 
rtorier - ) 
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Europe and thel-iecurity of Great Brit.a.in: they would not co si- 
dar such a policy at all. .Even had they done so, it would have 
J:ß'î difficult to carry it oi;'; without superseding Lord Cowley. 
is small wonder that the relations between Britain and France 
mere bad during this period, when we consider the character of 
this ambassador. 'A stiff, commonplace, self- ahsdrhed man, he 
despised the French character, distrusted and disliked the French_ 
ministers, and hated and feared the influence of France in Europe. 
Such was the man to whom the most delicate tasks were entrusted 
a time critical in the history of Europe. What shall we sad , 
System, ta, ptli á.A. 
th. T.,,,.,,9`, which, from 1863 to 1867,rß -c ,tç affairs 
,v,P r, 
n.._ Lord Cawley at Paris, Lord ';api er and Lord Augustus 1,7 
-cftus at Berlin, and Sir Andrew Buchanan at St Petersburg, ar 
Lift Hobert ?,gorier as charge d' affaires at Frankfort? 
It must also be remembered that the hostile attitude taken up 
_ 
by Russell aneClarendon towards Prussia, was not One Of hostility 
to Geritiany. It was only opposition to Bis~niarck. Th'e : ;r were still 
eufficiently influenced by their desire to see a strong united 
sermany, to hesitate before entering into an alliance with 
France, even to oppose Bismarck. 
só ended the second phase Of the making Of German;:. The 
olicy of force had again been victorious, and with a victory far 
'yore complete than before. In 1864 Bismarck had only defeated 
external foss, whether in the fi ld or in +.'.îe count il- chamber. 





One of the great disadvantages of the 
Ac. -lgc c . iTZ°a , 
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Ta-rd 
system was that- it involved a continual retracing .of _i_ steps, 
G continual going back to- b eginnings, and a consequent failure 
to profit Irr experience gained. 
The party in opposition cane into poir, er entirely i norant of 
t'.e details of the diplomacy of t'-_= years past. They h -td seen 
only the results, and seen then in a spirit largely of contro- 
versy. The new, Foreign Secretary had no time to read up old 
despatches: He had to rely on what the Permanent Under -Secretary 
oolQ hU7il 
eeol - o x -a f ì c ial_13:14;44-4g e4e!te 
The Conservative Party, then, came into office-in July 1866 / 
7ntnmuch the sane view on international questions as they had 
cell in 1863. They h d, to be sure, a vastly increased opinion 
of the Prussian army, but they were even more frightened of 
Franca than their predecessors, and ±,rho,,, &l.s.o relieved that 
%poison held the destinies cf Europe -in his hands. They had 
some opinion of the .capacity of Bismarck, and they regarded him, 
fa 
° represent o russia., as the sole hope against French domina- 
tion.\ They were thankful that he had so' far held his own 
against Napoleon. 
The nV,' governernttt, however, had one advantage over their pre - 
d °Cessors. They ha-d, according to their lights, revised their 
Dclicy. They had as few years before been closely attached to 
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Austria: but now that Austria was thoroughly beaten,and France, 
as they thought, cock of the walk, they did not intend to support 
Austria, and so further weaken Prusfiia as a possible counter - 
Tight to France. They had been very hostile to Italy in 1860; hu -t 
they thought it much too late in the day to try to hinder the for- 
nation of a United Italy now. There Are few things so invigorating 
as the process of completely changing one's mind; it lean -es the 3 
intellect, in a brisk and apprehensive state. Count Apponyi, who 
called upon Lord Stanley, the new Foreign Secretary, to beg for 
.British assistance for Austria, received something of ,a .shock. It 
was natural to suppose that Austria's old friends would be even 
more sympathetic to her than the Liberal goverment had been; but 
after the warmth of Clarendon' s declarations, Stanley's reply must 
have been to the Austrian ambassador like -a douche of cold water. 
Austria, Apponyi s aid, while using the good offices of France, 
'could not ask officially for Brit -tsh mediation,but "she would 
nevertheless be_ glad of the good offices of H.M.Governiient, so 
Oar as they-could be exerted, and she wished that England and 
kIaeia which have' hitherto. stood aloóf, ahoúld exercise their 
right of interfering in order 'to check the excessive prete , .nsions 
°f Prussia, ..He.(. sptat ed iñ very courteous te:rias his dissent 
from 
Jl (Sta-n(e) 
the opinion which Ihad pressed" (in the. House 'of Co ïmons ) 
as to the formation of a strong and compact power in the North 
f Gpny 'oeing\neither injurious -nor inconvenient to England. 
is heellencv thought that., the existence of such a 'power\involved- 
4fütureLrisk of wax. Neither Frarìce nor Russia, he considered, 
srlikely long to remain on good terms with a neighbour o 1Powelful ambit tous. - -- I said that I could not 
N 
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agree in this opinion; that I thought on the contrary that the 
dap ,7er of disturbance to the peace of Europe lay in the weakness 
'a the r than the strength of Ge . - - -An allusion hav been Colt 2,- 
t,, :iWdó 1 ¡1b', exyvv,od !n (xl:i.g tra:r ..:CC.a., adva- s1aCarbb 9apa , ik- wow 
to these treaties as being still binding. - - -In answer toy 6. 
Count Apponyi's request for the intervention of H.M. Government, 
said that we' should not in an;r case interfere willingly, and cer- 
tainly we could not do so unless we knew first on what basis Austria 
Tas prepared to treat." France and Prussia, he .said, would expect 
Austria to leave the merman Confederation. "Count Apponyi thanked 
lie for the -frankness with which I had spok en, adding that it was 
1etter #'or his government to understand the situation dzs t lnc tly 
(1) 
,han to be encouraged in delusive expectations of. support." 
r 
That any British minister should thus coolly repudiate the , 
treaties of 1817 was startling- enough; but that -t4te-e axent 
h -L uud ,,c10 .so 4414--eerrort a Conservative was even more surprising. M-orier 
had piously thanked heaven when he heard that the new Foreign 
Secretary was to be Lord Stanley. This was the first sign that 
a policy legs hampered by moral and political conventions, and 
'Iore in tune with the realities of -che day, might 0J - _ -. be 
expected. from London. 
Austria then requested that Britain would intervene to Prfsvent 
Italy's pressing her demands for Trent. Stanley refused: "nor) Sa16 k) 
1 
74' 1 Y +aline,' to support a demand which though professedly re- 
p 
rrinn °ply to the ...armistice-must be considered as indi- 
(1) P.O. Austria,) 742. Sk ("^ 9i. " - 
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ating an opinion that the territory in question ought ultimately 
(e. ) 
tto belon7 to Austria, and not to Italy." 
After this the appeals of Austria ceased. 
It was in the first week of August that the Conservative 
government first received an int imat ion that the triumph of Franc e 
was not so complete as they had imagined.') 
(t became known that Prussia not only demanded a pararnoun 
influence in the North of Germany, but inténcled to make large 
annexations there. Not only the Elbe Duchies, but Hanover, Nassau, 
Hesse -Cassel, the northern portion of Hesse -Darmstadt, and Frank- 
furt, were to be ebsorbed) by Prëe, while Saxony, though pre - 
lnuss 
serving its monarchy, would be completely under 4r control. 
Napoleon, egged on by Drouyn de Lhuys, now demanded his. com- 
pensation, and Benedetti wrote 'a letter to Bismarck, enclosing a 
ro'et for the cession of the Rhenish provinces to France. Bis- 
narck declined point- blank, and published both" demand and refusal 
in the newspapers. 
The result was sufficiently disastrous for France. All move- 
ments in her favour among the South German states immediately 
ceased, and Russia abandoned the- proposals she had been pressing 
fora Congress to revise the Prussian terms: Drouyn de Lhuys 
resiáned: and Europe woke up to the, fact that Napoleon had been /0 
ooapletely foaled by the Prussian firebrand. 
(/)frO .RuSt,ia..7o G, c 
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Benedetti had been urging, for sosie time that he thould be 
lycalled to Paris to explain the situation there; but he 
was only allowed to corne after Presenting the French demands to 
3ismarck. When at length he arrived his arguments convinced 
napoleon that further attempts on Bismarck would be wasted 
effort, and the requests for compensation on the Rhine ceased. 
The Emperor, however, could not yet resign hirñself to the worst; 
and after a few days the pourparlers about "compensation" 
,were renewed, eniti this time Belgium was the subject. 
Bismarck meanwhile was concluding the treaty of Prague, 
-ie.oh excluded Austria from Germany, and left Prussia undisputed 
mistress of the North. It was only, in fact, owing to .concessions 
ieliberately made by the Prussian minister, who preferred not 
to have a war this year, that Napoleon was able to retire with 
BM shoe, of credit. Even as it was, these concessions were 
of the most insubstantial nature: they made a- momentary impres- 
sion of success: but in a short time, like fairy 'old that melts 
MY, they were seen to be illusory. They were of two kinds, 
phlic and private. Those which were made public consisted, 
firstly, of an engagement that the South German states, (3avaria, 
viürtemberg, Baden should not be included in the new North 
German Confederation; and secondly, of a promise that a plebis- 
cite shoúld be taken in North Slesvig. 
convisteel ;n. The secret concessions ire - up an assurance that, though 
refus`d for the time being, the promised compensation should be 
allowed 
to France later. 
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Exact1J t.vho was responsible for the proposals relating to 
3elgium cannot even now be determined.. it seems fairly certain 
that Goltz lured on Napoleon by conversations in Faris, and 
Benedetti and Bismarck must share the responsibility of what 
13,happened in Berlin. Each of them aftervkards attributed the guilt 
to the other, and each represented himself as the innocent hearer 
of an iniquitous proposal: but such proposals are never i e 'o- 
c- 
unless a good guess nwer be made as to the manner in which_they will 
be received. Bismarck, had several times before this endeavoured 
to turn the eyes of- the Emperor to ' Belgiuri, partly because it 
, evibroil France with Britain. On the 
other hand, the paper is in Benedetti's handwriting, even if, as 
he maintained, -it was dictated 'by Bismarck. 
Is 
.. , 
The document, as is well known, was a projet du traite stating 
that Prussia would support France in annexing Belgium -at the first 
°pportunity, and that France might also obtain Luxembourg. 
Benedetti communicated the scheme to his Fruperor, and Napoleon 
to him "accepteY en, principe". 
Immediately after this, however, Bismarck's enthusiasm for 
t: e Bel i,scheme cooled, and he suggested that, in order to avoid 
offending Britain, Napoleon should rather look for compensation to 
1UXernbourg; and, apparently as a memento of a happy meet int, he 
induced Benedetti to let him keep the copy of the Belgian proposal, 
ghich tale French statesman had written out with his own hand, and 
c 
accordin to his own account, under. Bismarck' s 
instructions. (3) 
Benedetti aimiN.-- -14.ß ]7 g 
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Disraeli, years later, wrote tó his Queen that the misfortunes 
thy imperial house might have served as the materials for a 
Ireek trilogy. Indeed the imagination of a--Shakespeare or an 
Ibsen might have found food here, and only the creators of 
:'acòeth' "nr Skule Jarl could adequately paint the mind of the 
'. ached being in the Tuileries -- poor mortal :who 'had claimed a 
lace among the gods, and who now found himself confronted with 
L 
Titanic adversary. He had told Europe he was Napoleon, and 
':rope, looking to Paris, still ,saw Napoleon there, and was 
to the reality -- -the worn, sick, elderly sentimentalist; 
wrecked adventurer; the idealist ,Who saw his ideals 
Ehatte- ed; the c'leF t who had deceived himself as muSik as, others. 
1.f-1ecettful as he was., he was no fool: - he -must have 
'Arderstood, in moments when lie was not dazed by the 
illusions he had conjured up, or stupif ied, by the paroxysms of. 
rlis -ease that was slowly killing him, that it was his 
rF`'`A' iest enemy who had penetrated his pretence and justly 
aE'inited his worth. Not only "bhe sick man's aversion to a.ction, 
the humane man f s aversion ,to war, made him anxious to 
void rupture, but also his instinctive feeling that he eras 
to face such a foe. Yet to aLv î war, ,he knew, 
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eant to abandon his claim to be thé director of European 
olitics, and 1 r " that claim really hung his title to the throne 
of Frances _ - , . 1- 
As time passed, it slowly dawned on the 3ritish statesmen 
.at France h : : :d not won an increase of influence, but had met 
9rt1 -ems , 
°;tn a shocking and humiliating 4444. art. They realized that 
fr 
":roleon was faced with the alternatives of abdicating the 
;çition he had claimed in Europe, or undertaking war to check 
p 
Pretensions of- Prussia. 4e y had challenged France, 
d France was still hesitating as to 'her response. They had 
yet, however, fully grasped thé situation. They believed 
'At the danger of war came chiefly from France: that Bismarck 
feared a war and was anxious to avoid it. 
In reality the most serious danger came from Prussia. 
In Berlin, .a line of policy had been definitely chosen. 
France had defeated and humiliated Germany in the past and never 
12de anends: France was jealous and alarmed at the growth of 
f'erman.povrer and had interfered to try and check that growth: 
France ?núst get a lesson; her power to injure Germany must be 
ended, 
In Paris, on the other hand, there. wa.s doubt, indecision, 
eonrliet. If there was an influential war party, there 
a6 also a strong current of opinion running in favour of peace; 
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and Napolo''gri veered from one point of vieiry to the other. 
at-- -2.e sa mz. 
Frequently he carried on^ x.34 -r one policy through his ministers v- 
oand the oth =:r by secret negotiations of his own. 
V 
On the one hand the Clericals, whora hie dared not off end; 
:lie military leaders, on whose support he must be able to 
count; and. the wife whose fatal beauty had captivated him in 
the first hour of '_is success, pressed him' to anticipate the 
hostility of Prussia, and assured him' of an immediate and 
complete triumph. On the other hand, the majority of the . 
population, the lower and middle classes, were averse from war, 
and desired no wild and violent enterprises, but peace, 
-_ 
an.i a 'return to constitutional government ; while the 
moot respectable leaders of public opinion, _ 
aa, 
were c concerned with internal reform. ` IT. an 
.41. 
used the failure of the' Emperor's German policy 
. 
as ari exc 
I 2Ztic*j On 
In this position, he wavered. He had neither the courage 
to accept defeat, and decld.re for peace and reform at home; nor 
bad 
he the courage to make the immediate break with Prussia which 
o111d give a militant policy its only chance of success. 
The alt prim t iv es °-vr .r1,- .e,.t^ efczr+a6,4y4,160...4y.... e - rrkv, 
The most able 
°` the French statesmen were thooc in opposition or exile, and 
Nut influence on affairs; the Empress and the military 
 
'? 
;g `suoSl s,uo+lnay `998ï ad suo.'Z pagZ o saa.aaT Gli; aaS t41' 
Ep- 
Aq.oa;;a- au- p-eu. `aoaacttuqf uodn passaad 44+440-a aana g 
isOutuse:a.stu pue pos ev q.uauz:3pnf a4tTuatasa+w+s 
site( ti:otm sOtg.tTocl ut uotI.tsod et1q. uitk pa+uae 
-aacì p'eg s za+onavte(o .stt1 ut lNoap ao ssduhigana a+:autìt aaios puz 
`uot+ndaa Suts.eaTdun stte(. tq.og sat73;J:e uo aouanT;at t',aa 
Tue sVre uoaTodni\I: a OUT ad `aana,t,aou `.Ta+eun+ao,uP, 
'`\uótsnTTt nand sT ,rA funtuaap tta.nos ao sGt,z+unoo 
6t) 
aLíttlH +a0ddns rL[T: uveC}.go pTnota 8riu2:.tg ;E114 atftOIUIt o; 
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and ,Napo veered from one point of view to the other. 
ot- -Vne. sannz -ame. 
Frequently he carried onA t..l;ra- one policy tlirourrh his ministers -9- 
doand the other by -e-rit3A-1.t.a.u2.--.co.Ls secret .negotiations of his own. 
On the one hand the Clericals, .,whom cared not offend; 
the military leaders, on whose support he must'be able to 
count; and the wife whose fatal beauty had captivated him in 
the first hour of his success, pressed him to anticipate the 
hostility of Prussia, and. assured him' of an immediate and 
complete triumph. On the other hand, the majority of the 
population, the lower and middle classes, were averse from war, 
and desired no wild and violent enterprises, but peace, 
Se .en:i a 'return to constitutional government ; while the 
oQet respectable leaders of public opinion, _ a 
141,o,a ,,,, .-&ciF&n'E.-fr -ryf--^R-e-Y`rt3ßr--ny.i __ 41.4-4=N94 wi-si*---to -- p-Y=o;peke.--4-- 
were pr346Q concerned with internal = ef orn1 ._`ï _ anzd, 
aa. 
tot/ used the failure of the' &iperor's German policy as an exc 
is./4- cata. *sOn 116 
In this position, he wavered. He had neither the courage 
to accept defeat) and declare for peace and reform at home; nor 
bad 
he the courage to make the immediate break with Prussia which 
Rould áive a militant policy its only chance of success. 
The alternatives-were clearly set before i Only 
4YiSpr 
of 
>4-l- 3tyy -- whorl- he possessed«, The most able 
OY the Rrench statesmen were -..mhos in opposition or exile, and 




As the worthlessness of the Prague engagsr:lents become clear 
to Napoleon, he began to be more anxious than aver for 7(11s 
nroT"11sPd cOT?lpensatlOn. Accordingly with the ope;rinr; of the 
year 1867, we find a general a trao sphP re of "s o-rnething' s going 
fto happen" pervading the chancelleries. And when the full 
extent of the success of Prussia began to be rea:Lised, it 
became necessary to obtain some tangible gain at once to counter - 
lance t e shock given to public opinion in France. Ide I ie,po\ 
,,,ir1A that it was time that the secret arrangement about Luxem- 
yarg should be carried out. Bismarck had approved this 
:roposa1 and the grand -duchy itself Was -at present in an 
lom tous condition which favoured any attempt to change its 
Eatus. 
The King of Holland had. stocd in the. same relationship 
tov:arf1s the German Confederation as had the King of Denmark. 
, 
representative had sat in the German Diet for the provinces 
A Luxembourg and Lir2ourg //. Sin1e break-up, of tha t Confederation, thA position of 
hese two little states had been uncertain. Tre:' hid not been 
included in the new North Gernan Confederation, 
- -1-t° 
Illigerrlfi?I 11cL t 1 ^ nail. 8 t 11;:i. ' 1 -i^----1341?--f30-u-rf? c,e3.4457 'Prtt"-f n T_'vv. ard 
. CìJrI,GL 
..(41*.i1"4"444o4.- -11i.n1:4Irg, or French LuxemL.our. hfuture 
rere had. still to be settled. 
In the meantime the uncertainties of the last few months 




aq. London was endeavouring, to pour oil upon waters which 
Showed no disposition to become calm, 311--a-1-1-44-- 
,,.....: ,Le..s rr. ., 
g_f14TOi,) 8 ,7 1v1(ìí pacific advice to France, and 40iP soothing 
the nervous paroxysms 'of' Bismarck, who for the time being was 
representing himself to Britain as a defenceless Iamb alarmed 
by the howling of a hungry wolf. The position of the 
Cabinet was es?oecially tryiTi7, as all their energies were 
absorbed by home affairs, and they had a vague subconscious 
feeling that. it was tactless of France and Prussia to be. 
-V- 
':fus$ing about a war at the very moment when Disraeli was 
occupied with his Reform Bill. 
ca zc c irk fiai n?- ±-eí-t- r ro -,?nom- u&1141 _ -to -- trrye -44 - L_. 
GPCtz0n--> -" tirA -° ~FvZ2iárt._r r, r?us Lord Stanley - -a chancee --w* - ch 
,.- e- een- i.__..not unfort1zni- te for a i co,,c -ern -e 
Austria had. nove selected as Prime Minister Count Bers t, 
ha,d been expelled from his position. in Saxony, largely be -- 
-;Sue of the enmity of Bismarck, on th failure of his policy 
in 1866. Beust was for the present so lac in-: himself by making 
htçruns about his enemy, but he looked eagerly for a possibility 
°I revenge. The slender and vivacious littLe man, "chaque 
;Ure du jour un pro j éqt dans la t ét e, une haine dans le coeur, 
''une circulaire dans son encrier", looked on the prospect 





British ministers. It might offer an opportunity to restore 
to Austria something of what she had lost in central Europe, and 
-iztanist 
-,o revenge L iSelf. e a _orut 
But still his- position was very uncertain. Austria 
had 1e0eived such a thorough whipping that It w ÿuld be imn ossi- 
.t1e to take any steps against Prussia until that country had 
been definitely worsted. by France, and. even then the feelings 
of Austria's German subjects :lust o e taken into account. 
g a o .. . i Tn thw- r They 11,11i already displayed some desire to abandon 
Austria and be united with their fellow Germans to th North) 
v war with France would try their loyalty and might give the a I 
last shock to the tottering dominion of the Hapsburgs. Perhaps 
It Would by safer to hope for peace, a peace favourable to 
3.France, which would strengthen her position totivards Germany 
(.5) 
and so )Hake Prussian power less threatening to weaker states. 
ieTrrTrat---r ect-i-a-t-rTb 1St`tc517 
Russia had already cit :)men her part and made her understand- 
ing with 'Bismarck. She was to continue her ola. policy of 
tacit support of Prussia: but there was some uneasiness in 
St, Petersburg. The understanding with Prussia had already 
been Crowned with brilliant success - --for Prussia. But the 
advantages 
which. Russia was to reap from it ha.'i not yet material- 
was beeominT impatient for some po- sitive and 
(S) Beust in his Memoirs represents his attitude to have been much 
eoNprlenály to Prussia, and less friendly to France, than nt:1por6,l,y 
prove it to have been. 
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tangible gain. Moreover, Russia by no means desired a complete 
1&o Cam . 
or France. That would put Germany in a positions ch 
cis w e c'1$_ 71 _`_ot r L.r3p arr $°tat- 
Prussian success was all very well, bitt one can have too rauch 
of a food thing. Enough, Gortschakov was whispering to his 
master, is as good as a f east. For Gortschakov, vain and 
frivolous old gentleman, was becoming jealous of his erstwhile 
disciple. He had an uncomfortable feeling that Bismarck's admira- i k_.. 
tion in the past was-not altogether si:dcere. 
- . . r_ n f o o . ran 
. t r . a I 'ays ,, ha:cd- a--. ì Fe ani.ng 
The Tsar 
v 
preferred the Prussian alliance, but Gortschakov was not so sure 
about it, and even the Tear -did not to see his uncle Wilhelm 
cock of the walk, to the exclusion of everyone else. 
In Italy the situation was acutely uncomfortable. The 
'..rn)nerlt of Victor Emmanuel was openlmindecl, and was ready to 
Whtehever party would give the most. Victor Era211anue? 
'ald have preferred France, after all- -for the hatred of the 
le(ieschl, was no tt to be lightly overcome - -})ut Y1e was g8ping to 
( J ''â1104V kon e v 9 a44e-r 2EL }to. , vv 1 t k--p o-1 o *l' S I io- 
he f el t, 1 ike the Inisr*iiicLed. 
He watched all agog to see which vrais the 
oat Would jurmp. C 
33 
Denmark too watched with anxiety. She would dearly have 
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loved her revenge on Prussia, and the restòration of North 
aer24.- 
Slesvig at least. ,A strong party existed which was ready to 
declare war on the side of France. 3ut she also had learnt to 
be cautious. 
The little buffer states that lay between France and 
Germany were, however, in the most "pitiable situation. They 
;guessed that there was some talk of compensation fô"i France, and 
they were not quite sure whence that compensation was to come. 
[den more nervously did they loók towards Prussia. After all, 
t ey had lived for 30 years beside France without that country 
having* " "rl -?.de any attempt +c subvsrt their independence; -wher as 
he conduct of Prussia, towards Denmark and Austria was fresh 
In their memory. In -Belgium a war was regarded as almost 
Pevitable, an?. _ country believed that 
' inevitable fate would be to be annexed by the victor. The 
v 
3elgian Government had decided that the best chance of preserv- 
..Eoe 
ing their security was to join with France. For mie .thing, 
if they must b e annexed, they had 'rather be annexed- by France 
(2) "The sai 11 
` poaular f 
hav e j 
ountry i 
35, 
persons who were employe. to ascertain ;he condition 
eli 1 in Savoy and Nice _ evious to its (sic) annexa - 
st returned from a simil . mission of 1. vesti7ation in d... they report that the opular feel in in that 
eminently favourable to rance ". (Fane .n. Ince, 1656) 
l 
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by Gernany; for another, they were grateful for the 
eous way in which Napoleon had invariably treated them, 
or the third)theYT had some hope that64 gratitude for 
support might induce him to be merciful. 
Weyer. 
"Should this country" said M. van de wierr during the. 
is, "left unrrotected, be forced to take up arms, they 
d certainly, side with France rather than with Prussia, as 
V 
s well known that Count Bismarck has for some time past been 
y, so far as willingness could prevail, to sacrif is e 
:tan nationality to France as a set off for the security of 
r possessions actually acquired, or contemplated for the 
randiseiuent of Prussia, while the .Inl eror LavisNapoleon, on 
has steadily manifested his of 
nationality of Belgium as a neutral power ". Belgium 
this difficulty appealed to Great Britain. She did not 
ceive much encouragement fròm the, cautious Lord Stanley, who 
d no intention of following with règard to Belgium the policy 
Lord Russell towards Denman. Nor, did .Belgium intend 
c fall into the Danes' error; she wished to ascertain the 
ttitude of Great Britain, but she meant to rely on.her own 
'`forts to defend herself. Her army -was in good order, and 
a 
he peas prepared to fighterather than to accede to the demand 
C7.) `or the use of her Eastern railway which she expected from Prussia. 




The position of Holland was, at this time, even more un- 
comfortable than that of Belgium, owing to her connection with 
Luxembourg and Limburg. . =i eel 
ltcould nói'k crnn;vti is 
tivik seriously that Luxembourg, which in 1839 had. begged 
for uni4on with :Belgium, and had 'been united to the German Con - 
Imer2 ed n.N0-)-771, 
federation very much against its will, ought to be o '1`Germary, 
aoreover the position of the Duchy was so threatening to the French 
frontier that.,.sv_ch a claim from GATmany must iM -i +3b,y have S -d 
Wm a a- dP& t elAt r elR a_- 2u-at. ivL+ . 4100n. cse . 
e -en s _ -fie.. .. 
meantime the Prussian garrison, which under the old constitution 
of the German Confederation occupied the fortress, still 
continued there, tb,ough their presence 
howl /g2' 
had no4 justif 'cation L It was the presence of 
these troops and the f: tr that Prussia might refuse to give up 
the fortress, that alarmed Holland. By raising difficulties 
about the occupation of the fortress and the status of the 
ehy, Prussia could easily draw Holland into a controversy 
1i1ar to that in which Denmark had been involved, - and which 
'`fiat have a like ending. No doubt the Prussian Archives 
-re rich in ambiguous historical documents dealing with. 
luxemb ou rg, Two years before Bismarck had told a Dutch 
'diplorlatist(f that he looked upon the annexation of Holland 
h ñer Colonies as necessary to the completion Of his plans 
âe 
tfe eXte'lsìorr of the naval power of Prussia. Luxembourg 
°' no use to Holland, an(' the King -Grand -Duke was anxious to get rid of his highly combustible possession as 
r--- Hichern. 
ikon F. O. Au s r i a, 2 2. 131,` + b t 
AD, 
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was the Dynamiter of his infermal machine. The Luxembourgeois 
themselves had been fairly content with the rule of Holland, 
which had not unduly interfered with their affairs; but the 
general opinion was rather in favour of France. 
Holland; was, -r, by no means anxious to ge.t rid of 
:r own Dutch province of Limburg, and Limburg had been bound 
)7 the same artificial connection with Germany, and was open 
:o sane danger, as Luxembourg. At the opening of the year 
1867 Bismarck' s ccnduc t _ > became alarming. 
Ile had seemed to be meditating a new '.'ar, and though he told 
Holland that he meant to attack Austria. again, he told Austria 
;hat he meant to attack Holland, and naturally Austria dropped 
hint of this to the nutcheL Then Bismarck began to 
ooiup1ain of the tone of the Dutch Press - -- always a danger -signal 
with him. He said that Maastricht ought to be German. He 
='tentatively tried some sentimentalities about the old connec- 
tion of Limburg with the Reich. Exactly what Bismarck lntencted 
this conduct cannot be determined. According to what 
--qolkolki told Lord Cowley; 
(Q) pia t 
.k promised France that he 
"would press the Dutch Government on the ciu est ion of-Limburg, 
and so make them desirous of conciliating the French govern- 
lent)" e0 that they might readily accept the French proposal 
p 1v . () 4. France, l569. Cowie 8. 67. 
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about Luxembourg. Was Bismarck lying to Napoleon, or Napoleon 
lying to Cowley? --It is difficult to believe that Bismarck wòuld 
take 50-- -much trouble to induce this .very willing horse to approach 
Athe water. Holland was itching to get rid of Luxembourg, and ready 
to jump at any offer. But whatever Bisrharck's motives, his action 
bore so strong a resemblance to his methods in the Danish question 
that he soon sent the Dutch into a panic, and they were continual 
running. to France and Britain with cries of "Wolf!" and complaints, 
which in the case of Britain usually ended with impertinent 
Hg . 
assuranceSthatHolland had no .intentïon of -following in the steps 
(]0) 
of Denmark. As has already been described, Holland intended to 
cast in her lot with France in case of war, hut though she relied 
,.,,e on French. support than on British, was doubtful. 
-"During the second week of May", the Queen of Holland wrote 
!. -ter to Clarendon, when- the-danger' was past fór the. time, 
hen the Conference was sitting, France proposed to us a 
-atY offensive and defensive, nous garantissant 1! intégrité 
de notre territoire. As usual we hesitated. Then the 
Conference was concluded - -a peaceful result obtained -- -they 
returned with this offer, which to this hour we have not 
accenteä that _ This povas to 2n:ß c laariy thp-rè will be war -- 
.lD) "Count de Zuylen expressed his opinion that Gre. 
It 
eatesay 
the word, and these designs against his cou. 
out the Exam- ple of Denmark had a tendency to 
Britain had 
try would b,e 
ken 1,c)-\._ 
'1ehr reliance in (sic mere sympathy ". (F.O. Holland, 441. 1.x.67) "looking at the result which attended the intervention of Foreign 
such 
in the affairs of Denmark, they have no wish to invite my 
h interve) , . Netherlands". .Cs LtGM 4 2S- Fei, »7) -F:0 ,7),,,A, lb, J 
"that France would like to use this country to diserañark her 
'troops to enter Prussia that way. If we continue to refuse, 
we will not only have the threatening enmity of Prussia, out 
loge the- assistance of France, and remain utterly forsaken. 
(11) 
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what is to be done "? 
Just when Bismarck had succeeded in making everyone 
thoroughly uncomfortable, he announced the South German treaties. 
A few days later Napoleon III made the King of Holland an offer 
to buy f rora/him the Duc1v of Luxembourg. This scheme was submitted 
to Bismarck before the offer was finally made to Holland, and 
',as favourably received by him. He told, Benedetti that King 
"illiam had said that if the Luxembourgeois themselves favoured 
inion with France, then "I have nothing tò reproach myself with 
02) 
towards the German people. It is a matter for the King of Holland" 
òf Prussia 
Bismarck himself said that the KingAwould give no promise: 
he would "allow the abdication to happen" but would not lay him- 
aelf open to the accusation afterwards that he had given his 
assent beforehand. 
(J3) 
ThisVsatisf led the Imperial government that 
:i.had nothing to apprehend from Prussia, and the offer was then 
to the-. and was communicated to the other governments 
of Europe. 
7T«<17e7. 
lu) Clarendon ÿt, ), 
V2) Spbei, 6 




Preussen kann die Abtretung geschehen lassen, 
dass Jemand behaupte er habe ihn im voraus 




The plan met with general approval, for it was eminently 
'.)calculated to preserve peace. -This gain to Prance would, 
''ithout weakening Germany, soothe the wounded pride of the 
French, give an equivalent for the late acquisitions of Prussia, 
ana. strengthen the: _araperbr in his efforts to keep the war party 
h France in check. The nervous strain upon the other Pourers 
.roar b e removed as the danger of war' l es s ened, r and :Belgium 
especially would feel herself rmore' s ecure 'now that the ambit ion 
Napoleon was satisfied in another direction; while the . 
artificial connection with Luxembourg, which 
to Holland, would be ended. 
was ,So embarrassing 
l i. 1bï .Lcn-,:)ee.l believed that-41-1-b2nderot-ìil-N'2-fe of 
1s_T1FZ tux 8- ex 1 s t ,1J. .tyv r' 1 F and -- P:?'u-E&'ì a ery- QnQ_- 
c -4: 91 DrT" -1`r.-iitt4.1.4.cr+1.-`eri _i-n. a f.{42tq an rÌ. _ e af 
uS'. 
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The Conservative Government in; Britain had come into power 
pledged-to a policy -of non -intervention. They were anxious 
to avoid the faults of meddling and blustering which they_had 
condemned in the Russell- Palmerston government, and they had 
1 now maintained an attitude of extreme caution and reser ee. 
.'.it Dolicy was eminently congenial to the temper of the Foreign 
°eretary, Lord Stanle.:r, who had so perfectly schooled his 
r.lbassadors that ) even. Lord Augustus Loftus had almost 
-;aced to scold, while it was the most uncoìnnon occurrence for 
the others to give vent to a statement that could be 
rued as having any definite meaning in it Stanley was const 
W 'out not a stupid man: honest and sincere where ttre 




emergency, b'zt tenacious of what-he believed to be right: 
v of' office, obstinate, and resentful: b,t he had some 




Yong sense of his dignity as the representative of a great. 
on: he would neither nag, nor quarrel, nor give advice where 




e, and the hysterical outbursts of Bismarck and the 
ngiea With which he was accustomed to daze and madden his 




3,14a-zza.s..,j.usrt...azul-faa,i:r--mi-zd.ea, if nc, , sutle ßr,o.ri, 
rinx+, merit-e---of 





On th.. question of Luxembourg Lord Stanley shared the general 
opinion of Europe. He thought it natural that France should want 
to obtain some compensation for P.russia's caris. He saw no reason 
thy, when we had not apposed the territorial acquisitions of 
Prussia, we should oppose those of France. C 
:d :, = = rs- ith- t;hß-- -1- at -t.e -We- ountry -i- -pue*. .He did 
of have nightmares about les Idées 11 napoléoniennes, ana he was 
totally indifferent to the sentimental value of the tie which had 
trice bound Luxembourg to Germany. As has already been said, the 
-rest of. the ,government were largely; content to leave the Foreign 
Sseretarsr to his own devices. They fou 1:i + ;le b r=.vvilder. ing Reform 
.Sill, which their. Prime Minister had told them they were going to 
Pass, demanded all their powers of attention. But the most in- 
fluential of them were predisposed to favour France. Disraeli 
"'9 asvret a reliever in the French alliance; Malmesbury was. a 
Personal friend of Napoleon .l1A; Salisbury detested the nalicy of 
isn1.rck. Ther, like Stanley, were inclined to approve the 
ranBñction, and France was given to understand that no oppositio71 
52 
oulri be made to the transfer of the Duchy. They had no grounds 
for believing' that Prussia. would object to the transactions (117e7 
41-14-lad, o-# ers., -- tit iv en his con- 
fen- he 
had informed them in Septem1 ers 1866, "Prussia 
pad 
no personal interest or wish with respect to Luxeiubourg", and 
quite ready to renounce that treaty" (of 1816) "and ,Withdraw 
Iler 
aY 
berrtson" and that she was "prepared for arrant ement g'hic'h 
agreeable to the King -Grand- Duke ". (40 (.111) 
si, 6G).` _.?^ea 7:.r.na,,.. K}a 






-The King of Holla- i.d immediately gave his personal consent to 
t'rie French offer, but he had been thoroughly alarmed by the earlier 
conduct of Prussia, and before doing anything further he vr;lshed 
an assurance from Berlin that Prussia did not intend to oppose 
the transaction or make it a pretext for war. The French govern- 
cent advised him to apply to Berlin at once, nothing doubting 
teat he would receive the desired assurance without delay. 
The secret began to leak out, and a violent agitation cors- 
s 
menced in the German press. Bismarck maintained that the French 
government had revealed the plan too soon. Móustier, on his side, 
pointed out that the secret was only to have been kept until the 
arrangement was made, and that once the King of Holland had given 
his consent, he regarded it as completed, sand privately 
informed the other powers. 0Y, the 28th of March he first 
fficia11y discussed the scheme with Lord t owley, and had then 
- ( /s1-ß 
Showed no uneasiness or alarm. 
(11 Bismarck, as .Moustier said to Cowley later, had tolo. France 
'that he . 1 could give no preliminary consen, to the transaction... 
If it was presented to him as an accomplished fact he should zait to it, though not without a show of displeasure 
(Je ferai la moue ") ... Pressed by M. Benedetti to express 
2se1f more. clearly, M. de Bismarck stated that he should express 
:either disapproval nor regret, but only a certain amount of 
sorrow ( "un peu de tristesse ") ". M. de Moustier also stated that islaarck had promised to withdraw the garrison without waiting 
be asked. After this France invited Holland to announce 
Proposed sale at Berlin; Holland had done so, and _the King 
4ke for time to consider the matter._ CF . O. fiance, 1fi58.. 
C A Al -fer p " 6\n Qn-cà- N7 
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The treaty was drawn up,_ and would have been signed on April 
1st, but it was by chance postponed till next day, \in order that 
the Dutch government might telegraph the information to the 
Luxenïnourg minister. At this point the 'unexpected began to hap- 
pen. On the 31st of March, Bismarck sent for Bennigsen, the 
deader of the National Liberal party, and arranged with him. that 
the following day hP should ask in the Reichstag what the 
?russian government knew of the proposed Luxembourg scheme, and 
whether they were prepared to do their best to prevent this 
,Gerrnan state" being torn from the Fatherland? On April lst_ (tir 
itte-crInTrrirrY Benedetti arrived to inform Bisna,rck that the 
arrangements with Holland was concluded. He found. Bismarck' just 
leaving the Reichstag, Chancellor checked as 
began to speak. He told Benedetti that he was going to answer 
3ennigeen's question, and thFA, in the state of German Minion, 
'oit might mean war. if he could not say that he knew nothing of 
transaction. Benedetti returned home, therefore, without 
unicating. his nsasage. 
The question of the Dutch government was answered in non-com - 
uittal terms: the King of Prussia was at liberty to make his own 
decision, but he must take into consideration the attitude of 
t,>,e Reichstag, and also of the signatory powers of 1839. This 
last Clause. is -the only point in the conduct of the Prussian 
eooernment that gives ground for supposing that they wished to 
be conciliatñ,, and one would like to know whether .it originated 
itl- 
Bismarck or `pith the King. Vëhen taken in conjunction, 
SA el 6. 
s 
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'Iowever, with the proposal Which had in the meantime been made 
to Britain, it `is susceptible. to- a sinister interpretation. 
The historian of the "Fondatioî '1e l'.+ apire Alleiland" points 
out that Bismarck ra&y have believed that Benedetti would not 
dare to disobey the precise order of his government to con mini - 
nate the information immediately. If he had made the communi- 
a`,io1, after:_Bismarck's warning, it would have been equivalent 
to declaring that France wanted war, or at least could easily - 
have been represented as such. On the other hand, had the. com- 
e 
unie Lion been made, Mid the Reichstag ,:takers it as Bismarck 
anticipated, the technical declaration of war, whatever the pro- 
vocation by France, would actually have come from Prussia. Now 
smarck did not want Prussia to declare war on France; he Wanted 
France to declare war on Prussia. In this we find the key to 
- 
is attitude. He was sincere in his warning, to Benedetti, for he s. 
I4 not want to let the Reichstag force him into declaring war. 
preferred to let the matter. drag on, until France was irrita- 
'A. into declaring war herself. On March 31st, Bernstorff had 
=.)Proached Lord Stanley, and asked if Britain would interfere in 
`''tY WaY to prevent -the sale of Luxembourg. Stanley, with his. 
reticence, only replied that it would be well worth the 
11e of Prussia-to consent to the transaction. On being pressed 
fn 
an wlswer next day, he said that, the King of Holland being 
a consenting party, the Treaty of 1839 did not apply to the case, 60 
G 
(I 7) and neat Britain had no grounds for interfering. -- 
, r-A.rr-9 M d+-ct b I S .) c- .Q._,, ftO fL-A"; 1 ] ^ . I 6 - 2 1 t.7 
-_._._._..... 
39? 
If the action of Bernstorff came as an unpleasant surprisSe 
to the British Government, the reply of that Government was no 
J 
less a blow to Bismarck. It is clear from the efforts he made 
to rouse ill -feeling, that he had r , east hoped 
that 2uou/d reven,t 
the usual 3ritish dislike to any French gain _ 
;..9 acquiescence of that country in the sale. In this case he 
ould have made Britain his catspaw in preventing the sale. 
L the same time he hoped to provoke France into declaring war. 
on Prussia, fiter as he afterwards did in 18'70. France could not (,1 
possibly prove that he had encouraged her. He h ad low caur 
taken no written engagements, the whole story rested on the 
word of Benedetti and he could always, maintain that Benedetti 
misunderstood or exaggerated his words. Suddenl:ir attacked 
by scruples about e constitution, he now announced that he 
could not consent to the sale without submitting the question 
to the Reichstag; and it was already clear what the verdict of 
-.e Reichstag would be. At the same time, he followed his 
usual Spenlow and Jorkins policy with regard to the King, 
representing that rat ier bewildered old gentleman as strongly 
averse to the transaction. 1Nhen France and Holland recovered 
wits sufficiently to open their mouths, he 'cut short 
:<eir reproaches by protesting blandly that he was ,helpless 
4Za,inst -the force of public opinion and will of his master. 
'Z 
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At the same time on April ,rd Bernstorff i tfi'-' - announce 
Britain in Micaberlike phraseology that Prussia would 
lever, no, never desert Luxembourg, and yr? as_ whether "if 
France forced a war oY1 Prussia ", England would co- operate 
(i$') 
against her? 
It is probable that the extre;nely cautious policy of the 
3ritish Government had deceived Bismarck as e to th ir intelli- b3 
gerce and their feelinpe; !-, indeed »never 
understood the national characters 
94,-r-t 
C. 
/ , e- l. on es121T9+1zrP 
_,.t::44i-..sn=p y- -.3:+e- =4 kl io:..'2--d;i±ee---.f ailed ::2 iR! at i._rli-s...., 
. . -rrretr-*na:de a_.-Fft-i-s-t-st-k+e*.;-°-. if _, h e 
n4IL.P.X_.14).PeaYa.. tho s who-- .prof-2'WY?d- by it . B1sma3"c1{.. was,-,cêxpcib-1,° 
,. Ait--:sie-always-hated- those enemies- who 
-)The mistake which he made in this case was to expect from 
:: ̂.e Conservative Government now in power a policy similar to 
:ut of the Liberal Government they had succeeded. His own 
'x'rt;ine preoccupation, the excessively cautious policy of 
tanley) and the slight attention that Stanley's government had 
irected to foreign affairs, account for his mistake. The 
iberal 
Goti ernment had been ruled by fear of France, and he 
did not realise that this feeling was not 
n 
so strong among the 
gonservativ %. Apart from the personal feelings already de- 
acreihpd, 
the governnent had motives for looki ?1g 
°ne French cauC 
favourably on 
u ., which were underestimated by Bisma.rcc. 




in the first place, the Conservative party, which did not 
are the Liberal enthusiasm for -rationalism, had no of the 
a)eral and Nationalist hatred for Austria. 
;P- a ed, t,; ith - - _ -?te- - 
he had been intensely disappointed at the result of the 
ix Weeks Warn impression was still so fresh that their 
Áisli'ke of the victorious Prussia, whom -they regarded as a 
dully, was ver;r lively; they would have enjoyed seeing 
Prussia `et a slap in the face. 
Secondly, the Conservatives were more attached than their V 
predecessors to the tradition of the Balance of Power; and 
this proposal was in strict accordance with that idea. They 
àid not see the dry -rot .which underlay the apparent power of 
Prance but still they had a less exalted idea of Napoleon 
v 
:ænd the French army than they, -had had a year -tl before. 
.y saw that Napoleon had met with a-great reverse, and con- 
aidered that he had a just claim for compensation, and they 
tieved that peace could be secured better by allowing hits 
`.at compensation and soothing his irritation, than by further 
'Ckening France until she became incapable of making war. 66, 
-.It-ea-es-err; 
*.`.P-anaiiia.reci a well--f oleon would he sa;0,n'--Vhfa:n,.-1-43-ada 
4444411n7;t7 onA. 
{ih2"d 
hird--TrIr,-eY; Bismarck underrated the strength of 
1t p 
dlsCrust which.' his policy had aroused in the minds of 
°rtain Then. - - _ _ .. t-rn, -- -sn-re . , r e s- t- eCï -.., o ri. 
6h 
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st-riki.t?g._.-!pca,mplF o_._±.r ret-T : au he c eiaih"ay-rrrd-.ra.t-a, too 
"Nothing succeeds 
success" had been notably exemplified in connection with his 
on. policy in Germany. Many of the very men who had execrated 
that policy a year before now vied with each other in praising 
him, and instead of being the most unpopular man in -Germany, he- 
-;as- the national hero n . 
That this success had not carried the sane effect with it every- 
There. Many people outside Germany were dazzled -by it: to some, 
.r:oviever, "Bismarck's action seemed no less a- crime because it had 
escaped retribution; a:ed some of these men were in Cabinet 
pe.ope. 
of London. It is not a quality of , the British nation to nurse 
gch. 
revenge or cherish hatred; 
Q 
impressions of his nor dissolve very 
rapidly in the moist air of the islands: but this impression was 
Mill fresh. Salisbury the high -minded pessimist, had. been 
99 
revolted to the soul; 
i 
1`the solid sense of fair -play of Lord .Stanley 
'ran shocked; and there had been certain elements of brutality 
in Bismarck's policy which had offended the subtle and refined 
, , 3 f S 1t- rw tempo-_, of n _ - arc_ - ec.P.st 
ÿ.. th ir) 
men Bernstorff became so pressing, he discovered that the 
cautious Lord Stanley could on occasion be remarkably- definite. 
Britain Would certainly not join Prussia, he was told, 
ncr e'ïter on a continental war unless the neutrality of Belgl 
were violated. As Belgium had lately been preparing 
O Q Salisbury had resigned before the crisis 
' ;'as fully developed, but his influence must have played some part 




' -to fight on the side of France, the significance of this remark 
wag obvious. it was clear that Prussia must abandon hope 
of sheltering herself behind Britain. In the meantime, however, 
hsmarck's actions were making their impression abroad, and 
next day(April 4th) Holland decided to adopt a "safety first" 
and withdraw from the Luxembourg arrangement. 
war now seemed imminent; and all those anxious to pre- 
vane l' came forward with their plans to SEW-e the situation. 
The danger, however, was less real than apparent. For 
19marck' plans had' received a- rude check from the conduct of 
rat :Britain. 
v 
The view ha /been put forward that Bismarck was sincere in 
s promises to allow the annexation of' Luxembourg, and that it 
,s awing to t}ie mismanagement of Napoleon treat, the scheme fell 
:?:rough. Napoleon, it has been said, should have presented 
lsmarck with a fait accompli, and the latter would then have 
persuaded Germany'to consent and allowed the matter to pass 
over quietly. As it was, Napoleon allowed public opinion in 
1°rmany to -become excited. before the scheme was actually' carried 
out, and Bismarck was obliged to _give in to popular feeling. 
T`'ere are several objections to this view. For one thing, 
.poleon did` - offe.ra fait accompli for Bismarck's 
,00eptanee: the consent of Holland ih0 actual ly 
n 
n when the 
`ehefie was made public. If knowledge of the matter had been 
spread before and roused ill -feeling in Germany, the leakage 
7c 
tools place in Prussia, not in France - --so even the upholders of i( 
.0. Prussia, 615. 
T-- 
. '3. 0,11,.;,,e_, (541. 
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this belief a±nit: ,Xnd leakages in the Prussian Foreign Office 
did not take place without perYnissio.n from Bismarck. Secondly, 
3ismarck was not usually so deferential to public opinion as 
he was on this occasion. He had already rri de two wars in op- 
position to that opinion, and he was quite capable of keeping 
v 
q.pea.ce in opposition to it if he had so desired. Thirdly, he 
ould easily have put a stop to the scheme, by putting pressure 
on Holland, .f ore -it was made public, and as soon as he saw 
'that feeling in Germany was against it, and so avoided a crisis; 72 
and yet he preferred to allow the scheme to be completed 
,.rid published, and then- suddenly vetoed it. Fourthly, why should 
ismrck have ever wished -to give Luxembourg -to France? The 
neral verdict of posterity, in- accordance with Bismarck's 
onfessions,- is that he was determined to fight France sooner or 
V 
later: but he was also anxious to make France appear to .provoke 
the predestined war; and by giving Luxembourg to France, he would 
_lave practically insured peace. Napoleon, once satisfied and 
"Atli something tan ible`to show for his pains, was not at all 
il'kelY to rush into war`with Prussia for the fun of the. thing.- Y3 
If Bismarck wanted war with France in the future wry did 
--'1E take the very step that would make the disposition of France 
note pe i,cPful? If, on the other hand, we grant that he aid mean 
to give l uxenìoourg to France, for some unknown reason, possibly 
war for -a year, then whl, when obliged to give up 
t'ae 
scheme, did he deliberately choose to thwart napoleon in 
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l::e móst irritating and *publicly insulting manner, when he 
could have settled the affair comparatively quietly? 
There is considerable evidence that 3ismarck never meant 
for a moment to allow the annexation of Luxembourg; and that 
?:e of set purpose allowed the crisis to develope, with the in- 
tention of driviva France into a declaration -of ,war, and making 
1ranco -- Prussin war in 1867 instead of 1870. 
The great statesman not only seizes opportunity, but makes 
C, 
pis own opportunities. From 1866 to '1870 ismarck kept France 
perpetual state of irritation. His plan was to stir the 
and keep it boiling, so that at any given moment he might 
able to precipitate a catastrophe. Throughout the whole 
ríod lurc)pe passed through`'a continual series of minor crises, 
any one -of which)with skilful management, could have been 
leVelcped until it' gave occasion for war. Only in no case did 
circumstances seem sufficiently propitious, and no crisis was 
lowed to mature. 
If these crises, the. on which came nearest to ending in 
r was the Luxembourg Incident: and -it is probable that 
r5 
V 
'ìS'earck) s first intention was that it should do so. He did not 
`ßu1 merely to irritate France, but to drive her to decic,..re war 
atone, This intention was only abandoned because "Bismarck 
found that. public opinion, especially in Britain; was too strong.1y Y` 
ainst him. He wished, in going to war, to appear as the 
1nJureq party, not as the af;Fressor; this he d.i'_ successfully 
111187°1 but in 1867 he found that it was impossíb1e. 
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He found that he had gone too far, and he withdrew,with the 
greatest skill, cleverly turning the affair to his own advantage, 
ia.but not pushing France to the verge of war. The disposition 
of the French Government was sufficiently peace to make it 
possible for him to do this. 
If he did not mean to make a war in 1867, then in proceeding 
in -a fashion deliberately irritating to France he entered a 
singularly dangerous course. The. acquisition of Luxembourg,, 
ryas not popular in France: but by exposing '?apoleon to his 
people in a: position so humiliating, when he 'was. already unpopular 
anri distrusted, and felt his throne insecure, there was con- 
siderable risk of a revolution, which would deprive napoleon of 
his throne, and introduce a government, whether Republican 
4rleanist or Legitimate, that would have few of Napoleon's motives 
Por war, and would even be to some extent pledged to a peace 
policy. Such a change was -the last that Bismarckoould desire, 
'out, either that or immediate war was the likeliest result of his 
licy. 
(In his own Memoirs, Bismarck says that he was' anxious to 
.-ostpone_war until Prussia's preparations were made, and that 
''en in 1867 they were not quite completed. He makes, however, 
84many statements that are known to be false, apparently with the 
yy. 
Y. 
intention of misleading his readers, that a direct assertion of 
ithis 
kind is a1wa-rs open to suspicion. There is also the fact be taken into account, that Prussia had almost 1, 200, OOr) men Y 
for immediate service, and that France, who had only 150,000 
'oúá,l8ble men in '66 had even now no more than 400)9n0. o..1 (e, ha4 `'Ictor °vet, P)-ance * $6b, th %le.1 russia wag's' t1 `tehh'nìcally a-1 way w'ttkAust:12,., 
pplOE 
).imself wrote at the t ime: 
4nt 
The Luxembourg Question will hardly lead to war just at 
resent. Louis Napoleon laust be aware that he is not prepîred 
for it; but he cannot say so to his vain Frenchmen; public 
opinion is much excited in Parì.s, fomented by party-spirit, and 
an explosion is not impossible. Nothinç- could be better for us 
than that 13 war, which is bound to come, "should be declared 80 
rt once while Austria is, in all probability, engaged in the 
(P1).010 
v t as . r - Motke hs hralñer dol M 8In7. MOL-f-lü -:---------- , °i j 1 _ -;1-t a I i S }Ywx2 
The most serious objection to the view that Bismarck meant 
orar in 1867 is that he was still occupied in framing the =north 
German Constitution. It is possible, however, that he may 
Nave hoped the Constitution would be finished earlier; or that 
the crisis came slightly sooner than he had anticipated; or 
.even that he may have thought of finishing a Constitution for 
united Germany when the war was over. Besides, Bismarck even 
in his most reckless moments, 
alternative. 
W aS always preparing for every 
E _T .7 _ c:h ' _ ' ..ed 
Akist*ifx,- it woialcì ve .-_ . -Q bette. f^ France t 
Itht"siYr-1867 could not 
a,uV 
Again, what reason could there be for driving Holland and 
eigium out of their wits with fear, by the consistent course 
£ threats and bullying pursued by Bismarck towards those 
,cu: tries for the few months nreceding the crisis? The explana- 
To 
eoWa pion off Bred by NapolQon4is rather too thin, and in any cas e it 
.oes not apply to Belgium. But why, it may be asked, should 
bisma'c k 
^a.ve terrified and irritated the two buffer states if he 
r^:tended to make war on France? Should he not rather have 
ropit fated them? Bismarck, however, preferred to rule by fear 
rather than by love. He probably believed that he could frighten n. 
':qem into doing what he wished. He may even have hoped to 
.. Nurtall _ .. o.u.r-- 
scare'Belgium into acquiescing in the use of her eastern 
railways by Prussia, and hoped that this would induce France it/0 
attack Belgium, which would bring :Britain into the field against 
rance. Bismarck would have given a great deal to have Britain 
on his side, and he would only have demanded a verr.r small 
degree of assistance from her. He did not want British troops; 
'out one naval squadron would have been of inestimable service to 
him in defending German commerce from the French Navy. It 
was only at sea that he feared France. 
It must be confessed that Belgium "and Holland were singu- 
larly unpromising subjects for such a policy. Both the Dutch 
and the Belgian 'Tetherlands have throughout their history shown 
a remarkable obstinacy in def ending their rights, and an 
equally strong* resentment of any attempt to bully them. The s 
people which ha,i sinclehandeei faced Spain and France when those i 
countries were at the zenith of their power were not likely to 
be intimidated by Prussia. It has already been shown that after 
a couree of treatment'from Bismarck, both these states were 
a -nnin anainst Prussia. 
After studying the course of Prussian policy from 1863 to 
1866, one becomes so deeply impressed by the genius of Bismarck, 
at one is almost inclined to attribute to him exceptional 
pourers and believe that he could not be mistaken, and that the 
view of his policy just expressed must be false.- But in con - 
sidering his conduct towards Belgium and Holland at this moment, two facts must be remembered: first, that Bismarck was a born 
"e the curious story of Bismarck's pro - posa1 
to hire a fleet from the United States. 1- 1,L4..ß t FD , 1.77 ! 00. 4 ,14-,o.y if ( 7 7 6 .FA, t3 iqJ 
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bully; and secondly, that at this time he was in a very 
dangerous condition of nervous excitement. 
Some years later Sir Charles Dilke in a spirited if not 
very refined passage, reminded his countrymen that Count 
ismarck's digestion and Count Bismarck's- neuralgia were matters 
403 
8 
the most serious significance for Europe. Bismarck, ?vas, 
(t 
in fact, anything but "the man of iron" v he has been 
termed. He was not a cold -blooded and cold-hearted superman; 
.ut a rather exceptionally nervous, -warm- hearted and passionate 
an, One may say that he had what is known as "the artistic 
:emperament ", not usually considered a desirable gift. gis 
!,ngrring eye for the dramatic element of a situation, which 
site him so successful a liar; his understanding of the charac- 
ter of others, which gave him his adaptibility and his charm; 
the striking and picturesque language in which he naturally 
expressed himself ; above all, the facts of his life ---his wild 
and stormy youth, his stern manhood; his romantic passion for 
his wife; his romantic passion for his country: all these are 
indications of a poetic and imaginative mind. To man, and much 
lese a man of this type, could go through the strain of the last 
f 
°iur Years without serious Buffering; and the crisis had come 
is 1866, There is no need to doubt the essential truth (though 
the dates etc., were falsified) of the picturesque details 
which hey himself has embroidered the story of that time-- - 
thehettrical burst of tears at the council of war, the 
P"1 to 'ode in the .last charge" and so on. Throughout 
404 
that year Bismarck had been playing, single- handed, a game 
that meant life or death both for himself and for Germany: 
It must never be forgotten, too, that besides directiTng the 
affairs of Europe, he had to direct the conduct of the King of 
Prussia; throughout all the crisis, his high plans were at the 8r 
mercy of the whims of a silly and obstinate old man. Bismarck 
J ti 
-^ as like one trying to drive a railway train and a donkey 
Whery 
simultaneously. --n: mot. the game was over and won, he was 
on the very verge of collapse - --Òf what we should nowadays call a 
"nervous breakdown ". He gave vent to his nervous agitation 
bY smashing the furniture and storming at his subordinates, but, 
as he wished at present tox conciliate the Liberals, he was obliged 
to be courteous and amiable in his dealings with the Reichstag. 
In autumn he fell` seriously ill, and immediately on his recovery 
fell to the arduous work of creating a Constitution for the new 
lonfede ration, on which he was still working. It is small 
wonder if for a moment his finger on the pulse of Europe 
slackened, and his keen eye was-momentarily dimmed, 'and that he 
began-to bully Holland and .Belgium into doing what he wished, 
lust as he bullied his subordinates, and ai3 he afterwards 
r'ullied his Emperor, and his fellows, the Prime Ministers of 
'Irope But conduct which was well enough at the Congress of 
erlin was as yet out of place in 1867. He had not suffi- 
ciently taken into account the change of Ministry in Great 
Britain V 
He awoke to the fact that he had made a. false step, 
and he retrieved it with his own unequalled skill. 
90 
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He continued to protest with the utmost energy that he 
could never withdraw the Prussian garrison or consent to sever 
the connection between Luxembourg and Germany: but at the 
same ,ti.rne he dropped the magie word "Conference ", always a 
fpm L 
bait for a British Government; and that Government 
speedily took up the proposal. 
-ioth France and Holland were bitterly complaining of the way 
they had been deceived; but both contented themselves with com- 
plaints. Napoleon, indeed, -had on April 4th informed the Prussian 
r 
ambassador "that a-refusal on the part of Prussia to sanction the 
annexation-and to evacuate the fortress of Luxembourg must lead 
to war... Stating that his own existence in Prance would be 
imperilled if he were to submit to such a rebuff" . ... but the 
ritiar. e c it ereLe mAgirtr; 
átatenent was probably made in and his courage failed him. 
The fact that it was Holland, - - - - ,, 
Withdrew from the arrangement, gave him a loophole through 
2. 
which to escape, and on 8th April he told Lord Cowley that "he 
had heard th*rt Prussia had applied to the Powers and he would be 
de1iR t h ed to accept any honourable suggestion made b y the Powers. 
He would -he satisfied if the garrison were withdrawn and the 
CP 1 t) fortress returned to the Grand Duke. " 
In the meantime Bismarck was excusing himself to the 
11)eror }')`T saying "that all his ç*o od intentions had been flrus- 
tateel by the manner in- which the King of Holland's intentions 
ç 
F. Prance, -165;9. T (*)C4?ve - 
-"P,Q I(,3_ 
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1,ad been made known at "Berlin " -- -they should have been made to 
625, 
himself, not to the King: 
7i4.8aza_01 eh 
Bismarck., however, had not altogether given up hope of 
'nving his way. He continued. to protest that it would be dis- 
honourable for Prussia even to consent to withdraw the garrison; 
endeavoured to convince the :British Government that 
,ranee had merely brought forward the question as a pretext 
for war. In order to frighten them he suggested that he might, 
in self- defence, have to form an 'alliance with France and 
bribe ?er with Belgium to leave him alone, as "a guarantee was - 
'in these days of little value " - - -an obvious attempt to draw 
v 
Lord Stanley. "The conclusion which I drew from Count -Bis- 
m rek'saconversa.tion" wrote Loftus "is that he fully believes 
that -war is intended by France, and that the Luxembourg question 
is but the pretext put forward .... On the other hand, it 
mas ident 
. to me that Count Bismarck would equally en -gage to 
defend the existence of,Belgium under 'all circumstances if in 
return 
rrreat Britain should make common cause with Germany in a 
efensive, war against France. "(2) It will be seen the. +, if the 
overn;nent had all been Loftus,es Bismarck' s machinations might 
have 
09tained more success. 




(26) Prussi.a, 619 
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'QI He next began the dangerous process of protesting that 
Trance was arming against him, and declaring that he must 
ltse if she did not cease - - -a course, this, that almost 
i,ivariably ends in war. At the same time he declared that he 
oui(3. not promise to be hound by the decisions of the Confer- 
me, anal that he would not permit a full discussion of the cues - 
'ion by t ee conferring Powers : but these measures also f ai led. 
tanley, immediately rixeld that if Prussia would not consent to 
`.1i9, Great Britain would refuse a Conference altogether. As no 
nsponae whatever had been nade to his threats and promises about 
'elgium, Bismarck judged it best to give way. On 27th April both 
rassis, and France gave full and free consent -to -a Conference on 
the basis of the neutralisation of- the Duchy- - -a measure proposed 
CP7)Fy 
Y lritain with the knowledge of France. 
Austria was anxious that France shoùld come well out of 
the affair. Beust had proposed to Britain .a renewal of the 
o1i alliance between the two countries, and- though he had said 
Austria would be neutral in case of war, his conduct had been 
rather suspicious. He had. refused to guarantee to Bavaria, 
when that state asked him, that he would not attack her in the 
27-L 'F16-7. 0. Prussia, Z 6l5., A proposal by Austria to give Luxembourg 
°elgl,, ancra bit of Belgium to France, had been blocked 
°he oPPosition of the Belgian parliament, as the territorial ò/tegrity.of the country was a part of the constitution. 
te ", 3elgium, 2751. According to Beust the offer was refused anse the compensation offered to Belgium was not large enough. 
'$eua 1°P y ob 
v 
rear if she joined North Germany in the war; also he had 
asked whether 3ritain would be neutral even\if Russia, accordin 
Cash 
to Pier agreement to Prussia, attacked Turkey when war broke out? 
3loomfield's reply, that Britain would certainly be neutral, and 
the French fleet in .the Baltic would counteract any 
attempt of Russia, had drawn upon him a reproof from Lord Stanley 
for its indiscretion. It is, however, interesting to note that 
an experienced diplomat as late as 1867 believed that France 
:,.single- handed could keep both Russia and Prussia in :heck,, and is 
408 
an example of the exaggerated belief of many Englishmen- in the ct 
ovaer of Napoleon. 
pP 
Shen the Conference met, therefore, Bisnsarck found no emssLi, 
ort 
peNhaps f -om> 
say e _4 _...* Russia. - 
o.'_Prane '_ x His strength, however, lay in the wish 
of all parties to preserve peace. He had, from the moment of 
;ering the Conference, given up the idea of driving France into 
. dQclaratio.n of war; it was too clear that public opinion was 
finitely against Prussia. But 'he was determined to reap 
v 
'T'sry possible advantage from taro situation, and to prevent 
:ranee from raking any real gain. He had paved the way by 
-Is bluster of the ` last few weeks. He had dinned into the 
ears of Europe that Prussia could never consent to sever her 
connection With Luxembourg or to withdraw her troops, until he 
'84 Torried them into forgetting that there was no real tonnes¢ 
'Ion between Luxembourg and Germany, and that the presence of 
Austria, 72k ---c-77 t? L G o 3 
A 
.%b ' ̀  - i 
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Prussian troops in the fortress had no legal authority whatever. 
He hàd succe. .aded in hypnotising most of his conternpora- 
ties into believing that the withdrawal of the garrison, which 
really an obligation, was a Concession. According to the 
idea of Bismarck, France should give up all claim on 7.uxembour;, 
and Prussia would generously consent to withdraw her troops: 
'gut he demanded still more than this. 
The Conference had met on the basis of the neutralisation 
of the Duchy: but Bismarck demanded more than mere neutralisa- 
tion: he demanded a European guarantee. The British Govern- 
ment were extremely unwilling to contract any new obligations 
of this kind, and would have preferred an article such as that 
in the Ionian Islands Treaty rather than -a guarantee like that 
of the Belgian Treaty of 1839: but ' this was not enough to 
satisfy Bismarck, ani on the 7th of May he announced that unless 
the Conference "showed certain prospect of peace" the Prussian iòl. 
army would mobilise. q) These "certain prospects" were under- 
stood to mean the guarantee, and as these demand's were supported 
' °Y Russia, , the British Government unwillingly gave -in rather 
than risk the almost certain outbreak of war which a.Prussian 
mobilisation meant. In addition to this, Bismarck insisted 
that the Treaty should be so drawn up as to make it perfectly 
°clear J that the withdrawal of the troops was theresal,+ result, and not 
the cause of the signing of the general guarantee, thus making 
t appear , that Prussia had done this rather as a matter of rod 
pl^lz8 S1ëL, Ó`.,i ,Ì O, 7 
410 
7 ;érsonal convenience than as a concession to France or in 
deference. to the will of Europe. This "'as the article. most 
unpalatable to Napoleon, but having gone so far, he was obliged 
to give his consent. 
3ismarck thus succeeded in -wresting a triumph. from what 
might have been, under management less skilful, a rather un- 
pleasant reverse for Prussia. He had made a mistake, but he 
had retraced his, steps so cleverly that he had neither entered 
-upon a ° =ar in circumstances favourable to France nor appeared 
to make the sli?htest concession in favour of that country. 
On one point,however, he was to receive a disappointment. 
Luxembourg c_.arantee was not received with approval in 
:;land, and Lord Stanley lost his head during a debate in 
Parliament and practically repudiated the guarantee which he 1'f, 
,: d just signed. Even 3ismarck had not obtained 
o:nplete success, and he was furious with the Conservative 
cvermne.nt . 
The signing of the guarantee, and, the subsequent denial, 
-id that Government some harm at home; the Opposition accused 
of blundering and uncertainty, and of contracting respon- 
oilities which they had not the courage to fulfil. Lord6iysais 
B eecluesscertainly laid the Government open to this accu- h 
ation; but this estimate of their policy was not a fair one. 
it has been shown that that policy was crowned with considerable 
uccess 
; an that it was in a large degree owing to the conduct 
411 
p< Niz dbict,ca/ 
If Great 3ritain that a war did not break out in 1867. Had 
_e Liberal Government been in power, and had they continued 
the policy which they had pursued towards France for some time 
past, Great 3ritain would have looked with jealousy upon the 
couisition of Luxembourg by France, and would probably have 
iven moral support to the actions of Bismarck in order to 
prevent this. They would not have been persuaded into joining 
in the war on the side of Prussia; but it must be remembered 
that it was largely sympathy shown to France, and the extreme 
°1.ness shown to Prussia, by the British Government, which 
rated the conduct of Bismarck, and which enabled 7Tapo1 eon 
r to the large concessions which he did. Had Great 3ritain 
v ed even a benevolent neutrality towards Prussia., Bismarck 
id have been encourac :'d to carry out his policy cf hectoring 
!ranee to the point of desperation, and dould have n-c t 
7.:-'orcetkaooleon into a declaration of war either by refusing 
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If Great Britaiíl had come with some credit out of the 
France, on the other hand, had suffered a lamentable: 
loss of prestige: and in so far had the policy of Britain 
;ailed and that of Prussia succeeded. Though Napoleon really 
reserved some credit for , wish to preserve peace shown in 
latter part of the negotiations, his conduct to outsiders 
:e to his own subjects naturally appeared rather in the light 
of pusillanimity, for he had begun with confidence,v passed to 
:;.seer, and ended in concession and .retreat. -off -fa-ir h d 
3Frl f rtd ., al r ùreri 
ln, h 4-ft-t"o`'-a--[?r-eedy pup snapping at ci. bone, and being 
oe temptuousl orriered to .heel by. its master. He had under- 
oaken the enterprise in ì to restore his in 
eance and his prestige in Europe, and in both he had failed. 
nab 
It seemed ainorr_- .ikely that the Luxembourg Incident would be to 
oh e Second . spire what the Spanish Marriage had been to the House 
d Orleans. 
Untifrtunately for Napoleon, the affair was rapidly followed w 
ùp a series of huiiiliations and losses. 
The first was the news from America of the tragic fall of 
;la ghtperor ..d tie the .1Frene'ri 
. 
4,"1°n dis:r_wiou--r-t*nira-M---ti.n:--eres of Eurag ;--._a.ndy what was 
ry40.r.4.4.4.;1.0u_f which cast a shade over the 
44ia,ble relations which der to preserve i °nth Austria. 
the folly of the French government laid them open 





time that the clause of the Treaty of Prague relative to the 
ratroceasion of the Danish part of. Slesvig would never be 
;..rried out )4. Bismarck had continually postponed it, 
most frivolous of excuses. Now' the a> visit of 
King of Prussia to Paris had been arrang ed, and it was 
i sirable that His Majesty should be able to say that negotia- 
7:cns were in progress Bismarck therefore made a show of 
' °,0°) :: ing upon the business Q.ithethe Danish government. He 
:.:7eSted to them that he should guarantee their integri tir, and 
ten they refused this with words to the ffect that what was 
n to Prussia was death to Deni ar -, he began to bewilder them 
a whole series of rapidly succeeding and contradictory 
`ularations. He first announced that the Trea: of Prague 
:eased no obligation to cede to Denmark a single person who 
;referred to remain German -- -thus if in one village on the 
7'.tland border there lived a single German grocer, special ar- 
_,7pments must be made r'^Yich that ;Tracer remaireda 
tes:^ citizen, and was fully protected by the German .govern- 
:=1t: then he =aid. he wanted "guarantees ", but refused to 
Yn 
a.° at guarantees, What Vas to be guaranteed, or who was to 
ar&ntee it: Denmark .had had all the guarantees she wanted, 
: sie said that she would rather do without the territory than 
',aka it if Germany Were given any rights of any nature whatsoever 









system of German enclaves 1"313.C:h was Bismarck' s next sugçr4Stion3 
v 
:.Ad he thereupon declared that he would_ never consent to 
return either Duppel yr Als en; both purely Danish districts, 
aut important. as positions of defence for Prussia. The pro- - 
toned negotiations then came to a prerlature enct, because Denmark - 
ou1d not begin until she had heard what the frontier was to 
;., and Bismarck absolutely refused to make any statement about 
it. In the meantime the elections were held, and the, result 
in N. Slesvig was an overwhelming Danish majority. Both 
members elected there were Danes, and both refused to take 
he oath of allegiance to Prussia. The Prussian government 
J - 
eu +, in some skilful j erryria,ndering by which the electoral 
districts becaane remarkably writhen, 1 Bank a.nd long in-shape, 
aatt Which secured a return of one German candidate at the next 
lection, which r-as N :leciiiatel held. Prussia then pro - 
darned to all the world that T. Slesvig was really German, 
:4 that the few Danes who lived there were already reconciled 
German rule. 
Great Britain IrltE.s invïted, both by Denmark and by-France, 
Prussia, that it would be wise to carry out the Treaty 
Prague. The Conservative Government, however, refused. 
Danish affair had been a dirty business, and they did not 
to get into a similar scrape themselves. v e _ Tne;r said 
,a° they had not signed the Treaty of Prague and that 
neY °Vashed their hands of the - whole affair. 
f I z 
It 3 
It would have been well for Napoleon if he had followed their 
example: but he or his advisers were possessed with a spirit 
of folly. In July the redoubtable 7.enedett i received orders 
to remonstrate with Count Bismarck. The despatch unfortunately 
found its way into the newspaper. Bismarck regarded the in- 
terference as an unwarrantable impertinence., and Napoleon 
was obliged to withdraw with an apology. It was declared 
that the despatch was not an official communication, but merely 
an affectionate offer of Vadvice, as from one private individual ', 
to another. Benedetti said he had never read the despatch 
officially; Thile, who had received it, said he had. France 
"'as once more pu'.licly rebuked, and Bismarck bitterly corn - 
pleined to Britain that France was always trying to start 
=uropean crises. But Stanley was now gettin - a little tired L 
of '3i?narck's Wailin;s, and he tartly replied that Prussia' s 
Áe er.nination to take offence at whatever France did was still 
!lore likely to produce war. 
In the meantime an event of the happiest augury for Franco- 
3ritish affairs had taken, place: Lord Cowley had resigned, and 
dad Dean succeeded by Lard Lyons. It is to be regretted that th:to 
event did not take place sooner; had at been longer delayed, it 
is possible that Great Britain might have found herself involved 
WAju olirk, 
Vra,nee within the next few y ea.ra. 
Lord .Lyons was not a great J-abassadar in the sense that Lora 
gtrâtford a_ A 1 edcl ffe was great. He was not the mari to origin- 
ate a 
and, by the strength of his personality and the 
(4 4v.c, s-1L 4 /Wry 7). P4A &1 b ". 
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tower Of his intelligence, impose it upon the home government 
and carry it to success. He would probably have been too lazy 
to enter upon such a course, even if his nature had not been one 
whose peculiar excellence lay rather in the power to observe, 
to interpret, and to improve, rather than to invent and create. 
Besides this, his strong sense of dutyAregarde3V himself asAthe 
mouthpiece of his government, and he was always careful not to 
go beyond his instructions or hallow his personal views to 
modify them. Lord Lyons may indeed almost be regarded as the 
ideal ambassador. - vaf,n:re-- an4 -eu r ieìai-- -eyrri i. -em -c lv arv,ed 
to i czs se h4 natural- -to:ierafle ! -d-- tom. -.prevent -an;v..- ears-}- 
juigment-s, -and---ik- anitto -.,a;n--urfai>l-ing-sensa o-f..:..hameur . He 
N 
was n ev er avi.-a-d-eae_.al...-s3mpathetr#e- u-ndexa#.an4314.-, 
irritated, never angry, never impatient; he never quarrelled, 
he never blustered, he never threatened. He was always popular /r . 
with the ministers to whose courts he was accredited and with 
his colleagues of the Corps Diplomatique; his subordinates were 
devoted to him; his government reposed in him a degree of trust 
almost unparallelled, and not always welcome to himself. The 
most raw and uncoutteous admonition from London, when conveyed 
by the suave and tactful tongue of Lord Lyons, lost its uripleas- 
aeisess. He owed his success et Tto :sup?sriority of intellect and 
energy so much as to gentleness and generosity. At this time 
moat of the British ambassadors to thergreat powers were on bad. I` 
terms with the ministers with whom \they transacted affairs: 
the relations of Bismarck and Lord Augustus Loftus were compound - 
ed °f a mutual dislike and contempt; Sir Andrew Buchanan could 
not interview Prince Gortschakov without squabbling with him; 
and Lord Cowley since 1860 had distrusted all French statesmen. 
In Lord Cowley's letters there is never a friendly opinion, in 
Lord Izrons' never a harsh judgment. As characteristic of the two 
laó.one may refer to their relations with M. de Moustier, a brilliant 
diplomat whose services prance lost too soon. He succeeded M. 
q 
Drouyn de Lhuys in 1866, and Lord Cowley thus reported of him: 
"I should say a worse choice could hardly have been fie. very - 
capable but very indolent...acting on his first judgment without 
reflection - --of a violent temper - -- obstinate...and rather treat- 
ing opinions contrary to his own with raillery than meeting them 
by argument...His character is not, morally speaking, of the 
4 (31) 
purest, though he is fascinating and amiable in society." Lord 
Lyons, throughout Mous t i er ' s term of office, was von terms of 
untroubled friendliness with the objectionable minister. /mss 
unf artunat e t hat.3re- °-no = ßp1 
1401.447--- and._.i3ito.ler iplor!a, -' who repr-e&ent -eò . t-- Bstit.ain 
eftre.la:JV - 
'ñoustier, who had been ambassador at Constantinople, was pre - 
occupied with the Eastern Question, and the Vaffairs of Luxern- 
bourg and Denmark had been to hire,, 4 , a dis- 
traction from a policy much nearer his heart. Not even now, how - 
ever, did he find opportunity to deal with Eastern affairs, for 
fresh trouble for France broke out in Italy. In November 1867 
Garibaldi made his unhappy attempt on' Rome, and the credit of 
the French military success was quite discounted by the fact 
that it was a success against Italy. Napoleon made an attempt 
to solve the difficulty by suggesting AtAitropean Conference on 'GI I 
papal affairs. Italy, Austria, and Russia, accepted the invit- 
., r. 16X', ß- ( . I 4//,,G2 , \7-- 
ation, but the proposal was blocked by Great Britain and 
prussia 
who came to an understanding, and refused to take part in such 
a Conference. 3israarck had every reason to wish that the situat- 
ion in Italy might remain unchanged, for as long as it lasted} 
31 ill- feeling between that country and France Was bound to grow¡ 
he did not trust Victor ìmjanuel, whose attachment to France he 
knewtod one of his objects was to prevent a Franco- Italian 
alliance. The revolutionary leaders had'adked his assistance ag- 
(3366 
ainst France, and he had refused, fearing that, even if Vicr 
Pitíimanuel could be lured into war against France, he would soon 
change aides and join France against Prussia. Britain, on her 
side, was alarmed at the possibility of being drawn into some 
collective guarantee of the papal power in Rome, or of authoris- 
ing the French garrison there. TTapoleon`.ef -eetczsi wanted to 
'3.3get out of Rome, andV was desperately seeking for some\ excuse for 
doing so without giving offence to the Ultramontanes. He was no 
fool, and he knew that in the end Rome must fall to Italy. He ; 3 
wished well to Italy - --in this dreary hour the only y.otk of his 
hands that showed signs of enduring success. If he could with- 
draw his troops, as a graceful concession to the rest of rurope, 
and get some sort of guarantee signed, which would last a year 
or two, he would not have cared whether it was permanently rful- 
Pilled or not. He only wanted to shift his responsib ility to 
else's shoulders. The -British government did not under- 
de Bismarck est sans doute convaincu- que si la conférence 
ne se réunit pas, nous devrons continuer à occuper un point 
quelconque du territoire romaine, et la presence de nos troupes 
dans les Ftats pontificaux le garantit contre le rétablissements 
des rapports qui unissaient autrefois la France et l'Italie." 
l eiietti tu Moustier, 17.11.67. Benedetti, p, 24o.) 
at"a33r- ,Lnherz tn ni6r -r, a¡k pare R-Hy made Strn le ?rofeba(S. 
(3e; 
stand this, and Bismarck increased their fears, now assuring 
them that Napoleon wanted the Trench occupation of Rome author- 
ised and now hinting that France wanted to break up the new- , i iFiv csY i- #@ 
made state Vonrre-- , and possibly Genoa, and restore the 
.Napl _s, x Kingdom of Qlhr lessened the chances of French success 
odiS1 
by speed in the Chambers; lie had been 
secretly informed of Ratazzi's underhand dealings with Bismarck, 
and roundly declared that Italy should haver have Rome. 
The failure of the plan for a Conference was a blow, but in 
V, 
!3a.spite of this it seemed as if ,Bismarck's fears regarding an ital- 
ian- French rapprochement might be realised. The Italian alliance 
with Prussia had always been an affair of `-expediency; the King lay 
and some-of his ministers still had some gratitude and affection 
for France. They could not but see, that even if France stood 
between them -and Rome, she was the only country that had fraught, 
or ever would fight, in their cause. Prussia had used Italy, 
Britain had sympathised with her and applakded her: but if 
Austria should try to get back her lost provinces, neither l3ras- 
v 18ia for Britain would spend a man or a shot in Italy's defence; 
ex ect - only from France could they 1opc for help, and they could not 
hope to stand alone against Austria. Considerable feeling had + < ;á 
been roused against Prussia by La Marmora's revelations of her 
conduct to her ally in 1866. Those men, therefore, who preferred 
Íi He told Loftus that he had information of Ultramontane Alots,- and said, "It was at all events remarkable that the .reports 
thorn both Florence and Rome tended to the same point, namely to sorestoration of the Bourbons at Naples and an augmentation of 
me apal States. These intrigues were, he said, attributed by to Prince Nap&..leon, by others to the Ultra- Catholic party in 
- re,nce which since the affair of Mentana had considerably 
wars ?d 1t$ Pretensions , and wd, not see with disfavour a religious 
Jule uroPe v.hich their hoped to be victorious." Loftus to y, 18.ß,.6g F. ().Prussia. 637. 
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the policy of Cavour to that of Mazzini and Garibaldi - - -Me abrea, 
1a Marmora, and others -- -still hoped for a reconciliation with 
France. Hence the proposal, in June 1868, for an offensive and 
defensive alliance, in which Austria was to be invited to join, 
,.which was to be directedL_d.n_-_4a3y) against Prussia, and which 
demanded only the evacuation of Rome as a condition. 
The offer was tempting. The Luxercbourgaident had shown 
that war with Prussia was a veryvreal and threatening danger, 
and France was in little case to go to war. Some attempt at re- 
forming her army had been made, and since 1866 the numbers had 
been increased, but even now the etfieient force was equal to 
little more than half that of ?prussia, who could put into the 
field in three weeks more than a million men. Marshal Niel drew 
up an elaborate scheme of military reorganisation, and an att- 
v 
erapt was made, at the beginning of 1868, to carry this out. 
The negotiations with Italy were unknown to the British gov- 
ernment, but Niel' s arrtv schemes V were public property, and to- 1 í 
gether with the fncomplete improvements that had already been 
The reports of Mr E. J erri es, chargé d' aff aires in Italy, for 
10 eptiibdç ;NaißjQwTt, show that them were vague suspicions, and 
snow also the cross- currents of opinion in the Italian cabinet. 
"There came to my recollection a remarkably strong declaration 
of a determination to remain neutral in the event of a war be- 
tween France and Prussia. which was made to me last year by rrl Eatazzi.. 
a in answer to a casual observation on ray part as to the advantageous geographical position of Italy that would always enable her to hold aloof from a contest in Central''Europe- -and made,a similar remark to count menabrea,but without eliciting a eimìlar reply. H.J. merely said in a somewhat constrained and hesitating manner, "Noun sommes pacifiques. " Herries then asked What was their attitude about -Rome? "Count 'MMenabrea replied that they did not know what to expect as they received assurances one day that were contradicted the next. He spoke vaguely and showed no disposition to give information." 3arbolani later told Hernia 
that affairs with France were in an unsatisfactory state. 3oth Bald 
"some 
moment violent chang e» might be expected in Fra -a --an;T ,and 3arbolani thought they were holding ome so as , ''(,Vent tta,ly pomp; arra.inst them in case of war.. F.Ö.Italy, 128. \ 
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made, they threw into a panic Colonel Claremont, :3ritish military 
attache at Paris. kumour3f,1 vague probably started by ue re- 
ports of Italy's proposals, were in the air, and as the British 
government were ac1iawinaedh,that;uthe French army was the most eff- 
9.& ii 
icient in Europe, they concluded that, rïe it was already in a 
state of perf ectionv a proposed increase of numbers and armaraents 
V 
,.could only mean that an immediate campaign was in contemplation. 
A somewhat entertaining correspondence ensued - --a series of 
highly- coloured despatches frornVClaremont, expressed in his 
usual romantic and picturesque style, 614 each coupled with a 
companion letter from Lyons, who, while treating his subordinatéS 
opinions with full respect, contrived to soothe the fears that 
they might excite in Downing street. 
"The language of the French ministers - is sextremely pacific, ,, 
write Lyons, on March 3rd, "And their present policy, especially 
with regard to the Turkish question, appears to be founded on 
the supposition that peace in Europe will be preserved at least 
9 for this year," though he added that theta were rumours about . 
the scret intentions of the , nperor which "merited serious att- 
ention." Claremont definitely asserted that there would be war ) ? ° 
this ae1 e Year, though he remarked that he `taken special care 
(3', flot to als] .his Prussian colleague " - - -a tenderness which was r 
° 
3u possibly there was no connection, for Claremont wrote, He (Niel) evidently thinks that in the present state of feel- ing in Italy she would in the event of hostilities take part with rGermany and he wants to be able to threaten Florence from Rom 
!4 
)e rather than from the side of the Alps." (6..68. F.O. ranoe, l o1.) 
Prance-- 170 -.,r s x, 31, 1ti,"vti t 4 arémont to Lyons, 04.68. 
as 
perhaps superfluous. Later, after another agitated report from 
Claremont, Lyons wrote, "Colonel Claremont's report is certainly 
calculated to cause most serious apprehension, and I have noth- 
ing to allege on the other side except the pacific declarations 
of M. de Moustier, and the p rincipia civil members of the cabinet 
do not doubt that these declarations are sincere, or that they 
are sanctioned by the Emperor; but whatever may be His Majesty.s` ¡` 
present views, little confidence appears to be felt in his stead 
iness. in pmrsuing a pacific policy. He frequently changes his 
ovin mind, and it is believed that he may be overborne by the 
war party in the Army and *Tavy.- --While material preparations 
for war are proceeding rapidly, no sign is yet visible of any 
preparation for fixing a quarrel upon Prussia. The question to 
.be taken up as a moral Around for war has yet to be sought. This 
V 
is not however accepted as a reassuring circumstance..." The 
Prussian government have lately referred to military preparation% 
going on. "The`rmost pacific assùr ances have been given by the /,N, 
representatives of France, and have been accepted by Count 315-- 
rarck and M. de Goltz - --but while accepting these assurances and 
declaring their own personal confidence in them, M. de 3ismarck 
nd14 13 Goltz have not concealed their be ief that this con - 
YìcìenCe is nhpred by few of their county J ym n. " Lord Lyons, who 
had early mastered a fact never fully understood by Lord Cowley, 
also remarked that it was not "by any means certain t.at His 
avestY would confide his intentions to his ministers." 
In his private letters, however,Lyons spoke m- uch more confid- 1.3 
ptly. 
He had seen Prince Napoleon, who had just returned from 
C) ..- ,._____ 
France, 1704; Lyons to Granville, 28..68, 7. \.68. 
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a visit to Win: strongly convinced of the -necessity for peace. 
He had been deeply impressed by the strength of Cray, and was 
sure that she had an understanding with Russia. If France meant 
to fight Prussia, it was "_now or never'!, for Prussia was growing 
stronger every a.y, but he himself thought "never" should be 
the decision. 
While in Germany, the -prince had called on Lord .Augustus 
11 Loftus, and had spoken in a tone of alarm and depression, but 
not one that implied France was thinking 
v of immediate war. lie. i 
t-ter-ersiarerneqer The progress of Prussia, he said, up till now,was 
a fait accompli. If it continued, that was different. "Can France 
---can Europe -- -look quietly on and witness passively this ah- 
orbing process without equiring some guarantees as to the 
limits which shall constitute Germany? That would Europe say if 
France were to enter into a similar Zollverein Treaty with 'Bel- 
gium---and that Bel gjan representatives should sit in a parliam- 
ent assembled at Paris9hy -- -they would instantly raise their 
voice against the absorption of Belgium and the cessation of her 
existence as an independent state." 
A e'-...,t.pe,, -prov-irrc-es`° f-fiTtr, 
21e`4*/**r.-443-31.e-tinit...4da=.tcq..r>rttssia°con-grcrrzrrdsm.-cf,. nat ion-a2tty?.°.171T07- 
V.,-41e4".PevA-V4i- o-ri_cal-claim,---to 
VSee Lyons, I, Chap. 6. 7) Prussia had just renewed the Zollverein treaties with the South German states and had established a oic affairs, parliament for econ- airs, in which members from all parts of Germany, elect - `d bJ univerdal suffrage, met at Berlin.l 
425`. 
v 5 .,anrrLörta t was, of course, too late to check the 
triumphant progress f Prussia in Germany. "If Southern Germany 
is still to follow in the wake, I again say, let it b so, but 
what concessions will rrermany or Prussia be prepared to make for 
this boon? If the system of absorption is to be passively 
n "! 
per- 
mitted by Europe why should not others absorb likeise _ou, 
ate- -i- ghnes-st _have chosen to--- w- i.thdra. - --_ 
voureeives from- -fie pe3irey of Europe; - and --this abstention of N °from active participation/ in Huropean politics is a 
gnat-misfortune for herself. you pretend to:- abatain from i.nt -er- 
f Ar,nr in Eu - opean..affa,. -rs xaept on questions ,wich- ,d_irectly.. 
.af e t vnur ibexes -t-s; -but- is not this a- Question which directly.° 
0_ect-a- the well- being -"and pace of Europe --"- and -{-mus ot.- 
cónsequently concern the interests of your country ?... There -are 
es-Tîsre :.6:ngland still holds a watchful and careful eye- 
/ 
If -is:,,ev-er--r.mo:o,ted... 
w=ç ,4;:.;eQer menace the' independence of elgi url, you;-.Engla.nci3 
1y..r,is your v5riee---If Russia discloses any-- secret 
Aetigns on Constant inoile you again-- raise a cry -of-,a1arm---bu-t 
aLregarde.:tlie.,_cha.n s brought about., and - 3n -operation, in Ger- .. 
11 . rou l y p no--danger-likely = ....- are. -.anr, tar' - a a,thetic and-1 
4/411-tat> -your- terse , The present state of things is intol- 
erable and cannot last, - --for there is no basis for Internation- 
al Laws Treaties are no sooner signed than they are violated--- 
° landmarks have been torn down and no fixed ones have taken 
their place - -- .there is consequently nothing but confusion and 
insecurity 
and the result must necessarily be some great catas- 
trophe, which, if the statesmen of Europe had foresight and 
'db. 
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courage, might be avoided. yf they continue in their present 
apathy, they will be awakened some .,no rning by a 'coup de ton* - 
nerreL' Let Germany be constituted, said His imperial Highness, 
but let its limits be fixed and final so that it may not be led 
;to aspire after future aggrandisement, and let the arrangement 
concluded be placed under al-40R) European guarantee. If you, 
England, (continued the -rince) remain in your present state of 
abstention from .European affairs, you will some day see that 
(sic) 
Russia will profit of the moment, when we shall be otherwise en- 
gaged, to seize Constantinople---and having obtained her prize 
will leave Prussia in the lurch. To us, in such a moment, the 
Eastern question will be of secondary ánzieequenee in comparison 
toil 
with our interests nearer home. Now i3 you be able single-han- 
ded to oppose Russia in the cast? You will have to v submit to a 
fait accompli which will seriously affect your prestige if not 
;3 
your interests in the gast. if inka war with Prussia we should 1 
be victorious, we can make peace by compensating ourselves. s"e 
shall not expend our blood and treasure for nothing.' 
"In replying to His Imperial Highness 1 confined myself to 
general observations - -- saying that 1 could not see what either 
Rrance sr Germany could gain by a war which would be ruinous to 
both. Both viere great and powerful nations which could well Live 
st peace With each other --- enriching each other with their prod - 
uce ofvindustry and trade - -- without rivalry or blows -- -that 
could not believe Germany would ever become aggressive towards 
herVnei ghbours -- -that it was not in her nature to be so - - -and /L `Î 
that the military rawer of Drussia though formidable for defence 
%a not so for aggression." The Landwehr, said Lord Augustus, 
Y 
/./ 27 
would not are to leave their homes for the sake of conquest,and 
other powers were 'wally interested in protecting Constantinoplè 
from Russia, who would never dare to "undertake so hazardous a 
polttá 
Sap -._ .__ 
.°':-°îbe-=.Fl£1.}.1 
9 W. ; - . - ;i*2a tr .RT&x. 
$tanQ°i-!`fg-mbist ~'b- e gbise13'8°"3ti1y?'"t'>~.4,45.443 
r e , , . -44.9.gas,. iay-,..a. . C E>r4.-t ark nd 
j ndP t - - -gu3'9p-e ---3:rtW44-1- Qtt-esd4Piea; 
1-f-sO24Te'"`$ilch, "COUr$e 
f-.r-BbivAlaean-$-t+ateemerv-etYn - 
rhelrb4e?-i11: httv e to .face-ifimeisteiptAvikie ±á ... _ hr_..-t+llae.a4 
h14-- 
. irht }iev"e.`revitag- 
This speech indeed emphasised the danger of war, but it def- 
initely postponed war until «russia herself should provoke it by 
repudiating the Treaty of Prague, and extending her full sover - 
eignty to the South German states without offering compensation J1' 0 
to France. 
The confidence of Lord morons was justified, for the war 
scare passed away? although on April 28th Claremont was still 
writing that the situation was acutely dangerous: Rigault and 
111e1 were determined on :ar - -- "I knov,- both well, and both are 
1;1 
v cold 
, calculating, ambitious men....The imminent danger is that 
Mar hal (name omitted in despatch) has evidently made up his 
mind for war and that regardless of any remonstrance he actively 
n 
*Loftus to Stanley, 14. I 68. Y.G.Prussia, 640. 
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pursues the preparation for it... If after all this excitement 
1othin7 is done the Ariiy taríll think the U'ap?ror has given way, 
/44 
and with people so tetchy about the point of honour it- 'kill. not 
43) 
tend to raise hue in their estimation." 
7Tiel, however, was not a pile to carry hie atte :np is at reor- 
ganisation far. The Chambers refused the Ilioney necessary to 
carry out his plans, which Were thus brought to a stop. At thew 
same time 'Tapoleon decided to refuse the Italian offer, and 7q ?ie3 
had said to his m.st e_r, "I - would let myself be torn in four 
pieces rather than, with my consent, Trance should enter on war 
without outside alliances." The last attempt to put France in 
readiness for the day of wrath failed. Napoleon was too deeply 44.. 
committed 
_ to the Clericals to evacuate. home, and the Italians 
44) 
-stuck o this as a sine qua non. The military reforms were stop- 
ped,-,and the rumours of war died away. 'Tapaleori tried another 
plan to solve the Homan problem, and this also failed. He pro- 
posed to hand over the task of defending Rome to Spain, and in 
this way he hoped to extricate hirriself without offending the 
Clericals and displeasing his wife. Isabella the Catholic egger- 
1l accepted the offer. The negotiations were almost concluded, 
when she was dethroned b r r°volu t ion. The Fr e -ich government 11t 
suspected Bismarck, but though the coincidence w.7kTas a lucr one 
for him, there is no 
43) 
Claremont to Lyons, 28.April, 1868. P.O. France, 1704. 44) reril;r to Ital r was friendly in tone, but pointed out that the withdrawal of the garrison "would be take i in Eur- 
°Pe 84 sign that His 1,7ajesty was pr. eparing for war, while he 
ZLin truth most desirous of preserving peace." So 1 igra told 
ons..,Yons 
to F.0., 25 Sept. 1868. F.r). Franc:, 17 (19. 
/*as Mort that he via s implieF4ted. 
egotiations with Austria had gone on at the saine time as 
those with Italy. :%eust'was ready enough, but both Austria and 
Hungary were averse to another war, and he dared not pledge him- 
self too deeply. He had also set off on a wild -goose- chase, the 
object of which was to checkotate both Prussia and Russia; Russia 
was to be detached from her ally by the bribe of revising the 
Treaty of Paris 1856, and at the same time her pretensions in 
the Rast were to be ended by putting the reform of the Turkish 
empire . and the protection of the Christie under the collective 
authority of Europe by means of a congress. It was in itself a 
statesmanlike idea: Russia was known to be aiming at the abol- 
v 
ition of the Black Sea clauses of the Trat*y of 1856, and it was 
believed that she would seize the chance of a p'ranco- German dis- 
pute to repudiate them. But Beust could not bring his plans into 
a practi,,l shape. In the first place he bitterly offended Russia 
by suggesting European control of Turkey, for Russia saw that 
this was intended to lessen her personal influence, and the 
bribe offered was- not enough to compensate her for this for she 
believed that by sticking to prussia she could gain in both 
-ways. Next, for the success of the scheme British cooperation 
'was a necessity, and Beust could not convince Britain that there 
' ̂ as real danger fit Russia, for the government did not. believe 
ULUssIa 
that Rise had any definite understanding with Prussia; and they 
,4 
were unwilling either P to make concessions to eta, in the Black 
Spa) or take on the responsibility of superintending thie efbrm- /.4C 
')fie did not care even if the whole Eastern Question were 
0 
tight under discussion because he felt convinced some day or 
place 
thiis must be the case,and therefore the sooner it took ÿ - -, 
better." (3eust to 3loomfield in conversation 29.1-4.6$. F :o' 'Au rP.i&.. V29 
l30. 
ation of Turkey. 
Moustier, whose first interest was the Fa;4tern question, was 
also anafous::Í i 'collective action on the part of the powers. 
He was aware that Russia was restless, and actually hoped for 
the support of Prussia as well as Britain in restraining her. 
IS.In January 1868 he had told moons that "his recent communicat- 
ions with the Prussian government had been satisf a,cto_ry, and 
that he felt convinced that friendship between the two countries 
would be preserved. He thought the great danger to the tranquil- 
lity of Europe carne from svia. The machinations of that power 
against "Turkey were, he .observed, carried on with an activity 
and a boldness which showed that she counted upon a war in Eur- 
ope, which would give free scope for the accomplishment of her 
designs in the East. It seemed in fact that she expected and 
,, desired a war bet .weep J France and. Prussia, and that she did no t 
spare insinuations at Berlin ahLCulated to produce irritation 
and excite suspicion there against France. He thought however 
that the government of prussiaawas beginning to be apprehensive 
of the progress of Russia in the East. He had himself pointed v 
out to Comte deGoltz...that if the plans of Russia were accom- !ß'g- 
pushed, she would become a very formidable rival to Prussia.. 
keetier suspected that Russia would like to take the Slavonic 
Provinces of Austria, bribing Prussia with Austria's German 
Provinces to consent. "But this would be an exchange very much to 
the disadvantage of Prussia, and it could not be more V for the 
interest of Prussia than it was for the interest of France that 
ssia should extend her possessions to the Adriatic: nor could 
itbe safe for Prussia that Russia should be the sole power in 
431. 
the East." Later, M:oustier confided to Lyons that PruSsla susp. 
acted France of trying to embroil her with tssia -over the .ast- 
ern Question. In reality, he only wished to use Prussian influ- 
ance to bring Russia back into the European concert... "Comfit de 
Goltz also appeared to be quite aware that it was or great impor., 
tance to Prussia to prevent an outbreak of Panelavisn... Count 
3ismarck did not express these sentiJ ents with equal distinct - 
ness... The whole difficulty in treating the matter lay...in the, 
fear entertained by Count 3ismarck that Prussia might lose the 
support of Russia if she became involved in a quarrel witi raneey /57D 
or Austria. "He hoped to overcome this by tact and sincerity and 
46) 
by treating the 'Eastern Question as a thing apart. In October he 
spoke to Lyons about the international situation in a cheerful 
tone, though for the time he had abandoned his efforts to coax 
47) 
Prussia to support him in the East. "M. de Mustier went on to 
sar tbàt under present circumstances his desire was to avoid 
mooting any question with Prussia - --to avoid p'iving rise to any 
incident. The two governments should be as civil as possible,but 
should abstain from discussions in the present state of public /s--J. 
feeling; the;T should take off their hats to each other with mark 
ed civility, but should not enter into conversation. He was, he 
said, on the whole satisfied with the aspect of ,things, on the 
48) 
other side of the Rhine, and free from apprehension." 
Tioustier's wish to avoid an incident was disappointed, 
th.bugh at first all seemed well, and the year closed in a much 
46) Lyons to F.O. 2 Jan. , 27 Feb. 1868. F.O. France, 1700,1702. 7) Bismarck evaded reply, and would only say that he wished to maintain a Passive attitude. See also Benedetti, Chap. V. 48) 
?Urons -Co P.O., 8 Oct. 1868. F.O. France, 1709. 
atmosphere than that in which it had opened._ 
'Jnless this interminable ;astern Question springs up, " wrote 
Loftus "We may look for a year of peace. No dae is inclined for , u1 
war, and no country has the financial means for it." Nev erthe- 
less a new war scare arose within a few months. 
It was now clear to Napoleon that the guarantees of the 
Treaty of Prague were of little practical value. The military 
conventions and the new 7ollverein treaties had cut away the 
ground from beneath them and left them in the air. He had almost 
br.ought himself to accept Vthe completion of German unity as a 
regrettable but inevitable fact, if it were .6nly brought about 
by a process sufficiently gradual and quiet. But the means by 
which this end was being accomplished attracted his attention ' 
ad admiration, and the bright idea occurred to him -- -why should 
not France learn from prussic, and attempt something similar? 
A customs -union with Belgium and Luxembourg,' perhaps with Holland 
and Switzerland, was an arrangement which, he thought, could 
Induce nothing but good to all concerned. It could not reason- 
ably be objectionable to Germany or to Britain. Bismarck had 
lt 32 
continually protested that the Zollverein treaties and the mili- 
tary conventions even were of an entirely non -political nature, 
and did not in the slightest degree compromise the independence 
of the South German states, If this were so, then-the government f5-44 
merlin could have no objection if Prance entered into a sim- 
ilar economic arrangement with Belgium and Luxembourg. Britain 
had taken the same attitude with regard to the Zollverein, r1 - 44-ti`°i 
given it her hearty approval as an advance in the dir- 
private letter to Egerton, 11..6£3. F0. d3 
453. 
sot ion of Free Trade, so she oughto°intcy to hail with 
0pleasure the news on a similar advance in the case of France 
and Belgium. 
A etìstóms. union ti±eaty ;: once concluded, would, Napoleon hoped/ 
be followed in a few years by a military convention, and if there 
arrangements could be extended to - Holland, Luxe mbourg, and 
,S s 
Sritzerland, the position of France would be much more secure. 
The Belgian marches were her weakest frontier, and the one on 
which she was most open to an attack. Defensive al l[a nces with 
her neighbours would lessen the danger of war, while the customs. 
union would add to the prosperity of both parties. As yet no 
steps were to be taken in the direction of military conventions, 
but some preliminary arrangements pointing towards a customs- 
union should at once be entered on. 
An opportunity was easily found. The French Eastern Railway 
Company drew up a scheme f or the union of their lines with 
those of av3elgian and a Dutch company. The Belgian Company was 'S 
ready to sell, and the; drench government offered to advance a 
But of money suif is Tent for the purphaee This Aright b e the 
first step to a comrnerc ial understanding. The arrangement had 
been concluded between the two companies, when agitation against 
the scheme began in Belgium. 
The public there did not believe that Napoleon's object was 
a customs -union, They belied this was a pretext, 
and that his real object was to subvert their independence. He 
\18.8, It was said, meditating an attack on Germany, and w*ris d to 
°ntrol the Eastern ̀ railways for the purpose of transporting his OS 
}"opB through Belgium, _even if rron ÿ a customs -union' /were in 
* 
r 
question they did not want it, for the mercantile classesjthere 
as in Francefwere all high protections. 
Questions were asked in the -Belgian parliament, and M. Frére- 
Orban, in reply, said that the arrangement of the railway com- 
,panies could not be carried out without government sanction, The 
3elgian company ignored this statement, and continued their pre - 
cv-4 
parations for the sale pyre chambers then hastily passed a law 
prohibiting the sale of Belgian railways to a foreign customer 
without consent of government. In the meantime the n ag- 'yam 
itation had communicated itself to London, where it was believed 
that France intended do immediate attack on Belgian independence. 
3q ¢c 
and the Liberal government, which in 1868 had ß.i3 the con- 
servatives, fell into a panic. 
In Paris they were very angry. - Napoleon had no immediate de- 
signs on Belgian independence, and he was hurt and indignant at 
1 having his b enef is ent L. a eabadec . a }mse"i } intent ions 
thrown back in his face with insult. Public opinion was much 
disturbed at this new set -back to France, coming so unexpectedly) 
and excitement was increased by a rumour that Bismarck had in- 
cited the Belgian government to resistance. ̀ 'Quai' Vt.-Ors-ay-was in 
the mood to blame him for every misfortune: to them, 
Tn a word, be it understood, 
He was always for ill, and never for good. 
According to Sybel Bismarck preserved a- strict neutrality. A 
stronger argument is that the conduct of the Belgian government 
t 
K can be well acounted for by other motives. It is not impossible 
The French foreign office papers might throw some light on lathe matter, but the publication has not yet reached 1869. La flette told Lyons that Bismarck had planned t e whole affr 
prom the beginning. See Lyons, tea. .. 2.213. Lyn., Ci .lß,,4614 
+3.31- 
that the Belgian government mentioned the matter to Bismarck, 
v 
'¡hand that he advised thera to take up a bold. attitude. He may also 
have increased the panic in London, for it was always his habit 
to insinuate there that prance was nourishing designs on Belgian 
/0 
independence. 3ut all this is mere guess -wt it is, °tertä my 
remarkable that Bismarck made no attempt to Vise the incident to 
f 
bring on a quarrel with Trance. According to Syh el, 3elgmum ask- 
ed for his support during the dispute, and could get no promise 
from him. This might be due to a desire fro peace, ter -to a.knovit 
kedge that napoleon laad never intended to attack Belgium, and 
would not risk a war on a point that would involve a quarrel 
W i - Uma b` N1 
wit7.1 (reat .Britain, and (an) which could have ^l444A:4- ~'° ; ̂ ^, 
ular s .pe-rt in France itself. Napoleon's intentions had been 
at first quite peaceable, and the greatest danger of war came /6i 
from the conduct of (reat Britain. 
The queen had been the first person to take alarm, and on the 
14th of January had -made General Grey write to Clarendon on the 
subjecto Shortly after Gladstone drew up a memorial referring to 
French designs on Belgian independence, and instructions were 
-sent to Lyons to' drop a hint that Belgium was still under Brit. - 
i ishVprotection. hen the panic -began, Gladstone wrote- to Clar- 
endon, "The da -tr when this nation seriously suspects France of 
meaning ill to Belgian independence will be the last day of 
friendship with that country, and...then a futurefr ,/;,/;2, wili open for 
which 
. no man can answer. n Clarendon also took the matter very 
seriously, but hoped France might still pull up on the road to 
Perdition. "Bismarck is biding his time quietly," he wrote, 'if 
14Yone _ i.2.i ( j 
l34. 
France annexes Belgium and we take no part he will be delighted, 
as France could no longer complain of Prussian aggrandisement. 
js,If we do take part he would be equally delighted at the rupture 
between England and France, and would come to our assistance. 
zither way he thinks Prussia would gain. Why should Napoleon and 
la Valette assist him? A giiarrel between France and England or 
y9 
even a coolness is the great German desideratum. 
The cabinet then drew up a despatch, couched in very strong 
terms, warning France to desist from her supposed intention of 
annexation. There was, however, some consciousness that this was 
a dangerous step to take. They wavered, and could not decide 
whether to send the despatch or not. At last it was sent to 
Paris, and Lord Lyons was told to use his own discretion as to 
/6 S 
whether he should present it or not. Such responsibility was not 
altogether to the taste of the douce ambassador, but, being told ' 
to use his discretion, he had no doubt as to his course. convin- 
ced of the conciliatory spirit of la Valette, and believing that 
lapoleon's annoyance would pass off, he suppressed the despatch, 
the presentation of which would have made Napoleon's position 
much more difficult, as his enemies in France Xould zrb-erree have 
accused him of getting the country into a scrape, and n meek- 
lY drawing back under fear of British threats. As it was, the 
Perot' was left alone, and made up his mind to withdraw. Niel 
and Fleuri were sent on a special mission to London with assur- 
afees of4- their government s peaceful intentions. Clarendon, how- "¿; 
ever) was still much depressed. "1 have never, as you know," he 
wrote to Lyons, "Felt any confidence in the soft sayings of the 
F h 
government, ut I did not think they would have exposed 




hoof so soon and so qbbRiprleteiy aa;Thr have dronesoNo 
given me so much pain since my return to this place, 
and I foresee that out of it will grow serious complications and 
an end to those friendly relations 'between England and France 
that sre so advantageous to both countries, and which have had 
an important influence on the politics of Europe... The policy 16 
of the French government is perfectly understood at Berlin,where 
the leading object of Bismarck is to deatch us from France. we 
might tomorrow, if we pleased, enter into a coalition with Prus- 
sia against France for the protection of Belgian independence 
which is a European and not an exclusively French question; but 
ì we will do nothing of the kind 'so long as there is hope that 
Prance will act with common honesty... I send you rather a cur- 
ious despatch from Loftus. Bismarck' s ways are inscrutable, and 
he is never.to he relied upon, but he has h).d a union with us " / 
against France in- his head ever since the Belgian business bega. 
Bernstorff, Clarendon went on to say, has several times prof er- 
ct 
red such an alliance. T treated this, as-did Gladstone, rather 
as.a...ruse to detach us from France...as i did not choose that 
) Bernstorff should have 
the suggestion, but it 
to report the slightest encouragement to 
Oir 
may come to that after a . n This letter 
seems to suggest that Bismarck, in spite of Sybel's statement* 
would willingly have made use of the incident if he could, and 
only the really peaceful intentions of France, and the backward -/c¡ 
ness_of Clarendon and Ìladstone to commit themselves to ?russia, 
prevented his success. we may see, all the same, that Clarendon 
d travelled far since he so fiercely repudiated the "man with. 
y310 19N . Lyons Noi. r Ty. 2.) / 
4,38- 
out faith and without law." Russell had spoken 
to him favourably 
concerning the German proposals. 
Bernstorff reports that Russell 
J 
id said to him: "I said. to Clarendon, 
too, that in case of "a war 
between France and Germany, 
we should not at th:eebeginning make 
too binding -a declaration of neutrality, for probably the 
moment 
sy 
would come, when we ourselves would have 
to join in the war." /6 
Bernstorff, however, was more of an enthusiast 
for the British , 
alliance than :Bismarck, iv.ho finally decided to 
tell Loftus that 
he would not enter any alliance 7,7ith Britain against France, 
without making his own conditions. _Perhaps he doubted if Britain 
would really go so far; perhaps he did not wish to commit him- 
self, until war had actually broken out, to a government which 
he despised and distrusted. 
In the meantime the difficulty was in a way to be quietly 
settled. Frére -Orban visited Paris, arid had been còaxed, threat- 
erred, entreated, to consent èdther to the sale of the railways, I 
b 
or to a customs -union; but he had refused both, only saying that 
Belgium was ready to grant compensation to the railwayf company. 
lsoreover, the idea of a customs -union was very unpopular in 
France itself. The government eventually decided to accept 
Frre- Orban's proposal of compensation, and the affair of the 
railways was settled by .an international commission. 
Throa6la,ct A,il th.isgotiations with Austria and Italy had 
lingered r on; but no clef inite arrangement could be concluded. The 
:::r 
could not bring himself to the break with the 
als which was necessary if hewere to accept Italy! s pro- i J 
Posais:: for Italy held firm to the evacuation of kome as a con- 
ition. Nor would Napoleon commit himself so far as to enter 
ol Kheindorf . p. 50. Etaympb . 
39 
into the offensive and defensive alliance agat nst Prussia that 
was now suggested by Austria. No treaties, therefore, could be 
concluded: but the Emperor exchanged private letters with Pktanz 
/Josef and Victor imesserevin, in which the three sovereigns gave 
;their adhesian-tc the pr inciple of joint action, of an unspecif- 
ied nature, against Prussia, to be taken at some undecided date 
in the future. There was nothing binding in these declarations 
- - -- nothing that committed ,nustria and Italy. France was left, 
without an ally in Europe, to face the crisis that now descended - 
upon her, with apparent suddenness, but in reality after long 
and careful preparation. 
}7 
1i,23Q 
"Seriously, I am nearly desperate. The utter contempt with 
which this government treats all international questions....and 
Jladstone' s absence of control and sagacity point to one result 
.the entire ruin of our national policy, and the loss of all 
(1) 
our European prestige." 
So wrote Malet to Metier in the spring of 1870. The two were 
preoccupi e,'$- with foreign nf-f said, were fully conscious of the 
tension of the situation in Germany, and could not sympathise 
with the absorbing interest which the Gladstone government had 
in home affairs. with \. the exceptions of. ce Det., 
Lord Clarendon, and Lord Granville, 
ill-Peeltiefts- ! that government was composed 
men whose interests lay almost entirely at home, and who were 
very ignorant of foreign affairs. Their minds were teeming with 
plans of reform - -- -not so much the social reforms that were 
urgently needed, as with new experiments, commercial, political, 
and religious. Their watchword was economy, and they relied on 
this to win them popularity, even if it meant a constant paring 
down of necessary expenditure, while they put their sbheaes into 
action. They had no time to study the international situation, 
and on the surface it was reassuring. _ to 
4k41- e- ,that.t'he barorneter- _ato -od- at-- RSet -X4 ir-), 
The excitement in France seemed to have settled down, ß&--it 
s 110'p44r- -that-- j eal usy- and f ear. of Germany would. gradually dis- 
\ &p The` Emperor liad introduced a new constitutional form of } 
"wYua.. r. 134. j 
y9. 
government, r----though it was feared that this rgight da.iage the 
jnsec -of Fr-e-e-Trade"- sys±'Fi, it was hoped, 
would give an additional security for peace. Every- 
one was weary of change - -- except those tiresome Italians, who 
were still brooding over the "folly of trying to ',lake Rome their 
capital." As long as Germany did not ,zove, everything would 
keep quiet ; and Germany, they were confident, would not move. 
as- not Bismarck continually crying, "Peace,Peace! "? He was well 
aware that any further step towards German unity would give 
offence to France, and would he not anxiously avoid a quarrel 
with his powerful neighbour? Colonel ',Talker, the British mili- 
tart' ¡ attache at Berlin, had reported that "The mutual indispos- 
ition of the North and South of Germany was becoming so manifest 
IMO 
that the unification of Germany was far distant," and Lord 
(3) 
Clarendon had the highest opinion of Talker's judgment. 
Clarendon's hopes were wont to "spring like daisies in the 
grass, cut down and up again as blithe as ever, " and the memory 
of the needle -gun had almost faded from his mind. He looked on 
the Prussian array as the King' s plaything, and believed that 
Prussia would be content with her rains, and seek to make no 
further advance for the present. -- -idea that Prussia might 
with Frane e - would have - appeared to- him and - 
colleagues 4s -áe4 Iot2ej 
In Paris, they were by no means so free 9f- alarm. The advent 
of the constitutional regime had brought into office the Liberal 
()llivier, and the able diplomat Daru; and the new cabinet had 
(t) d ord Russell to Clarendon, 18- k0 6?. Clarendon t. t',. - 
t370118 AIR p. 219 
o the t, r 
at once put a aa$op + sec_at negotiations with Aus tria and 
Italy, and to all negotiations not having a strictly pacific 
tendency. A rumour got about in January,187o, that Prussia was 
meditating the creation of a "North German Empire," and ClliviEl 
.5 0_1_ 
in much alarm, that another blow from Prussia to Prance would 
/í4,140(k///////// in the present state of opinion, mean war, 
arrut 
/sup;gested, as a means of lessening the tension, O s- 
disarmament on both sides. 
y 
.He ask,kd that Lord Clarendon would 
w- -y 
propose this at 3erlin, aws to avoid the 
danger of a rude repulse for France. Clarendon was ready to 
agree to this, for, he averred, if 3isTnarck heard that the pro- 
posal carne from France, he would think, "that we had cast in our 
lot completely with France," and "would straightway set about 
an intimate alliance with Russia, which would not be for the 
(4) 
interests of either England or France." 
No encouragement was given at Berlin. c - ' e ; >i d, 
àr. ,ed ---zìo n.t.ian...the- -atter- . óe_4k ar?cins) al would not 
even dare to narre the subject of your letter/ to the King, much 
(5) 
less show it to His Majesty," Loftus reported to Clarendon. 
Daru did not despair, i.nd replied that France would begin to 
disarm in any case, whatever Prussia might do. Clarendon heartii7 
approved this. "Nothing,'" said. he, "Is more likely to bring over 
1,1i) 
Clarendon and his colleagues did. not yet credit the Russo - russian bargain. Cf. :3enedetti, p.254. "Enclin de ne voir dans les aggrandissernents de la Prusse que de nouveaux gages peur le Maintien de la continentale, l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre poftue) s' est longtemps refusé á crGire ,que l'accord de la (sae eet de la Russieiltut être envisage avec inquietude." 
4'70. Lyons \il1 4 V. 
.- Z. 
. 
Germany than France partially disarming. without reference to 
Prussia." paru, whether he agree or not with this optimistic 
statement, diminished the rate of the yearly conscription in 
b 
France by one -tenth, and at the same .time urT d Clarendon t 
continue his efforts. Prussia, he pointed out, was .erecting for- 
013 
tifications on the.'Torth Sea, and she maintained a garrison in 
?[ayence for which there was no legal justification. These points 
might be brought forward. So Clarendon once more approached the 
Chancellor, whom he found in a more jovial mood. This time Bis- 
marc; k rlpted that he was afraid to di sarm, av erring that Denmark 
was making military movements which had a "sinister" signific- 
ance. Clarendon, who does not seem to have perceived any impert- 
inence in this reply, persisted, only to be told that Bismarck 
had laid the proposals before the King, and received " an absol- 
ute 'Not." 
"What if we recommended you to diminish your naval armament?" 
(7) (we 
3ismarck'thus countered the arguments of Loftus. The ambassador 
answered that Britain had aleady sold an ironclad to Prussia,and 
was Perfectly ready to sell as many more as Prussia could pay 
wn c(, 
torIA did not understand, the bonvulsions of laughter into 
which the C,hancellor fell. 
tS't"Ctitrot^ a..., 
4d9."11ra-s+aetn.&s-s on, a-,, V.3e ,, a wt-a-i . 




php0is yeC1r Britain spent £24, 250 000 on armaments, £14 000 000 
ana?he army 
-.nd £lo, 000, 000 The total naval and military ex- 
J1 The tPof Pk Grtivatexsn Confederation was £lo, Boo, 000. 
1fons' 
disarmament is found in 
-he numbers were in all reduced from loo, o o p toy( aijiyijiikil 
 
014 
condone the flippancy with which the disarmament proposals were 
received by Bismarck, by asserting t }tat they were essentially 
r 
frivolous and absurd. A mutual and proportionate disarmament, 
such as was proposed;' would, he says, have been useless, as it 
would have left France and Prussia in exactly the sane relative 
position as before. The argument may be taken for what it is 
v;oth. If France and Prussia had each reduced their armaments by 
W,their relative positions would have remained exactly the 
same: nevertheless there would have been considerably more 
ground for believing that neither of them intended to attack the 
other. 
This failure was discouraging, and the cause of peace soon 
received another blow. The Ñnperor wished to obtain then sanction 
of France for the new form of government by means of a plebis- 
.t t,s rxtizviiìs 
cite¡ Libera feared that he might use this expedient in 
n 
lure to undermine ministerial authority, and there was a split 
in the Cabinet on the question whether the authority of the 
Chambers was necessary for the measure. Daru and Buffet, two of 
the ablest and most a ministers, resigned; and Daru's 
Place Was taken by the Duc de Gramont, late ambassador at Vienna? 
Ulan of poor capacity and uncertain temper, who had long pre- 
dicted that a war with Prussia was inevitable. The effect of the 
change was soon seen. while Daru was still in office the' Arch- H. 
duke Albrecht of Austria had come to Paris and laid before Nap- 
oleon a plan of campaign for a joint attack on Prussia. He had 
obtained 
no success; but now an envoy was sent by Napoleon to 
11enna, to keep the possibility open. No arrangement was con - 
olu4ed,however, 
and no treaty signed. 
^;r 
N 
IL few years after this, Lady ` - 41 - was sitting beside 
Bismarck at a state dinner. The Chancellor opened the conver- 
sation by saying to her, "I was never so glad of anything in my 
life as when I heard of your father's death." Clarendon' s ,daugh- 
ter having betrayed by her expression the feelings which this 
ark aroused, he realised that his playfulness had approached 
1- manners, and hastily exclaimed t-hat she must not take it so;. 
re; 
il 
he had only meant that if Clarendon had lived he would have 
vented the Franco- German 1'ar. 
f 
Perhaps 73israarck's sole ob j et was to pay Lady 11 
Pr . 
a retty compliment; if so, the remark is only interesting for 
the future compiler of some Irork on "German society in the 19th 
Ce ntury." Possibly, however, he really meant to create an i`1- 
P 
th 
ession, that he believed Clarendon could have restrained 
e' French Government. This is in accordance with a certain 
te 
lview, voiced by Morier, that 3rita.in could have prevenß 
d the 
/ 
war by telling Nap olecn that if he declared war she 
he 
BO 
self would fight on the side of Germany. s 
No one would have regretted /f more than 
liltJaa7 eut.re 
emarok ,v and we cannot say that Clarendon might not have done 
though it seems next to impossible that he could have got 
the consent of the cabinet to klaalc4 such a tAtth4evt. He c di eid, 
wever, on the 27th of Jun e \s....indiime to sage k fror 
4 - ttrrger. jls successor aims Lord Granville. The Per- 
cent Under- Secrets.ry for Foreign Affairs was at this time r 
h 
11mnodd, ?'a person whose fate it has been to be remembered by 
aterlty solely ca,1.  , or his greatest . He told Lord 
r &nville, on July 6th, that never had he known "so great a lull 
in foreign affairs." Ten days later France declared war oh Ger- 
,;,any, and the crisis which led to the quarrel was already well 
advanced. \ ) 
it was a crisis that had been maturing for nearly two years. 
The same, which had ruined ?Tapoleon' s hopes of withdrawing 
his garrison from }tome, had sown the dragon' s teeth which in 
1870 sprang up as armed rien. 
Spanish affairs, since the days' of Louis Xlu, had always 
brought ill -luck to French governments who meddled with them. 
In the 19th century they caused the downfall of three dynasties. 
At first,Napoleon had been preoccupied with the ill turn 
the Spanish Revolution had done him wit:. h regard to Rome, .iThe 
stioutd 
question, tef whopinthe crown of Spain , had not 
yet caused much anxiety in France. 
ÇJust after the Revolution Lyons had written, "He (Moustier) 
t 
would not say to me that if he were squeezed like a sponge he 
might not confess that some modes of settling the Spanish sues- 
not 
tion would less agreeable than others to France; but he did 
Mt intend to volunteer any opinion -- -much less should he exer- 
cize 
any pressure. The natural desire of the Spaniards to be on 
cordial terms with so powerful a neighbour as France would no 
doubt weigh with then, in settling their form of government, and 
th (2.iß 
41$ feeling might be left to/Work its own way." 
It was possible that the revolution might end in the establ- 
Lyons t o st.Tti C4,17 le 68. F.O. France 17o9. 
Gw,ce 47, frourlAS 
115 ant of a republic; but4 f-°Noi 5ovar414,44 atiel deprecated 
such a conclusion, republics/being regarded with fear and dis - 
trust at_ this timè',British opinion held them to be unstable and 
(1/h 
unreliable, and continental dynasties feared that their own 
subjects might saw-Lai-6 their neighbours. There was a strong re- 
publican party in Spain, but the energetic Catalonian, Prim, who 
peas at the head of affairs, was a monarchist, and he was looking 
about for an eligible prince to found a new dynasty. 
It was a difficult task; the eligible princes did not wish 
to accept the uneasy crown of' Spain, and those who were ready 
to accept were ineligible for various reasons. 
The candidate preferred by the French government was the 
Prince of the Asturias" but he was still a child, and his return 
meant the restoration of the influence of Isabella, which Spain 
would not tolerate.The Carlists' \still numbered many adherents, 
but Don Carlos would never be accepted by the progressive and 
republican elements. The Duc de Montpensier, the ex- Queen's 
brother -in -law, was willing enough, but he as an Orleans prince 
was objectionable to Napoleon, and besides, he was personally 
disliked in Spain. This exhausted the- princes who had any per- . 
sonal connection with Spain, and it was difficult to find 
candidates abroad. 
An English prince would have been preferred, especially as:' I r\ 
some simple- minded schemers/ suggested that he might bring Gib- 
raltar as a Lieb espab ea but the British government had no mind 
Ir 
lti "It is difficult for our English mind, with the history of 
a8a cenfor the last 4o years before us, to regard republicanism 
11(117'I:hall a fleeting stage in European politics. II 'fiimes, 30Sane/VI' 
to let orle e Victoria's prinue1i gs set off on so expensive a 
wild- goose-c.naSe, and one that irlight Five offence to foreign 
powers. The King of Portugal would have been even more welcome, 
for this would have produced an "Iberia Union", but t'rE an o. 
hie heirs persistently refused. Beigkum hal no 'p inloe' to ipa. e7 
9nd though offers were ioade to ',Inadeo Of "avoy, younger son of 
Víctor Rmanue1L, and to 'r..is cousin,. Moriae Duke of Genoa, they 
Tere a for f also refused, t  the Itla,ian. Crown ?wince had no c_.i.La, a,rc 
enterprise was a dangerous one, with a risk of assassination. 
The situation was now becoming strained. The' longer it last- 
ed the more difficult became the positron of the provisional 
government, and the spectacle of the Spanish crown being hawked 
about Europe was becoming ridiculous. Prim was therefore very 
read: to ,Listen when one of hit; colleagues, Salar y M:azarredo1 
sug`ested Prince 1 ,eopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. 
As earl: -3,s 1366, this name had been suggested to Salazar 
Wer her :i, Prussian envoy to Spain, and Wertherz had reported.. . l iJ 
the conversation to itismarck, the King, and Prince Karl Anton. 
T'la fROilu Were then iiu_cñ in the public eye., having just estab- 
lished a son as Prince of Roumania, and Leopold him elf was 
married to a Portu,,uese princess. They had originally been : 
eldest branch of the Hohenzollerns, but had lately resigned 
their sovereign rights Mind the headship of the family to King, 
Willìi-ao. After Prince AinadPo refused, Salazar took up the idea 
Il) 
Lord) P. 16. 
seriously. in .;?arch 1869, }{ances YI, illanuevd, ambassador at 
Vienna, visited. Berlin, and. saw -Bismarck. Benedetti, whose sus- 
pici.ons were at once aroused, questioneu cQt.'- }?,ncés and Th1>:e-- 
,, . 
3iszns,rck had gone on holiday---a:zd -oot1., aenieci that the visit 
had any connection with the candidature of ?rince Leopold. =ien- 
?lettlfwae called to Paris for instructions, where. the .&mperor 
told him: "TFe candidature of the "Duo de Montpensier is r-ï?reltir 
&?lti-dynastic, it affects no one blzt me, and I can accept it; 
';,qe candidature of. tl ; ?:.ince of HoYl.e]^,Zollern is essentially 
enti- national the countrr will not endure it, and it must be 
12) 
prevented." 
Bismarck now sent Theddor Bernhard', Ilf o was high in his 
confidence, to Spain, and there followed an offer from Prim to 
Prince Karl Anton of the Crown. ofl Spain for his san Leopold. The q' 
offer was refused. "The Prince, King William, and 7.ismarck were 
of the same opinion about it, " says Syi)el. 
Benedetti, returning; to his post, approached Bismarck him - 
self, and was assured that the Chancellor regarUad the tenure of 
tige Spanish crown by a foreign prince as (ephemeral and dangerous 
if the CQrt s ruade the offer the King would certainly 
1p`t adviise the prince to acce0t. Benedetti, anxious to avoid the 
appeararice of picking unnecessary quarrels, merely said that the 
&Ipercrr would continue to observe complete circumspection regarri- 
, S pal?1, but had the" highest interest in its affairs ; but he 
reported that hA was not a.bso._utel.y satisfied by the Chanc;ellor6 
assurances-. 
" s liegt hier 'ein glanzendes Beispiel, " says q ,,Yoel, 
Tie ein argwohnischer meist aus einem tiiciits heraus 1To.rstelt- 
12) 
3QnQae+ tì, P. 307. 
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aria en giant ri r;? a.P t. "4 
The French government approved 3.enedet ti's moderate lane,.- 
uag e. They need net take further steps in 3erlin unless they had. 
proof that Spain really intended to make the offer. It puas natur_ 
al that they shou/(1 7;'18ií tO avoid raìsinr* unnecessary difficultie 
with Prussia, but it laic. them open to the acouSation, later, 
that ì:enedett i had not mentioned Napoleon's objections to Bis- 
marck. 
In July, 1869, a great Berlin banker wroté to Salazar to - 
urge the advantages off the Hohenzollern candleìature,. and asana 
second attempt on King Perdinanci and on the Duke of Genoa had. 
.o succe[a, Salazar in September applied to G"erthern for an in- 
troduction to Prince Karl Anton. Werthern, of course with 3ìs - 
marc.k's connivance, took him secretly to We inbu rr. , ^'per e he saw 
'Ooth the pleuie ee. They dies not refuse the offer, but they made. 
it a condition of acceptance that there should be ffio rival cand- 
idate, no danger of trouele from Portugal, and a unanimous in- 
4ition. Salazar was not discouraged ''J e pars demain matin 
Pour Paris assez satisfait de aon voyage. Pour á ter toute appal- 
eice de menace a le. Prusse nous tacherons de faire agrs er la 
candidature de l'EmnQreur. Mais reste a savoir si le roi Guill- ; 
aline l'accepter de son c`óte. Je sais que le Prince de Hohenzoll- 
ern craint beaucoup .son parent, il ne veux passer la place d'am- 
hitietr et il desire qu' Oft 111i force la main au lieu de iraontre'r 
l) 
3011 c16:r lu]- nerrle." 
- On returning to Spain, Sal j;zar advised Pria to try hard for 
13) "Here is a exar ale of how a s svicious mind aas es 3ub3+ ancp out of shadows." Sybel, VI, p. 179. 11) Salazar to Werthern, 20 Sept.. iBbS. Fester, I, p. 36. 
(,. 
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LeOPOld, reminding him that Napoleon was related ti)zr ?aarriage to 
the prince, and might therefore be g.Lau accept him. werthern 
was s'ordFr?d to keep "Bismarck _fully informed as to how tr_.t: affair - 
was going on. The sounding of France, horeve.r, gave no encour- 
aging result. On 17ei7kg told that Leopold was a possible candidci.t@ 
lerci?r, the French ambassador, replied that he was convinced 
t_,at Public opinion in France would not accept a Prussian cand- 
idate, and, apparently discouraged by this, the Spanish rrojrern- 
ment decided to keep the negotiation entirely secret. 
In February 1870, Salazar i:ici.uceci Prim to write a personal 
letter to Leopold, and he himself again interviewed Karl Anton. 
This time the offer ':as laid before the King, and 3Iss2arck wrote 
a report strongly in f?vour of acceptance. The two princes 1came 
to Seri in, and the'r di- sense ed th z of f(kr with the King, at a 
dinner at whiff were present also Bismarck; the Grown Prince; 
fi lhile, the under-secretary for foreign affairs; Delbruek, the 
director of the Ministry of Commerce; Moitke, the chief of the 
genera? staff ; and Roon, the Minister of War. The councillors 
unanimously decl Led for acceptance, as a "patriotic duty to 
15), France 
Prussia." According to Delb.etuck, nc, one raentioned A et Tt e, cöui cil 
' )'it at table lloltke was asked, "Are we ready if France takes it 
iii ?" and replied with,&'silent nod. °? 
>Vihe hzn, sn' ,`rpr, C(Ulii :!lot br ZPrsU£acled ti look favoul`a')y howeve
on the proposal, and after long hesitation Leopold decided that- 
15) na. 
to 
KallnofnkOWlanta,12t) ]`arch 11870.pFester, rI, 1p. Karl Anton 
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could not accept un]e ss the King commanded hire to do so. The 
King would give no command -- -only if Leopold found himself call- 
ed by Pa voice within',' he would agree to the acceptance. 
Bismarck was :Huck disappointed. He encouraged Salazar to 
turn his attention to Prince Frederick, the \younger son, bit, the 
sane answer was given. Neither he nor Karl Anton, however, had 
16) 
yet given up hope, and he sent Major Versen on a special mission 
toVSpain. Since February Bismarck had kept up a secret corres- 
pondence with Salazar. But Leopold still proved obdurate, and or 
May- 4 Thile "with deep regret" telegraphed a final refusal. Prim 
was at his wits' end, and applied to Napoleon to make a personal 
appeal to Ferdinand of Portugal to accept the crown. Napoleon 
did so, but without success. 
Bismarck was ill. "iverything now depends," wrote Versen or 
17) 
1(ay 14, "nn the speedy recovery of Count Bismarck." A few days 
later Versen returned from Spain, interviewed Karl Anton, and at 
last persuaded Leopold to reconsider his decision, going at once 
to Bismarck with his news. Bismarck wrote to Karl Anton, urging 
18) 
acceptance "in the' interest of Germany," and then sent a letter 
to Prim informing him that if he were of the same mind he might 
try again. Lothar Bucher, Bismarck's friend, went to Spain to 
ensure the success of this step. He returned with Salazar, and 
both repaired to Sigmaringen, where they at last obtained com- 
plete success. Leopold would accept, if the King would telegraph 1 
agreed." The message came, and Salazar telegraphed acceptance 
A 
to Prim. 
Bismarck himself, and a school of 'German historians of whom 
SYoel is the chief, hä re endeavoúre&'to show that the Hohenzoll- 
10) arl of Roumania to K.Anton 1 April 1870. Fester I, p. 69. 1 Pester 1, p. 81. 18)' "Im interesse Deutschlands." Ib 
Candidature, was` regarded in 3exlin simply as "a family 
4 
affair" concerning the Hohenzollern-- Sigmaringens only; 'and th.,s 
K 
up :no the` attitude ° take i h r the Prussian government at the 'time) 
for the;, denied having i,ny off icial knowledge of or interest.in 
(14?) 
the affair. Ac6ording to wthi s v ievi, -King william consulted 3i s- 
marck as "his most trustworthy adviser',' and fór the same reason 
summoned his foreign minister, under -secretary for foreign 
affairs-, director of commerce, minister of war, and chief of 
staff, to diseuas the .private affairs of his 'young cousin.', 
This view will not bear inspection. The. accession of a prince 
.of-a royal house'to the throne of a Uropean power was not, and 
,-could not he a purely family matter. The European powers had' 
',always claimed the right to interfere, if they considered their 
'interests involved, ,ire such questions. Within forty years this 
rtg}at had beep exercised by various powers in the cases Df 
(2(D) 
iurr, p,ehmak, and (:Treecg, and during the lest two hundred . years 
the question of who sheuld "occupy the tfir °one of Spain had caused 
two. Tsuropean wars and á revolution. Had it he en proposed to 
Place Prince Napoleon on the throne of Austria, would Prussia . 
have been content that Napoléon should weigh the question simply 
.as .a family matter? 
povsib1y the Hohenzoflerns at. first applied for the 'ding's 
,,adviCe simply because he Kwas head'of the house= -- though it must 
').° reaPfbered that william was head of the house only because he 
was Kind of Prussia. Rut the Kinn could not so' dissever his offi-- 
çial from his'oers- on'a,l existence as to decide a question with 
ó73.'The negotiations were officially hrbux ht to the knowledge 
"he King of Prussia under the express condition of secrecy. As.th 
°'' did not concern either Prussia or the N. German Confeder- ation,thp Kin 
' 
_ g',accepted this condition, and in consequence he did nó speak of the affai.r to Ii-i's Gov ern:i , äs it was ,t. r,, r 
aim merely ely a'amily affair.." Bismarck' s Circular of 13.!.7oß C 'd r _ 
state o not include koluriariia, as it was not then a sovereign 
See above -o. pp, 1kitq -4A"n 
a . 
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far- reaching political results simply as a private individual. 
If the matter were private, why did not the King consult his 
personal friends and relations; instead of the ?North Ge -rnan 
Chancellor and the Prussian Minister of war? 
It is possible, however, to show that all thö9e concerned, 
including the Hohenzollerns themselves, discussed the proposal 
from a. political point of view. In 1868, Karl of Roumania wrote 
to his father: "Ich rnóchte einen Orleans oder Philip von Koburg 
den Spanishhen Thron besteigen sehen; nur night, einen .von ' \Tapo- 
leon gehackten Regenten!" When Karl Anton made his first applic- 
ation to the King, in February 1870, he wrote: "Vertragen die 
Interessen der Preussischen Macht eine i ó'sung der Frage im Sinne 
des Annahme, so wollen es Jure Majestät, mir zu erkennen geben 
lassen - -- vertragen sie es nicht, so ist unsere Entscheidigung 
schon getroff en -- -sie lautet auf Ablehnung." On the sarge day he 
wrote to 3isr. rck: na der gegenstand meiner heutigen Mitteilung 
aber nicht unsere Privatsache allein ist, und da hohere Staats- 
interessen moglicherweise meiner unmassgeblichen Auffassung nach 
entgegenstehenn,, so muss ich an die .tntscheidung S.M. des Konigs 
22) 
appellieren." Having related his dealings with Salazar, he went 
on to say: "The acceptance of the crown, on the one hand, is a 
historic incident, on the other, the token of an extraordinary 
increase in the strength of the Prlis si an power. A dynasty, whit 
represents the weightiest force (Schwergewicht) of ë:eritra1 
22} 1."I would rather see an Rrl Bans or Philip von Koburg mount 
the Spanish throne; only not a Regent backed by ?\Tapoleon! " 2. "If 
the interests of the Prussian power require a solution of the 
question in the sense of acceptance, Y.M. will let me understand 
ft` "iß they do not require it, our decision is already taken-- - incline to a refusal." 3. "As the subject of my today s corm- ünication is not a private, affair of cur own, and as, in my huinble 
ópinion,hgh interests of state ossiby hinge upon it so I must 
ap1)eal to' the decision of H.M. the King' Fester,I,pp.56 -7 -8.( "Lo` 
Europe, and branches of which blossom upon the Slack Sea 
and across the Pyrenees, the one ruling over a nascent civil- 
isation, the other over one that has be-e i -- -such a dynasty history has not seen 
since Charles V---with such a dynasty, therefore, there rests b 
the will of Providence a high mission, and as' summons to rule 
over the most heterogeneous elements." 
ismarck, in his Februarr report to the King, treated the 
question entirely from a. political point of view. At the council 
then held, everyone present discussed it only as án affair of 
high policy, with the sole exception of the Crown Prince, who 
spoke of the private and personal interest of his cousin Leopold, 
It.as already been said that the unanimous decision was for 
acceptance "as a patriotic duty to Prussia." 
The subsequent correspondence of Bismarck and Salazar, and 
htí4i10rti 
the akiredesit of Bucher and Versen, were scarcely undertaken 
for a private and family affair of the prince, and certainly not 
in his personal interta , for at the time when Bismarck was thus 
pressing on the candidature, the Prussian ambassador at Madrid 
was telegraphing urgent warnings against the dangers of accept- 
ance. 
"Bismarck wants acceptance," wrote Karl Anton to his son in 
Romania, "On dynastic and political orounds,but the King only if 
Leopold wishes to answer the call." 
Equally remote from fact is the argument put foward by 3is- 
marck, and by subsequent historians, that the Chancellor be- 
lieved. that France would not object to the choice. 73ismarck 
writes; "I had thought Prince Leopold would be no unwelcome 




pi 5g, -ara. 
?Se faites pas' l' emprunt, 
espagnol et non pas étranger. 
1a,ggurre civile tôt ou tard 1,70 IY.aALhv 18.x.70. Fester .. 
en Espagne il faut de l'argent "... "Eng cas que l'emprunt se fasse, 
est inévitable." Canitz to Bismarck 
I, PPp64 -5. 
liadrid via Paris, in order to get into touch with the Imperial --210) 
French policy." The Hohenzollerns themselves did not believe this, 
"Moreover France, on account of our connection with Prussia, can 
never permit the establishment of the Hohenzollerns on the other 
side of the Pyrenees. She is already swollen with j ealousy, that 
one of the Hohenzollerns rules the lower Danube," Prince Karl 
(27) 
Anton hp.d written to his s7 n in Roumania; and at first they had 
refùsed partly on the grounds that France would object, though 
later Bismarck had persuaded them to withdraw this objection. 
Bismarck's assertion that he believed that the accession would 
automatically transform Leopold into a Spaniard was emphatically 
denied by the Prince himself, and is contradicted by 73ismarck's 
own report to the King. 
"with regard to France," he wrote, "It vrmíllce useful to have 
a country on that side of France, on whose sympathies we can 
cou-nt, and with whose feeling France will find it necessary to 
reckon. If in a war between Germany and France, affairs in Spain 
stood as under Isabella the Catholic, and if on the other handa 
government, in sympathy with Germany existed there, the differene 
between these two situations for us may be reckoned at two army 
Corps. In the one case French troops would be ;nade available 
through the goodwill of Spain, in the other case it would be nec- 
43,) 
essarY to leave an army corps on the frontier." 
NNW)491 
T / %5641-TPYY4 04640 ß/-T7'/ 64s V')'/ #01461 ITd "7_7FT(k IS-n cNLÿdy Ul 
,' - II (2 . )Fester Ifp.9. 
= - arl of Roumania's letter, Correspondence of "'illiam and R ssnarck Vold , p#134. be- 
lieve 
"I 
that as Prince of Roumania, I have not disowned the 
qualities 
, 
a German prince." 
Pest sr I) p, 59ff. .
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If the plot cane to a successful issue, Bismarck must make 
a profit one way or the other. If France opposed the election in 
arms, he would have his v;ar, and it would be a war declared by 
Franc e, and fought by Germany (as he remarks in his memoirs) in 
defence of the liberty of Spain and her right to chose her oZ'.'nt 
sovereign. If, on the other hand, France decided not to take the 
risk, but to accept. another diplomatic def ea,t, he *iould still 
have won a great victory. He would once ìiore have humiliated 
Napoleon, have st'ic k another feather in the Hohenzollern' s cap, 
and, a;o ov e all, would have planted a n evwr enemy on the f l ânk tif 
raice- -_a power`yrhich in peace would support the policy of 
Pri esia, and in war would be, her secret or open ally. 
Froq his point (ïf view, the success o.f the game depended 
on its being presented to France as a fait accompli. VTere the 
candidature to become known before the ellecti on were C oïl sL?rllat et 
there was always a chance of something going wrong, . ní1 c2f` 
Prance securing; an bktirenth hoax' ..vigtory. If once the deed were 
done, and France went to war, she would have to fight both 
Prassia 
. land Spain. He was therefore anxious that the CortAs 
should proceed to the elections imi iedia,t ely. A curious accident 
interfered. Salazar telegraphed home that he would be in Madrid_ 
r 9th with Leopold's acceptance. In transmitting or de- 
ciphering the despatch, "July. 9" was changed t o "July 26 ". The 
tor0,8 were already grumbling, and it was impossible to keep 
theca waiting longer for their summer holiday. Prize adjourned 
the Ei,ss enio ly till J:Tov emb e r. 
In the meantime rumours reached "Paris, and Napoleon wrote 
458. 
to Gramont that Berlin and Madrid must be +7_n if t'pis 
true, that France would be greatly displeased. ?'Mercier, however, J 
reported that there was no real danger; Prim had rec siv ed over- 
ture.* from Prussia, ïfut would not risk offending France.. On the 
3 of Juïr Mercier c_ianged .pis tune: Prim had announcedt la.t the 
Hohenzollern candidature S "P,S practically decided. Two dare be- 
fore, Prim, retury11,-1c- fcmonn a hunting party, -].ad met two acquaint,- 
a.nces,who congratukated him an having found a candidate. Salaser 
had been blabbing. The minister stood stupefied, then exclaimed, 
"Lost trouble, lost candidature, and God grant" that Play be all!" ti-G. 
He, approcahed Mercier, wio was frightfully agitated. Mercier 
declared France would have no security for her frontier in case 
of a ro;pea 1 war, and could never accept rß. _ ian king of 
Spain. Prim replied despairingly: if everyone else refused, they 
:aiEht be reduced to Montpensier. Then, at a word oaf Neráder's, ha 
cried, "Comment! vous croyez que 11filnpFr7atzr aimerait mieux Mont- 
pensier (04114/1 Hohnez(?llern?" "Il ne me l' a pas dit, " said 
Lercier, "Mais je of en doute pas. Llikapereur est Franca.is avant 
30) 
tout. e 
Tile peculiarity of the fact that a mistake should have been 
in (e phar ing the most critical passage of _ s;,daci en t so ti imp- 
ortant has suggested that the mistake W'c08 either invented, or 
_ücida, uSe of, ti),J Prim.. He was hitherto, it is said, hardly aware, 
±1á,± the incident was likely 0 lead to war, w,tolif.**neadeaseq and was 
now awakened to the danger 1%µr a letter from Bismarck, in which 
t,+ 
h?'° statesman showed so much eagerness for haste, and at the 
Barge time so much anxiety to avoid compromising himself, that 
-__ 
3(')det ti, p. 420. 
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Prim began to suspect that he was actuall,T hopin i- ping
with France. Prim therefore adjourned the Cortrs, in order to 
?ive -anoleonvti*ne to collect himself. It is certainly true that 
in JUne Prim had become very anxious for an interview with Nap- 
Mwie 
oleon, and was arranging to Akiase.ut hiIy at Vichy, where, he told Q
Atercier, he would tell rJapoleon all that had passed collcerninF 
the Prince of Hohenzollern. We have also SalazaTM' s letter, 
quoted 
31). 
e - - above, where he states that Spain 
-te,-;,41greff,-,414ww tIfiltVe- 
e,Tr-eer la candidature de l'k2pereur." 
a_ _ tri 
would try to "faire 
Professor Lord, _riotrTever, who had access to the newest mat- 
erials, concludes that the mistake was Tenui ne, and that Prim 
all intended to sprinn the election on Napoleon without 
32 
vTarning. It is obvious, however, that'# Prim, who was perfectly 4-41 
sane, could never have contemplated the possibility of allowing 
distre.cted Spain to be dragged into a war with France. He must 
have been so absorbed in internal affairs that he failed to re- 
alise how acute wcaLß the tension between France and. Prussia, and 
must have believed that Napoleon would rather acquiesce in a 
fait accompli, especially if he received personal friendly 
assurances from Prim, than make an undignified fuss over the 
matter. If this were, so, we may take it that his surprise in the 
interview 1vith Mercier was genuine, and also by the --fact that 
when he saw the crisis develope next week, he accedää to the 
requests of France, and begged the Hohenzolle_rns to withdraw. 
31) See above, p. . 
32) 
Lord, p. 23 ff 
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- In a1^,y case, the. cat wa§s out of th- bag now. 
In :Berlin, the absence and inaccessibility of all the 
principal parties is so striking as to sugmeSt a careful pre- 
paration. The French Charge d'Affaires, who hurried to rerron- 
strate, f^11n11 clay Ttilile at the Foreign Office, Bismarck was 
gathering wild strawberries at Varzin, thc? King taking the waters 
at Ems, Prince Leopold had. gone for a walking tour in the Alps 
without leaving an address. lhile sai(A Te Prussian governren t 
was ignorant of the whole- affair, which for t; did. not exist, 
and he simply denied that his interview with Benedetti in March 
1869 had ever taker. placo. (Afterwards he said he had '11*-$14 
"forgotten": about it. But Gramont was determined not to be 
put off by excuses, and he sent 3enPdett i straight to the 
V+exkest point of 3isr.:a..rck' s defences----to the King at Rm.s. 
Gramont., nervous, exc ip'11Ct?'a'2` , and ?T iriciictlZi e, V7ciß7. 
in a state of vzolUnt; agitation. He was convinced that Bismarck 
meant to force a war onX France, and he saw that the danger was 
great. France had no allies. The government was tattering~ tinder 
a,series of reverses at Time and abroad. Now carp a threat. to 
plant d Prussian prince upon tie throne of what had hitherto 
seemed the most negligible of neighbours. 
All this, which should have made him the more cool and 
cautious, rendered Gramont frantic. He did not see tha t, if 
Bismarck had arranged the Irhole affair to provoke France into 
?+ar) he could best counter Prussia's schemes by refusing to pick 
d1la.rrµ1. His iangua, #e was wild and blustering. He irritated. 
f0reign\lopinion, which was, on the whoie,favoura'le to - 'rance, 
reckless speech in the Chambers, in which he talked of 
461 
refusing to allow a Prussian prince to "mount the throne of 
33) 
Charles V, " and in making enedetti approach the King persona-11y - ¿J 1 1 
Ile took a daring step which, ho17,rever happy it might have b gen 
in the hands of a :Tore skilful diplomatist, Gramont hirnGeLf woe - 
fully rsismanaf ed. 
At the same time he left no beans untried to avoid war by 
getting the candidature Withdrawn. Austria, Italy, Russia, and 
Britain were all entreated to remonstrate. with prsssiai Napoleon 
fid, W44460 40( / /# ##P ndit as ed the Bing of the. 
to make a personal appeal of Leopo:ldj Prim was coaxed and cam-- 
anded until in the end he consented to send en7r7S to the Prince 
to beg him to withdraw; and pressure was put o,n the Hohenzcll- 
ern.s through Roumania, by threats that the French party there 
?oula organise a revolt if the candidature were persisted in. 
At the first. raoment, 011ivier and Gramont had persuaded the 
Prussian minister, Werther, to their views (he was not in Bis- 
rarackts secrets) and he had gone on leave to hyls, pledged to 
conyev to the King their hopes that he would refuse to sanction 
the candidature. 
Bismarck was in a state of acute suspens e as to what his 
roval master might do, free from his sheltering care, and sent. 
repeated exhortations to Aheken, hia confidant, who was with the 
33) Thin conroar'stn had already been ruade ber Prince Karl Anton, 
see above, pp. The assertion that Grarlont's speech caused 
,bind excused the stiff Pnd unyielding attitude of Prussia has 
peen disprov -d by Lard Inho publishes a despatch of 33isra rck, 
gated July 5, the day before the ppeech was made, in which the 
Chancellor dwtlinep s plan of campaign, and emphasises the 
epcessitzr of keeping the King from any nprolnis e OA concession, 
and Of maintaining a "f ii n and fearless " attitude. " This 1'Tas 
Afore France had taken any steps that could be, by any exagg- 
eration, called violent or irritating. See Lord, No. 16, p. 131. 
. 
King. Had he been ale to foresee the future, he need not have 
been anxious. It is true th.,t the King was acting in a way that", 
would have a +sari eted- .:3ss.-x:i ist.er, but. at the sane time it 
ould have been difficult to find a:. : means more likely to irri- 
tate and terrify -the French government than those w hich the 
benevolent old gent:Lelnan adopted. The :r could not credit. the 
statement of the ?rues ian'Foreign Off ice, that i t w totally' &1' 
ignorant of the matter, and yet they could not prove it w 
They could not accept the kin-eAs assertion that he had 
had no concern with the affair except as a private individual. 
They found it di' f icult to believe that the hero of the event., 
Leopold, had vanished into the Alps, and that his own father trawl 
unable to corunicate with him. In 18661 Leopold' s brother had 
been forbidden by the King to cept the throne c.f Roumania, lend 
then, with the secret connivance of the government, had gone 
disguised to Roumania and appeared temp° a4çPrince, and all the 
king's horses and all the kings men had `'ailed to dislodge hirt 
from his position. There was nothing to prevent Leopold from 
making, a, similar dath for Spain, leaving prussian king and 
government to disclaim all know.zvlkdge of his doings as blandly 
34) 
as ever. 
The King, moved by Werther's report, sent a letter to his 
cousins, asking 'what, in the circuristances, the 2.7. proposed to do 
"` a step which he carefully concealed from the Chancellor. But 
at the same time he còntinued to maintain that he had no conn- 
ection with the affair as King`!of Prussia, and when aenedetti 
cired to hint that the French public might not uncierstand this 
rigid distinction between his official and unofficial self, he 
34) 1,-,,óns_to Cr:*_'a?^.tti1.Le_, ry July 1870', Bluebocik.. Na LlÄ ónF'éosto<% p ont, 
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took the remark as, a doubt cast an his veracity, and haughtily, 
said they would have to believe it if he told tea so.. He absol- 
utely refused either to command or to advise Leopold to w?thdra75 
though he promised to cornunic at e the demands of France to his 
cousins, and to give his consent to whatever steps they pro - 
posed to take. On t1-..e afternoon of the 10th he despatched a 
special messenger to Sigmaringen to see kart Anton, but this 60i 
step was kept secret, and r rrt,irne the situation grew mare danger- 
ous. Karl Anton did not answer the King's letter; Leopold was 
still not to be found; Gramont wrote to 3enedetti that if the 
7irg of Prussia would not give a definite answer soon public 
opinion would become too much excited to be .held in check; and 
Bismarck was organising a newspaper campaign against France. 
werther's indiscreet conduct had been exceedingly annoying 
to the Chancellor, and he was even more perturbed r !.en, on she 
loth, the King asked whether he should sendAa ibassador back to 
Paris with a friendly personal note for Napoleon, orwhether 
it would be advisable to apply for mediation under the Paris 
Protocol of 1856? :bisinarck of course put an instant stop to both 
hNov these projects; but he seems, before this, toArealised that. there 
was a growing danger of the prince's withdrawal, and to have be- 
aP to prepare an alternative scheme. On the 9 he instructed Ile 
6 
crarge d'affaires at Paris to tako the first opportunity to 
infOrra Gramont that., far from giving explanations, Emussia would 
35) be 
'Lore likely to demand them, and, under his careful fostering -, 
:le warliketand anti - French feeling in the press grew steadily 
in intensity. He telegraphed to .ins urgent warnings t..hat . Nno. d 
35) lord, No. 63, p. ibl. Also Na. 71, p. 165. 
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claratio?46 of the Prince addressed to France or Spain should be. 
36) 
transmitted through the King or through the royal_ hass i es, " 
and on the evening of the 10th he offered to repair to .erns in 
person, and the King assented. 
StrYt, Karl of Roumania.'s ligent. in Pe.ris, now arrived i:. 
Si taringen, bearing the French threats of revolution in Buchar- 
est, and at the same t i(sl ì cain.c King William's messenger. Karl 
Anton was very unwilling to giú7e..i1']:T but the two _hveys, and e - 
r 
pecia lly 1the new danger to his son, had their effect., and of ter 
ene mere night of indecision, drúing which the tension grew, he 
rna.11% decided Ito wi t. raw the candidature in Ltcp old' s name. 
This news reached King vrillia.rn on 1 e morning of the 12, but he 
ob curved 3israarck's instructions, and on meeti n? Ben- 
edetti in the afternoon only told him that he had learned Leo- 
pold's answer would arrive 
37 
1i1rti,t.o(Abe td i -- - the newspapers the fol.-tarring mornings 
tefars .,m%kin :.any . rOff Cemee -tQrr't. i thClnir.x..gs riv#d_ im 
the early afternoon, vela a t.b{7:, 044.44 
.-, Oil iv i er -1-us).'.ed to the Chambers t.* ;ring, "Peace! We 
have succeeded!" and passed the telegram round a group of depu- 
ties, While the funds rose from 70 to 72. It. was a French 
victory; but Gramont at once proceeded to ruin everything. 
He fully understood Bismarck's views, and had been sure 
from the beginning that he was using the incident to provoke a 
tsar. He. had for some (tars believed that he was bein : made a fool 
of, and now, when this unexpécted success crowned his ung .in13" 
he was like F man who had flung all his weight against 
3ô: Lord, No. 84, p . 1741 
37) King willian to Queen Augusta, 12 July, 18'70. Fester II, 
IL 92. See also the sane., 13 July 187O,Fester II, p. 118. 
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,a locked door, and finds it not even latched: he lost his 
balance. He was sure there .,.a:: some trick. After all, the cir- 
our.ut..x:.. w- = v re- ii.eÁ.icl.cus. Leopold was 35 years old, able 
to act by himself, but the withdrawal was n dTr b:' s father; 
!hat if he repudiated it? Then, the effort to brim: t e guile 
hone to the Prussian government had railed- ---th3 King maintained 
his position of having nothing to do with the affair. Suppose 
Leopold were airead'r On his way to Spain, "unknown" to Prussia? 
1. With 011ivier I s eons° t, Gramont 
saw Werther, ande i ncluc ed hin. n. t o conv;ey to the K " i Fîe views of 
the French government. They would be completely satisfied if the 
King would write to Napoleon, expressing hie friendly fegäidgs 
towards France, and is c;onsent to the prince's withdrawal. This 
was couched in the f orra of a suggestion, not a aemand. Later on 
the same day, Graraont and 'Tapoleon, ,. "rt +^ 011ivier, sent 
ine :rretions to Benedetti to demand that the King should assoc- 
iate. himself with Leopo'd s withdrawal,, and give P guarante 
that ither candidature would net "hó _ere7.,v ed. 
Bismarck had been met by the r e,, -s af. the withdrawal w.ie , he 
arrived in Berlin envllís way to Ems, and the dis^ ..7r1ntment. had 
bee?1 p0inTrt-. T?^i°. f1e'_ :ns-' 11 erns 1h.n Kirr had ÌJ vt__ 
'1121 According himself he meditated reslgna,t icsnr but he sccn 
'' c ave re i himself and cast arni,.t for some 7ae ans of repairing-. the 
'MC 
.. H E T +.'r e K? nc~ instead of hims elf, and 
°Etr'l'stly urged that no further communication of any sort should 
oe made to Benedetti, and published ari announc e2.ient th$t the 
iithdra,wa.1 was due to 3rit is h influence exerted upon Tdoleer.- 
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zóllerns. He ä1 $o interviewed Gortrc'_a': ov, 7-ho ",aá in Berlin, 
and -probable concluded his bargain with - Russia. Ezlenourg was 
t f P f instructed to iprep the King s mind .'ar a .counter -ol _ e.sive 
against Prance, and the newspaper campaign continued. 
Gra'nont's injudicious step gave him the opportunity he 
needed. Benedetti had received his instructions during the night, 
anrZ in the Morning coIwiunicated the demand fo r a future guayan- 
tee, in a conversation, initiated b," the King. William refused 
ft. as out of the question, but promised the n'o actor an inter- 
view afternoon. The arrival of Eulenburr. ''Titfi Bisi'ierck's 
ilstructions inciuc.ed the King to rescind his promise, and send 
an adjutant to annieunce that he '-4.1. received Karl Anton's: letter 
- 
' f about +re withdrawal. At was at this moment as Professo4rrd ` , 
has proved, that Abek?n sent off a telegram to Bismarck, inforra- 
ing him tai all that had occurred. Abekan's account was so worded 
as to imply that 3ene.dett i hz.(. forced hens elf upon the ki ng, 1 no 
as was the truth, that the King had begun the conversation, ) and 
tat message was much -.. more rude:' worded than was /I/ 
38) 
really the case. 
3enedetti replied that he had received new instructions, 
')nd pressed far the promised lntervieVT, and the' King, still 
au.,llorised him to telegraph to Paris that he approved 
tre renunciation, but would i 'i lì?'°. 
a?lede +tì s +ill besoucht. 7terview, but in the meantime 
4' tlier's despatch arrived, ?1i1. P( T 
to the Kira ^,? ,." insolent demand for a personal 
38) The King used the express icon 
now finished." Ab.eken alt ered 
,further to say to him. " The refu 
"el promised to a foreign aìîoas step to take. 
i;h?t "regarded t,,'r,.P, affair 
it to "the King has nothing 
sal of an intervivh rt1ich had 
sador was in itself a serious 
ap010'. 
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King was de-eply moved, a 1Ci sent an absolute refusal 
±^ ' C._ 'i i -l-Po raing him that if he wished further' discuss- 
ions he roust approach Bismarck, 
The Chancellor received A'cie ne a of-the ;near 'PreRaáb . .ands 
in the: after- of°erE,d bK 
noon, ar.A :rasped at once the possibilittes %x óz t .1. 7 
His fir's` step was to interview Augustus Loftus, tb whorl he 
blustered and stormed, saying that France had insulted Pros ?a, 
tiud would have to make °ßu11 a3ueiids : she must snake an off is i al 
-, 
°- 
declal'atio.i to the powers of Europe ti--4L t s withdrawal 
waa suf'ficierit, and that she asked no thing further. If France - 
zp 
wcvid not do this, Pr+assia must have sat isf'action from her. This 
would give a new pretext for forcing a war if- France shoWed 
signs of a peaceable retreat, but it was dangerous, fr the 
one hand it might expose Prussia to the accusation of seeking. 
for wear, and Ti the other its gucees depended on the King's 
resolute repulse of the new der,B. nds. He telegraphed the _King, 
therefore, that he intended to address a summons to France, and `1 S . 
begged him to return at once. In the first version he used the 
40) 
word "u /timatum" instead of summons': 
Mol,ke and kcon were with him, waiting in susper;e, when 
Abeken's telegrau arrived, gt' i.ig that gentleman' s version of 
the 'King's dealings with 5enedetti, and accompanied by the 
King's peraission to Benedetti to publish it if he liked. The 
Chancellor saw his chance to clinch the matter. He prepared a 
condensed version of the despatch, so skilfully that scarcely. 
'vord was a.lterd, and yet the impression was conveyed that, the 
King 'lad dismissed the4French ambassador with a sharp refusal -`l. - 
amounting to a public rebuke, while the fact that the negotiat 
J3) Mgenugthuung von Frankreich fordern." S¡î l, III, };. 239 -10. 
40) Lord, No. 18i, p . 228. 
ions were not, ended, but might be renewed through ministerial 
charrriels, wa.s suppr s s ea. 
nj read it"( the. King's message)"out to my _guests,whose: dejection 
V 
was so great that they turned away from food and drink... I put 
a few questions to Moltke as to the extent, of his confidence in 
the state of our preparations...He answered that if there was to 
be war he expected no advantage to us by deferring its outbreak. 
He regardedva rapid outbreak as, on the whole,more favourable to u6 
than delay...." He ldhen relates how the despatch was condensed. 
The difference in the effect of the abbreviated text of the Ems 
telegram as compared with that produced by the original was not 
the result of stronger words but of the form, which made the 
announcement appear decisive, while Abeken's version would only 
have been regarded as a fragment of a negotiation still pending, 
and to be continued at Berlin. After I had read out the coneen- 
c 
trated edition to my two gueltte, Moltke remarked`m -Before it was 
ti -ttr -retreat ; no it is a challenge.lr..This explanation 
brought about in the two generals a revulsion to àVmore joyous 
good, the liveliness of which surprised me. They had suddenly 
recovered their pleasure in eating and drinking and spoke in a 
mare cheerful vein. Roon said: "Our God of old lives still and 
will not let us perish in disgrace. " Moltke so far relinquished 
his passive equanimity that, glancing up joyously towards the 
ceiling and abandoning his usual punctiliousness of speech, he 
smote his hand upon his sbreast and said: "If I may but live to 
lead our armies in such a ,war, then the dev.7s may come directly 
ter' and fetch away the old carcase. "' 
itcLae_pulalitcatd tae.e th a :- 
1**1$13°4,1 a ion- ,-waa. printed ai -trhe -- French-. _German 
" Vorhin klang es w - ch - ade, jetzt wie fj,l,nf are." lsolveknotwer- 
I, 2 2. 
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The telegram was publie Ci that night in all the reman 
rapers; c1Y1Cl copies of it were sent immediately to the rQ.ÉZÌ7GLsS` 
adors of Prussia at foréign courts, with instructions that it. 
Was to be communicated at once to the respective governments. 
In the cases of Britain and kuRsia, a personal appeal was added, 
emphasising the fact that Benedetti had insulted the Kiazg. A 
grandp( outburst of patriotic indignation was the result. through- 
out Gerruanl. On t'îe morning of the 14th, the King read the 
telegram in the paper, and reiaarked, "That is war." 
469. 
In Faris , in spite of Gramont s extravagance, the tide was 
Betting towards peace. The pa:cif is elements, really'.the stronger 
though momentarily swamped, were regaining their ascendancy- in 
the government: in the Chambers Thiers was denouncing an iniq- 
uitous w^rar. The cabinet decided to be satisfied if the King of 
Prussia worild merely associate hiJriseif with the withdrawal, ever 
if he refused the guarantee. Irons reported that there was gen- 
eral quiet and hope -of peace, until 4t 
e arrival of the Errs tele- 
gram in the morning set all ablaze. The superficial and unheal- 
thy excitement easily aroused in all great capitals broke out 
cries for vengeance and shouts of "a Berlin! " A council met at 
once. Gramont and Leboeuf wanted war. The uperor was in an 
agony Gf indecision: he showed them his letters from Franz Josef 
alid Victor iÑnanuel, stimulating the war party. The peace party, 
however, gained a momentary success, for the,r carried a resol- 
ution to appeal to Airope before beginning preparations for war; 
but Gramont indlic ed 011ivier, in spite of this, to call out the 
reserves. _Ta + Q P 
+' 
i r...the- e 
42,a "I see the public generally suppose that war was a foregone 
conclusion on the part of France and Prussia. I don't believe 
it in the case of Prussia, and ? ?mow it not to be the fact as . 
regards France. Prussia threw the first stone, by bringing on 
the Hohenzollern question. France made a peaceful settlement 
difficult. by Grauont's irritating declaration on the 6th. The 
cause of the change from a mild to an irritating declaration 
was the arrival of the report from the Chargé d'Affaires at 
Berlin, that Thile pooh -poohed the French remonstrance, and said 
that the question "n' existait pas pour le gouvernement Prussien. 
Then caste: the great fault of' France in not accepting the renun- 
ciation of Hohenzollern as a final settlement., but even at the pst moment the declaration of the 16th would have concluded 
with a phrase leaving the door open to the mediation of a Con - 
gress if the article in the North German Gazette had not arrived 
ard convinced the French that Bismarck had decided on war." 
Lyons, Is p. 305. 
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Metternich and Zli.tsthum von Eckstaät, visited Gramont, and 
as they 1°f t the room the former Said, "it is well you have seen 
,im. You can agree with me now that it is wasted trouble to 
44) 
preach reason to one who has lost his '.had and is not responsible.: 
In suer. a state of mind the minister repaired to a later council) 
held at St Cloud in the presence of the Empress, and without 
the three ministers who led the peace party-. He brought news 
thatFerther had been to see hinì, . had announced that he had 
btlerdiavd*ed by his government, that his despatch conveying. 
the French sue.;;estion for a personal letter was to be regarded 
as non avepuand that he was ordered to leave. Paris` immediate], 
on a furlough of indefinite length. This grave enough in 
itself, but it was accompanied by t =ee 71 ?r's that ev era 
Prussia's anbasadors were officially comfnunicating the Ens 
telegram to the governments to which they were accredited. It 
appeared like a deliberate insult, and before the council broke 
up it had decided on war. While in Germany they were singing 
"Die Wacht .am }Lein," in Paris it was the Ma rs eilla is e, and 
CTOwd8 in the streets were shouting "A Berlin! " Both countries 
'nobl.ilis eci, and His {oar ck announced that there was now no alter- 
guarantee, S1 native between war, and a dP- rla,ad frombranee thatkwoi_t1d withdraw gt 
:ter deñands and never again disturb the peace of ilarope. On 
tha 
19:' the French c eu.ìaration of war was presented at .Berlin, 
Karl Anton was congratulating himself. By his letter of ree 
n'1fCiation, the "dynastic" war had become' a "German" war, 1,rhere__ 
as if he had refused to tr,i thdraw, "All South Germany would have 
left Prussia in the lurch. " Strat, he admitted, had persuaded 
hirn, 
"for he too, lies everyone in France, has not the remotest 
G1 . 
'4 SA el, VII p. 259. 
471. 
idea of the overwhelming superiority of our arms. Napoleon has 
brought about the unit.;' of Germany in twenty-four hours 1 ... God f)1 
45) 
ia5 willed it sol" 
Since t he Franco-Berman 'War was- f ought , every successive 
revelation, every discovery- of new evidence, has gone' to prove,. 
more and more completely, that the responsibility of the war 
lies with Bismarck. It has been shown that he had two ai ernat- 
ive schemes, and that he had fully prepared the ground for a 
counter -off er._s ,T e in the event ßß the Hohenzo ll ersn withdrawing, 
and France declaring herself satisfied. But if Bismarck!s 
designs appear the blackest, none of the main actors come off 
scot free., save possibly the two unfortunate ambassadors, 
wer'ther and Benedetti; who here appear as butterflies on the 
creel. The reckless folly and vindictive spirit of Grationt, 
the weakness Of Napoleon, and the insane conceit and pucn:city 
of such men as Le oóeuf and the other leaders of the war party 
in France, were necessary conditions for the success of Bisnarc_2: 
schemes, and. deserve the sevr'est. condemnation. The praise, 
%never, which has been lavished on the dignified and pacif is 
ttitude of_ the King cf Prussia appears to be somewhat too. 
generous. The attitude of the old man tÏ roughout was one cf 
extreme self- righteousness. His object was less to preserve 
peace than to make certain that he himself could not be blamed 
for provoking; war. His attitude throughout, that he had no offi- 
Qla,i connection the matter, was quite untenable, and had 
p really done his utmost to preserve peace, he would have. 
co.i3nu_nicatFd Yews of the withdrawal to Benedet ti ii ~Zediat. ;= 
1cu 
// (¡%) 




and he would not have refused the interviev- already promised 
to the arabassador. It may be said that this wculci have been 
contrary to the advice of Bismarck, but the King had alrea,dy 
disregarded the advice of Bismarck o:-i several important points. 
He must have been fully arare that if authorisihp. Bismarck 
to publish the telegram reporting his transaOitc)n5i "Werth 3ene- 
detti, he greatly intensified the risk of war. Such nega,tiat.iona) 
intent d to be private, are rife with clanger when th J are 
cornn>>nicated to a public ignorant of diplolaatic subtleties; 
they ire like noxious . a :s that must he kept corked up in test 
tubes. The mere publication of the telegram, quite apart from 
Bismarck's editing, was a risk. The Kinf -.' ituce was in fact. 
°lib t erfuge 
insincere throughout, and the pitifulf\to .which he resort in 
46) 
the course of the affair is typical of his whole ednduc á. He, 
t leas *, knew almost the whole truthtof the affair, ant he 
deliberately allowed ' himself to be hoodwinked by Bismarck, and 
to be jockeyed into a war which, in the course of a few days, 
he Persuaded himself WPM the will of the supreme God. 
1..tnd1 c.0 c .X r u-v' GQ--- 1c _ ..0 ch4 à c- CJL._rv S 
``"7 fc (4.4 1` - tw. 24,, 
b 
The most part of the events just- related were known Cxnl'ir 
to the Prussian and Spanish ?gents in>'ri.edíat,eïy erlploye?d in then. 
In France, the p.avp.rnmen:t and people, their e7es sharpened by 
enmity, suspected an intrigue. In Great Britain, public opi_nion 
VMS incred lous of any such underhand dealings, and regarded 
the U:ild accusations hurled by Gramont at Prussia as merely 
ridiculous. 
The press -had begun by treating the whole affair with con- , t 
tempt. 're decline to be startled at anything col^irected. with 
Spanish politics, " said the Times, "Nothing happens in Spain but 
the unexpected, ál:d the succession off surprises is fatiguing... 
Here is Prim, with another '.7.ng, just found,, and, as it appears, 
verr neatly cau' *ht... A prince of Hohenzollern, with a great 
ea?íy names, the first of which is Leopold.... belongs to the 
class of Prince which it is the special province of Germany to 
produce. .here is generally some person to whomÁthe popular 
imagination aerobe aerhlunan astuteness, and the French have 
seen the hand of the Machiavellian 3ismarck in every unexpected 
event since Sadowa....W1e do not pretend that these jealousies 
are founded on reason -- -far from it; and we are, moreover, con- 
fident that a King of Spain r for Spain herself, and 
not with a view to foreign interests." 
The attitude of the government was much the same as that of 
press and public. They took for granted that France was respon- 
Bible for this new disturbance of the peace, for !-a re-e was the 
power that wanted ward i ngly st-rrsng-a-rmy, 
wel1 q 1'44 nt,- ready to take -the f t td. at ̀ ä f ëw wèeks 
eotica.__G.a.rmany, en the other hand, was afraid ô f - r-anc.e 
- love for v'ar as such the G- erman -array- wa-s-Infériór tr-t- i -' 
C., 
french, and was not well ada. t ed__ to zet° J_T 
y eugh.. -it was _an,--- rni _ . etm.A-titv 
hat France had any legitimate grievance ,,406 '^nt á.n 
The-attitude Was 
one of righteous self -satisfaction. They had always refused to 
allow English princes to start upon doubtful enterprises of this 
Bort, and could. ostentatiously exhibit their hands clean of any 
Buehu ambitions; and they were also, they claimed, superieh. 
toeuch petty jealousies. They did not believe that Leopold, as 
a constitutional king, would have any opportunity to viftert the 
olicV of. Spain to the interests' of Prussia - - -- though the posi- 
,tion of affairs in Spain, where constitutional government was in 
its infancy, was hardly f'sisimilar to that in England as they 
imagined. Napoleon was connected bynarria,ge with the house of 
Hohenzollern- Sigmaringen, and they apparently believed that this 
fact would have ?pore influence on Leopold than his German pat- 
riotism. They did not believe,,French assertions that 3ismarck 
had prepared the candidature, and readily accepted his statement 
that the affair did not exist for the Prussian government. They 
had not sufficient imagination to place themselves in the posi- 
tion of their French nngbours : it: was a matter of complete 
indifference to Granville and Gladstone who sat on the throne of 
Spain, and they could not understand that it was one of much 
more intimate" concern to France: yet twenty years before Great 
Britain had been within an ace of declaring war on France, be- 
cause she had broken an agreement and married one of her princes 
to the heir- presumptive of the Spanish crown. Had it been Prince 
Napoleon, not Leopold of Hohenzollern, who was Prim' s fancy, we 
Y guess that their attitude would have been less placidly 
superior. Had it been proposed to place` a French prince on the 
throne of Belgium, it is easy to imagine the snow -storm of des-- 
patches, the frenzy of the press, and the cry that Belgian in- 
dependence ivas about to be annihilated. 
Granville from the first took up the attitude of regarding 
the Whole affair as a storm in a tea -cup. He blamed Prussia for 
paving entered upon such 'a course, when she knew well the exagg- 
erated sensibilities, the tetchiness, the vanity, of France; and 
so far `he upheld France, that he consented to advise Prussia to 
conciliate her but he refused to admit that France had any 
right to ßtaterfre in the matter, and told her that she was a 
fool to think twice of such a trifle, with the indulgent scorn 
of a nurse to a chit. who takes the moon looking'in at the 
window for a bogey. He admirdd the position of complete indiff- 
erence taken up by the Prussian government, and did not doubt 
that their wish to keep the peace would Lead them to abàndon the 
foolish enterprise. 
"I have expressed regret at an occurrence which had at all 
events given rise to great excitement in the Imperial government - 
and French nation; but I have carefully abstained from admitting 
r 
that the cause was sufficient to warrant the intentions which r !. 
been announced," he wrote; and later, "I was always of `Opinion 
that the French government had exaggerated the danger %y' which 
the candidature of the prince of Hohenzollern could cause to so 
'$ 
powerful a nation as that of France." 
The remonstrange to Prussia Was couched in the same tones and 
as a sign of how seriously the government took the matter, it 
may be mentioned that the despatch containing it, though dated 
July 6th, was not sent off till the 9th, as then did not find. it 
¡ //i convenient to summon a cabinet meeting sou r. Granville told 
Prussia that to her "it can be an object of no importance that 
a member of the House of Hohenzollern should be called to the 
throne of the most Catholic country in Europe... Success could 
add but little to the dignity of the p'Ma kept Royal Family...or 
to the power of North Germany, while the want of it could not 
fail to Yee. a painful incident You will be careful to say 
f 
I Granville to Lyons_ls letters 9 - - -l3 July, Bluebook. 
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nothing which could give ground for the supposition that H.Z. 
Government controvert, or even discuss, the`'abstract right of 
Spain in the choice of her own- Sovereign. For your own inform- 
ation I may add that we have not in any measure admitted that 
the`assumption of the Spanish throne by Prince Leopold would 
justify the immediate resort to arms of France. On this topic, 
however, you are not at present to enter into communication with 
the Prussian Government." He adds that the secrecy with which 
the proceedings had been conducted by Spain (not by Prussia) had 
been very unfriendly to France. 
To 3ernstorff he was more frank.f`Lord Granville," reported 
the ambassador, "was for the rest very mild and far removed from 
threatening, but said to me in confidence, that he was convinced 
44/14. 
from all he heard that France would in the end make war on us : ', 
Se-was-on-,the=-8th-,---wh en- the government had begun to take, the 
ti .hough Lyons had reported that he did not believe "that 
eithe the Emperor or his Ministers either wish for war or ex- 
h'2 ( 
pact it the home government had by now begun to suspect that 
nip 
France was simply making use this trifling affair 6,s a pre- 
text for a war already determined on. It was the inevitable out- 
come of their views of French policy, and 3ismarck did his best. 
to strengthen it, assuring Loftus that however many concessions u 
Prussia might make, new difficulties would be raised in Paris, 
for the Spanish incident was only being used as a pretext for 
are 
Granville to Loftus, 6..'7o Bluebook. B " 
Biamarck, 8t 70 Rheindorf. , flLyons to ranville 7.13. 
3luebook. 
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on the 9th of July Italy proposed to Great 3ritain a joint 
intervention of the four neutral powers to relieve the tension 
of the situation, and Austria associated herself with Italy's 
proposal. Granville, though he had on the previous day 
told Bernstorff that some such action might be necessary, refus- 
J 
el the offer. The time was not yet come, he said, when such a 
proceeding could be of Use. 
The voluntary renunciation of Prince Leopold was hailed 4 
'Brit with great relief ; and Gramont' s subseq- 
uent proceedings caused great indignation. The government took 
this as a final proof`] that France had 'been determined on war from 
the beginning, and had only used the candidature as a pretext. 
Gladstone, on the first news of the renunciation, had expressed 
himself strongly to Bernstorff. 
"He expressed himself in his frank and honest way so decided - 
ly about the behaviouu of France in all this matter thaty not the 
slightest doubt remained to me that he had regarded her from / 
the beginning with the utmost surprise and disapproval 
I `"ó Ire--fo ern and tone of -- -her attttu and that he, although 
he does not deny to her a certain justification with regard to 
the opposition to the choice of a Hohenzollern prince for the 
Spanish throne, would learn 1 ith the greatest displeasure that 
the French government was not satisfied with the withdrawal of 
the hereditary prince, and was demanding yet more explanations 
and concessions from the 'government of H. M. the King. He said 
tome that` I knew he had attached a great value to the Anglo- 
French Alliance, and that he did so especially because he be- 
lieved that the two nations together would not easily commit an 
'tn 
act of injustice; but if one of then did so all the same then it 
would be certain that the other would separate itself from it; 
this would be the case if France pommitted the wrong of making 
war on Prussia after the excuse for it had been removed. He 
seemed, for the rest, to fear that this would happen, and ob- 
served that he did not indeed believe that ail the members of 
the French government wished for war but that the emperor (the 
0_11).WY 
great puller of the wires)ìéemed to wish it... ry --remark 
that - °-..p era ërì tx } °-rt did --,not c.,a t -w&- 
watrlcì- a.t._.least have_...the-- --gaod result that- it - - -t-- -1 e-us -" 
the alight- es-t.-- .doub.t_..aa.....to..- --the- aniTnus of the - r - e -v-ern e 
.44t7-14,64 the English Premier 
.then said with praiseworthy frankness, he had certainly last 
winter, when the confidential correspondence about 'the disarraa- 
msa_nt plan took place between us, had the opinion that the Ñaper- 
or. 7'Tapoleon had placed himself in a better position than us - -- 
which proves to me that the proposal made at that time by tord 
Clarendon 1,.as inspired by Louis -apoleon in order to place As 
at a ddvantage - -- -hut admitted, when 1 replied quickly that 
the present events clearly justified our opposition at that 
time) without contradiction, the correctness of this stateanent. 
Oren if nothing' else can be inferred from this interview than 
that the English government will stand with all its moral weight 
on our side if France makes war on us now, still this is of a 
f. is* considerable value to us. 
Later. in the same day, when the news of the French demands 
na(i arrived, -3ernstorff telegraphed' "Mr Gladstone... is of the 
English in original. ( 3ernstorff to 3israarck, 
Hheindorf. 7.) 4bfr 
4dß 
opinion, that we have gî ne to the uttermost verge of conciliat- 
ion , and that France will be, flagrantly in the wrong, if in ita- 
spite of this she begins war." 
Jpon the same day Brunnow called on Granville to present a 
proposal from Gortschakov, that the powers should make a joint 
declaration that by the withdrawal of Leopold the Spanish ques- 
tion was solved and the difference between France and Prussia at 
V 
an end. This, it was hoped, might save the dignity ofboth 
parties, while exercising a soothing effect. Granville refused. 
His raotive is unknown, for the reasons afterwards given by Glad- 
stone in Parliament are obviously mere excuses. Gladstone said 
that 3runnow acted as a private individual only; and that at the 
time Granville did not know whether the withdrawal of Leopold 
would not be regarded by France as satisfactory. In .reality, 
Brunnow was acting under the official instructions of Gortschak- 
ov; and as to the second point, if France had declared herself 
content, the pîd.a could easily have been dropped, though even 
then the Russian proposal would have given an additional secur- 
ity against a rep t it ion of the events of 1866. Probably Gran - 
ville's action was due to a desperate instinctive clinging to 
the policy of ?on- Intervention, an unwillingness to be dragged 
into joint action, however mild, with any other powers, and a 
vague dislike and distrust of Russia' s motives. It is possible, 
ift Bernstorff to Bismarck 13.'57o Fester IL, 131. 1.ladstone was at first doubtful. "On the face of the fac is °°rong,but as to personal trustworthiness the two moví 
its on the respective sides, Napoleon and Bismarck, are 
ana Par." Sut he was soon convinced that France was the and later wrote of her "feverish determination to force 






that it was at this time that the proposal was made, referred to 
on 10 and that Granville in haste returned an unqualified 
refusal to both plans. in any ease the fact that he declined to 
adopt either this or the Italian plan lays him and his coll- 
eagues open to the accusation of not doing all that they might 
kgre done in1he interests of peace. 
Granville's conduct of the affair was throughout remarkably 
inefficient. He could not bring himself to adopt any definite 
course, though strong action on almost any one line might have 
had a fair chance of success. He was afzaid to compromise him- 
self in any way. He began by irritating both parties by treating 
as a trifle a matter of the gravest consequence to them. He for- 
warded the complaints of France, while refusing to admit their 
:7 e. justice; he advised Prussia to make concessions, whi4 at the- 
same time he allowed her to understand that he did not think 
France had any right to ask for them. At the sane time he re- 
fused to cooperate with the other neutral powers in taking 
measures to enforce peace on both the disputants. This feeble 
and shuffling policy seems to have been due, in parti to f ear 
of giving offence to either of the great military powers, but 
in a greater degree to fear of involving his country, either 
in continental squabbles or in continental allices. He 
not 14e4.2.4ee u ' dertake C-e ,` t . -ass -- to.z- zder- interference 
that might have`' to be backed by threats, or to pledge his govern?, 
merit to collective action rith other powers, especially 
Itussia. 
The government had been taken by surprise. They had little 
t v tae to .consider their settee of action, and were quite unpre- 
par 
A.A.w.amsa 4$0 
ed. E er-e4 --na _ --s- - e -fer- *3 t whey. -- rh;t 
'rcis- -repent - it- -=-ani -4eh to- 9.° Both France and Ger- 








e prevented war. if she had liked to do so. By definitely 
ting the side of either of the parties, she could at least 
e postponed the outbreak of tear for the time being; and 
an understanding with the other neutral powers, and the en- 
cement of collective arbitration on both the -`rivals, she 
ld have assisted in the formation of an authoritative opinion 
Europe) Which might have succeeded in preventing v ar altog- 
eth 
squ 
er, letting France and Germany understand that their 
abbles would not longer by tolerated by their neighbours, 
Qirt -ccr u!y - 
BO --rir '01:ir02`tuni-13y»4 the peaceful klements in and 
bot h states to win the ascendancy over the disturbing forces 
rep 
ei 
resented by Bismarck and by Napoleon. 
. on- G-er- 
..- public opinion in Great Britain generally against 
M(A 
The "Tirne4 still the weightiest organ )(of opinion, had per - 
stently disseminated the view that the trouble was entirely 
JWL 
Q to t unreasoning jealousy, of Franc *. 
"If France could fore:o her jealousy of Prussia' there is 
ally no reason why she shnuld fear the establishment of this 
ince at Madrid... Leopold of Spain would probably be just as 
cod a Snanicrd and as faithful an ally of France as if he dame 
du 
4$1 
from Austria or Italy... The truth is that there is an immense 
body in France that would be too glad of any excuse for a war 
Aort 
with Prussia." Prussia, on the other hand, was praised for 
her "imperturbable calmness" which has "removed all suspicions, 
that her concessions might be prompted by undignified motives." 
t = 
and Passed a resolution of gratitude to the English Press for 
ira sympathy with Prussia. 
4B1 
Bismarck knPw when to strike. when the feeling against France 
as at its height, he published the still -born Dro j ét du traité 
of 1866 regarding Belgium, which the trustful Benedetti had left ;v 
in his hands. 
Bernstorff was eager to revive his plans of the previous year 
and promote an alliance between :Britain and Prussia, and Bis- 
marck would not neglect the chance of winning the island power 
as an ally; in any case, he would ensure that she should cherish 
no lingering sympathies for France. The chance that she would 
enter the war was very small, but he would have asked very 
little from her -- -only that'her fleet should prevent the French 
from attacking the north German coast, and protect Prussia's 
merchandise and her baby war-ships; if she even sent a few 
troops to Antwerp it P. 
her attention. 
Bernstorff communicated the treaty secretly to Granville: but 
Bismarck was not satisfied with the impression made. The govern- 
ment were thoroughly scared, but they were pledged to a policy 
of peace, and besides, part of their fear was that Prussia might 
try to make peace with France and buy her off by reviving the 
Plan, Old Lord Russell said, "They would come in by and by." 
This was not enough, and before a week had elapsed Bismarck sent 
the treaty to the "Times" office, where Delane jumped at the 
chance 
of such a "scoop." The treaty appeared in the issue of 
e 
25 +h. In order to produce a still greater effect, Bismarck 
`f° uIt is evident to me ghat C. Bismarck will use all his en- .: yours to obta . the cooperation of England and he hopes by 
±, 
could serve to alarm France and distract 
4$3 
altered the date of the document from the period of the peace of 
i Luxembourg Incident in 1867) Frankfort to that just following the 
thus imparting a darker tinge to the disgraceful transaction by 
making it appear that France had proposed this scheme when she 
ti 
failed pf. obtainitafr Luxembourg, and./ immediately after she had 
guaranteed the neutrality of the duchy. He hoped in this way to 
r'. 
,ouse a popular in$ignation that would force the government to 
abandon its lackadaisical attitude. 
It almost seemed that the device had succeeded, so fierce and 
Bo wide- spread was the feeling aroused. Gramont before this had 
voluntarily given the assurance that France would observe the 
neutrality of Belgium, unless it were violated by Prussia; and 
before entering the war, the French government had publicly de- 
clared that,whatever success she might obtain, France would make 
no annexatior}s: but these declarations were forgotten or dis- 
credited. The "Times' had already told its readers that in spite 
of fair words France was fighting for the Rhine, and now that 
paper actually went so far as to assert that the infamous 
ro ét had been offered to King William at Ems as a means of 
ibuying off France, and that this was the third time of making 
the offer, the e and having been on the eve of the Belgian 
Railways crisis. Whether Delane or Bismarck was responsible for 
this outrageous falsehood is unknown, but there is 
no evidence against Bismarck. 
(etd.) representing the dangers with which Belgium is menaced to Rork on public opinion in England, with a view to the eventual aid of Grp, t Britain in the war against France." Loftus to Gran - állle, 
303,W7o, Bluebook. The curious but not inapt mixture of ,eograPhical terms is that used by yoftus. Ì 11. 2 ( -i r 2 L 11(7 
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The somewhat confused pretests of Benedetti, that 3ismarck had 
offered -Belgium to France, went for nothing; was not the treaty 
in his handwriting? while "Bismarck said that he had been too 
much stupefied with amazement and horror to reply to =4enedetti, 
and that he had even been relieved to find the atrocious aabi- 
tions of France directed to other quarters than the Rhine. 
Both go:vernrient and people in "Britain were peculiarly sen- 
sitive upon the subject of "Belgium. The cons.ciousness o:f an ob- 
ligation to fight for :Belgium, and a fear of r, ing called on to 
fulfil that obligation, filled every heart with fury against 
w who threatened Belgian neutrality, Bismarck's bomb failed of 
its full effect far, though it turned the balance of opinion ' 1 
against France, it produced, not a cry for war, but a demand- 
that the government should Ay *hpa.nec ?s,, ì +zr. for war by pro- 
viding safeguards for Belgium. French troops across the Front- 
ier *night have brought 'Britain into;\ war on Germany's side, but 
the mere suggestion of this possibility was not enough. Perhaps: 
the most useful effect of the announcement for Prussia. was that 
the r)pposition, hitherto inclined to the side of France, changed 
their tactics, and preferred to attack the government, for fail- 
ing to provide adequate protection for Belgium, though Disraeli- 
did go so far as to recall ty at``; ín 1815 we had guaranteed the 
}thinela.nd to Pru.s sia. 
+it 
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The government were Puzzled to find some means of satisfying 
the general demand. They istere quite decided that if the rival 
powers made peace on the Dallis of the Benedetti treaty, there 
was nothing to be done. Gladstone expressed himself On this 
point with less than hus usual ambiguity. 
"The sole or single- handed defence of Belgium would be an en- 
terprise which we incline to think quixotic; if these two great 
military powers combined against it -- -that combination is the 
only serious danger." 
If sure of one ally at- least, they were ready to eTt-l-f-i-1 their 
engagements, though Bright used all his influence against this 
decision, and protested against any steps being taken to fulfil 
the treaty of guarantee, whether against France or against Ger- 
many. But it not till the last necessity arose that they 
would make preparations, or take any steps that night be called 
threatening. Gladstone considered the problem of sending troops 
to Antwerp if French troops invaded Belgium, but he threw cold 
Hater on all the practical proposals súbnitted by the War Office, 
when the danger was there, he wrote, he would begin to consider ì 
the means of averting it. Still it was necessary to do some- 
thing to quiet public agitation, and they hit upon the idea, at 
last, of a fresh guarantee. 
Proposals were to be laid before France, Germany, and the 
neutral powers, that all should sign anew engageaient to respect 
the neutrality of Belgium. What effect this proceeding could 
hate, beyond throwing a doubt on the validity of the Treaty of 
1891 was known only to the devisers of the scheme. Possibly 
° Gladstone to Bright, i Gladstone., Iii II)p- 339. Bright, p.417. 
they considered that the value of a promise is increased by the 
number of tikes it is repeated. The best that can be said of the 
arrangement is that it calmed popular excitement, and found some 
occupation for Granville' s idle hands. 
The belligerent powers were ready enough to sign. Lyons was 
"really ashamed to speak to him ( Gramont) about our treaty, but 
I, thrust) your deppatch on him, " and the minister answered with a 
desperate hilarity, "N'ayez pas peur, nous n'avons pas grande 
envie d'entrer en Belgique en ce moment." Prussia, still hoping 
for an ally, was equally amenable. The neutral powers were less 
eager to please, and Russia and Austria refused their signatures; 
Russia because a new guarantee\ was unnecessary, Austria because 
she would not fight for Belgium. 
The government well aware how transient the 
ment that could be aroused in England by questions of external 
policy: they did not want to fight, and 
they counted on Granville' s- harmless scheme to tide them over a 
momentary difficulty. Their confidence was justified. In a few 
days calm was restored in Britain, and in Germany anger and dis- 
appointndnt reigned.The bid for alliance had been useless, and 
there was a general outburst of hostility to Britain. 
"We are apparently unable to think of anything except Belgium 
and ourselves, " wrote "...Oh the fools, the fools !fit.... 
Do they not see that it is Germany with its best blood defending 
the integrity of Belgium whilst we are making speeches at/the 
Mansion House? Can they not for one moment realise what the red, 
1sanes at stake are? France draws the sword to assert her polit- 
ical 
px e l?,9np,ererce over draws the sword to 
Lya,,s , Z , f 3 0 
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art her national existence. 3ut the result will be that the pre- 
ponderance of Germany over Europe for centuries to come will 
take the place of French preponderance. We sit by like a bloat- 
ed Quaker, too holy to fight, but rubbing our hands* at the roar- 
ing trade we are driving in cartridges and ammunition. we are 
heaping up to ourselves the undying hatred of this German race 
that will henceforth rule the world, because we cannot muster 
\ up courage enough to prevent a few cursed Brurmnagem raanufactur- 
ers from driving their unholy trade." 
Having ,wade themselves unpopular in Germany by refusing to 
kY 
join in the war, and by selling munitions to France, the govern- 
ment proceeded to make themselves unequally unpopular in France 
d by pressing upon Gramoht the Prussian 
complaints about alleged violations of the Red Cross, etc, by 
French troops. These complaints, if not settled between the 
respective commanders -in- chief, - should have been preferred by 
the minister of the United States, who had undertaken Prussia's 
affairs in Paris, so that Granville' s action gave the írnpressinn 
Of being solely due to a desire to make himself unpleasant, and 
Lyons was obliged to send a startled protest home. 
44461-6.et14-rir- .. -°fu2f" rr6d_ 'firä' °rttr1M - neutra 
to Mallet, 9. 1.70. Morier II .pA The comm 
erc1e1 class were .. admirably neutral; in August al(i September the e s .
y 
supplied munitions to France, and in Obtober and November 
A.A- IA) .7?-a,vhsaj, 
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The general expectation in Great Britain was of a,speedy 
victory for France; the best the friends of Germany hoped was 
that she would, with time, be able to rally her forces and drive 
the enemy back across the frontier. 
"France brings an army into the field, Prussia onl y/ an armed I&?. 
people," said the "Times; . .. "There will be hard fighting on' the 
Rhine, in the Baltic, or it may be in the heart of Germany." 
"There is little doubt," wrote Morier, "That the Prussians are 
not yet ready, and that a great portion of Germany will be occu- 
pied...before the decisive battle is fou ght, which will be some - 
where in the interior of Germany." 
No one, outside Prussia, knew how exact were the preparations 
made there: how every by -path in France was mapped; how Moltke 
had examined the frontier on foot from end to end; how the pre- 1 0,c5 
else breadth of the rivers between the Rhine and Paris had been 
calculated, and materials for bridging them of the correct 
length! 
\, collected. The shock of what was to come was all the 
greater. The first emotion was surprise that the French were so 
slow; weeks passed, and not a French soldier across the Rhine! 
that was happening? August brought the answer, and as the tale . 
of French disasters came thick and fast--- Weissenberg, worth, 
SPicheren, Borny, Mars -la -Tour, Gravelotte - -- stupefaction reigned 
in London. Realising at last that the bilge // of French military 
domination was laid for good and all, the Government heaved a 
sigh of relief, and entered upon a more ambitious' policy - -- -what 
ed "iimitin the area of hostilities :" 
"Times" 22 7o. 3 Morier I p 54. 
its ?. 
Both belligerent powers entered the arena alone, but both had 
hoped to be able to find allies. Bismarck had trtád to engage 
Spain in the struggle, and had even had some hopes of assistance 
from Britain. In both cases he was disappointed, but a useful 
friend remained: Ruefiika, though she did not enter the field, ren- 
dered him ;reórnan service. 
remembered 
apoleon, it will be 71,6440p4i7 had encouraged his ministers 
to think that" France might count on the help of Italy and Aust- 
ria. In reality, mei.er of these powers was pledged, though 
.looked with goodwill on the cause of France. Had Napoleon 
consented to abandon the Pope, there is little doubt that Italy 
would have stood by the side of France; but clerical Influence 
was still too strong. Not till,.the first disasters of the war 
were the French troops recalled from Rome, and then it was too 
late. Napoleon, in despair, wrote to Victor Emanuel, recalling 
old friendships . The King, considerably moved, 
called his counsellors, and showed the letter. La. Marmora said, 
if the king decided to go to war; he would beg permission to 
lead a company; but if asked as a statesman, he must answer that 
it mould be madness for Italy to forsake her neutrality; and he 
left the room in tears. They decided for peace; and when the 
news of Sedan came - -- "pauvre l pereur! -- -mais j e l' ai échappé 
belle!" said the king. 
In Austria, Beust, always the Sir Uwaine -les- Adventurous of 
the day, was eager to risk it 
ut the Emperor was afraid, and Andrassy, who was in 
correspondence with :Bismarck, spoke for peace, and carried the 
406. 
rest of tJia council wlth'him. The matter was clinched by a de- 
claration from :izus s ia, that she would be neutral, but that if 
Austria, entered the war dn the side of Prance, s.he would. join 
p rus fi ]: aL . 
For one more ally France h0pcd.--¡DFn71ark, where fpel1,1g 
aT, ixlst. Germany was naturally very strong. There, was a plan for 
a joint naval attack on the North German coast; but 7, lsrarc_ 
allowed it to beknown that if Denmark Joined France, and Prussia.. 
were victorious, Jutland would be annexed; and both hiissia and 
Britain put pressure on Denmark to remain neutral. Notwithsta.nd- 
/ 
ing that it proved a luckrr escape fmar Denmark, France naturally 
looked on -British action there as unfriendly. 
*SIX, YMIMa4,%>l 41g;41W#M#13WM-W,W#,,/P10-,i;44( 
Once their decision was taken, most of the neutral powers 
became anxious to give t "hat help they couic to Prance in the 
way of mediation or good offices. The first German victories 
filled then with consternation, and they instinctively- turned 
6g) 
for guidance to 3ritain. 
At the beginning of the war, the :Italian government had 
proposed to Britain a league of the Neutral powers, and had 
been at once .refused, on account of the difficulty of the 
66) "I have been beset with representatives of small powers, all 
except the 3elgian, in consternation, and with Rothschild's and 
other bankers in despair. They hope England will interfere to 
atop the Prussian any on its way to Paris; not an easy task. ?.. 
Lyons to Granville, 8-August 180. Lyons, I, p. 306. 
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undertaking. This was followed in a few days by a similar pro- 
posal from Russia for "a real solidarity betvreen the }neutral 
Dowers during the present war," which had the same fate. On the 
day of the Battle of j!'orth Italy renewed the offer, 11uggeating 
an understanding between herself, Austria, and Britain, and was 
v 
again refused; but three days later, on the 9th, the Government 
in London changed their minds, and consented to a new plawt, by 
which neither power should take any step affecting the neutral- 
ity of other powers, or undertake anything in the nature of med- 
iation, without the knowledge of the other The remaining neut- 
rals were to be invited to join. 
Russia immediately acceded to the 1feague. Spain joined on 
Aùgust 19th, Turkey on August 24th, and Denmark on September fith 
Beust at. first delayed, wishing to make Austria's accession con- 
ditional: he propósed that the League should immed&ttely declare 
that its object was a joint mediation, and that each power 
should guarantee that it would not mediate alone. Britain refused 
to agree to this, and Austria finally joined unconditionally 
on September 10th. 
The motives of the various parties who entered the League of 
Neutrals (its- - e.e --ea e-- tro--43-e-e& were contradictory. 
Granville and his colleagues had as object "to limit the area 
of hostilities." The aims of the other powers were much more de- 
finite, and much more aggressives G!se this) It may in fact be 
said that with the exception of Great 3ritain, all the members 
' According to Schweinitx, Prussian ambassador at Vienna, this 
Italian proposal was inspired by Russia. See Rheindorf, p.179. 
 
League believed that it was meant to undertake a collective med- 
iation: Italy proposed it: and the other powers joined, under 
this belief. 
There was nothing in the terms of the league as finally accep- 
ted by Granville or in his conduct of affairs up to its found- 
ation to give the lie to this. In past times the prestige of 
Great Britain had stood much higher on the continent than it now 
did; but'`still no one supposed that, in a crisis of this magnit- 
ude, a first -rate power would remain in a state of languor and 
impotence, and allow herself to be ignored by the actors in the 
V 
drama. Both in Britain and abroad it was the general belief that 
the country would demand to have some voice in the settlement of 
affairs, and that the startling news which was daily arrivi:zs 
;ror. k}^e battle -front must necesarily modify her policy. The 
conduct of the government had already given a hint that they 
were prepared for strong action if' necessary, for Gladstone on 
August 2nd had asked and received a Vote of Credit for f2, 000poo 
for military and naval purposes. The mere formation of the League 
seemed to promise action. Why erAter into such an engagement at 
all, if it were not to be dlrectedV to some definite object? 
There had been great wars in Europe before, but no one had 
troubled to found a Neutral League. Austria and Italy 
'O*Ka P that- aim mi giì t - he s xp13T . -t o res t?^a: rr -1uß 
tblr--1102E-e-rs, from action: th.e3), thought that the losses of France 
had alarmed Britain like themsselves, and that her object was the 
aarae as their own---a joint mediation to prevent the too) great 





Russia had other motives, though she also believed that coll- 
ective action was intended. Gortschakov hoped that' the League 
would propose a European Congress to decide upon the terms of 
peace, and there he intended to introduce the Eastern Question. 
Russia, in fact, was loyal to neither party, and wau playing 
for her own hand. The extent of Prussian success alarmed her. 
She had no desire to see France reduced to a third -rate power 
and a Prussian Germany dominating Europe. That was too dangerous 
to herself. Often the ally of Prussiaÿin the past, Russia had 
yet never fully trusted her. 
"That for the Russian policy there is a limit," wrote Bis- 
marck later, "Beyond which the.' importance of France in Europe 
must not be decreased is explicable. That limit was reached,as I 
believe, at the Peace of Frankfort - - -a fact which in 187o and 
1871,was not so completely realised at Petersburg as five years 
later. "I. hardly think that during our war the Russian cabinet 
clearly foresaw that,when it was over, Russia would have as 
neighbour so strong and consolidated a.Germany. 
Though not "completely realised',' yet enoughLof this was under -. k - 
i 
stood at Petersburg as to make the government uneasy. The Tsar 
as much attached to King William, but the bonds of affection 
which united Gortschakov to Bismarck were distinctly less close. 
ItIseia Was determined to use this opportunity to obtain the re- 
wision of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of 1856; but var- 
ious means to doing this were open to her. Gortschakov loved a 
ongress; and to introduce the subject there was less risky and 
lo5B likely to prdduce .quarrel than the course which he ultim- 
BiSmAAN 66. 
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ately adopted. If he could bribe 3ritain\ and France to consent 
to the abrogation of these clauses, by giving them just suffi- 
cient support against Prussia as to save France from complete 
defeat and set bounds to Prussian ambition, then he would gain 
the coveted prize with less danger to Russia, and at the same 
time would prevent Prussia from becoming too dangerously strong. 
Either way, he meant to get rid of the obnoxious treaty; but he 
would risk as little as possible. If he simply repudiated At 
there was always a chance that Britain might go to war, and he 
preferred not to fight unless it was necessary. 
Gortschakov's new policy -rested on a misconception,however. 
He hóped that Britain might be ready to buy Russian support at a 
price, but Aid not understand that there' was no desire in London 
to obtain the goods offered for sale. There they had not begun 
to realise the magnitude of the change which had overtaken Eur- 
ope: they had no intention of stepping forth in defence of the 
balance of power, and as yet no desire to mitigate the else dis- 
tress of France. 
Either at this time, or just before the declaration of war, 
must have occurred the incident referred to later by Sir. Chatìes 
Dilke. "It is the fact," he wrote, "That Austria and Russia both, 
but independently, proposed to us at London through Baron Brun- 
now, and at Vienna` through Count Beust to stop the outbreak of 
Par between France and Germany by guaranteeing to both parties 
their territory.... The negotiations did not indeed break down 
apon the merits of the proposal, but upon the mooting more or 
less directly by Russia at the same time of the question of the 
Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of 1856." 
When Gortschakov finally understood that neither the misfor- 
: 
tunes of France nor the t ±iumphsL:' of Prussia would be sufficient 
to alarm gìreaa Britain, but that she still considered the limit- 
ations on Russian sovereignty on the 31ack Sea coasts more im- 
portant than, the Lance of European power, he reverted to his 
original policy of unlimited support of Prussia and a bold dis- 
regard of international law. He held his hand until he was fully 
convinced of the feebleness and timidity of the Gladstone adriin- 
istration, and then he struck. 
On his side, Granville had forwarded the formation of the 
Neutral League largely as a means of restraining Russia. It is 
not to be insinuated or believed that -the attitude of the Britih 
government was hypocritical. They were sincerely desirous of 
limiting the area of hostilities, and so preserving the rest4of 
&irope from the horrors of war. 
Nor was the 
League, as France believed then, and as some French writers hav`)e 
since tried to prove, directed against France. There was certain- 
lY a strong feeling in the government that France had made her 
bed and ought to lie on it, there may even have been a certain 
mount of sour satisfaction at the first Prussian victories, and 
there was relief that French armies were not, after all, invin- 
cible,t is true, too, that they meant to use the League as a 
"Present Position of .European Politics" p.6.By the courtesy 
of ;fir C.R.M. C ruttwll I ' am informed that there- is no reference 
to 
this proposal treserved in the official Foreign Office papers. 
means of restraining possible intervention in favour of France. 
Bernstorff had reported: "Your Excellency will see from this, 
that England of all the powers is doing us the greatest service, 
in holding ack other powers from taking part in the war ag- 
ainst us." t is, however, in Bernstorff's letter of the previous 
day that we find the ke jr to Granv ille' s policy. The ambassador 
had been instructed to complain that it was generally believed 
on the continent that the Neutral League aimed at a joint 
mediation. OGranville contradicteeto Bernstorff tïhis, tendency 
of the coalition, rather }e i an English mediation. Accord- 
ing to him the league will only serve to hinder possib a tricks 
(Ektratouren) on the part of powers not involved in t - . 
The power whose "possible tricks" were to be hindered was 
Nussia. The British government were well aware of the danger 
that Russia might demand the revisiit of the Black Sea treaty, or 
even something more, and they hardly knew how to prevent it. For 
this reason they were strongly opposed to a collective mediation, 
That, if successful, would lead to a Congress or Conf erne, and 
it the council /table/ Russia would bring forward th question of 
the Black Sea. It is a remarkable proof of the incapacity of the 
government, their confused outlook and inability to grasp the 
situation, that at the moment when the fate of Europe for the 
next generations was being settled, they could think of nothing 
beyond the danger of Russia's freeing herself from these ridic- 
ulous restrictions; of which Bismarck said later: "They were 
Bernstorff to Bismarck, ..70. Do. 16.x.701 ganz vertraulig)). 
Beindorf pp, 58, 179. 
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the most inept conclusions of the peace of Paris. One cannot 
permanently deny the exercise of the natural rights of sovereign- 
ty on its own coasts too a nation of one hundred millions of 
inhabitants. " . Or three months the whole endeavours of the govern- 
ment were directed towards this single object, to which every 
other was subordinated, and their endeavours completely and 
signally failed. 
Russia's first announcement, that her neutrality depended on 
the conduct of Austria, had thoroughly alarmed them. Thus they 
wished to prevent the entrance of the neutral powers into the 
war, because if Italy joined Austria would join, and if Austria 
joined, then Russia would attack her, and once Russian troops 
entered the Slavonic provinces of Austria the fat would be in 
the fire. A European conflagration would be unavoidable. Turkey 
and the BhAkans would be in the thick of it, and 3ritain might 
against her will be dragged into another catastrophe like that 
of the Crimea. Once Russia began to fight, she would not stop 
without having obtained some compensation, for that she would 
overcome Austria they could not doubt. 
(On the other hand, if a peace conference met, Russia could 
sell her support to the highest bidder, and bribe either France 
or Prussia to gtpaer a free hand in the East. 
By using the League to prevent either intervention or mediat- 
ion, they hoped to do away with both: these dangers. 
This policy was short- sighted, for it left out of count the 
possibility that Russia might attain her wish by simply repud- 
iating the treaty without either going to war or asking the con - 
ti3' t6 isvrstt.ctot i 1 ! li 
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sent of Europe. If the Black Sea clauses were to be annulled, it 
was better that they should be annulled by general consent, and 
not by Russia defying international law and denouncing the 
treaty. By preventing Russia from taking legal action, they en- 
couragedto take illegal action. It was imp -- that this 
great empire, which for years had fretted over the, humiliating 
restrictions, would let this unequalled chance pass by without . 
seizing it. To this pitiful policy of postponing the evil day 
the British government chose to subordinate all other consider- 
ations, though the longer that they succeedèd in maintaining 
this policy of inaction, and imposing it on the other neAutrals, 
the greater became the very danger which they sought to avoid. 
The weaker that France became, so much the stronger pilaw Russia, 
It' r2, 
if she da to defy the Western Powers. The more complete 
the success of Prussia was, the more dangerous would it be for 
Britain to intervene between' Russia and her desires. Seeing 
France so reduced, they saw the destruction of a possible ally 
against Russia, and their policy was self -destructive. 
Hitherto British policy had been largely determined by fears 
of what France might do; now that all necessity for this had 
Tanished, they stood bewildered. The fixed and inapprehensive 
new 
character of their minds was slow to receive mpressions, and 
when these impressions were so forbible that they could not be 
ejected, the result was at first confusion and disturbance---a 
general dislocation of thought- processes. In this state of be- 
Uderment, the idea of Nol- axtervention' was a fixed star aove 
the troubled waters. It offered an excuse for inaction, when 
`7)}'-., 
¡.hey 
could not decide what action was necessary. i-t wws an old 
familiar idea, and it covered with a sounding name the laB itñáe 
and weakness into which they allowed themselves to sink. Non- 
Intervention they fervently proclaimed their ruling principle. 
It would have been difficult to find a policy more likely to 
offend all their neighbours. France, too much absorbed in her 
own difficulties to analyse British riòtives, not unnaturally 
concluded that At was directed entirely against herself, and 
loudly reproached 3ritain for depriving her of possible allies. d 
Italy and Austria, as they gradually that 
Tritain was using the league not to forward but to hinder a. 
joint mediation, were angry and disappointed. Russia was irrit- 
ated at finding her hopes of a congress balked, and her position 
a.de more difficult. Even Germany was not in the least grateful, 
though the practical effect of the coalition was in her favour 
344, 
This' might not last long; Great Britain might in the end become 
alarmed for the balance of power, and change her course, or be 
lured into somel understanding with France and Russia; and' then 
the /league would at once be transformed into a weapon of offence 
against Germany. 
As yet, however, the aims of the British government were not 
fully understood, and, on the clay following Mars -la -Tour, Gran- 
ville reported: "The Italian minister communicated to -day very 
confidentially a telegram from his government stating that they 
+ere. of opinion that the time had arrived for England and Italy 
to interpose to preserve Europe from calamity; that they desired 
u 
therefore that England should offer mediation, and wereNlidiyjc 
to aoquiesce beforehand in the teanittions she milt propose, be- 
as' p that she desired equally with Italy to maintain 5'oQ: in$" itisf;i .d 
tlìe integrity of France; and that unfettyred by any engagement better 
Italt oould /promise her fullest support to such mediation. My 
f 
deb r 
that Hilis Majesty's government consider any offer of mediat ion at 
the present moment would be premature and worse than fruitless." 
Russia, in joining the League, said that if any great power 
.ade a proposal about mediation, she would accede to it. Gran- 
ville replied that the time was not yet come, and Gortschakov 
assented. 
(ln August 29th Italy again suggested that the neutral powers 
J 
should take some step to put an end to the war, and Granville 
said it would be useless: any offer made with that object would 
not be acceptable to either belligerent. 
Immediately after Sedan Beust made a proposal similar to It- 
aly's of August 17th, and received a similar answer. 
gorier now reported to the government: "A very general im- 
pression prevails in Germany tòthe effect that H.M. Government-. 
have taken the initiative in the organisation of a neutral 
leagué4vhich when the time for concluding peace comes, shall in- 
sist upon Germany not making any demands for territorial Cess- 
ions on the part of France." Granville1 replied ` not altogether 
frankly)that, the government had "declined to entertain any pro - 
Posils for a combination of the Neutral Powers with a view of 
localising the war, or with regard to the eventuality of comb- 
ined mediation... They have interí clanged notes separátely with 
the majority of the Neutral Powers, containing \mutual assurances 
against the departure of one Power from an attitude of neutral- 
' ranville to Lyons, . 
_ a 
This quotation, and the ref er- to 
3eust' e proposal 
in September, are made from the Foreign gffice the courtes,, of r Cru 1twèll. 
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ityl without a previous communication to the other... You will 
consequently see that there is no truth whatever in the rumours 
75) 
to the contrary effect." 
The fall of the Empire and establishment of the Go« ernment, 
of National Defence in France did not .lead to ally alteration in 
the policy of Britain.. The first action of Jules Favre was to at 
ask for British mediation, but this was refused, and so was the 
request for the official recognition of the republic.. Granville 
rade recognition conditional on the formai approval of the new 
itfgovernment b'r the nation, and Favre and his colleagues 7Tere 
averse to holding a general election in the midst of a desperate 
war and with a.large part of French territ.ort ilccupied by the 
=,:ienly, it was impossible to obtain this. 
Thiers had now set out upon his pilgrimage to "find Europer 
and repaired first to London, but had little success there. His 
reception by Granville was cold: when Thiers said that France 
had not wished the war, and shbulci not be blamed for th.e policy 
of the !t ?peror, Granville int errupted him, saying that France: 
had wanted war, for the ?Napoleonic dynasty was the instrument o 
public opinion. So such discouraged was Thiers that he wrote to 
Favre: '"It is believed in London that Lord Granville: is influ- 
enced by the queen's feeling for her relations, but 1 must say - 
that he appears principally guided by a polie :J of irresolution, i ( . 
7 /hic)i consists in avoiding all questions which may cause diffi- 
76) culties. Later interviews with Granville and Gladstone were 
°111',/ a little more encouraging. Britain, they said, wished well 
S) r)orier to Gra,nville, 2 Sept. 1870. Granville to TForier, 12 slupbook. 
161 3 avre, 96. 
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to France, but she 
would not fight for her, and if she insisted on a mediation with 
the other neutrals, "she would exposR herself to the displeasure 
of Prussia, who would not hear of their inbttrvention, and by 
that means she would damage our cause instead of serving it." 
Such interference would be so disagreeable to 3ismarck 
that France would get much better terms by direct negotiations. 
Gladstone said that if the Prussian peace -terms involved' a terri- 
torial cession, then "England would speak out her mind." But 
this was vague enough, and all that Thiers obtained of effectual 
aid was a promise that aianutile would facilitate a personal 
interview between Jules Favre and Bismarck, and that Queen Vic- 
toria would write to the King of Prussia and advise him to neg- 
otiate,? 9 
Granville was as good as .his word in advising Bismarck to 
negotiate with Favre," though he told 3ernstorff that he fully 
recognised that there could be no talk of armistice or peace,un- 
less France would sincerely accept "as basis the terms laid down 
by Prussia, The interview took place, and led to nothing. 3is- 
na'rck demanded a guarantee that the new government was approved 
V the nation, and when Fevre said this could only be given by 
nvoking a national assembly, he said this was impossible: "In 
order to carry out this plan, an armistice would be needed, and 
twill not grant one at any price." Later he consented to an 
rmietice on condition s that included the oeaupaióion of the f or 
on.i0nt Valérien ---the virtual surrender of Paris. Favre was 
o1117,ed 
to return, having gained absolutely nothing. . 
Favre, p 96 ff } 
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Italy asked what = iritain intended to do, since the negotiat- 
ions had failed. Gra,.nii ilie replied that there was nothing to be 
done, and the siege of Paris commenced. L_ustria then proposed, 
once more, a joint mediation. She could not at alone, she ex- 
plained, for fear of '_pus s is ; out she would gladly join in any 
collective action. Granville refused. Bismarck had sent a hector- 
77 
ink dispatch, sa7,ring it would be "eine grausamkeit des letzteren 
.,Bich would protract the war, if Britain did not innediately cut 
78) 
short French hopes of diplomatic or material intervention; and 
Granville had taken it to heart. Early in October, 3eust, worn L.7. 
out of all patience, broke out into expostulations. He had hope51, 
he said, "when H.M. Government proposed the exchange of notes 
elotive the maintainance of neutrality, that that measure 
would result in a collective effort for the establishment of, 
peace;;and it was with this vier, that the suggestion was made by 
Austria that a clause should be inserted in the notes which would 
prevent. the isolated Iriediation. of any one Power..." The only 
chance of success would be found in collective action. Austria 
"-ished "to seeTurope recover from the species of torpor in which 
she seemed to be plunged in fear of a great convulsion." Itv was 5 # 
necessary "to rouse France from her illusions, and waken Prussia 
79) 
from h ;r contempt and indifference to the other powers." In his 
letters to his agents at Berlin, Beus t described his object. "The 
Golernx ent of Austria- Hungary...consider it a duty to state that 
they' still believe n European common interests, .L]rid that tìie.y 
would prefer peace obtained b7r the impartial influence of the 
;17utrals to the destruction of further hundreds of thousancis." 
78) Bismarck to Bernstorff, 13 Sept. 1370. i-Caeindorf,p. 183. 
) Granville to Bloomfield, 10.0ctober 1870. Bluebook. 
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The Neutrals should "moderate the demands of the conqueror, soft- 
, 8T) 
en the sentiments which must" crush the_vanquished." 3e.ust's pro-- !(14, 
posals ootai!ed no definite reply. 
The exuus e offered by the Frit ish Governilent for their re- 
peated refusals ád prolonged inaction was that it was useless o 
intervene as, long as Favre adhered to his declaration, on first 
entering office, that France would never give up "a foot of her 
terito'ry, or a stone of her fortresses." On October 8, however, 
Lyons reported that "though they declare in private as in public 
that they «'ill never consent to any cession of territory," still J 
Chaudordy, had told him that a general mediation could erforce 
terms that neither France nor Prussia "could spontaneously offer. +-7 0 
This het being explicit enough to draw any response from Gran- 
ville, Chaudordy a week later, and under pledge of secrecy, de- 
finitely told Granville that France would consent to such a cess- 
ion when the time came, but that no one dared to say so openly 
at present. The men now in office could not sign such a treaty 
of peace, but they would be ready to resign and to give their 
full support ti, others who were not pledged a,s they were. It was) 
hove ever, impossible to declare this openly as yet., without rain- 
ing the 7o.7ernlúent.: "It must appear to rise\ at the critical time 1-21 
al) 
out of the necessities of the hour. " 
Perhaps this confidence contributed to the change that now 
began. to. appear in the gab inet of London; perhaps thisLw *as 
rather due to the alteration of public opinion, or to a slow a- 
178'kening to the real significance of events in France. 
80) oust tò 
1870. ?Pust, 
81) LTTons to 
D' 325 ff. 
`?'ikpff en, 13 not. 1870. Beust tò Chotek, 12 Oct. 
I1, p. 207 ff. 
Granville, 8 Oct. 1870, 18 Oct. 1870. Lyons I, 
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Public opinion, at the beginning of the war, had been, as 
we have seen, generally upon the site of (7,- rer12any. The most part 
of the press took the sanie side, though there was alwa s a res- 
pectable. minority that upheld the cause of France, and this min - 
ority gradually increased. 
The terrible disasters which had overwhelmed France, and the. 
rapidity of her fall, awed and moved the spectators. Sonne consid- 
ered that she had expiated through suffering the fault: of the 
past ; others, with that unreasoning generosity that is one of 
the endearing qualities of their nation, simply went over bag 
and baggage to the weaker side. The friends of France were en- 
couraged b:r the news of the abdication of the mperar and the ss- 
tablishment of the Republic. Enthusiasm Was stirred by the des- 
perate efforts of the Government of "rational defence, her the 
orations of ambetta, and by the patriotic awakening of the dis- 
illusioned people of France. The shooting -doten of franc -tireurs, 
t',e burning- of villages, the bombardment of Strasburg., without 
Warning, anca deliberate destruction of its priceless library, 
?1'0c14-1(1 R generation strange to\ \the horrors of war. A ribald 
parokr on King William's pious letters to his wife, in which 
82) 
?aussi `"Ï mentality was curiously exhibited, went fro l lip to lip. 
The Climax same when i +, was understood that Germany intended toi 
Thanks be to God, my dear Augusta, 
Ire've had another awful buster; 
Ten thousand Frencbraen sent below. 
Praise God from whom all blessings flow! 
Punch, 3 Sept,. 187G. 
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deflt nd a territorial c.essio.n from France. In what way, indignant 
voices began to ask, was the conduct of Germany superior to that 
r' 
for which France had been often reproached? 
To bring this growing opinion, which fav cured some soot of 
intervention in favour of France, to bear upon the government-,, 
was no easy matter. Generally speaking, the powerful middle - 
c1a.ss was still solid for Germane and peace. The working -class 
had rallied to the side of France when the republic was proclaim- 
ed, and a considerable section of these, led by a few members of 
the professional and literary classes, and a. few rather discred- 
ited politicians, began to agitate, not only for the recognition 
of the republic, but sometimes even for military intervention. 
These demonstrations were of t000`dereocratic a nature to find 
favour with government or press, and were persistently ridiculed 
as waa the somewhat over- effusive syspathy of Ireland, where the 
cause cf France was upheld partly as a. means of annoying Englanda 
A much larger body of the public was content to show its \sir spath7 
simply by. generous contributions to Red. Cross and relief work. 
But even had opinion been stronger and better organised, 
there was no adequate rrs ans of expressing it. Parliament was not 
bittirl.t, and the government took care that it was not stenmoned, 
Putting off the evil`day as long as they dared, and in fact 
until it wa,s too late for any change of policy. Even had 
Parliament been in session, the working classes were not rep= es- 
elted there, and only a few of the Conservatives had definitely' 
Fepcused the c au e of r ranc e. 




i=t the country had, from the first days (af the cam.3a.2T`?, carried 
on a consistent and Virulent attack on France. "o accusation 
was too wild or too ruffianly to be brought forward in those 
'?lsterlal pages. Trie hatred with P'hic.' 3ritain was at this 
time reáaraed in France was chiefly due to the' Times, which, 
efficient was its editor, penetrated even into beleaguered 
Paris. The events which had changed general opinion had had no 
effect upon the Times, and the paper showed the utmost dexterity 
in throwing cold 
f48 
rater upon popular admir3t.ti.on of the French resistance. 
Doubts were cast on the resolution of the new government and 
of the people. "In Paris, indeed, the clamour is very loud, but 
ft is said to rest upon a feeling pervading the citizens that 
'every man's neighbour is bound to die for his country,' It be- 
hoves those who have the destinies of France in their hands well 
to consider whether the defence of Paris is reall: racticahle, 
and whether both themselves and their people are really so firm 
determined to carry matters to 'the bitter end' as they wish us 
to believe. " 
The. government of National Defence were vilified, and accused 
of considering only their own interests. "Men taken from the 
pavement to -govern a great nation..., their first and only in- 
stinct is to do nothing that shall associate their own dear 
,. 
names with national disaster.... here is a race between parties 
as,to who shall. go farthest in the exhibition of patriotic dev- 
otion... in the full expectation %that the hand which wields -the 
avr.dKmay..ultimately also secure the sceptre. 
The ress&ttance of the peasantry, England was told, was no.N 
due to patriotic feeling. "The collapse of the 'Napoleonic system 
'13B let loose the peasantry whom 7. apoleon III has so long con- 
trolled, A 'white Terror' has become possible.... `re can hardly 
hope there are any feelings to contend against the bigotry of 
the average peasant in France. The scenes i of La Vendee may ag- 
an he enacted. , .not aga inst a revolutionary government or an 
invading enemy, but against suspected Protestants, or any whom, 
°r anY reason, the priests may denounce." In the rural districts 
i\ ---- -- Ñ H 
U %neeii2. 1.1`570. (t If 31. 22.44.0'7o. 
sue. 
,fio 9 
the peasants are rising against the Prussians "not so much be- 
cause they are enemies of the government and the dynasty, hardly 
because they are foreign invaders,` but because - --'as their 
Priests tell. t .em they are Protestants, irreconcilable enemies 
of the Church." 
After this attempt to awaken the spirit of religious intoler- 
ance, we cannot wonder that it was attempted to prejudice opinion 
itagainst the Government of National Defense by urging that resin 
ance'could only lead to Red Revolution .The enemies of France 
"ni11 rejoice to think that the reverses which France is now 
aidergoing are in great part due to that innate spirit of levity 
It unsteadiness in the French people which at the period of the 
first revolution caused such countless zeroes in Europe, and which'/ 
it is the duty of all who have the power to confine, in. this her 
fourth revolution, as far as possible to the soil of France it- 
self,.... What have the French left to fight for? They know not 
what. They are no longer a people, ' or a political unity, with a 
common consciousness, consistency, and purpose... For a century 
Pence has been trifling away its existence in quest of some 
better self. The result is a universal collapse... They fought. 
men Without a cause, a loyalty, or a faith... We see France as 
?e really is---a social chaos Vóf violent antagonisms, without I 




Sne'erinn allusions were thrown oùt as to the way in which 
Par. 





J r ti , ` iti1 
sro 
French were elaborately compared with the Irish. elre -- flermans 
a re...full....of contempt for an enemy who cannot -meet, them in the, 
f:i:eld.r.,,who assembles in disorderly swarms, but dissolves before 
o 
any..,f.o.r4& -set in array against him.. - ieñci?i""h re nf- or-the: 
r.e-- t- o- ±d-- . he corm: - m°an i sä This race -,- whTire 
`eng-ti"''shame te''2r- weakness, - whose virtues are not t hei- r-- -v --ìí- 
* * ; -whieh - rn°°s . porr:...them -Tike a remorseless fate1 crushing 
all their hopes and indifferent to their despair, must be hated 
with a wild unreasoning hatred... T)o : we not see in the eXtrava.R 
ant exaggeration of everything that .promises a -glimpse of favour 
irtune, in the stubborn incredulity to a-ccept the fact of 
a at- , ---3f the refuse4l to endure the lesser of two evils, a pie, 
i 
t -e- -only too familiar o us when-we review. our own history'? 
Nothing so much shocked 3ritish opinion as the demand for the 
cession of Alsace and Lorraine, but the "Times; though momentar- 
ily startled and incredulous, soon began to find excuses. The 
french determination to fight to the death for the provinces was 
(tile to "folly, vanity, and prides" and it was --idle to preach to 
right and justice on the part of others..." Germany "would never 
have thoughof demanding these long -lost jewels out of the ok3 
diadem of Germany, had it not been for the threatened invasion.", 0 
"France must pay for her wanton attack on German r . 
The arguments of Thiers, that' the success of Prussia might in 
the end be dangerous to Btitain too, brought a solemn refutation. 
"Germany may grow strong and France weak, but the strength of 
Germany is nothing to us, and we are content in our isolation. 
of 
We view with equanimity the territorial èstè1epe lent /Germany... 
-a pea-ls.a.......prove- -that the - rD tiona p+ropensities which-the 
fnnero hplie..ved_irapelled-- him -- to -war - have not:, eradii sated." 
halcaisz. af. Germanys s- mill t,ary_ .powe-r -made_ France make wary-and, 
ne -tIs aeaµ,to the same e it g,, in - r -it r . Any manif estat- 
ion of jealousy on the part of the ministers of France nips the 
growth of sympathy for the misfortunes of her people...They att- 
ribute to us an envious apprehension of the growth of our neigh 
bours which has long since ceased to be a principle of our 
c1Cna 
policy." 
It was small lronder that in Paris 
ii8marck had paid the4 irne&'(and that 
bitterness left by these attacks;'- 
.lt was small wonder, too, that the government were encouraged 
in their policy of inaction when such whole-hearted support was 
;raven to it by the only power that could effectually criticise 
their conduct. 
Lout 
1:he middle of October, however, a change was beginning 
to 
take place in the minds of the two leaders, Granville and 
4cletone, The minds of the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
l nps 
7th October - -'3rd November. ., (T., :;r 6.ïe.1.70. 
ID 
they were asking how much 
it took lotit to remove the 
02 
Secretary had already begun to diverge. Both iad been affected 
by the harshness of the peace -terms offered by Gerrla,nT, by the 
J 
siege of Paris, and by Lyons' late reports of the more concil- 
iatory spirit, or grolritng desperation, of France: but though 
each was inclined to action of a mild sort, their ideas of what 
Was desirable differed. 
Granville, who prided himself on his practical outlook,Ça d- 
e (i _.. Ö 1- " á,ß `4i -c f-s 'ol- ̂ trod -s rid 
Ifeettrrrrij wás just beginning to have an idea that so complete 
a destruction of French power might have its disadvantages. He 
ad, by now, had time to assimilate some of the new ideas that 
lire being forced'Jlipon him. He still thought a collective inter 
Mention would be a kittle matter, requiring over -delicate hand- 
ling for him to attempt it, but. he thought it would be worth 
'hile to risk an attempt to come to an understanding with Russia 
-since time had passed, and Russia- had done nothing alarming. 
October l+th he wrote to Buchanan, asking whether it would 
possible for England and Russia to come jointly to an.. under- 
atanding between themselves as. to the terms on which peace might 
e made and if Prince Go rtschakov' s answer shpuld b e in the 
frrnlative.. ,you would further. ask him whether he considers 
th t, thsre would be an y possibility of putting a stop to the 
°ierY! of Paris, if England and Russia jointly with other neutral 
°sera should make an appeal to the humanity of the King of 
ssia on the one hand and recommend moderation to the French 
'OVernnient on the other. it The terms suggested were the razing of 
t tz and Strasburg and an indemnity. The singular ineptitude of 
+,t 
second part of the proposal possibly disinclined Gortschakov 
to consider the first seriously. Perhaps he had definitely given 
up the idea of making a bargain with Britain about the Black sea 
before this , yam the progress of the war was making the alter- 
ative course less dangerous. Though the state papers do not 
throw rauch light upon the matter, the private correspondence of 
Granville and -Buchanan might do so. At any rate, nothing came of 
Granville's invitation, a resxlich he attributed to "lack of 
openness" on the part of Rus s . ' 
Italy, on October 21st, again urged intervention; "By bring - 
mg a little pressure to bear upon both belligerents the terms 
of peace could be found," she suggested, Fsnd she had information 
t Favre would treat if there were any possibility of obtain- - 
iag reasonable terms.' Granville was averse to action which. should 
include Austria and Italy, and exclude Russia, but he was nOw 
efficiently exercised in mind as to be ready to act alone. He 
took no. dvantage of Italy's offer, but, having prepared the mu- 
)Y flattery, he appealed to Prussia, in the name of what Bismark 
oslled "the English catchwords " -- H'w'aanity, C ivilisat ion, and the 
sufferings of non -combatants - --to grant an armistice. Austria 
hard of, the proposal and supported it with enthusiasm, but the 
discussions ended in nothing, for Bismarck refused flatly to 
7,rant` . revictualling of 'Paris for an equivalent period to the 
rmistice, and the French naturally said that without this there 
oeldbe no armistice for them. Annoyed by the failure, and by 
oe continued refusal of France to announce publicly that she 
Quid consent to a territorial cession, Granville relapsed into 
r;11. 
s 
Eythp courtesyaof is the Foreign (moi r3k . 1r two moral Caus es have added imm ens ely to the 
MoWp 









'°_rh1(.I3 had aî7'ZOU)^.C'ed the event- w.ith graaf ...p. r Os1t..,. 
aseinp_.:, the world that 7,ngln,ntl was "the one Euroyo?an--na.tian., 
opa;i1e of negotiating a durable peaes, because the On-e ,-na,taon_ 
which-has .no territorial tt lon to grztlf ,r, " -was -corresponging-- 
1;.-ci, ..a.nc3.f-v ic iozzs.lccus Cd.? av re of ins-incer,i -* y-: e.:ko-ap 
/ 
'4.0-wished some=--help #o---iri-ven to Frane-e--wäre-Aie,ap:ßoì.-n_ted 
ti.--4--Granville seemed-- tio-4x; co fl*.-ent_ witik--the- rQpei-1--se 
Gladstone 'rYa(1 taken late events in a different spirit. "'hough 
he had the personal dislike for the French of the English zaddile 
1 t 
Class, where Granville had a personal liking for them, yet ras 
zit in alarger mould. He could not endure the t<houglit'offstàndOt 
tag by to watch the annexation of the French provinces in a 
silence that seemed to him like complicity. This violation of 
to principles of nationality and self -determination touched the 
Idealist'. nearly. His instinct ''ras to ser .onìze, and he would 
ladlr have sho'- ri to the ^er:nan goverrne'it and people the error 
their wkrs. He was cautious---he had no intention whatever of 
kinz any action to prevent the cession - - -but he longed to 
IFeak out in thundering. periods his detestation of the outrage- - 
let his England, from her proud moral elevation, denounce the 
"eed of Prussia. H began to urge on qranville a public protest 
t,ainst the cession, and the Foreign Secretary was hard put toit 
resist him, "quite exhausted," h wrote, "after the longest 
°Rt I ever had against Gladstone." e did not want to encour- 
°prance and offend Germans by public disapproval, and he was 
ietd) of foreign invasion and to assert the rights of a great 
"r° to onstitute itself etc," Granville to Loftus ,20.140.7o 
ook, 1) He a'so wished -to suggest a plebiscite th Prussia. 
mrilre (o . .. ; 2 
obliged to ask Gladstone to restrain himself when interviewing 
the foreign ambassadors, and /not to raise illusive hopes by ex- 
pressing his opinion of the cession too freely. Gladstone him- 
self soon realised that he might get .himself into a position 
from which it would be difficult to withdraw, and constrained 
himself to'write a long and meaningless letter to Lyons, in 
which he strove to reconcile his prudence and his conscience. 
The French claim for inviolability of soil yr is quite untenable, 
he said, and their d alaration "not an inch of their territory, 
nót a stone of their fortresses," was extravagant and unreason 
able.ithe other hand, he did not wish to convey "on my part,O1. 
by implication on the part of anyone else, the belief that we 
approved of, or were in our own minds indifferent to, the trans- 
fer of Alsatians and Lo rra i ners from France to Germany against 
their wills... I should be to the last degree reluctant to be a 
party not only to stipulating a German demand of this kind, but 
even to advising or promoting a compliance with it on the part 
of France. All this you will see is quite distinct fromVand con- 
sistent with the desire which you and which we all entertain 
that the Defence Government of France should not needlessly deal 
in abstract declarations... on the failure of the armistice I 
think the cabinet will disperse, as having nothing more to con- 
sider in the present circumstances. I cannot help feeling doubts 
fal as to' "whether. the Prussians do not le ejmore than the French t 1 
bYthe unhappy failure of the negotiations. 
Granville, meantime, hoped that in the end Pimassìa would only 
48k for the fortresses, and not for the w hole of Alsace and 
TO- 
,t1.70. Lyons I p,334. 
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itoiraine. "The time may comes,' he said, "When we may use this bit 
ofbuncombe (the public protqt) with effect, and possibly help 
3ismarck by doing so." He imagined that Bismarck was against the 
annexation, and that the demand was being pressed by the mili- 
tary chiefs. This idea was founded on .Bismarck's conduct in 1866 
when with all his strength he had fought to prevent King ' illiaan 
and the generals from stripping Austria of her German provinces. in 
3zt Granville misunderstood the situation. In 1866 Bismarck had 
wished to save Austria from destruction, because he already saw 
in her a future ally; he treated her generously because he want- 
ed to have a strong and friendly power for his neighbour on the 
south, and so he would not let her be either irretrievably ruin - 
sd or unendurably humiliated. in 1870 Bismarck had no wish to 
spare France or to avoid raising in her a thtiet for revenged We 
simply wished to reduce her to such a condition that she would 
sever again be a dangerous neighbour to Germany. The "tecovery 
of Alsace and Lorraine had been with him, as with every patriot- 
is German, erg' dearest ambition, and he had intended, from the 
commencement o f the war, to secure it. Military reasons, as well 
as sentimental, played a part in his decision, and economic 
Iwhjeh seem to have been ignored by Granville) played perhaps 
he most important part of all. 
The siege of Paris dragged on, and everywhere feelings were 
tittered and tempers sharpened in consequence. In Paris itself 
thoseHlied "ele>eaeni;s which thrive on despair, darkness, and suffer- 
ing "'axed stronger and more confident : while" the Paris govern- iElq 
a °nt squabbled with their colleagues at Tours, and Gambetta felt 
the timidity of his companions, a drag on his fiery spirit, and a 
hisd 





better; 3ismarck, worked into one of his nervous fevers by. sus - 
pense and anxiety, was involved in a violent quarrel with Moltke 
and the generals. It was WI the utmost importance to him that 
Paris should fall, before any outside intervention could snatch 
the prize from his hands. "The possibility of a European inter- 
`. aL0175. 
ventior_ was a cause''of disquietude and impatience to yfe in view 
of the slow progress of the siege... If...the hostile elements 
and the jealous dishonest friends, who were not wanting to us in 
any of the courts, had succeeded in bringing about an understand- 
ing between the other powers, or even between any two of them, 
to address to us a warning or a question, ostensibly suggested 
by philanthropic feelings, no one could know how quickly a first 
movement of this kind might develope to a collective and in the 
P-1) 
first instcance diplomatic attitude of the ±veutrals.:.An inter- 
vention, which could only tend to depri e,us Germans of the ` 
prize of victory, by means of a Congress Moltke, foiilitary 
reasons, was not ready to bombard, and held on his way 
ff 
undis- 
turbed by the Chancellor's storms, and by the exhortations which 
reached him from á1V quarters of Germany. 
The English attempt at mediation had but one result: Russia 
feared that it might be the beginning of a more decided policy, 
and considered that shay must act now or never. On the 31st of 
October she issued a circular denouncing the Black Sea clauses 
of the Treaty of Paris. 
4) ,w I I,.,e 
ÚiSx .; .: . //1. außer Moltke, gehict .. s,.;< st unm Immer um das Ding herum, Beater Moltke sei nicht dumm, 
Mach doch endlich Bum, Bum, Bum! 
A A - w. -ka (AZ kj s,,t 
G1, ` a.-(' /"- 
A great politicalentus impresses something of' his own char - 
acter on the age in which he lives ); and the influence of eis- 
marck's career was already noticeable in the change which had 
stolen vw1J- i19 gradually over international aff ai rs -- -the 
growing spirit of lawlessness, the less care taken to hide naked 
greed with a mask of morality, the more open tribute paid to 
brute force. This change was for the first time clearly express- 
ed in the Mack Sea Circular put forth by Gortschakov. 
"Le Traitê du 18 - - -3r 1.!ars 1856 n'a d'ailleurs pas échappé, 
eaza dérogations dont la plupart des transactions européennes ont 
été frappé, et en presence desquelles il serait difficile d' 
firmer que le droit écrit, fonde sur le respect des traites; comme 
base du droit publique et régle des rapports entre les États,ait 
conserve la méme sanction morale qu'il a pu avoir en fi,$utres 
temps," 
The danger which threatened ,Turope by the denouncement of the 
Slack Sea engagements lay in this, not in any material loss or 
gain to any power concerned. The treaty, as far as these clauses 
ere concerned, was absurd; it was a treaty that should never 
save been signed, resulting from a war that should never have 
bien fought: Europe would gain, not lose, by the abrogation of 
the unnatural and art ifict*l restriations it had imposed on 
14ssia. But the circumstances in which Russia had obtained her 
ieliverance were ominous. The deliberate flouting of law, the 
unscrupulous repudiation of solemn engagements, and the open and 
ccntennptuous ádnission that one of the great powers of Europe 
knowledaed material force as the only restraint and rule of 
her actions,----all this warned observers whither the new Mach - 
iavellism initiated at 'Berlin was carrying the world. Putting 
all question of law and morality aside, the political situation 
was equally dangerous for great Britain. She found herself isol- 
ated: only from Austria; the weakest of the great powers, could 
she se --a& support against Russia. 
For a long time Britain had been satisfied to rely on a 
single friend, and that friend attached to her by the slenderest V 
ties. She had stood by to see this solitary ally destroyed, and 
she now discovered that, without the support of France, her in- 
fluence in Europe had vanished. She was powerless. Her protests 
were disregarded, her friendship or her enmity valued by none, 
because no one believed she would strike in her own defence. Her 
statesmen had frequently proclaimed that the alliance of' the 
Western Powers upheld the peace of Europe, meaning by this that 
Britain was able to restrain the aggressive and ambitious spirit 
of Prance: but they now found their statement was true in an- 
other sense, and that only the-good understanding of the western 
Powers could prevent any action, however illegal, undertaken by 
the Powers of the North. Their policy of peace, quiet, non -in- 
tervention had led them to a situation where there was no remedy 
but the sword. Unless they were nrepared.to fight, they must 
stánd by to watch an outrage on the public law of Europe, and 
al 
a treaty, which they valued highly, impudently thrown aside. The 
policy they had so long pursued, of confining their attention 
to internal affairs and personal intere6ts, or neglecting their 
rlò 
They afterwards sasserted that they attached no value to the 
treaty; but their policy had been for some time directed chiefly 
to preserve it. Moreover the Crimean war had been prolonged for 
Other Year to obtain the Black Sea cla:ises only, all the other 
t' hay in been secured in 1855. 
military resources ..nd relying on their strong natural frontier, 
the sea, for defence -- -this policy had only been possible when 
they had a strong ally in Turope. °.y Ilac often said that only - 
Egan ,' aaÿ onets-- uph-el-&- -t=he- dynasty-of 3ona.pa-rt-e,- .:. -they hack - no-t-- 
realiseel---how- -far -those rrench bayonets upheld also British pres- 
tige on the..Cont inent. ,,Tow France- was no longer ,a--f-actor in the 
political-balance in Europe, they must either rely on their own .. 
'strength, or abdicate the position which 3ritain held as a great 
power. That strength was g _.at : perhaps no power in Europe -had 
Bach vast resources, moral and material, on which to draw. But,' 
ffie_libaral ,Tovernment hardly realised this. Even hark. _their-. 
wishes nn.i...been so pacific, they would not have dared to fi;ht; 
for-they feared another débacle- such --r --tr y rad -kn.own in the 
kigisa2) 
They found now of how little value was their' assumption of a 
superior political morality. rnhe great strength of the gospel 
of force is that it cannot be countered by a morality that is 
in any degree false and unreal; and the weakness of British pol- 
itical morality was that it did not rest on facts; it was uncon- 
sciously insincere. Devoted as often were the menvwho upheld it, 
r °t there was always a certain amount of truth in the accusation 
of foreigners, when they said that Britain wanted peace for the 
sscurity of her iianulgnturee and trade. Consciousness of mili- 
"a1f Weakness, fear of offending the mercantile classes, and 
society to concili&te those classes by economy, all played their 
arr) as well as sincere abhorrence of the brutality of war, in 
Forming that dtep love of peace that existed in the ;overn ent. 
the men who made up that :goverrunent- -n °ere-conscious ,. po- 
S'ß1 
çAtes.-i.._p 'acticed- self -deceivers, the r =never- stöppe-d -to -- analyse 
their ov ar vcs: e z hsse i f 1 . hdá helped - to 
decide the- government t.o_- ,a4a31410a Denmark -in- 1864,_= -when they 
found. they 'oust. fight without, an ._ally. This was known- .abroa ra 3 
foreign .states íunjus.tly ,enòu Y) never again credited - o- r°<reß 
t a, ,t;.s- -- -The -- ,g alaume Britain 
was not the martyr of her conscience but of her weakness. He oioq 
that turns the other cheek to a blow, not through self- control 
but because he is unable to resist, 11eEr expect no admiration. 
ed= .t12eelf_e 
4' 
> é -str y- beg e .pacsasehaws.. r f. nth 
.. and:,x.est-f-orrz>r.-1 zer ~ c a.e 
j7ttaìn. 
In the East, she had to face the alliance of what were now 
the only two European powers as strong as herself - -- Russia and 
Germany. For a time there was a danger that a third enemy, and 
one that could injure her in a more vulnerable spot, would join 
itself to these two. Bismarck had already threatened Loftus with 
aGerman- American alliance, when annoyed with 3ritdan for ex- 
porting arms`-to France. There had been a long and bitter quarrel1C 
between Britain and the .tmited F7tates since 1862, when the care- 
lessness and indecision of Riissell and Palmerston had allowed 
the Confederate frigate Alabama jto escape from an English port. 
711e States claimed a huge compensation, and the agreement 
arrired at by Clarendon with their agents had been repudiated by 
the Senate, so that the difficulty was still dragging on. soon 
4ter the Franco- German *war began, Bismarck thought to take ad- 
`e 
tape of this, but the ascendancy of the Monroe Doctrine in 
343 
action the British government intended to take against Russia, 
, and Thiersv had rushed to Lyons to propose an anti-Russian alli -- '1.14 
ante of Britain, Austria, Italy, France, Turkey, and Spain---the last- 
named state, having made a few mild efforts in favour of collect- 
ive mediation, might be ready to go further. British opinion was 
greatly excited, and the press waaj( talking of such a combin- 
ation as this. Buchanan had not waited for instructions before 
telling Gortschakov that he expected orders to ask for his pass- 
ports at once, and the '9ritish ambassador at Constantinople was 
equally martial in tone. The rimes', y61jjE a few weeks before, 
had proclaimed that if Russia had ever contemplated such a move- 
mt, "she must now perceive thatN`' en the opportunity is lost, for it 
is now300oiaiet#o oarelyrance ti,ead: tt or lete ̀ tt rye r on the 
connivance of Prussia in an attack on Turkey... It is a grave 
error, .to believe that any German power can ever be indifferent 
to the fate of Turkey. But th é Thunderer now remarked that it3tr 
had expected the circular for some time, though it1/ wseÁ 
'grievously disappointedin Alexander II, and that "it is impose - 
ible to admit for a moment the power claimed by the Tsar to free 
himself fromvthe obligations of the treaty of Paris.Russia 
has placed herself -in the position of a public enemy, " it added,~ 
but "even if France were ten times more utterly annihilated (situ 
than Russia, perhaps, Imagines her to be, there would still remain 
sufficient strength in Europe to curb Russian ambition, no J 
matter on what ground the contest might have to be carried on, 7 
beside the banks of the Danube or the waters of the E xine. 
So great and so general was the excitement that the government 
considered 
it wise to postpone the meeting of parliament, which 
1.1 6; 16 ,' 18 < ) 1V 
had already been delayed., lest attacks should be made on the 
policy of "laisser faire." 3ernstorff reported`` that it was eitia- 
pected that. "the Tower. House will if necessary vote like one man 
against Gladstone for war with Russia. The Ministry takes the 
matter very seriously, but will make no war if they can avoid 
it." Later he wrote, "He (Granville) holds it desirable that, in 
the interests of peace, to Conference should be concluded beforQ 
the meeting of Parliament. 
For the government did not for a moment contemplate strong 
action against Russia. Gladstone was so anxious to avoid being 
drawn into a quarrel that-he even ,opposed the sending of a 
special envoy, Odo Russell, to negotiate with :3ismarck at the 4j /i 
German Headquarters. Bit wrote from a sick -bed to plead for 
peace. "No war, I hope and believe. My interference on our part 
would fail, and General Grant would come down on you for payment . 
d the Alabama claims and an apology. Then the blackness of 
darkness. War would destroy your government and ruin your own 
reputation. The ruffians of the "Times "will support you only to 
betray.., I ,do not complain of Lord Granville's despatch- - -but- 
You should negotiate and yield---first because it is just and 
Second because you cannot avoid it... Be strong for peace - -- and'i'n( 
show a good front against the +services' and all who would urge 
You to military preparations. Every man added to the forces and 
sperY ship put in commission strengthens your opponents and 
weakens your own poweQ9 " 
Popular excitement had obliged Granville to write a strong 
Bernstorff to 3ismarck, 13.ßy,1470. The Same 2.A.70. Rheinclave. 
Bright II) p,417 -8. 
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despatch, in which, adcording to the "Times; he "conveys a. most 
cutting reproof to the Russian minister...and puts him complete- 
ly in the wrong...Our Government is so scandalised ë. this neiv 
mode of Russian aggression that it refusedv altogether to enter 
into the merits of the question except to say *that it is im- 
possible for ßär Majesty: -Government. to give any sanction to (loi) 
the course announced by prince Gortschakov.' " This despat ch, how - 
7. 
ever, and Granville's declaration that the T,eaty of Paris must 
stand or fall as a whole, were nothing more than bluff. The best 
the Government hoped for was a Conference, and even that was not 
so easy to obtain. 
ku awrP 
ry 4,4a.ast4TE3 had fallen on France. Metz had surrendered, as a 
result of imperialist' intrigues set on foot by Bismarck, and 
so Gambetta's new levies had to be flung into the field after 
three Weeks' training. A balloon» containing the plans of the `= 
hew campaign, came down in the German camp. A sudden rising of 
the Marne interfered with the necessary military movements. But 
Paris still held out, though psoltke had boasted that he would 
be shottngghares over his own ground before the end of October. 
loth Austria and France suggested that the presence of Odo 
Wiase11 at Versailles might be used to force Bismarck to consent 
t°8/1 armistice; but Granville refused, and told Lyons to Hex - 
piain to them (the French ministers) that it (the Russian circ- 
118-r1 is, at t '- e very least, subject-for th. lol) fr th 
an for us 
- , - yia,:-Mart-saa 
14P*ttewe,Ale.ere'rrcrrAC`Cr-titxsan-,help:by.::.;e f.frrirt°g---trire* ' 
1111/T r( t4 GO 1 o VE .. -1 17.1 fo. 11. o. Lyons Vold I. - ` ̀ ,,,° 
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Only the daring of their envoy at Versailles saved the E;ov- 
arnment frr'i poìnp /ete. humiliation. Russia. Seas at first inclined 
to, refuse a conf erence, and - isma.rck would give no support to 
3ritairi. "They wish 70S+ Strongly here for an understanding with 
102) 
Prussia," 3ernstorff reported, and the er_Zroy had special instruct.- 
Lions to take the greatest care not to annoy Bisnnarck, and to 
avoid all ref ere-rice to the questions of peace or armistice with 
Trance, unless the Chancellor himself introduced the subject. 
fisrck's first reception of the overtures was cold and dis- 
103) 
couriging, and Granville was much'ldisappoi 'item; but by good luck 
thè Chancelior took a liking to Odo Russell, and the envoy, on 
his own responsibility, boldly told him that Britain would go to 
war) with or without allies, if Russia did not consent to a on- 
!erence in London. Bismarck dared not take the risk. He was 
annoyed with kilssia., who had made her declaration at an incon- 
venient moment. He promised to put pressure on Russia to accept, 
nd became very friendly with Russell, talking of Germany as the 
natural ally" of 'Britain, and saying that Germany could. not 
1elect th e chance of such an alliance "eve1L t the cost of '1 4 
144). 
saCriftci7? .existing friendships.' 
The conference, it Was arranged, T ould :''feet in London in 
luluarp, and Prussia, admitted to the conference of 1856 only 
onsufferance, now issued the invitations, and signalised her 
ntrFnee into Balkan politics by arranging the Eastern Question. 
"I BM afraid, " wrote Granville, "Our whole success has been 
lÓ)I m'rnstorff to :3isria,rck, 18 Jov. 1877. kh?inclor_f, p. 112. 
loa' 
The sa'iQ, 23 Nov. 1870. ileìndorf p. 186. 4) 
°do issell to Granville, 18 Dec. 1870.. Granville, 11, p.74. 
sB7 
owing to. the belief that we would go to war, and to tell the 
truth I think that Anwar in some s. ape or other, sooner or later, 
IOT 4:14. 
was a possible risk after our no ." 
While the preparations for the Black Sea Conference went on, 
the patriotic enthusiasm ly Germany, which had alreadÿ` been 
shown in devoted and heroic service, culminated in a final demand 
for national unity which swept away all possible opposition on 
the part of individual governments. Bismarck's long- sustained 
efforts were crowned with complete success. A deputation from 
all the German states offered the Imperial crown to the King of 
Prussia, and on December 18th he was proclaimed German Emperor 
at Versailles. 
Granville at last attempted to do something for France by in- 
sisting that French plenipotentiaries should be invited to the 
Conference. He would, he said, permit no discussion of the posi- 
tionUof France while the sittings lasted; but when the negoti- 
ations were concluded, therèwas nothing to prevent the French 
plenipotentiaries from introducing the subject if they pleased- - 
and if anyone remained tovlisten to them. This rather vague 
promise was received with little enthusiasm in France, but it 
caused considerable anxiety to -Bismarck. "Even at Versailles," 
he wrote later, "If red that the participation of France in the / 
London Conference...might be used in order, with the assurance 
that Talleyrand had eho n f at Vienna, to graft the Franco -German 
question onto the programme for discussion, For that reason,not- 
withstanding recommendations`-from many quarters, I prevented, by 
(lp,rra`nv ill e ,)ec, TR , e,. , /. to Gladstone 8.á,27o. , =ö -=r.6. Gladstone II' ( 33 
Sea 
influences at home and abroad, the participation of Favre in the 
(1019 /1.'7 
Conference. _ Tn cau ed it to be understood at 
Bordeaux, through Russian channels, that he would permit no dis- 
cussion of the peace terms even /if France went to the Conference, 
Granville's letter, announcing to Favre that Prussia had at last 
consented to grant a safe -conduct, written on December 29th, was 
delayed in the German camp till January 10th, and when, after 
waiting three days, Favre wrote to Bismarck to ask for the safe - 
conducts, Bismarck replied that Favre should have applied toythe 
military authorities, and that as he had not done so the safe - 
conducts could not be granted, for if Bismarck himself sent them 
it would imply an official recognition of the Government of 
national Defences Finally he told Favre that in the negotiations 
for the surrender of Paris which were inevitably approaching,he 
required his personal presence, and Favre, who had already post 
poned his departure on a romantic scruple when thl bombardment, 
ioTA 
began, was constrained to accept this virtual command. It was 
not until the last sitting of the Conference that a French ple- 
nipotentiary at last appeared in ̀ time to append his signature. s' 
The French government have been frequently blamed for failing 
to Beize the chance offered an others besides Bismarck t d 
have drawn comparisonsvwrith 1815. This is hardly just. France i 
hel no Talleyrand in 187n, and, what was more important, Britain 
hot no Wellingtondf Neither the solemn and pr iggish old man who 
lib the ministry, nor the piCadstit ,selfish, and unimaginative 
14 teeen who was foreign secretary, could have played the part 
(., 2 b' d 
paarelIZarck . , II -Chala- II) pp. 287---3o5. Rheindorf) p. 124. Su.41.(.0 
SAg 
. or the Plenipotentiarto the vienna Congresso, wi nn-ad foreriítf grPat`sta-tesman-.with-tha-eouvage 
en erciy ---off -- 
Moreover, Great Britain was not in the same position in 1874r1 
as in 1815, and even with thèl best of goodwill her government 
could not have exercised the same influence, without changing 
their foreign poli5cy. Then she had been the strongest power in 
Europe, flushed/with triumph after a great war, and now she was 
trying to cover with fair words a humiliating diplomatic defeat. 
Then she could count on the support of' a great power, Austria, 
against a power hardly then of the first rank, Prussia. Now she 
had the friendship of two weak powers, Pally sáîgd drefated Austria! 
against the greatest military power in Europe, fresh from three 
successful wars, and supported by kussiaG it is doubtful, in 47.7 
these conditions, whether Talleyrand himself could have produced 
the understanding between the powers that was the necessary con- 
dition t the success of a peaceful intervention. In London 
feeling against Russia was too strong for these powers to work 
together, and when backed only by the weaker states the 3ritish 
government would not have ventured to take up a determined posi- 
ion against Germany. France could have done nothing with Italy 
and Austria alone. Moreover, the peace terras were not to be in-- 
oluded in the deliberations of the conference; they were only to 
.oe introduced, by a luckychance as it were, when the sittings 
Here concluded. Prussia-could easily have avoided a reply by 
°aYing t:!Rt her representative had no full powers to deal with 
an exterior question, and could then have withdrawn. There wasp 
ihaddition to all this, a strong feeling in France that the 
co411trY should not either allow herself to be represented as a 
free agent, or 4» commit herself to t'r_P approval of terms which 
shé was in any case powerless to modify. 
No doubt it would have 'been wiser to catch at every straw, 
and'to send some ether representative when Favre's departure 
v;as prevented; but it is not probable that any-real success 
could have been attained, beyond the official recognition of the 
Government of National 1)efence. The time for outside intervent- 
ion had passed with the old year. 
Russia could afford to make concessions. She had obtained 
all she wished for at the cost of the paper and ink with which 
her circular was written, and no doubtt herms n-W 
lawadar,- only regretted that she had not asked for more. 
der Bismarck's persuasion, Go rtchakov consented to write a 
second note, in which he said that he could not allow that the 
abrogation of a theoretical principle without immediate ~applic- 
ation, and which only restores to Russia a right of which no 
great Power ought to be deprived, can be sonsidered as a menace 
for peace, or that annulling one point of the Treaty of 1856 im- 
plies the annuliäent of all. a Britain declared herself satisfied 
with this. The `Times'thad changed its tune, scenting danger, te- 
?'es`e"*L449 and declared that the honour of England was satid- 
While praising Granville, s statesmanlike handling of the 
fair. Granville stipulated that the decision of the Conference 
should not be considered a foregone conclusion; but this d- not 
parent Europe from thinking it so, as r t was Andeed st4 
Ater protracted discussions, the Conference finally adopted a. 
toeol which said that!mIt is an essential principle of the 
Ike en 4\10f Nations that no power can liberate itself froní a Treaty n 
formodifY the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of 
s 
5581 
the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangements', 
The Conference then abrogated the clauses,14 and 19, of the 
Treaty of Pariswhich had been repudiated by Russia, and made 
anew arrangement which authorised Turkey to forbid the entrance 
of ships of war into the Dardanelles. The British government, 
proclaimed that everything had been satisfactorily arranged. 
Nevertheless they had no more than draw a decent veil 
over a humilating defeat. TheIepiódbàe of the Conference only 
showed that any power, which was in a strong enough position to 
repudiate its treaty obligations, might count on having that re- 
pudiation ratified by Europe, if ready to make a few concessions 
as to the phraseology used. such success as Great Britain had 
obtained was due in great part to the unauthorised threats of 
her agent at Versailles that she meant to go to war ---that is, 
simply to the momentary belief that she was ready to meet force "2 5' 
with force. The fact that the engagements in question were much 
better abolished did not alter the fact that Britain had been 
mocked at and defied. These ltttgagements had been regarded by 
her ministers as reasonable, desirable, and necessary, and they 
bad just refused an offer to alter them by "amicable arrangement 
in.return for Russia's support abroad.q'rrr--crtriteaa---e4ft-tre-,--i-rt---t.he 
408- pobitiuri , J' other t ea- 
4-41140) 
While the ministry were eagerly proclaiming "Doch die Katze, 
d1e Katz' ist gerettet ; and pluming themselves on theirYmoder- 
ation and good management, the peace preliminaries, and the 
final peace terms, were concluded in France. Bismarck made only 
' "o concessions to the efforts of Thiers to soften his heart. 
The indemnity, originally fixed at six milliaYtds of francs, was 
reduced to five milliards; and he had given the French negotiat- 
ors the choice between the cession of Belfort, and a German entry 
into paris. Thiers and his fellows immediately resolved to keep 
Belfort ; the Emperor William, when asked for his preference, 
chose the triumphal entry, t i-R44 c a sent -oihe ' . i -tom 
su; s ! bout Afterk the 
signature of the peace preliminaries, the Commune and its attend- 
ant horrors, besides again alienating public opinion in Great 
Britain, gave Bismarck excuse to break some of the pledges 
he had made at Versailles and make the definitive terms more '2 
stringent. By the Peace of rrankfort, Alsace and about two -f if t13. 
of Lorraine, including Metz, were ceded to Germany; one milliard 
le 
indemnity was to be paid by France before the end. of 1871, the 
remaining fogy. within three years. ter- - payment of 
iza --emu e dCpen_ Svrsiner Ske4414444446114imre, 
er-- - woulst b:0--- t g-tri -' iuiri ái ñ Ë _ delrdrtrlettS 
e; Seine -et -Oise, Seine -et- Marna, and- iM, -:.a i.th a. FaF et7 
fAGíi paw frieva^ uitu- ̀  wzaa. te -tp( 144. eva, od, 1,1X- 
the territory between the 21Toselle and the Marne would be occu- 
pied until the indemnity was completely paid off. The army of 
lecupation was to be supported by France, and had the right to 
iTTp supplies of all 'kinds if not punctually provided. Various -{-' 
orkis of art were confiscated with which to adorn Berlin. Then 
ismarck, like King Ant iochús, "when he had taken all away, went 
into his own land, having made a great massacre, and spoken very 
proucy n 






the went to the two 
Northern Powers. Prussia was now the rq1i4g1pewer in a new 
German Empire, which was beyond question the strongest state in 
gurope. Bismarck had obtained a complete military and diplomatie 
success, had established German unity, and added two new provin- 
ces to the FInpire. The great rival had been ruñ aed, it seemed, 
beyond recovery, and Germany was in a position so secure as to 
/to 
fear dattack from oAts, singlevpower. 
Russia had also gained much, in recovering her sovereign 
rights in the Black Sea, and the peattical status which she had 
lost by the Crimean War. she was already doubtful, however, 
whether in the pursuit of her own advantage she had not allowed 
things to be pushed too far against France; whether the ascend- 
ancy of Germany was not too complete; and whether the entrance 
of that power into Eastern politics was altogether to be desired... 
Francekeet apparently) permanently deduced to the" rank of 
a second -rate power, and for the present, at least, she was a 
negligtable' quantity in international politics. 
Austria also had lost much. The success of Prussia had been 
áo great that all hope of revenge ensiollenxust be abandoned, and 
!Istria had seen her only ally destroyed. The Eastern Question 
had. been settled in favour of Nussia, without Austria being able 
e 
obtain any compensating advantage for herself. 
galy had profited by the crisis to complete her unification, 
for the districts still held by Austria, and had made Rome 
td, February 23rd, .while Broglie only arrived in London with 
the request of the French gpvern-ment that Granville would protest 
on the night of the 24th, and when the remonstrance arrived it. 
°nY annoyed and exasperated -Bismarck. 
5'94 
her wog; but she found herself in an uncertain and isolated 
position. She could ño lónger rely on the friendship of France, 
and the only alternative was an understanding with , if 
S%, 
Germany, Mould think it worth while to enter 
one. Austria also saw the necessity of such a step, 
''fa 
eiplikitua was soon shown by the dismissal of Beust, and his re- 
placement by Andrassy, who Sas in favour of friendship with 
GermaiY. If, however, Italy should enter into an alliance with 
Germany, and Austria did the same, then Italy must give up all 
hope of elitataiìg Ts*ht and Trieste. 
After France, Great' -Britain was the power that had lost most.' 
The prestige that she had partly regained by her conduct in 1867 
was now thrown away through her owh indecision and weakness, and 
failure to play the part in international which her 
strength and resources justly entitled her. Had she 64;í';c4, 
giti}v to support either Germany or France, she might at least 
have gained the respect of her neighbours by a display of resol- 
ution and strength. Had she decided to hold the balance equally 
between them, and by intervention to prevent any really serious 
alteration of the relative strength of the two powers, and any 
S 
a'oure of success by either of them, shevwould have played an 
honoura j1 .part, and would ?-s ve obtained the gratitude and the 
support of the me »t part of the neutral powers. She would have 
shown herself in her old position, defender of the balance of 
power in Europe. As it was, she was universally believed to have 
oeen guided only by selfish rintEves, while at the same time not 
daring to make any bold stroke to secure her own interests; and 
She had tried to conceal her selfish and her timidity by glib 
-5' 5 
talk about heunanity and civilisation and peace, while all the 
time her trade and industry"were profiting by the war. This view 
was ? 4-:aojust one, but her attitude had lent itself to this 
conclusion, and it was no marvel that she was thus regarded. 
luence in the-counc-ila...of -Euro-pe° hatt-etee- 
g.pea -1- -as- -that . of. -Franr9 
The interests of airope in general had suffered by the in- 
creased spirit of lawlessness, exemplified by Russia's repud- 
iation of the Treaty of paris, and Prussia's of the Luxembourg 
Guarantee The brutal character of the war 
had also pian unpleasant effect, and though some attempt was made 
to repair this by the peace Congresses later, which condemned - 
1 of the methods employed by the German command during the 
war, their efforts were handicapped by the refusal of Great 
Britain (apparently out of pique wit r_ Russia, the convener) to 
attend the Congresses. In addition to this, the cause of peace 
was 
damaged by the almost exclusive ascendancy in Europe of 
a state whose policy was based on material force. 73ismarck in- 
tended to mend his ways: now that his work was done, and German/ 
united and secure e meant to be as law -abiding and pacific as 
anyone could desire. But the Vcritical years of the founding of 
the Empire had left an indelible mark on the character of its 
people, it was inevitable in the circumstances that a dispositiòfl 
ehóuld exist to rate material power above moral law. Moreover, 
he,that calls in the sword to decide must always live in fear 
that others may appeal to that decision. "Coalitions are your 
nightmare," said Schouvalov to 13ismarck later. Coalitions - - -of 
t' Such as shooting of franc -tireurs, taking of hostages, etc. I1I, Chap. 24, etc. 
'64,4n,an e 1tß,,, 
/, 
ota.tes injured by or threatened by Germany - -- continued to be the 
nightmare of every German statesman. The tranquillity, which de- 
pended chiefly on the overwhing strength of one power, and 
the weá kness and disunion of the others, was unreal and illus- 
ory. The system of. international law, frail as it was, built up 
slówly and gradually through several centuries, had been shaken 
to its foundations in the last ten years, and nothing had taken 
place, save doctrines of self- interest. Eúrope was in the 
position of a country where through some financial cataclysm 
credit has failed, and the tokens, which have hitherto regul- 
ated .the market and bound together the community, no longer pass 
current : where every man clings to what he has, and none dare 
trust another. 
In the midst of this time of danger and doubt, it is inter- 
eating to note Granville s final comment on the result of the 
war, and the emotions which the communication of the peace terms 
roused in his mind. 
"Vae Victis indeed!pow hard the conquerors have been, and wht 
eristake in a great country like Germany to give up all direct- 
"ton 
of its affairs tó --one- -bold unscrupulous man! We . do not be- 
lieve in France being able to bear the burden that has been put 
'1Pon her 
"1Presume one of the results will be *o put protectionist 





Jer VI. ' L pe "'itho.ut France, 1871 --78. 
I. 
'Europe has lost a mistress and gained a master," said a 
511 aip.lonmat. The bon mot had truth in it: when the supre?sac'f 
anee in Europe was replaced by that of Gerrna.ny, an eí7sent- 
', ial change took place, 
First and foremost, the ascendancy of France, save in the 
of the first Aapoleon, had never been so complete as that 
?rri;av1z7 was now. ln 1871 there 'Ara g no sinr!le power that could 
Germany Cn equal terse in war, nor were thesnt many which 







e had never been in a position relatively so strong. She 
lwa.ys been surrounded by great powers, nearly, if not 




e was opposed by Britain, with her great resources rmobil- 
ar,d ready for action. ''Tai olon's success had larrratly been 
possible by' the weakness and pusillanimity of Prussia, and 
havinv Russia far a time his accomplice. In normal conditions 
"mhen the unmanageable genius of a Napoleon had not to ne 





by France as by Ger.,is.ri,U. If Germany chose again, as she had 
before, to appeal to the decision of war, there was no 
r that dared face her alone. 
In the second place, the ascendancy of France had never 
based ao completely upon material force as was that of 
nY) not even in the days of _Tapoleon. France had always 
resented an ideal, and had always owed something of her 
542. 
strength to. the influence, sometimes romantic, sometimes int eli- 
ectua,l, which she exercised over the minds of men. 
"Franc e, famed in all great arts, in none supreme," had, by 
this very quality, alwa :rs exercised a charm over the irnagina.tioQ. 
v 
The many-sided developement of the national life -- -- nowhere. 
stunted, :nowhere overgrown----lead produced a civilisation that 
7a1re a remarkable impression of gracefulness, symmetry, complete- 
ness----qualities that se.Tned associated, on the one hand with 
her natural formation, the gracious interrainglìcìg of every 
various kind of scenery_ ---and on the other with the finesse, the 
precision, the elegance of her language. T owhere in ,urope, 
perhaps, were there minds so ready to perceive new possibilities.* 
and so eager to carry them from the realms of speculation into 
those of act ion. I wás inert .so Jinueh /tha tiEranc e originated new 
ideas as that she was the 'first to grasp their significance and 
cam- t:aea out. From France had come the spiritual impulse, as 
from 3ritain the material, which, in a double revolution, had 
transforried0 the o1d,_u*mrid-.ifito the new. France had made the 
Ideas of liberty, ()Ir. equality, .atià: -.òf :nationality part of the: 
intellectual currency of . urope: and. there was no European state 
hose character and history had not been essentially modified by 
the doctrines proclaimed by ;_? e French Revolution. It was only' 
since France had loosed the itevblution that the old absolute 
n9n rchies had found they could not afford to continue longer 
L 
V 
°stagnation. France had given many of her neighbours a new 
or law and an impet,tá tr reform, ?r-d had helped to create 
- Btates that were now caking their own contribution to the 
,4 
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welfare of the community. The power of France rested on this 
spiritual influeoe as much as on her 3nilitary and material 
strength. This made Pble Arid. cum raitart turn to her far sympathy, 
and sent Italian, Swiss, and Irish volunteers to Bight under 
her ba,nners. 
The power of Germany rested on Radowa and Sedan. Germany 
had produced great thoughts and great art, but her intellectual 
deve.lopement had nothing to do with her European position. In 
the critical years of Germany, s recent history, her great 
thinkers and artists for'.the most part dissociated themselves 
with her political ana national revival. Krner wrote battle 
songs, but Goethe stood apart. The work of Goethe and Schiller, 
Kant and Hegel, swayed the :aincis of raen; but it had not availed 
ape jot to seduce the heart of Alsace back to her old Fatherland 
or to bring °a- sTagle, foreigï volunteer to the German army. The 
unification of Ge.;rvicLn:j and her subsequent success were not due 
to the influence of poet and philosppher, who for years had 
preached and pro litlecied in vain: they were due to Bismarck's 
statecraft, and to "'blood and iron." 
I 
The danger of the exclusive domination of one great military 
power was increased by the disorder and disintegration of she 
Test of the continent The rerne,ining states were all at c.ross- 
urposes, each trying to stand alone, and for the most part 
Tegarding its neighbours with suspicion or hostility. Not one of 
aer1, however, was so co i pletely isolated as Great Britain. 
`once had been the Only state with really strong motives for n 
411 
ance with Britain, but France was no longer a possible ally. 
Not only was she too weak to be muc'n use, but Bismarck could 
dictate her foreign policy as long as the (erplan 
army of occup- 
ation remained. Even after this, he Made it one of the chief 
objects of his statecraft to sow distrust Between France and 1) 
Britain, and prevent any understanding between thei. 
Political opinion in Britain was so inimical to Russia that 
it was vain to hope for a reconciliation until circumstances 
should have completely changed --- -until British states ien ceased 
o regard the large space occupied by Hussia. on the map of the 
rorld. as outweighing all advantages of wealth, organisation, 
and climate possessed by other states; and ceased to have period 
is nightmares in which they saw the Preob.ra jenski Guards pouring 
through the passes to Jellala,bad, and Alexander, like Vryezhie 
()leg, "fasten his shield to the gates of Tsargrad. ". 
Italy had always a friendly regard. for Britain, but her 
gratitude was counterb.ale.nced by the fact. that she felt she 
could not place any reliance on. the efficacy of British support, 
so that her weakness forced her to search for a more dependable 
411y' The same was the case with Austria. A short while before V 
loth these states would have triuiingl_y entered into an under - 
stulding with Britain, but since the Franco - German war theyire -- 
garded it as unsafe to count upon that power. 
The dangers to which this isolation laid Britain open had 
°en demonstrated by the -31ack Cea affair. it was obvious that 
p any of the great powers should snake a similar at teítipt, Brit- 
. 
111% let either throw away her principles and prepare for war, 
o° Busch, II, p. 235. 
rp, 
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or definitely abdicate her position aft atirst--gate `pA`x-er. 
The 1ritish government, however, in spite of some impress- 
declarations, (lid not iRcike any attempt to revise their poi- 
joy in the ;rears. followin ; the war. They apparentily regarded the Hi. 
chief difficulties as past, as soon as peace Was declared, and 
'sere ready to immerse themselves once more in internal affairs. 
An opportunity soon offered of showing their pacific and 
disinterested views. The United States had finally consented to 
an arbitration over the Alabama claims. The 3oard of Arbitration 
i . . ..,... 
consisted of representatives of Great Britain, the United Statep) 
Switzerland, Italy, and Brazil, and it demonstrated the hostil- 
ity' to Britain which existed on'the Continent, for the Swiss and 
the Italian displayed strong animosity towards her cause. The 
3razilian's friendly disposition somewhat improved. matters, but 
even then the compensation awarded was so large that the British 
delegate, Lord Cockburn, said that he would have resigned, had 
he been the government, rather than sign the treaty. The concil- 
iatory attitude of Britain was quite wasted on its audience; (tiete 
C6-74- iuptett 
T ó ì:u7 y the Eux-apean. powers 441,1J:(., 
01- 
looked on the matter as one more example of British cowardice - 
Stna,T arrtd ° íe6.6,t adoe.liwj 
when dealing with a s -tat 4-not-- r,a_.e, _.:a._ . 
Bismarck had to a large extent alienated the sympathies of 
4 
the Liberals during thewar, and they were at first divided be- 
tween dislike and distrust, and a desire to keep on friendly 
teins with him. Odo kussell, who had been sent as ambassador to 
3erlin, was deeply impressed by the strength of Germany;le - 
Bismarck, he wrote, had two objects 
'(i) the supremacy of Germany in Europe, and of the German race 
in the world. (2) The neutralisation Of the influence and power 
of the Latin race in France and elsewhere. To obtain these ob- 
jecte he will go any length while he lives, so that we must be 
prepared for surprises in the future." .Englishpolacky, he con- 
tinued, should aim at a "reestablisï;ment of the Balance of Power 
in Europe on ̀ a general peace footing...,Ger.nany is in reality a 
i1* £3, 229,166. 
A 1 Lyons, +14.`.73. Lyons Vol. II. 
ht 
a great camp ready to break !zp for any war at a week's notice 
with a million of men....I believe myself that the alliance and 
understanding between Russia and Germany, (ortschakov and Bis- 
f arkic ifi real, intimate and sincere; and that they have agreed 
to preserve Austria as long as she obeys and serves them." .0á 
A 4-- --prob fiy `arrt -elte 
-t-P . " 
despatches siAcla t cony inc edhis govern - 
rnent that it would not be wise to offend Germany, and events 
soon occurred which lessened their suspicions and revived their 
fainting sympathies. 
Bismarck became involved in the " Kulturkampf; the struggle 
.with the Papacy over the relations between the state and the 
church and the control of education, and a section of opinion 
in Ragland became enthusiastic over him as the champion of Pro- 
testant ism. 
"A Protestant state in the midst of the continent is emin- 
ently healthy in these days of Ultramontane aggression..." said 
the Times, and added that Bismarck lived in fear üa..t "The 
Powers of darkness, represented by the UUtontane priesthood, 
will be leagued with a powerful and vindictive enemy" 'rance) 
"against him " Being a Protestant state she" (Germeny) "has on 
her side the chief social and political influences of the age.* 16. 
Moreover, 
Bismarck began to wish to secure the support of Britain, at least- 
her :Moral support, against these "powers of darkness." 
I Tuáes, 
0 \Act 12 Vt.t,ay 7 \ivi 
The rapidity with which Francè was repairing her losses 
startled him, and in 1 prig,1873, he spoke confidentially to 
bflo Russell, with whom he was on very friendly terms, of a poss- 
ible alliance with 3ritain "against the common enemy." He said. 
the Anglo- French uftderstanding had been an "unnatural" one bet_ 
ween two .instinctively "inimical races." He even - --a pretty 
touch this; he knew his Gladstone---complained of "His Imperial 
master for^esisting the introduction of a system of administra- 
tion under a responsible Premier as in England, which he, Prince 
Bismarck, considered the best method of developing the education 
of the Germans and teaching them the art of self- government." 
Germany had no motives for cultivating the f rr ddship of France, 
who had nothing to offer Germany, while Britain could offer 
Germany Heligoland/ and a reduction of the spirit duties, and 
had every interest in preventing France from attacking Germany, 
who only wanted peace Granville could not quite bring himself 
to swallow the idea of the French revanche, now brought up for 
the first time, but frequently to recur. He eve riwrote that Biel . 
narek himself was a "greater danger to the peace of Europe:" but 
the offer was not without effect in calming the rani fears 
to the Government. "My own impression is," said Granville, "That 
if things are left to take their own course, England, Germany, 
Austria and Italy will from common intereias and from religious 
BJmpathies as regards England and Germany, act together. But if 
Germany was to begin a purely aggressive war, I doubt whether 
, do Russell to Gramrille, 11.,Y..$B.,11 AM" 1G.r3'.`Iga f-Jr 






anyone emuld .-answei for the feeling in this country." The common 
interests shared by these four states were, in Granville's eyes, 
the need to oppose the influence of Russia and France. Austria, 
under the guidance of Andrassy, had finally thrown overboard the 
hope for revenge, and accepted Bismarck's friendly offers, en- 
tering into a "nreikaiserbund" with Germany and Russia, and 
Italy was constrained by her isolation to follow her example. 
Granville, however, 
seems 
to have ignored the fact that Russia 
was the é` 
many 
i-s--fTiendly-d agu e, and that Ger- 
might hesitate to join Britain in resisting her. 
Bismarck's proposals of alliance were probably made only wit 
disat 
the view of separating Britain and France. He always 
Britain as an ally, regarding her as quite unreliable owing to 
her parliamentary system, and he was not likely to offer any -. 
thing very definite to the man of whom he contemptuously said, 
"Professor Gladstone - -- nothing can be expected of him!"' 
The conversations`served his purpose, however, by convincing 
the British government that Germany wished to be friendly, and 
1151 41exot 
that thing to kite fearei from her 
".:.,....a-sztft Thus one more state acquiesced quietly in the 
domination of Germany. Austria and Italy had been already wan 
x 
over, and kussia was hei old ally, while France was helpless. 
The ascendancy of Bismarck seemed complete: but it was not 
quite so secure as it appeared. 
In the first place, the friendship of Russia was not 107 
Granville to Odo Russell, 3l. .23. Granville II. 
"It is a favpurite saying of Prince Bismarck's that he lost 
teavsrsilnsreroe life or, lQ 174} tiaat FTg- tlagatpwr. Mrie Morier, 
551 
deep and sincere as :- m_t,1t ftip, v.- t . It is a remarkable proof 
of the blindness and feebleness of British statesmanship that 
Russia, who was Germany's ally, who had greatly profited by that 
alliance, and whose sovereign was the devoted friend of the Em- 
peror william, was before her in realising the dangers of the 
situation. Russia was not directly threatened, for Bismarck was 
V 
very anxious to keep her support; yet Russia was already wonder- 
ing whether the price she had paid for her gains on the Black 
Sea had, b een 2)too high. Bismarck was ) obliged to 
admit that the meeting of the Three Emperors in September 1873, 
which was to have been a demonstration-of the\ solide.rity of the- 
Northern Powers, had not been completely satisfactory. The Tsar 
had gone out of his way to assure M. Gontaut -Biron, the French 
ambassador, that France might be "certain that I would partici- 
pate in nothing that might be attempted against her." Eta; J1 
Germany was the un- 
recovery of France. That country had always exp ec t ecÌ 
possessed extraordinary resilience and recuperative power, but 
perhaps never before had they been so remarkably displayed. In 
Spite of the losses of the war and the Commune, the cession of 
two of her richest provinces, and fact that nearly one third of 
her territory was occupied by a foreign army living at her ex- 
pense, she contrived to pay off the instalments of the in- 
pity in less than the prescribed time. Bismarck had believed 
that he had imposed such terms as would give him a hold oft 
France for many years, and had counted on delays in the payment 




r,cL lono occupation of French territory. He was uneasy and V 
displeased.. rie saw gnat he had .uiscalculated the vitality and 
the resOUCres Of France, and he was haunted b,' the fear that skie 
Tould recover her position in .¡Europe, find allies, and perhaps 
txr to revenge herself On Germany. II le laa.ci every excuse to delay 
the evacuation, and to find fault with the French authorities. 
^.15 language, al't'a rs brutal, became flore and more _ferocious, and 
finally flunk; France and Europe into a fever of alarm. 
The Kulturka?apf offered a handle of complaint against 
Prance. Bismarck had found a foeman worthy of his steel in Pius- 
TX whose combination of obstinate meekness and flaming inrtis- S' 
eretion was excessively irritating. The contest was long-drawn- 
out, vicious, and indecisive. The position of the French govern- 
ment, was made more àwkwardl_by a number of Roman Catholic bishops, 
who supported the Pope against the German Chancellor all the 
more heartily because they were Frenchnlen, and who gave vent to 
their religious and patriotic indignation in reckless and vehe- 
ment letters and speeches. 
Rrl )ctoñ er 20 3ismarck wrote to Count Harry Arnim, ambass- 
ador at Paris, that no government could be so\ mad, if it once 
understood that it would be forced into war, as to wait for the: 
taent that best suited its enemy. The immediate outbreak of war 
10) 
ould be better for ('rerraany than this continual threat. Arnim 
11) 
conVreyed these complaints and threats to Broglie, who gave pub- 
llcassurances of the peaceful intentions of France; but this 
'48 onivr the first rriov e 
11 ; 
137. 
11Ì Hanotaux I T, p. 413 ff. 
l ' .i. 
pORMIW 
of a long campaign, On November 21st the Pope issued an ency- 
clical letter deploring the condition of the church in 4asailatarr 
Italy, and Switzerland, which roused great indignation in these 
rime countries, and brought the controversy to a more bitter 
stage. Bismarck's retaliatory measures brought protests from the 
French bishops, and the government publicly repriman- 
ded the fiery prelates. But this was not enough for Bismarck, 
:d he demanded that they should be prosecuted. "Well!" he de- 
`cared, "we shall have to declare f_ar against you before the 
clerical party, seizing power, makes war with Germany in the 
name of the persecuted Catholic Church," The extension of the 
Chancellor's attentions to Belgium was not a reassuring symptom. 
vo, 
Immediately af te; a "confidential" circular 
' _ 'ri ifo_rm_ed his subordinates that if he were 
puce cony inced that war was inetitaQle he would not let France 
choose the time. Rumours that mauser rifles were being distrib- 
uted to the German army, and that 7ançy was to be occupied, add- 
ed to the disquiet. r_ . 
( ...-ea. ,1:3.7-.4} l 
` VL t rVk ' ib ti ar _ e 
`Itlree!2s t%3*ItÍ _:`ands that-_ 
...Lit_.sa r a 
A 1 ] üw 1414 41- tari, Q. 
- lugubrious 
strain. 'What can other powers, and particularly Rngl-and, ido to 




help to preserve peace ?\ A Coalition is impossible; 
advice or interference adds to Bismarck' s excuses for going to 
war, so the only course Governments can follow is to let him do 
as he pleases and submit to the consequences, until he dies.... 
Do I attach any importance to the Emperor of Russia's pacific 
assurances? None whatever, Because Bismarck is prepared to buy 
his cooperation with anything he pleases in the East. Bismarck 
1,9 p-'14' 
is now master of the situation at home and abroad. fi eror, 
e misters, ' thé Array, .thy:- Press; d- theeNattarra mTa-rity- 
pialA liam$as i. arn -- --ins-t rüme °s- in his ha:nd-s , Vii: ä. l s t abroad he can 
So-bribe 't21 -P. ̀ Neat Powers as to prevent a coalition and make 
re ry 12 nt- 
.: 
+ ó p l i e y. " 
There were, however, indications more cheerful. for France. 
Though Russell discredited the "pacific assurances" of the Tsar, 
they were heartily welcomed in Paris. Ministerial changes had 
brought to the Foreign Ministry the Due Decazes, a statesman 
eminently fitted to cope with this difficult situation. 6e-kxtzw 
ah r 
4i i ry. r- ..'.`. = .... -. ,_ .. .. At once far- - y r 
sighted and practical, quick, cautious, and subtle, he rendered 
Ms country service nearly comparabble with that of Talleyrand 
at Vienna. 
Another event that brought encouragement to anxious hearts 
in Paris was the fallxof the Liberal government in Loddnn in 
February 1874. The Conservatives when last in office had showed 30' 
afriendly disposition to France, and , the waSal 
17ons II pp`52--3. 
ag:.ci ne-t,- -G- 
ges 
were known.to be less averse than their predecessors from 
an active foreign policy. 
Their attitude at first was somewhat timid and clicouraging 
to French hopes. Derby, the Foreign Secretary, was inclined to 
take 110 Odo Russell's lackadaisical paint of view: Bismarck 
was unmanageable, and if he forced .another war on France, well, 
. . & tii 
it was "only Pretty Fanny's way. ",h.e Prime Minister, however, 
was a-rttrch more promis ina.s! 
had hut little meanie for Disraeli; but in a long political 
experience he had acquirecï a superficial familiarity with them, 
and he fully appreciated the necessity of paying deference to,--t-"" o -t 
them(for the sake of their hold on public opinionp and 
his colleagues. Far the rest, he resembled Palmerston more 
than any other of his predecessoe. 
The ;,Jo.Lit lc:,.1 principles of the day 
n both, flashes of genius alternated with fits of criminal 
carelessness and reckless folly. Palmerston was more to be 
blamed for neglect, owing to laziness, and Disraeli for folly, 
owing to a temper too romantic. The latter was incapable of 
taking politics seriously: great affairs were never quite real 
to him, but were transmuted in his sunny , imagination to the 
materials of;_ romance.. -He- felt - h em aß -the -beta- af- on -e- -of his r 
own novels: Endymion, grown old and frail, but hardly less 
otiriehtly. Parliamentary life was a tourney, internat ional pol- 
s, 
politics a game. His opinions varied from hour to hour. At one 
time he would credulously accept the most ridiculous rumours, 
at another would analyse and discriminate with coolness and 
cynicism in some difficult complication. With great gifts, con- 
siderable sense of honour, and sincere devotion to the state 
which he served, his ruling principle was still to make the most 
of circumstances, and indulge his passion for power and for 
romance. He was at his happiest playinr= his pretty game with` the 
Queen, a compound of Burleigh, Leicester, and Spenser to her 
Gloriana. 
s uncer,ain, bu, ie`i2M% and character 
lit ion 
6frmtY`äs gexear-t`iRivréll-bf"t'elf,---c3t-c-ept-i-oxr-ae- hat-wvhzch insular 
breedin gave to his eora.ßiarspso th,.t at times ne, could be as .. ,..x. 
bli,-=1i ts'"_`i`éJ r 
l'3"4"-»*"14/8. 
,. - ± w. 
heeithaibiteeireiterrvg- 
His attitude during the war had been bneh hostility to 
'ranee, Once he had "preached that a good understanding with 
fir` p should be the basis of British foreign policy," but he 
V. g2 Lc, 
ti 
s.: 
nad been converted by he pur,lic' Lion of the 3ene íetti treaty, 
ana had urged an armed neutrality for the defence of 3e1g111m. 
He had,o ",ever, been greatly vexed by the Russian coup, and its 
Success, and by the somehwat ignominious result of the Alabama 
k'ìitration. He mi J't, therefore, in his desire for a vigorous 
foreign policy, be ready to 'b something to oppose Bismarck's 
machinations. 
The new Cabinet came into being in the midst of the growing 
alarm.LyTons laid stress, in his first report to Derby, on the 
fact that this year 1 as likely to be critical. \Frannce was very 
weak, but even next year she would be less weak and "less tempt,- 
ma. to national hatreds and to the military thirst. for gold and 
glory which prevails with a party in Germany. But just now, if 
15) 
4 
319arck chose to make a new war, nothing could prevent him." ss. 
3ismarck had now ceased his love-making to 3ritain, but, taken 
in conjunction his attitude to France, his Schxieicheleien 
of last year looked uncommonly like an attempt to secure British 
neutrality in case of a new war. The bishops were still skittish, 
and from Berlin reports of a serious natuTe were coing in. Oda 
Les ell hoped that "3ismarck's blustering, and Moltke's violent, 
16) 
speech in the Reichstag, were 
16{ Lyons to T)erl)y, 
16) SpeAc,l of 16 Feb 
r4VengA" in France, 
"professional army, " oilitdrY laws. 
24 Feb. 1874. Lyons 
. 1874. He spoke of 
and 4 :ncted that Ge 
not a _iilltia. This 
II, p. 54. 
"the savage cry for 
rnan:;r should have a 
was in a debate on the, 
only meant. to pecenclIepilblicogpiniontki the large sacrifices 
demanded by the new army bill. .T . - ha 1R ^rt er , 
.. Soon 
after, however, ) oltke told Russell ice that war was popular) 
must come sooner or later, ̀ and in his opinion had better come 
soon. Humours spread that Germany was about to seize Belgium and 
orthern France. The Empress Augusta herself warned Gontaut- 
Biron to prepare for trouble, and Franz Josef went out of his 
way to express sympathetic anxiety for France. "'e are living 
at the mercy of the smallest incident," wrote Decazes to a 
friend, "the least mistake. Our days are without rest and our 
17. 
nights without sleep. 
On the 4th of May Lord Russell was stirred by these rumours 
to demand that any papers dealing with the matter should be laid 
before Parliament. Derby replied in .a tone 
reassuring to France. He hoped there 
was no present danger, though looking forward to the future 
there were great groundsfor apprehension. There was a general 
desire in France to recover the lost provinces, and a general 
determination in Germany to keep them. 
inevitable -.at -some t ir7e 
It 
The government . _ would "leave no reasonable 
endeavour untried to preserve peace....without embroiling our- 
selves in a quarrel to which we were 70 a party, " and would 
adhere' to treaty engagements. In fact, Germany was allowed to 
understand that in a war with France she would have nothing to 
()41 




from Britain except protests, unless she invaded Belgium; and 3 
even the declaration of adherence to treaties was given in some- 
what vague and non -committal t erras : - -- the Government would be 
under obligation to def-end treaties to which they were party, 
unless they ha given other powers to understand first that they 1g 
would not do so. 
This was a blow to France: but sÑ more reassuring was the 
t/ 
Tsar's positive statement to the ambassador, le Flô, "There will 
be ne war." 
Still the alarm persisted. Warnings came secretly from 
Vienna. 3elgium was known to be full of German spies. In summer 
cane a dreadful rumour that the Hohenzollern Candidature in 
Spain was to be revived. Spain was still less, for an attemp-È 
to establish a -(}e had failed, and Prim had been ass- 
assinated. Complaints from Spain, that France was giving assis t- 
ance tc the Carlists, were obviously made in collusion with Ger - 
any. The situation was tense; but Decazes had a card up his 
sleeve. In the early days of December he secretly interviewed a - 
iíu d . s. CSC._ 7 %!, c :,! 
Fa,+ and a few days after - 
wards, a sudden change of government in Madrid led to the recall 
of the Prince , and trouble from the side of the ° 
Pyrenees ceased. It was the first ghost'of a success 
for ''rench diplomacy - - -he had always been ..heir candidate.\ 
had -=n 
Hansard CCXVIII. /This method of wriggling out of a guarantee 
maybe compared with Gladstone's,who in the following year "quot- 
Kith approval ". Palmerston' s saying that a guarantee did not 
give the guaranteed right to demand help,but only gave the guar- 
antor a casus belli if he wanted it. (Forster, II, p. 108. ) 
Sr 
6-11"' 4.1té Am,, 
+ r.._,0öd Omen, anriwA--w-,'came a sudden change of front in 
London. Perhaps Schouvalov had been sowing good seed there; at 
any rate Disraeli, in his speech at the G i1dhall, made the most 
friendly referenaes to France, gongratulating her on her swift 
recovery, and the "magnanimity and prudence of her present 
rulers." This encouragement was needed, for it followed on a 
speech of the German Emperor to the Reichstag, reqesting mili- 
tary supplies, and making use of the expression: "I know that on uE_ 
the dar when these hostile sentiments are translated into action 
the whole nation and its princes are ready to join me in defend- 
ing the honour and rights of the Empire." 
The new German military laws, passed this year, a dis- 
turbed all Europe. Instead of being reduced, 
army was 
the 
increased. Against whom were these armaments 
directed? Neighbouring states naturally looked to their defences 
kussia introduced measures on the same lines as those of Germany 
--- France speeded up her military reorganisation -- -even Britain 
had been feebly tinkering at her army in a. haphazard Ert oo way,, 
Bismarck now complained that the new French law 
of conscription (similar to that of Germany) and the proposal. 
to addxa fourth battalion to each regiment, were direct-threats 
to Germany. 
A lull during the winter was followed by a sudden revival fl 
the War BBare in the spring of 1875. It commenced with a violent 
attack on Belgium, whom Bismarck accused lop us ing her neutrality 
as 
a shelter for onslaughts on the peace and security of her 
561. 
neighbours. The Catholic bishots were again the culprits, and. 
Belgium in breathless haste a:7,1en:.-iect ,her penal laws so as to be 
able to prosecute them. Bisraeli was by now disturbed. "we shall 43.. =_ 
have no ._.ore quiet times in diplomacy," he wrote, "but shall be 
kept in a state of unrest for a long time,. probably till the be- 
19) 
gimping of the next Thirty Years' war." The dispatch to 3elgium 
was communicated tO 10.aanee in a tory pointed manner, and was con- 
teporaneous with a prohibition of the export of horses from. 
Germany. France had received, "from two of the most exalted per- 
sonages of Purope, " a secret warning,---"You will be attacked 
in spring. " This was followed later by another from the sal' e 
20) 
source - -- "War has been postponed till autumn. " T3ecazes confided 44. 
his fears to the British government, and begged their support, 
but tháir only action as yet was to let. Lyons come home on long 
21) 
leave. Odo Russell's letters were now reassuring; it was very 
wearing to the nerves, he said, but would blow by. 3ismarc_k, who 
did not find flattery so effective with the new government as 
With the old, had gone off on a new tack, and had been giving 
U. .. . at tí . ' ticcìe ite"'tRTTna-1IIir2Itatript-e:"17 
confidential warnings that Russia was very unfriendly to Britain; 
acid this may have put them of.' the track. "Bismarck has given us 
19) Disraeli to Serby, 18 April, 1875. 3eaco 
2Q) Hanotaux, III, p. 217. 
21) "I do not know and cannot conjecture the 
anxiety. Nothing has passed or is passing in 
to justify alarm as to an early disturbance 
73ut 
1- hear of a similar feeling of uneasines 
}ssiRn government is credited with designs 
Vhich no two persons agree... T)ead calm for 
conceive any reason why you should not take 
Wash it. Paris is always within reach if any 
DefoY to Lyons, 16 March 1875. Lyons, II, p. 
nsfield, V, p. 2r. 
cause of Decazes' 
any part of Europe 
of general peace. 
s at Berlin, and the 
as to the nature of 
the moment. . i cannot 
your leave when you 




'hrough ndo HU.seel . a\Berious warning,' derby told. Lyo,ns, "Ag- ,4s 
ainst the unfriendly feelings of the )ussian government. towards . 
England. He may be only trying to stir up jealousy, a ga2.e he 
often plays or he Ynay be s: ncere. I, take his hint as one: not. to 
22) 
be slighted yet not infa.111W, trusted." 
In April the crisis ciane. The campaign was opened by the 
3.erlin Dolt, with its notorious article; "Is: war ,ir. sight ?" The 
ranische Zeitung followed with a positive assertion that France 
was preparing for a war of ,revenge. Other papers, also se.n -off- 
icial, chimed in with a more peaceful -_note. Decazes again appeal- 
ed to Britain, and Derby was at last startled, 'Disraeli a little 4:b 
stimulated by the excitement ... "B'iauarck is -really another old 
Bonaparte, ''a ìd he must be bridled,," he wrote loftily, but with- 
23) 
out specifying Who was to bell the cat. The centre of interest, 
__owever, was rio.v neither London nor Paris, par. even 3erlin, but 
St Petersburg. Decazes, playing his lone game, was far too; wise 
to neglect Britain, but his hopes were: in the north! for he be- 
lieved that, if Russia failed her, France must face the worst. 
. France was, indeed, preparing for the worst; feverishly building 
up those arru.Aments which Marier called, "The armaments of de.spaiT` 4 
24) 
the armaments of a people aúi a la mort dans_ l' ame. " whether 
Russia would indeed 
22), Derby to Lyons, ,16 March 1875. Lyons, U, p. 71. . 
23) Beacons,fiel Vtp. 421. ,To date given except April 1875. 
24) "A well-informed Frenchman said to me... 'These arents 
are the last resource of a drowning man. We know that the high military authorities of xermany (in riot cease from urging the nee - 
esSity of a new war to correct, the shortcorlings of the last, and 
Piave laid it down as an unanswerable axiom that a new war with 
US is necessary before we..have regained our normal co.ndit.ion... a . 
aye know that no preparation vve can make can secure us victory, 
5ut we must at least be able to die with digit t.y 14 Marier to :the 
Crown Prince Frederick,. 9( ?). May 1£375. ,Marier,. I1, p. 348. 
intervene must be uncertain, for the Tsar's affection for the 
German . npero.r was always a source of danger.l Germany, too, was 
bidding for the Russian alliance. In February, Radowitz had tem- 
porarily replaced the merman ambassador at Petersburg) and it 
was believed that he had instructions to offer a free hand in 
the East, in exchange for a promise of non - intervention between 
x 
Germany and France. He had been told that this time Russia would 
make no bargain, and since this Decazes nad been hopeful. The ub, 
French ambassador, le Flâ, came home with Gortschakov' s guaran- 
tee that there would be no war, and on his return to his post, 
armed with heart -rending appeals from the wily Decazes, Gort- 
v., )tom,« t;: 
schakov vis it vd him ' ̂ e.f ^r......ß:.,Á.. a*as ---ou` off jhed to repeat the 
friendly assurances, and the Tsar was even more explicit. Alex- 
ander had an impulsive generosity, and had known exactly 
how to flatter his self -esteem: how could he refuse co cast his 
shield across suffering France? "Our two countries have inter- 
ests in common, and if, as I refuse to believe, jdrou were one day 
seriously threatened, you would soon know its" and after aE,pause (19- 
---"You would know it through me. " If Germany should attack 
France, he added, through his teeth, "It would be at her own 
risk and peril." Gortschakov frankly told le Fló that he would 
not have committed himself so far; but Decazes was jubilant. 
He wrote a grateful letter, but suggested. that 3erlin might be 
concealing something from the Tsar. Would not His Imperial Maj- 
esty declare that "he would consider a surprise as an insult, and 
that he would not allow such an iniquity to take place ?" If, in 
theend Russia should be taken b surnr.ise, Decazes was confid- 
2 o(ai' -tole! 4 o2tau áYOR. 'cr was Hano taux I I I. j ñ , ,- 
atr,ck , oRt,ì1 nhm mora) ahd I wus YouhCjs oYler, 1 ) T,3G3 rahcf , «, , 
confident that the Tsar "will cover with his sword those who 
rested on his support." ]fie Flô, in a terrible fright, handed the 
idlifetz;,1 letter to the Tsar, and got the warmest assurances. "Au 
revoir, I shall remember," was the Imperial goodbye, "And` hope 
there will be n surprises." Gortschakov and his master were 
2-7,-0-. 
bound forge n. 
Meanwhile the storm was raging again. Hohenlohe had deliv- 
ered a peremptory Aessage from Bismarck, definitely declaring 
that the French army reorganisation was directed to an attack on 
Germany. Nothomb, the Belgian envoy, Vcame in a kanic to Odo 
Russell saying that Moltke had just told him that a war could 
not he avoidedunless the great powers intervened to induce r 
France to reduce her armaments; while Bismarck had told-him that _ 
3elgium must get her army ready, as France was aboutto invade +- 
*s-. Nothomb was convinced that Bismarck meant to annex Belgium, 
This was more and more alarming, but as yet the British 
diplomatists preserved their apathetic and despairing attitude, 
and did not seem to consider the possibility of doing anything 
x 
to avert the crisis. 
The prospect of another war fills me with horror and dis- - 
gust," wrote Odo Russell, "And' if Bismarck l'ves a few Nears 
¡9 gip 
longer I do not see how it can be prev ente ." 
Derby looked about for a catspaw. "Is there no hope of 
Issian interference to preserve peace? It cannot be the intere* 
ep Russia to have France destroyed and Germany omnipotent. If 
the Czar were to say that a new vrar must not take place, and 
B 
*Hanotaux, III. had succeeded Arnim as ambassador at 
paris. r9\ 24.4. 5. Lyons II./10:13, 
SI. 
so, 
rthat he would not allow it, Bismarck would hardly undertake to 
ftrht 14.194ai a-4 France enninr:I. 1 p7o5:nect 
rr mlsonier, 1-.jo 1G 1; 
a id notritlistanoinq ti yrpathy felt in main for 
the 7'?-nt,..9 tPrt c.?rman Pmnire...tliere would be a g.!7er.t 2,Nuislon 
of '1311 Tnglish nnblto knows 'Attie bolk't forp.ign 
A(;el'e, but i t 'ti'ì th»t hi in a ',,an he is 
down is not fair 0.ay, nnd I tn ti' -4 rest of !Europe fear 
Pvi jealousy of the rredomina.nt power would :rive 7rance many 
7 i-hot I or;r1 to point tl,t,2 oil+ in a nutet and 
friendly way: but rithout brrir7 sanallinr; 
0May 4° Ti Lo converpstion about, Bolg,tum in the House of 
Tiords L1 nipht led to tc) resnit. I think T see F., 7r:r,qng feel- 
indtcatQd by ths, lang,uage of the press, thP,t the Cierman 
V/ 6,v,pn9 pro? not nonessaril7 unreaponatIle, and tat we should at 
r10-,? of cae. b fore prononnoinrr ludr,;ment." 
or efficit?nt tbn. oaty,le cf tea ce was done by 
rijn' loss irootant representative at Milnich than by the 
theArt)assacior at Vienna. The calm resiirostion of íìo Busse!' 
7,1P not to ho expected from nne of Morlerls ent'(!usitio temper- 
arientAis friends, the few nld TAberal 10,o ,rer c. still fighting 
Rivlarckism, haft warned trim in March. Ai ominous aspect of the 
rt+mation 'was that Bismarck bad won nver the Crown Prince to a 
vary,mlipy, and garter's friends bemered him tn use his influence 
topenPreaerics-eyert4 the truth, 7vid.also prep- Derby 
t) T)i-Aon. goriot 'À%Dtalert to the prince in the strongest terms, 
_ 
U. ;,:ri -t? , 
WrOte,Nyou ge,1 we pla7 have a pre ,ty hot "Nr.t muF3,,,ilteie 
566. 
veit'_rr great effect ; a.nd passib deppat.c.hee helped to de- 
31) 
termine th? government an a more active courß p. 
Two other PvPntB occurred to rouse Derby and his colleagues 
front apathy. One val.'s ,the return of Schouvalov, bearing friendlr- 
overtures from his government to that of Britain. He stoppea at. 
32) 
3erlin, gave reassuring messages to Odo Fussell, and, apparently) 
l'arned 3isEarck ana was disbelieved. At the same time, if .75.instrt 
is to be credited, 3eust induced Derby to consider the idea of 
collective action with Russ?_. and Austria in the interests of 
33) 
Franc e. 
The second event t-as the .publication by the Times, on 6s 
of 3lowitz' famous article reporting the fears that were agitat- 
ing France. A leader, in the same issue, belittled the report, 
31) on Maych 28 Geffeken warned 1R orier "we may have a pretty hot 
s'?omer, but we must sPe what forces cari be opposed to this ßu4 
furieux who wants to stake Germany's future on his blind policy? 
Il }Ra, -,r he wrote: "If he (Bismarck) succeeds in winning over the 
Russians he will act immediately, aed ask categorically in Paris, 
that signify tine hastened armaments? 1 am convinced that all 
this is a shard, and that Bismarck puts (it) forward becuase he 
wants an outlet from his internal B.if ficulties; but 1t, ,s 
the less a given theme, and he has\won over not "only Mo l t_ke, but 
I are afraid, also the Crown Prince, who is expressly coming back] 
from Italy for the interview, and if 3ismarck succeeds wil.L re- 
turn to Italy and establish a conformity of action between the, 
koran cabinet and the 7'Torthern Powers. " He urged ?gorier to 
6ee the Crown Prince, "And convince him that Bismarck is leading 
:lira into a snare; you must do everything to see him on his way 
from Italy to Berlin. 91.1hen he returns thence it may be too late: 
Ax,111 account of Morier's int cry iew and letters to _the Prince 
ta.'I be found in Morier,` II, p. 323 ff. Morier's biographer be- 
lieves that 3ismarck's attack on ?,iorier and Geffcken in 1888 
Mien the latter was tried for publishing the Crown Prince' s 
darf) was, due to a desire for revenge for the part they-had 
Played in checkmating his plans in 1875. 
) "The good news he brought respecting our relations with 
'Lssia filled me with delight. after the dark allusions made to 
lie here at court and b'r the Chancellor during the winter. As re- 
çards Germany and .the war rumours. ..the Ñ.nperor of Russia.. .will 
insist on the maintenance of the peace of _ urope, even at the 
cast of a rupture with !"rerrnany." Russell to Derby, 6 :.tar 1875:, 
LYo11s, II, p. 76. . 
83} "ünster to i .P.G., 7, rune 1875, G.F.G., I, Io.16b. 
A 
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:1a took a tone no.t very friendly to France; but it stated with 
;;rie force that the schemes attributed to Cr7any "ia'ould be more 
34) 
ort.hy of a. barbarian conqueror than of a civilised state." 
3'4) Times, 6 May 1875. Blowitz's article, accorditg to his own 
account, ` "`a.s inspired by Decazes, to prepare the ground for the 
Tsar's visit. According to Decazes, it was inspired by uohenlohe, 
(lio wanted to spoil 3isrr.arck's plans. 
54. 
The result of this article was an indignation so general 
kor 
and so f-ee that not only did the Tires assume in its later 
jssues a tone much more condemnatory to Germany, but the govern 
ment was btir.red from its inaction. Derby spoke strongly to 
Gavard, the French chargé d'affaires: "Such an a; gression would 
arouse general indignation in Europe...You may count upon me; 
A- . 
you may depend upon my government not to fail in its duty; I give s& 
you, _regarding: this, every assuranc that can be given by the 
fr- 
minister of a constitutional sovereign." Gavard remarked that 
this did not mean much; but the government was really moving. 
Victoria wrote, for the second time, a personal appeal to the 
German Emperor; , . _ . - ; Odo Russell 
received instructions to remonstrate; Italy and Austria were ré- 
Ometed . o :. joif ;Britain. sand Russia in putting pressure on Berlin; 
The Times at the same time assured Germany that if such a course 
were really contemplated, alarm would be so general that "Ger -- 
3I. 
many would soon be confronted by an international league." 
A this auspicious moment the Tsar and Gortschakov arrived 
. . . . . 
, 
_ , - -- --^ - '' ' - 
so. 
5% 
at 3erlin. A peace campaign immediately opened in h semi -offi- 
cial press, which assured the world that German relations with 
France had never been better. After private interviews between 
the two Emperors and the two Chancellors, Gortschakov went to 
the French and British BMbassies, and told Gontaut -Biron and 
Russell that peace was assured, and Bismarck' s demeanour dove- 
like. (He was perhaps not aware that Bismarck had sent in his 
resignation, which the Emperor had refused.) The T ar gave the 
37 --(a- 
same assurances: "Rely on me and do not be anxious." At this 
V 
moment the remonstrances of the other powers began to come in, 
and as one diplomat after another repaired to the foreign min- 
istry with solemn air and words of warning, there was glee in 
the French Erribassy. On May 12th, Gortschakov capped the climax 
nR by issuing the famous circular which commenced: "Maintenant la 
x est assurée," andA' Pax whdáh Bismarck never forgave him. 
"Peace is secured," wrote Geffcken to Morier, "...since his 
return from Wiesbaden the Zmppror spoke decidedly in the sense 
of peace; there must have been strong influences to bring him to 
the positive declaration that he would not hear of war. But the 5 
most important was that England and Russia arrived at an under- - 
atanding there should be no war; Lord Derby and Schouva.lov have 
both acted with a decisiveness which left no room for a doubt 
that every attempt to separate them would fail. As soon as Bis- 
marck saw this, he felt obliged to give in, and the world was 
startled by the article in the Norddeutsche, that it was all the 
38 
J % 
fault of the Press if any uneasiness about war had prevailed. 
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Almost everyone was charmed tha Bismarck had received a 
slap in the face. The government in London 
)pleased with the gratitude of France, which, effusively ex- 
pressed by Decazes, seemed a little excessive to Lyons, who knew 
vieil enough what British intervention had been worth. Derby was 
well satisfied. "I do not believea to tell you the truth, that 
prince Bismarck really contemplated such a war, zt he wished to 
30 
provs general opinion, and he has his answer now. " ()do Russell 
wrote with some enjoyment that Bismarck had assured him that 
"Good offices, support, sympathy in his efforts to keep the 
peace, was just what he longed for; our demonstration against 
French armaments most welcome to him, and so he was happy at 
last to see Russia and England united in peace to Germany. But 
behind our backs Bi m rck raves like a maniac, and swears he 
will take his reveng . " 
The Russians also were highly delighted. They had had a- 
ro;ral opportunity for un beau Feste, and had shown that Russia 
had regained all that she had lost in 1856. She had proved her- 
self the only power strong and self-confident enough to stand 
betreen Bismarck triumphant and his victim. 
But in Paris, above all, there was exquisite relief, - - 
r and pest -imperial France, strtggliro- 
o 
ÍOrher footing, felt all the steadying :influence of a diplora- b1 
atic success. "I feel that the Chancellor is furious with you," 
gote Decazes to Gontaut-- Biron, "And, I feel quite proud to add, 
S q. 
ú0, 
with ïue :1 
;41CV44.A( 
ve...disturbed his ganar e.nd we intend to do so 
11 
ó.-KLIssa.i Mtratt,1 ln.4_ 
5f" 
again,.. As to the situation itself, you can see what it is. 
Someone cannot console himself for having warner? Europe., and 
thoroughly intends not to repeat that mistake. 'It is by the 
sound of Prussian guns in Champagne that Europe will learn our (V 
'designs in the future, ' he said a few days ago. I 
no mean 
.._Er,pero-r, 
So ended the 1375 war Scare, one of the most mysterious 
episodes in :Bismarck' s career. For German policy in the affair 
we have very little information, beyond the will -o'- the- wispish 
ight cast by Bismarck's own "Reminiscences.'L 
Most authorities conslude that 3ismarck did not really in- 
tend to go to war; but in thild case, what did he intend? 
The suggestion of Lord Derby, that he merely wished to test 
public opinion, will not ) r water. whatever view we take of 
the incident, we must admit that 3ismarck made a : nistake; but 
it strains our credulity to believe that he made so abject a 
fool of himself as Derby's view would imply. Surelyñe could 
have ascertained the opinion of EUrC)yoe without laying himself 
open to the worst, 'i'2niliation of his Career? Surely he must have 
been playing for larger gains, when he staked so much on the - 
throw? The same applies to the suggestion that he was trying to 
test the durability of the Russian .Alliance. If that were true 
it Mould recall the old method, of finding whether a puling babe 
'113a changeling man) by putting it on the top of the fire 
J w 
no+a,.z?c III' Decaz to..Gnntant -D;i.ron' 294.75. 
ji4t `1-Cu Ot. 0 t-'1,4-,4 t., t t : .. pe4i.o a( e'er It. toe. 
Cr-cizof-ping a...Sllap e.c_ t.ed._luat.G:.CL.-1J,ç 
vetr}e'r-ftuatt 
There 
n b . . 
l'arre-abo 
v0Mr-nn-tkrer-itea4.44z ; * . TTI 
- 
remain tigmbee-spoiregiVpsle explanations. 
: , ,-_ , : _ zt's YièiYf; ismarc" s`Iri"éd 
en-terting-trrar° ir-tortga-- 
STd 
Te2nrertcr° `"in the-East 
lItef`3l`s'"bÿ c lùbb ing them -:.o n-:the . hea41-writir-te`ir , 
e 
rIa$°Pr?l8$ian J znker, and the .4:eate.--titrer y t 
asaaAmiaill there is the possibility that Bismarck merely- 6y. 
wished to frighten France out of any attempt to strengthen her r 
position by alliances. If so, he singularly failed . 
If a Franco -Russian alliance was not formed after 1875, it was 
not due to Bismarck's conduct then. 
The t; iio4y4 explanation is that Bismarck, startled and angry 
at the rapid recovery of France, began to regret that he had not 
inserted a clause into the Treaty of Frankfort limiting the 
numbers of the French army, and that he now hoped to obtain this 
neglected advantage by offering France the choice between such - 
a limitation 4,nd a new war. 
This is e, sufficient and plausible explanation: but there b5 
is some evidence s to show that Bismarck really meant 
to go. to war. If we once accept his point of view, that France 
.67/ 
was/ 
an obstacle that must be remlowld from Germany's path, he had 
every motive for a new war. German unity had been obtained; but 
Bismarck aimed at making Germany predominant in Europe, and how 
could this be possible if a very strong state, an irreconcilable 
enemy, existed upon one of her frontiers? Bismarck's attitude 
towards France was characteristic: he was convinced that she 
would nurse the idea of revenge, as persistently as r had G6. 
nursed it since Jena, nd that -- e- sof t en n -g- of #.,.:_af -time, 
c _ -irrcrtlent- Y°cr- nee t?y -- and-the-preference for 
r. P of n :3. _ tiny a-alu ust l .people- maul d 
trust4gi.---43444mwte-th4s-44e9 His fear of France after 1871 
was almost a morbid obsession, and i -- ,Q, T%^+ `=- -ti 
y is p i.ng -the »ter. His hatred of 
France had always blinded him. inr 1871, it has. led bAm to under- 
rate the resolution and patriotism of her people, and to regard 
1 er as thoroughly decadent. Now, it led him to an exaggerated 
fear of what she would do, when she recovered her strength, to 
revenge herself on Germany. He did not see that her recovery, 
X 
extraordinary as it was, was due to certain qualities in the 
character of her people, not to any miraculous strength, any 
metric .F ccalibur. that quenched the bleeding of her wounds. In 
reality, Awas not likely, .-te th eon - she., had- lea-rn ever 
to regain hither the power or the will to be an aggressive mil - 
itary state: But Bismarck dared not believe this. He had scoffed 
at those who in 1871 had warned him that his policy would breed 
a desire for revenge in/ France, because he believed that he 
And to good luck: it was said that the remarkable harvests of 
1872 and 1874 padd the indemnity. 
672 - 
had so crippled her that she would never be strong enough to be 
dangerous. Now he saw his mistake. No doubt he would have been 
4,90irfreT71 if necessary, to obtain the limitation of her arma- 
ruentsg but that could only have lasted for a- certain length of N 
time. mother war, involving the des- 
traction of some of her natural resources, and the annexation 
of more of her territory t o Germany, would have been much more 
sure and satisfactory. 
In such a war, he could count on the support of a large 
body of public opinion in Germany. Victory had not quenched the 
German, hate $f France. With his control of the press it was easy 
Os_ 
to manufacture a public opinion, the German public has al- 
t pays been tocile in such matters /She military classes and their. bet_ 
k 
leaders were thirsty for ware, 
not- 
The chief argument against the view +hat -.Bismarck wanted a 
new war is the reckless imprudence, so unlike his usual mixture 
of caution and daring, with which his preparations were under- 
taken.áËv en if he did not mean war, 
i 6,0,41.-" /6 etme. -0'l4.it itiY 
on 
. 
- .asalac;h,:,.a..rray,.=halueuer, his carelessness in 
laying himself open to a humiliating rebuffgri. 
sy 
It seems strange that a statesman of Bismarck's quality did 
not realise that his conduct was more likely to provoke the very 
danger he most feared- ---an understanding between France and 
41ssia and 3ritain- --than any other possible course. Prussian 
statecraft, however, has always been inclined to believe that 
7. 
success may be obtained by bullyíngs ' N . - _ 573. 
is /a/ 
- - - err ,^Bismarck had 
bribed Russia, and frightened Britain and Austria, and he 
believed he could do the same thing now. He was -of -eou ee 
*Woe mistaken: he was wrong in believing that the Conservative 
4 
would be quite as easily frightened as the 
Liberals had been, and wrong in believing that public opinion 
in Britain would be agythin b t indignant to see a strong power 
a I' 
brutally bullying tom weak o. el. He was equally astray as far 
as Russia was concerned: he underrated both 
tha _ was grcT the 
generosity of the Tsar, who was not to be bribed to stand aside 
and watch the destruction of France completed, and the astute- 
ness of Go rtschakov, who saw that further reduction of the power 
óf Franoe would be dangerous to Russia. 
His stupendous success, his exhaustion after his great 
efforts, and the uncontrollable fits of temper which he allowed 
to master him more and more, account for Bismarck's blindness.a- 
ia It'vwas a lapse of judgment, as the Luxembourg iÑdi ent 
had been, and it was repaired, though not so qdickly or so com- 
pletely, as that earlier mistake had been. Very possibly Bis- 
Iaarck was not quite himself in 1875. He was i.444asaairr worried 
and irritated by the ì lturkarapf. Odo Russell reports that. 
Schouvalov, when he visited Berlin, "insinuated that he thought 
4d0 Russell's feeble acquiescence may have deceived Bismarck 
as to the probable tone both of government and public opinion 




Bismarck a little out of his mind at times. Something of this 
might have been due to the malady of "swelled head," from which 
,tom 
the greatest of empire- builders - are not irn une,,, Bismarck was real- 
ly remarkably free from this weakness *, 
i i t_ 1i e., _ úns elf . 
If he did not mb .v¿,r, he deceived his most confidential i 
friends and colleagues. Moltke and the military leaders, the ambássador 
L - .,t London, and the Crown Princes,- wPTe con- 
vinced that he meant war, and were for the mostart in favour of 
it. The very force with which he repudiated such intentions, the 
viciousness of his resentment against Gortscha.koy, zthe Tsar. -a i 
Victoria, and his anxiety to kno-7 it was that had wakened the 
suspicions of the British governr. ,nt are in themselves  suspicious. 
Decazes shared his hostility: Bismarck asserted that he had inven- 
ted the whole .affair for stock -jobbing purposes! 
"So far was I from entertaining any such idea at the time,." 
. 
7. 
said Bismarck later, "Th t I would rather haveL resj ed than Merit . 
hand in picking a quarre . " At the time hero 
Later, returning Victoria's letter to his master, he 
ülaraec4ofe Mánster. "At this day, as in 1867 in the Luxembourg 
Question," he wrote to 'Killian, "I should never advise 
Tour Majesty 
to begin a war at- once, on the score of a likelihood that our en- 
emy would afterwards begin it better prepared. For this we can nev- 
er sufficiently predict the ways of divine Providence. But, on the 
other hand, it is not advantageous to give our energy- the security 
that we shall yin any case await his attack. Therefore I should 
note. 
(4 fo Derby,8.5.75. Lyons II.A VHo nlohe seems to have been 
puzzled, see his deppatch G.F.O. 1,160. Is he to let French exàite- 
ment run its natural course, or \endeavour to calm it? He will be 
grateful for any communication on the real lie of affairs (zusam- 
menhang). Tn his Memoirs he denies that war was ever contemplated, 
however. ,Á See lett erS to Mfinst er, G.F.O. , I, Chap. 7. ( 1;erninis- 
oences Itp.z I. ":Bismarck said it was Moltke. Emperor much dis- 
pleased with Moltke. Bismarck very abusive of Moltke. 
By common 
consent Moltke shou n this- occasion be made the scapegoat." Morier's account, Morier II, p. 353. 
575. 
e inclined to blame Minster if he had let fall an occasional 
emark to that effect, and this would by no means give the 
nglish government the right to base official action upon the 
noffiLlalfstleeeliessf an ambassador, and sans nous dire gare 
all upon the other powers to bring pressure to hear upon us." 
'3isrnarck represents- himself as "sharply reproaching" Gort - 
ha.kov "fis y cutting invectives .Wade }ira sing rather small, but 
e combated the facts which I considered esta dished without. 
hawing his usual security and fluency, thus causing to con - 
lude that he was doubtful whether his imperial master would 
pprove his proceedings. This was further confirmed on my cote 
laining to the Emperor Alexander, " who laughed, and said, "That 
i 
must not take this vanite senile too seriously. The disapproval 
.us expressed never found authentic exr:ression to 
Ed the world of the myth of our intending to attack France in 
5n' ) 
75." \otwithstanding this gracious reception from the Tsar, 
ìsnsa.rck was so annoyed that he refused to go to the station to 
51) 
ec the Imperial visitor offe 
The incident of 1875 was perhaps the most serious reverse 
2f Bismarck's career, His policy towards France was, of course, 
ìeckmat ed, and he was forced to resign himself to see her 
adually regain much of her lost influence. Par more alarming . 
1) Bismarck, II, p. 297. 
1) ìiorier, p. 363-4, also gives some suggestive details. 
h7. 
than this was the possibility of a friendly understanding 
between Britain and Hussia, which the incident suggested. 
France, in that case, would no longer have to choose between 
these two neighbours, but could maintain good relations with 
both of them. By his masterly policy in the next few years, 
31smarck succeeded in destroying all chance of this, while at 
the same time satisfying his desire fear revenge one tiussìa. The 
course adopted by Britain gave him hiG opportunity. 
577 
ZZ. 
"It is curious," wrote Disraeli, just after the War Scare, 
"But since the fall of France, who used to rive us so much alamm 
and so much trouble, the conduct of foreign affairs for England 
has become infinitely more difficult. There is no balance, and 
unless we go out, of our way to act with the three 'Torthern Power d, 
they can act without us,v.hich is not agreeable for a state like 
52) 
ffnglana." 
The words seem to have been one of his suggestive meditat- 
ions, thrown off casually, und never seriously taken up. The new 
53) 
government had no policy, except to make a splash. The Prime 
A 
'linister was an old man now, with failing powers, though his in- 
tell Act often flashed as brightly as ever. He had arrived, at 
last., at the goal of a long, doubtful struggle, he knew he was 
not likely to hold office again, and that if he wished to prank 
himself before Europe in some such róle as his great contempor- 
aries played, he had no time to lose. He was on the look -out for 
an opportunity for himself and his country to take up a central 
position that would let him move in splendour across the stage, 
and vanish "trailing clouds of glory." *IL ive in a blaze and in 
ablaze expire' would content me," he wrote, "But I won't be 
54) 
snuffed out." 
had, therefore, no definite object., save that he meant 
to avoid the mistakes of indecision, pusillanimity, and priggish- 
ness made by his predecessors. Hence the crisis which was wait- 
. -- 
in7 for them when they came into office found the Conservatives. 
o. 
52) To Lady Bradford, 6 Sept,. 1875. 53) "Die hiesigen staats- 
manner kommen mir iinioermehr als reiche .dilettanten vor, wehe 
von einem tage zum andern leben, an die zukunftigen Machtstell- 
ung ihres landes nicht denken, und sich die Situation nicht. ganz 
klarmachen." Munster to Bismarck, 28 June l87. T.F. C?. It, ih.295. 
)--79 
unprepared, and their handling of it was at first 
uncertain, though in the end acme of the reflected glory of 
Russia fell upon them. When they at last began to act with ener- 
gy the critical period was practically over, and their remon- 
strances served chiefly to add to the irritation of Bismarck, 
he- f _ r ire y e rect at l e suns -of- Ruasia, 
and to make a public demonstration of European solidarity a-sain- 
st German aggression, which, useful as it was at the time, was 
illusory. 
644, 11- 
after assured that _Russia meant to act did they dare 
to take up a determined attitude against Germany. Had Russia not 
been ready to move, they would probably have been able to per- 
suade themselves that the limitation of French armaments would 
be a useful security for European peace. n- 
s1dAr.44-trse ;3058Ìt , r 1IIarcK Zß 0 s , o 0 
A JaYc4 
.d 
*igiat.kaues. fi177171AT+ ' . 
.. :-... . .-.. .- -.'.. _ _.. --. . . . _-iñ ̀this, though ñis a%fea-__ 
gueen victoria's letter certainly had a great effect on the 
hind of the -I äpéroz91, and some authorities maintain that it was 
entirely William a action that caused the retreat of 3ismaarck. 
Zhe hnperor, they maintain, was as ignorant as as infant of all 
that had been going on, and as soon as he w as apprised of it 
by the Queen he interfered and put a stop to it. It is rather difficult to believe this, when the European press was ringing 
'ith it, diplomats talking of nothing else, and a great part of 
the agitation in 1874 had been due to' 'William's own speech in. 
the Reichstag, ., Did he never read a newspaper, 
Ind was he kept in absolute ignorance of his own'Smilegigot minis - 
Ietrdoings? Queen Victoria wrote to remonstrate with him in 
1894) without having the slightest effect on his mind, or Bis- 
tarok's policy. Bismarck had already persuaded his peace -loving 
caster into three wars, one eV which was contrary to his con - 
8eience and his wishes, and he might have persuaded him to an- 
°her. He had already converted the Crown Prince. No doubt Vic - taria's letter awoke the old man to what foreign powers were ' lint7 about German pol cy, ar_d soy acted as a support to the re- 
trances of Russia. 
Eve ti 
ii#9044413. L 
sraek ld heeANd-Ye.acly `b ake.. ZC'vn ki cscturK., 
no power would have i2oved Derby. ---.54 
'iativ-e caution and prudence had hecome almost a morbid affec- 
tion. a + ; , - T :..T-enMz4,1.i ..t-4,aary-0 tle now 
shrank f rom every kind of act ion i _ and 
- 
anything so dangerous as threatening war to Germany, with 
liussia and France at his hack, would have frightened him out of 
wits. 
Three years 
later Disraeli and Salisl)ury found it was only possible to carry - 
)ut a decided foreign policy by doing the work of the foreign 
W kr 
office over his head)/i.2n 1875 they were r strong enough/ 
norirzrd -- a - = to do this. 
How slight was the impression made by the incident, how 
treat the aiix_ietyr tlia t it should not lead to a coolness with 
Germany, may be seen 'o-,r 1;1A fact t'_nat it waF scarcely over when 
Derby made the friendliest advances. The only interest of 
gland, he told Minster, was to keep the peace in Europe, and 
for this there was no Kett :r guarantee than a strong Germany. 
in ?land had no divergin interests with Germany, as she had with 
France, and no intelligent Englishman could shut. out the con- 
viction that a too strong France must normally be more U 
dangerous for Fncrland than 
, 
a. string Germany. - He heartily 
deplared, therefore, the momentary ill -humour, and hoped that good 
relations, the best understanding and confidence, between the- ÿ 
countries would soon be .restored, and grow ever stronger. -er, 4 
. 
4. 
Münste-r to Bismarck, 28. 7. 75. German F.G. I., no. 191. 
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The real cause of 3isriarc.k' s defeat was the act ion of the 
Tsar:. but the :3ritìsh efforts, feeble though they were, were 
still of the highest importance. They indicated a tendency to- 
wards ..a more determined foreign policy and a greater interest, 
in European affairs, and also towards a departure from the aid 
attitude of suspicion and veiled hostility to Russia. 
British statesmen, however, quickly proceeded to throw away ' 
all . the advantage that had been gained. For the next few years 
Bismarckis chief object was to prevent. Russia from approaching 
the western Powers, and to prevent the "'estern Powers fron 
comin to an understanding between the selves. The only really 
safe way of restraining Russia was to renew the alliance with 
her, but this, in his present mood, he would not do. A crisis 
in the East was developing, and if it led to a quarrel between 
'Russia and Austria, he could not keep on good terms with both 
of them; he must choose one or other. It was in.part the conduct 
57) 
of Russia in 1873 that decided him to choose Austria. To avoid 
the danger that Russia might. turn to the Western Powers, he did 
his best to sow distrus, by secret insinuations and by warning 
each power against the others. 
57) He had, cf course, many other motives. 
y2 
An opportunity of making mischief between France and Brit- 
ain soon occurred. In November 1875, Disraeli bought the Suez 
Canal shares, and resentment was aroused in France. Britain 
had always opposed the construction of the Canal, Palmerston had 
declared' the enterpris76 was an act of enmity towards Britain; 
it had been a French enterprise, financed by French capital and `6 -1- 
x 
conceived and executed by a French engineer. Now, it was said, 
when the success of the Canal had been demonstrated, when France 
in her weakness was unable to give it the necessary support, 
Biitain stepped in and secured the control and the prof its. Bis- 
marck was heartily delighted at this turn of ranee. 
He sent congratutlations to Disraeli, and offeraO of German 
support, and from this time on he continued to urge 3ritain to 
annex Egypt, well aware that nothing would so Infuriate France. 
RU .),4i4 
- 
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Xhe government were not left unwarned of Bismarck's aims add ¡A% 
Wishes. On November 12th Odo Russell submitted a memorandum in 
hich theywere indicated with sufficient clearness. 
"Since MAY, " wrote the ambassador, "It has become manifest 
that Russia has the power to hamper the movements of Germany... 
and that Germany can undertake nothing new without the passive 
consent of Russia. This power must be so intolerable to Bismarck 
that he is sure to exercise all his skill in drawing Russia out 
of the combined arms of the Great Powers, back into his own ex- 
elusive embrace. This, a difference between Austria and Russia 
about Turkey, might enable him-to achieve. Bismarck's endeavours 5s% 
last winter to make us suspicious of Russia, and vice versa, are 
ow fully explained. His failure must add to the general irrit- 
ation he suffers from....In regard to Oriental affairs, Gortscha- 
kov, instead of being satisfied to act with his German and Aust- 
rian allies exclusively, has sought to keep up an equally bal- 
anced understanding with England, Prance, and Italy; from which 
Bismarck suspects that Gortschakor does not mean to let him have 
his own waT, and wishes to control Germany through the united 
action and agreement of the other European powers. This does not 
suit his book, and above all he fears that Russia wishes to keepao. 
on good terms with England and France; which would, in his opin- 
ion, neutralize the exclusive action of the three Northern Pow- 
ers, over which he hoped to establish his own influence to the 
exclusion of all other Governments....The joint action of Russia 
and England last May... took him by surprise, destroyed his fond- 
est calculations, and left him isolated and disappointed to, e- 
fleft opjjàhe possibility of a peace coalition against Germany.* 
Lyons confirmed Russell's view, remarking that "It is on 




this" (the Eastern) "quest ion that he would have-the best chance 91_ 
of embroiling her" (Britain) "with Russia." ---- 
x 
In the summer of 1875 the people of Herzegovina revolted 
against Turkish rule, the insurrection being secretly encouraged 
by Russian and Austrian agents. Though the beginnings were small 
the tnbels were not put down, and in a short time the Porte went 
bankrupt. Turkish misgovernment was so clearly demonstrated that 
there was a general feeling that immediate action should be tak- 
en to ensure that the reforms so often promised should at last 
be carried out. Austria, Russia, and Germany, united in the And - 
rassy Note, pressing reforms on Turkey, and Britain, with hesit- 
ation and manifest disinclination, acceded to it, perhaps partly q.). 
owing to the urgent appeals of France. 
Disraeli, adz' Lord Beaconsfield, had 
in the first troubles in the Bast the opportunity for 
dashing foreign policy tainiihe desired. He guessed that Russia 
would try to turn affairs to her own advantage. He could follow 
the brave old traditional policy, which, he believed, would ob 
tain universal, su pport in for - _ _ i' 4__t. n- 
e r"f ; ö -te-r '- it would be 
easy to stir up popular indignation by recalling Russia's trench 
erous denunciation of the Black Sea Treaty, and pointing out-the 
danger of her acquiring Constantinople and threatening India. 
SPeaking in the Guildhall in November 1875, he had given the 
first hint of his intentions. The government was "deeply conscious 
of the. nature and magnitude of .British interests, and those 
bQns ¡ < _. . , F 
73 
British interests the: are resolved to guard and maintain¡" and 
the speech had been received with general approval. Bismarck 
perhaps noted it. At -any rate he made secret overtures to Brit- 
ain---just after the Andrassy Note had been sent - -- promising 
full support to her Eastern policy, and apparently asking nothing 
in return. Dos t was suspicious, but Disraeli was flattered and 
inclined to accept. "You have to deal with a man who is danger- 
ous, but who is sincere," he wrote to his colleague, "And who 
will act 'straightforwardly with the English ministers, whose 
sense of honour he appreciates; a man, too, very sensitive and 
impulsive. The step he is now taking is one which, I believe, 
he 
has long and often meditated, but he was piqued by our ©iee-t-rip.- 
4 
doctrinaire non -intervention and all that." Either Derby's pol- 
icy carried the day, or Bismarck dtacovered that Disraeli needed 
no spurring on totake the lead in opposing Russia's plans, and 
prudently withdrew. The Premier was disappointed. "It appears to 
me that we are hardly taking as much advantage as we might of 9s. 
Bismarck's original overture to us. Odo writes, as wit it were 
something that happened in a dream. we ought to have revived the 
feeling previous to the arrival of Gortschakov and the Austrian, 
so that Bismarck 
j 
should take no step without apprising and don - 
eulting us.* 
g.A Góledltuf4 
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The result of the Andrasey note was nothing more tangible 
than fair words from Turkey. Bulgaria joined in the revolt, and 
a revolution in Constantinople dethroned the Sultan and placed 
the Young Turk party in power. Hopes that they would pursue a 
more enlightened policy were disappointed, andin May the three 
Emperors drew up the Berlin Memorandum. France and Italy at 
once acceded to it; Britain refused, objectiatto a phrase which 
said it would be necessary. to take "efficacious 
) / measures" to V 
induce Turkey to consent to the reforms. France and Italy re- 
monstrated with her, because they feared this would lead to a 
Turkish rejection of the Memorandum and a war, which neither of 
them wanted. Bismarck, however, was delighted, t Íe had been 
in X difficulty . Russia, when she found that Turkey was 
likely to resist, candY itth4 8--rQ .= aIttrecl --- ; .-- any- _Austria 
had applied to Bismarck to know if he would support Russia in- 
case of a quarrel with Austria over Eastern affairs. He had 
no intention supports Russia, yet he realised the 
Disraeli said. he "was afraid of being drawn, step by step, 
into participation in a scheme which must end very soon in the 
disintegration of Turkey. Though we may not be able to resist. 
the decision of the three Military Empires, he does not think 
we ought to sanction or approve the proposals." A Relief 
Commission for the distressed provinces would be "a system of indiscriminate almsgiving... utterly demoralising to any 
country ". - The concentration of Turkish troops in garrisons 
would "give the whole country to anarchy ". Consular supervi- 
aion of reforms "would reduce the authority of the Sultan to a 
nullity ".`'..Neither Britain nor any other power should on any 
account send ships to Constantinople to press for the acceptance 
of the reforms. The Cabinet was unanimous in refusing the 





danger of an open quarrel with i s.aia.. He wanted his revenge k 
, but not to drive h.ar into the arms of France. He 
answered, in some distress, that he would he neutral in case of 
a quarrel, but if necessary he would join either' power tp, 
prevent its losin7 its independence and influence in Europe. 
This was practically a threat to Russia, that 
41 See Billow's despatch of 26.11.76 to Schweinitz, attempting 
to sow ill -will between Russia and France, also Bismarck's to. 
Schweinitz, 24. 1. 77. German F; O. II nos. 262, 273. 
He promised at the same time to do his best to reconcile 
ingland to. Russia's advance <4-b ibe fie-r' With Egypt. He could not 
oonternplate a war with England in the interest of Russia. 
German F.R. II . no. 251. 
if the worst c=ane Germany would,` rta Ke part against her. At the. 
same t im he used his influence with Austria to make her come to 
some agreement with Russia; and secret negotiations betwee_ the 
two powers were opened. Russia, disappointed of German support, 
began to make friendly approaches to Britain, in the hope of 
coming to an understanding with her. The news that Britain meant 
to take the lead in opposing Russia was grateful to Bismarck; 
taqaea 
it meant that Russia would bey- s-ae44Wgs°te but 
that someone else than Germany would do the dirty work. 
The refusal of the Berlin Memorandum was the initial blunder 
.of the British government. It-encouraged Turkey to resistance, 
it put a stop to amicable understanding between the ( powers 99 
and the possibility of collective action,' it repelled the tenta- 
tive advances for an agreement with Britain made by Russia, 
and drove her to individual action. 'Russia could not remain 
quiet. Only on one point was it possible to raise a public 
opinion in Russia, and that was the religious question. Already 
volunteers were pouring over the frontier into the Balkans, and 
the pressure on the government was increasing. 
After the refusal of the Berlin Memorandum Serbia and Mo?'Ite- 
negro declared war on Turkey, and soon after Europe was horrified - 
S'g9- 
9 s_ 
by the news that the 3ul,Tarian revolt had been put down by Turkish /Do 
barbarity. A movement troops 
i,,,,,, c..tr.. 
(Gort,schakov) 
Wlr erwarteten grosse Dinge von Ihnen" sagte er,A( "Warum ? "` 
writes Bismarck on the margin) "und Sie bringen nichts Wass 
Rir nicht schon längst wüssten ". Russia had had 300, 000 men 
0,drhese in 187'1. Was this her repayment? Schweinitz to 
3imarck. 1. 11. 76. German F.O. II. 252 
of public opinion in Europe, perhaps more widespread than had 
been seen before, culminated in a general demand for the adeq- 
uate protection of the Christian populations of Turkey. 
The Bulgarian Atrocities ruined Disraeli's hopes. His "spire 
ited foreign policy" was robbed of all its splendour and gallant. 
ry. He could not pose as the defender of the weak against the 
strong - -- Russia had suddenly usurped that part. He iould not 
not stand forth as the patriotic defender of British interests 
in the East, but as the ally of the oppressor, the supporter of re/. 
Islamism against Christianity. to -aver ge --- Popular 
yw,tt0( fiaPlppreedillg Russia, and was obliged to write to . SHHo;t 
that all sympathy for Turkey had' di sapp eared-:.3_. °r' LL __4f1 
and that even if Russia were to declare 
vrär "H.M. Government would find it practically impossible to 
interfere. Any such event would place England in a most unsatis- 
factory sit ,ation. Peace is urgently necessary and Turkey must 
lk 
realise this. 
In his first anger and disappointment Disraeli refused to 
believe the Bulgarian news, and ridiculed those who reported and 
credited it. This was perhaps natural; but even when assured-of 
the truth by the ambassador at Constantinople, he deliberately ro., 
suppressed the fact, and fats if i ed''the contents of Falietis 
r Derby to Elliot, 29.8.76. Bluebook. Disraeli had already been 
much annoyed by the spread of the war. He talked of the "infam- 
ous invasion" of Serbia, and hoped it would be "properly punis» - 
ed" by the Turks. (Disraeli to Chesterfield, 9.ßï.76. = T? 7' 
(2-4 
telegram, in the hope that the excitement would blow bye It . was 
a tactical mistake; it prejudiced the very policy he was anxious 
to carry out, and allowed the leadership of opinion to slip for 
the moment into the hands of his political rival. Gladstone con- 
stituted himself the champion of the Bulgarians, and could not 
have found a subject that gave more scope to his eloquence and 
his powers of denunciation. The play was staged, but with the 
wrong hero. 
Disraeli had chosen his policy because the traditional hos- 
tility to Russia led him to count on Popular support. It was a 
policy congenial to himself, apart from his political views, be- 
n4 
cause hej a Jew, hated Russia, and had no special 
Sympathy with the Christian populations of the East. This blow 
was a severe one, but he had still one great advantage, in that 
the majority of the Opposition would not follow Gladstone all 
the way. Hartington's followers-wereffriousikt the unfair way 
that Gladstone was treating their leader, and Harcourt and 
intriguing against him. They seized the Bulgarian 
a weapon of attack against the Government, but they - 
á moment intend { if they obtained office 
others were 
incident as 
did not for 
` ' 
io4 
In justice to Disraeli it must he admitted that though Elliot 
confirmed the Daily News articles, many of the British consuls 
adopted a pro -Turkish attitude and persistently belittled or dis- 
credited the reports of massacres or abuses. As a specimen of 
the stuff British officials sent home, we may quote Layard's 
later report that Dr Washburne (of Robert College) had told him, 
that a Bulgarian gentleman had told him, thatthree Turks in Kaz- 
dike had died of broken hearts,due to remorse for having mass - 
4Qtiti C.hti8tiàne Turkslfferertaturally very humane but had lost: 
their heads in a panic when the Christians rose and commenced a 
el40b1or of the Mohammedans. (Layard to Derby, l2.5. 78. Bluebook" 
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Russia. They did not 
want to displace the government,; they relied on a strong oppos- 
ition in Parliament, the presence dal the cautious Derby in the 
Cabinet, ar4, their own secret relations with Russia through 
44 1 
Schouvalov, to prevent all siting action in favour of Turkey, 
and that was all they cared for. This weakness on the paBt of 
the Opposition, and the slow deve.lopement of the crisis, owing 
to Russia's unwillingness to act alone until she had exhausted 
every means of securing the support of the `b± her powers, allowed 
Disraeli time to repair his position, and time for the old trad- 
itional hostility to Russia to recóver the ascendancy over the 
temporary indignation against Turkey. 
For the time be i_ g t'_ne force of that indignation compelled 
the government to tack. There were traitors in the C'3:ainet it- 
self . Not only was Derby asA averse from every sort of action qh 
,-Iffettlia but Salisbury and Carnarvon were both convinced of the 
\, decadence of the Turkish power;, and. anxious to secure the prot- 
105. 
action of the Christians. Salisbury, however, wished above all Gov. 
things that British policy should be bold and consistent: he 
preferred a friendly understanding with Russia, and possibly the 
partition of the Turkish Empire, but he had rather have an anti- 
Russian, pro -Turkish policy than one of inaction and indecision, 
a long waiting to see which way the cat would jump, would 
end by missing this chance of making British influence felt a- 
°road. This weakened the opposition party in the cabinet, for 
Salisbury and Derby could only at times work together, since 
1 
4Scheuvalov obtained secret information about the views of' the 
Cabinet_from_.T.+ady_Derby -- d-- çoranuni.o tea it to Harcourt. J) 
4, 
A ¡ y 
u 
t {r._ Y ,' t Hare o urt I. r, t 
motives and objects were contradictory, and the more energetic 
character of the ' yotznpr Than --- -- inevitably drove him X07. 
to sympathise rather with the fiery and enterprising Prime T in- 
ister than with the Flow and timid Secretary. 
ette -t mod' t zé 
n r _1_aß°` "21öxh 
. 
On October 4th the Cabinet met and decided on a policy of 
opposition to both parties. Beaconsfield had considered for a 
moment the policy of a general partition of Turkey, with the 
r. 
British lion dividing the spoils, but he believed that Gladstone,' 
violence was already producing a reaction and that with pati- 
ence he would be able to carry out his first intentions. 1.4. N., 
therefore decided to refuse Russia's ef-f-76 collective action to 
induce Turkey to consenti t a an a mzistice, while at the same time m%. 
Elliot was instructed to press Turkey to grant one and if Tur- 
key refused, and Russia marched into Bulgaria, Britain would 
then occupy Const anti. oole. "P.0., " says a suggestive note, "Ex- 
ceedingly recalc it ran . " 
None of these resolutions were carried out, save the refus- 
al to Russia; whether it was that Derby continued obdurate, or 
Beaconsfield succeeded in dropping those that he liked least. 
Austria, and Russia tuga=ow ft than proposed that Britain and 
alisbury, 4.10.7 6 . 
France should make a joint naval demonstration to induce Turkey 
to grant an armistice, and this also was refused. Turkey had 
replied to Russia that she would not grant an armistice for less roq. 
X 
than six months; this would be disastrous to Serbia, who could 
not keep her army so long in the field. Beaconsfield declared 
that it would be quite satisfactory, and that he could take no 
steps to press Turkey to consent to a shorter period. It would 
indeed have satisfied him, for by that time, as he said, "the 
people of England will h.are quite recovered their senses, and 
Gladstone will be shit üpa" 
-etiror4 Rus- 
sia acted alone, presented an ultimatum to Turkey, and at once 
Me°.r 
obtained then armistice for which the powers ¡fe- 
had pressed in vain for months. 
The Bulgarian agitation was already cooling down, and the 
kussianxsuccess began to re- awaken jealousy in England. Disraeli 
iitered to make a speech in which he indirectly threatened war 
against Russia "in a righteous causes" He was in the meantime 
working to secure a congress, and continued to re 3ek4kie .friend - 
10 offers which Schouvalov conveyed from his government, for he 
was convinced that Russia was playing double. He hoped to ab, 
tain German support rt for the Congress, and as both that country 
and France wished to avoid war, he obtained it. The Conference 
met at Constantinople, in December 1876, and Salisbury represen- 
ted Great Britain. 
fish policy --to Derby 
0 r" 
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t was not 
yet too late to make terms with. Russia: but Turkey had been en- 
couraged by Brit thle conduct, and Salisbury's policy was not 
suppott.ed by the home governMente 
He visited Berlin, Paris, Vienna, and Rome, on his way to 
the East, and attempted to fathom th intentions of 
Bismarck. The Chancellor declared that he would give no help in- 
the useless task of bolstering up turkey, but neither would-he 
support Russia. Partition, he hinted, was the solution, and he 
urged that Britain should take Egypt._.. or occupy- Constantinople. 
As far as can be judgedff 
never even contemplated the success of the Conference. He was 
convinced that Russia meant to have Constantinople at all costs, 
and events at home were encouraging him to resume his old policy 
for though Gladstone still maintained his hold on Scotland, Lon- 
don and the south were rapidly coming round to point' of view . 
lithe was determined "not to coerce the Porte or 
to sanction coercion by others, "and to evade the wishes of Ru-s- 
sia, which wer always to induce England to join in coercion of "3. 
the Porte." 
The Conference sat through December and January, and the 
OSalisbury =13:0414", j .°"1-`` 6-'47 a42-47 3 Ncn. S P. pa 
Russian and 3ritish delegates soon came to an understanding. 
Russia was read :r to make concessions, for Schouvalov's influence 
was dominant at St Petersburg just now, and he was working hard 
for peace. The work of the Conference, however, was continuallr 
undermined by the 3ritish ambassador. 
7ei ther Beaconsfield nor Derby had any intention of supp- 
orting Salisbury's policy, Beaconsfield because he did not want 
to do anything against Turkey, and Derby because he did not 
want to do anything at all. Beaconsfield believed that hussia 
was playing double, and that Salisbury was "duped bfr Igo" as 
he denominated General Ignatiev, the Russian delegate. "He seems 
most prejudiced," the Prime l,.inister wrote, "And not to be aware 
that his principal object in being sent to Const (sic) is to 
keep the Russians out of Turkey, not to create an ideal exist -- 
73) 
ence for Turkish Ohristians." 
13) 3eaconsf ielcì, VI, p. ill, 
Turkey rP used absolutely every point submitted to her by 
the Conference. 
5 q 
While Salisbury urged that some means should 
be taken to show that Britain did not approve of her conduct, the 
Wm government was giving her every encouragement. Elliot, the 
ambassador, secretly allowed the Turks 
V 
understand that Salis- 
bury's views were not to be taken seriously, and Beaconsfield and . I S. 
Derby gave repeated public assurances that, though :Britain would 
mive Turkey no aid or protection in case of war, she would not 
These included: Small territorial cessions to Serbia and 
'ontenegra: guropean Commission of Supervision for Reforms: 
Foreign Gendarmerie (Belgian) to assist in pacification of 
Bulgaria: Cantonment of Turkish troops in forts and chief towns: 
dew Mode of nominating Valis: New administrative division of 
provinces: Judicial Reforms: Financial Refoall Encouragement 
of Circassians to emigrate to Asia. A Salisbury 
Ili pp. 1l7-9. Cp. Ignatiev's statement to Forster, that 
The Constan tinople Turkophils told "the Porte, that "no matter 
that Lord Salisbury says, three or four months after the war 
begins England must help you". (Forster II44) See also the 
%).44-F.O. papers "letzten (Elliot) mache, so wird in einem 
as den Vicomte d'Harcourt gerichteten Privatbrief erzählt, aus 
seiner Ansicht kein Hehl, spotte über die fruchtlosen 
ÀIIetrengungen der Konferenz und unterst ete die Turkey in ihrem 
fiiderstande 
"'. Hohenlohe to Bismarck, 6. *.77, no. 269, etc. etc. 
saw, 
consent to' coercive measures, and these assurances were given in 
sympathetic and courteous tone. The Turks were given to 
understand that Britain dreaded a Russo -Turkish War more than 
anything, and had come to the Conference solely to prevent one, 
and they naturally concluded that áef this fear 
` ;- 
due to a belief that British interests would be endangered 
by a Russian success, and that if war was actually to begin, 
3ritain would sooner or later intervene to save Turkey. On Jt-' 
ary 13th Beaconsfield told Odian Effendi, the Turkish special 
envoy, that no one wished more than he that Turkey should "main- 
, 
tain her place in the European system," but that she needed 
peace to put her affairs in order. In a war with Russia she 
would be beaten. If she accepted the reforms she would gain sev- 
eral years' respite, and sWwoul d regain t" pathies of Eng- 
land, "alienated by recent deplorable events." No clearer hint. 
V 
116. 
that Turkey need only gain a little time to be'sure of British 117. 
support and 'sympaihyA neededita. The Turks 
sil" .. 
brand -new constitution and 
`",44,416 
Parliament,gwhich only lasted as long as i r -wee. required ta 
diddle British diploraatsr11 which, they said, was a proof that 
they intended to enter upon_, _a,caareer of reform spontaneously, 
though they would not have it forced upon them by outsiders. 
Salisbury at last was driven to beg that Elliot should be 
withdrawn. Germany, Italy, and Austria, had all earnestly urged 
him to procure this. Unfortunately Schouvalov made the same re 
quest on the same day, and the government took this as an excuse "- 
-3001- 
Derbyto Salisbury, 4.3-.77. Bluebook. %71,MP. 
to refuse - --it would ruin them with the electorate if it lsakedtt. 
out that they had removed a British ambassador to please Russia. 
As Turkey continued to refuse every concession, the Donfer- 
enc a up, and the ambassadors of all the powers were 
withdrawn as a protest. Salisbury saw a troubled future, but 
L' 
Beaconsfield was!not alarmed. In ppite of all argument, he was 
onvinced that Russia was only bluffing, and 
would give in. Russia still showed great anxiety to preserve the 
European concert, such as it was 
wta Gortschakov had signed a preliminary agreement with 
!ustria as to a Russo -Turkish war, but the final agreement was 
not reached till March, when all Itteetzets efforts for a peaceful 
olution had failed. On January 19th Gortschakov issued a circ- 
ular dar!iatiiing what course the powers would follow if the Gpf 
rence failed? gmeetetrilp A month later, having received no r Jr, 
A 
e instructed Schouvalov to tell __ _i __ _ ______.__ that if 
119, 
he other powers would not act, Russia must act alone and she, , 
ould take the tone of the answer as in indication.4The powers. 
Iv mot L-«.,.c4s i 
nerd sa r that they still maintained their requirements as 
o reforms for the Thris tian s, and that their unanimous wish 
list be _respected . TWO days later 
he asked for an answer, as she could not keep her many mobil- 
sed much longer, and suggested a new compromise; a year should 
e given to Turkey to reform, and if at the end of ̀ this time the 
eport was not satisfactory, Turkey should submit to a European 
The powers reserved their answer till they saw how the new 
Urkish parliament worked. 
i&o. 
Commission; Britain need not say she will join in coercion, but 
need only "not imply that Russia was to be lit to herself to 
secure" reforms for the Christians. These attempts at comprom- 
ise were only taken by the government to mean that Russia was 
showing the white feather. "It is understood by H9 M. Govern- 
ment," wrote Derby to Loftus, "That the object of the Russian 
Governments, secure an honourableK retreat from their present 
(....., position. 
Still receiving no answer, Russia, on March 13th, proposed 
a Protocol, to be signed by the powers and presented to Turkey. 1 
It was to suggest that the Porte should enumerate the reforms it 
proposed to carry out, the powers should determine if they were 
satisfactory, - observe their progress through their diplom- 
atic representatives, and, if disappointed, Wo donsider common 
measures for enforcing them. As a special concession to Britain, 
Russia promised to enter úpon disarmament$ negotiations with 
Turkey as soon as she accepted this. 
Great BritSn consented to sign, with the stipulation that 
if disarmament were not obtained, the protocol should be null 
and void. It was signed on March 31st, and, together with the 
declaration, stint for Turkish approval. On April 4th, Britain 
dissociated herself from the other powers by sending Sir A.H. 
Lavard as ambassador to Constantinople. The Turkish government 
replied that "the Sultan is very sensible of this delicate mark/ 
.. °soöIc . %.d a s : ( 12 t k 71 9 
1 .14, 
6 00 
f atte:ntion. r.. the more so as His Imperial Majesty knew by rep- 
utation the eminent qualities of KrLa?ard, and his sentiments 
'r9) 
of friendship for our country." Immediately afterwards, they 
refused the protocol. Russia at once declared war, and her troops 
entered 3ulgaría. She had concluded her arrangements with 
Austria. The latter promised to be neutral, receiving in return 
leave to occupy Bosnia. and Herzegovina, and a promise that 
Russia would not try to create a gre t: iicry Slavonic state in 
till 30..11iüiilì. 
Bismarck was well satisfied. There was no Ganger of a war 
between Russia and Austria. Britain, he hoped, would intervene 
to prevent Russia from being too successful. He himself Boil &d 
prevent the war from spreading further, and so becoming danger- 
aus to ri ermany , for, as the only power without ambitions or r24, 
interests in the East, he held the balance between the rivals. 
The Story of the "onstantinople Conference casts an inter- 
esting light on the relations between the two leaders of the 
British ministry. Salisbury had shown that, alone, he was asp - 
able of a generous and unprejudiced policy. once returned to 
London, he fell again under the influence of his chief, and 
weakly abandoned the line he had taken. 
Beaconefieititbelieved-,that ñowAhe had :onìy.ro:twait. He had 
79) Safvet Pasha to Musu rus Pasha, 5 April 1877. Bluebook. 
6n1. 
the full support of the Queen. The Opposition, except for 
Argyll, had deserted Gladstone, disgusted ber the violence of 
his procedure, and E-.artington, Granville, Forster, and Lilke 
were perhaps more in sympathy with the Prime ==inister's views 
80) 
than with those of their own eader. Salisbury, who was puzzled 
Q.S 
b :r the attitude of his chief, made a feeble attempt to carry 
his own plans. proposed that the old policy should be aban -- 
$cried, and that 3ritain should take tai: , __y :,iü +iv e in the 
partition of the Turkish Empire. The proposal was rejected by 
the cabinet with horror, 7ieaconsfielci cszlling it "immoral." 
Resignation might have been the best course for the ''arciuis, 
but few of us have the courage to jump overboard twice, and he lats- 
preferred to remain in office, using his influence to restmettn 
action/ 
80) Dilke and Harcourt were in favour of applying coercion to 
turkey, but they were strongly cant i 1 us s ian. 
1 
,0,2 . 
too favourable to Turkey, for which he made use cf Derby's aver - 
,x 
lion to action of any sort. "We may prevent evil," he wrote with 
his customary pessimism, "but we can do no more. The result will 
be an emasculate,, - urposeless vacillation, which will be very 
discreditable." 
It was the strength of the Cabinet oppposition that most 
distressed the Prime Minister. "In three months time Briti 
interests will be in the mud," he wrote bitterly to Derby. All 
efforts to win over the Foreign Secretary to his side failed. 
Derby "sat like a buns on a log," immovable alike by flattery, 
reproaches, and exhortation. Disraeli would gladly have forced 
him and Salisbury to resign, but he could not count on enough 
support from the rest of the Cabinet to venture this 
He was eager for an energetic policy. He wanted to occupy Con- 
stantinople, and t reaten 3isrrrarck until he consented to sup - 
port He tivemsuggested that Turkey should. be asked 
to adhere to certain terms of peace, on the understanding that, 
if Russia rejected them, Britain would go 
side. Secretly, unknown to anyone but the 
I Z7. 
to war on Turkey's taâ 
queen and #ass secret- 
ary, Montagu Corry, he told Russia that while Britain would wel- 
come an honourable peace this year, she would become a bellig- 
erentfif the4war were extended to a second campaign. The. tvhole 
;'Salisbury II; It should perhaps be stated, as possible: explan- 
ation of Salisbury's conduct, that he believed that the Constant- 
inople Conference had faildd owing to underhand dealings of Ger- 
°any, and believed that if any dangers threatened Britain they 
Came from Germany. See letterp,164.77, 2.x.77. "W may be fight. - 
íng for Hall; d before two years are over, " etc. a I %' 
41111111Pri.p10 " 3 b. p. 152. 9, He was impatient ecause Odo 
}ussell did not care to undertake this task, and wrote "Lord Ocio 
a}nd Lord, Lyons...are both absolutely cowed by Prince Bismarck." 
IJC ac.p,,,,,1,vtdi 
d`a 1 0, 
Cabinet was ready to fight if Russia seized Constantinople, but 
the malcontents believed that this could be prevented by a 
friendly appeal to Russia. 
As the O 1! passe prose ect brightened., 
f._r 
fie a s _ v ) The first good sign was that the news 
frorci the East was beginning to ffect public opinion. Layard 
was singing the praises of the Turkish Parliament, its "complete 04. 
independence and vigorous freedom of speech, " and :3ritish consul; 
were sending in reports of Russian outrages on Mohammedan peas- 
- ants. The fall of Plevna, and the advance of the Russian troops 
both in"Europe and Asia, roused a panic ,Brg It was sud- 
denly revealed that England was not, after all, immune from war 
fever. Excitement rose to such a pitch, that, if the thing had 
happened in Paris, it would have been called by the island -ipress 
a final example of "French levity and lust for conquest." _ - 
i-eetr ave been more satisfiatagy-nThavImactialc9 
Besides this, the Prime Minister began to see that he might' 3A 
be more successful in seducing Salisbury than Derby. In December 
there was a last struggle. The defeated Turks appealed for medi- 
ation, and 3eaconsf field proposed to summon pá .riament, demand a 
note of credit, and at the same mo ment offer mediation. Derby 
threatened resignation, and Salisbury supported him. The Prime 
ilinister seems to have realised now that he could win Salisbury 
bT' ortatm*AA co no essioneks, . For the next few weeks 
tka- 
negotiations went on between T t- 
--for Irrd.lr The news from the East helped Salisbury to dec- 
ide. With the success of the Russian armies, the war party in 
 
Petersburg had go t the upper hand. Russia showe `,herself imper- '31 
tinent and resolute, refused mediation, and entered alone upon 
peace negotiations, whose secrecy caused general alarm. Appar- 
ently in return for a promise that reform in Turkey would not. be 
V K neglected, Salisbury undertook to support Bea,consfieldS 
he -- act±eri against Russia, and from this time dffi these two were 
allied 4ipeedtker against the passive resistance of Derby. 
In Febïruary the Russian armies advanced, occupied Chatal - 
dia, and cut the telegraph wires to Europe. The British fleet 
was ordered to Constantinople. Beaconsfield had so far succeeded 
that the country was offered the choice between a strong anti- 
ltussiar. policy, and a feeble and cowardly acquiescencer-inr.tli&,4x 3Ñ. 
treme demands formulated by the war party at the Russian court. 
Russia was elated by success, . - _ , i - Ï+ 61Iféo7t 
`he- gall'7 .- QilQs.i.tirr-of--3-ri Ias -:-- and threw 
prudence and honour to the winds. The secret treaty with Austria 
was abandoned, and the peace terms signed at San Stefano created 
an enormous autonomous Bulgaria, with ports on the Black and 
Aegean Seas, and including Greeks, Serbs, and other. Balkan races 
among its subjects; it was to be occupied for two years by Russ- 
ian troops, and a Russian commission was to draw up its constit- 
ution. Serbia and Montenegro were left in the lurch, and inoff- 
ensive Roumania was to cede Bessarabia to Russia, i neashánge. for X33 
the Dobrudja, which she did not want. Large territorial cessions 
Were made by Turkey in Asia, and an indemnity that' would cripple 
her for many years was imposed. Russia was made the special pro- 
tector of the Turkish Christians. Several of these stipulations 
Dc3' 
were contrary to the secret treaty with Austria, and that state, 
scared and indignan was ready to give some support to 3rí fain. 
A, 
9o)1t was Bismarck. 
Co- operation with Russia in defence of the Christians bras 
of course no longer possible; chance after chance had been 
thrown away, and Salisbury believed that, unless 3ritain was 
to sink back into the disgraceful lassitude of 1870, he mgt 
adopt the Prime 'Minister's policy. The terms arranged have 
been described. Derby still proved obstinate; and after some. 
weeks, while Ahe ou' s ne,ss- -- _ reign Off is was transacted 
over his head by 'Beaconsfield and Salisbury, he finally resigned 
on a proposal to call up the reserves, to brim; Indian troops 
to the Mediterranean, and to acquire a strong port in that sea 
as a counterpoise to Russia's gaine. Disunion in the Cabinet 
was thus at an end, and a resDlft e policy was at once adopted, 
c,rmat stag ' , cpw- .. start 1 n --t o- artzrrfi 
Austria can see only two alternatives, "Konflict mit }uss- 
land oder Konferenz ". Andrassy to Karolyi (Berlin) 284. 78 
G.eTm. F.O. no. 303 (11). re_t < x 
0' See despatch to Schweinitz 1:. AK 78, Gar -F.O. no. 30'7. 
England means war- Ytsch2.1ccAl knows best himself what he is 
doing, but Sat i .rust tell him this. 3 
a6 
V 
Britain and Austria demanded a voice in he peace terms. 3s. 
v/ (. , 
xussia was will in? to go to a ,Cox3`-t -rees, but she would not 
consent to submit all the articles of the Treaty of San Stefano K 
to discussion, and Britain insisted on this. Austria gave 
but lukewarn support: she was afraid of being left in the 
lurch by her' new friends, and could not decide which course 
was the most dangerous. Possibly 3' arck shared her doubts- 
s7 
of the reality of the British threw s, and was secretly 
advising an accommodation with Russia. The resignation 
of Derby changed all this. He was known 
tiittcñt t ..., D' 
Cf. Münster to Bulcw, 29.0. 78, 375, "Lord Beaconsfield... 
ie Verantwortung für den Krieg trotz aller Re en iron spirited 
policy, nicht gern übernehmen mdchte." 2.Á 7844 '378 He will . 
throw the responsibility on the F.O. Derby would not do ìt. 
Salisbury will if he can't do anything else. He is one of the 
Very few English statewuen who will be ready to share the boot- 
With = 
1,.,... 
England has no object in this war but "prestige ". 
607. 
to be the leader of tLF peace party, and his relaoval, the 3G. 
sure oning of the Indian troops, and the determined tone of the 
new foreign secretary, convinced',. rppe that 3rita:in° wasinow in 
earnest. Russia consented to a congress without limitations. 
Salisbury appealed to Bismarck, who had already declared his 
readiness to act as "honest broker." The Chancellor said he 
would support Britain so long as he was net led into anything 
that would give offence to Russia, and he ai vieed a preliminar T 
arrangement with that power. Schouvalov on his part also appeal- 
ed to 2.erlin for support, but could get no promise; and, accept- 
ing ils, he began t0 urge concesSions to 7ritain, for he believe i 7. 
a war would be disastrous for ' us e is . S preliminary arrangement 
was accordingly signed, by which the chief causes of dispute 
between the two were roughly settled, an the peace terms 
outlined. 
Bísn rck was elected President of the Congress. In after 
days Schouvalov used to entertain select parties in Ñ'uropean 
drawingrooms with a mimicry of the tremendous C'hanc ellor 
striding up and down the room, storming, "Settle, gentlemen, 
settle, ' beg!... Tomorrow I go to Kissingen "' wing to this 
strenuous course the Congress finished 
its labours in record time. 
Britain and Russia had each sent two plenipotentiaries 
and in' each case the younger was the ruling spirit*, 1 îi d. 
. Schouvalov forced his views on the 
X 
ancient and unwilling Gortschakov, and though Beaconsfield was 
happy in the thought that he was dictating terms to listening 
Europe, the worn -out old man, incapacitated by gout, deaf, half 
blind., and speaking only imperfect French, w^ -much less -Ì 
important than the public and himself imagine He was spirited 
enough and ready to carry things with a high hand, but in 
matters of detail the settlement was usually arranged 
ury, and when Beaconsfield intervened the result was 
astrous: in the p eneral\character of the treaty, the 
cessions made to Russia and the attention paid to the 
by Salis- 
often dis- 
large con- tsy_ 
claims of 
01 "What with deafness, ignorance of French, and Bismarck's ex- 
traordinary mode of speech, Beaconsfield has the dimmest idea of 
ghat is going an - -- understands everything crossways -- -and imagines 
a perpetual conspiracy ". (Salisbury to his wife, 23.67 ..J e f67í. 
Vol. II . r-127. 
Múnster to Bismarck, l ..78Ç;í. "Eure Durchlaucht 
werden finden dass es sehr schwer ist. mit dem sehr-eitlen, dabei 
doch schon sehr alter schwacher Mann ein wirklich ernster 
lespräch zu fuhren. Dabei kommen aber allerdings oft einige 
lichtvolle and geistreiche Gedanken zutage, es fehlt aber dem 
Geist die höhere Auffassung, der sittliche Halt." Salisburÿ 
has learnt a great deal at the4ms5AviolaConference. He will 






stian populations, the influence of Salisbury was d,,rni- 
3eaconsfield would have preferred the revolted 3b.1kan 
provinces to obtain no advantages only a deference to public 
opinion induced him to take any interest in the Christians, and 
only the fact that he had obtained Cyprus consoled him for the 
large rains that Russia was making. 
In the final settlement, Russia kept all her. conquests in 
Asia, except Bayazid and the Alashkerd valley, which left the 
{ "I am personally somewhat anxious - - -b ecause neither the 
agreements we have entered into, nor the pledp.es we have 
made as to the Christian races have impressed themselves very 
deeply on the Chief's mind: and in those matters I have toi 
act as a 'flapper". (Salisbury to Lady S., 15A.a7a. ialae 11.- 




trade routes to 7ers7.a in Turkish control. In nurope Russial. 
^liowed to take Bessarabia from the reluctant Roumania, in 
whom no one took any-interest. Bulgaria, however, was removed 
from Russian coni;rol. The Russian occupation was limited to 
nine months instead of two years, and Bulgaria was divided into 
two parts, the most southerly remaining under the rule 6B, the 
Sultan, while the non-Bulgarian districts at first included 
in her boundaries were distributed am on- the other :Balkan 
states. 
Austria coyly accepted Bosnia ,and i?erzgovina. 
Britain occupied ^yprus, which was to be used as a means 
of supervising the reforms piouised by Turkey. 
Trance was bribed to consent to the British acquisition-by 
- í -r I13 of a free ha -,u. in Tunis. 
Italy Tat riot ink, for though '/ism arck hinted that she 
should _ave Tunis, he hinted the same to France, and Italy: knew 
it e._od was furious,. The representatives of the other powers. 
Separated ver-r well pleased, with the exception of ' *ortschakov, 
who saw himself shelved. He hait indulged his passion for 
congresses once too often. 
k, 
1 
In the course of British policy from 1876 to 1878, almost 
the whole of the advantage n;ained in 1875 was thrown away. 
The establishment óßf a counterbalancing power to resist 
the overweening ambitions of Germany was postponed for thirty ?4. 
years. All possibility of a reconciliation with Russia was 
nipped in the bud, and on both sides fresh enmity was awakened. 
usually 
The accusations e-s rnrt±y- brought against the Treaty of 
Berlin itself are scarcely just. At the time the friends of 
Turkey declared that so many concessions had been made to Russia 
that she had ained practically all she wanted, while Turkey 
had been betrayed for the sake of Cypris. Others, then and since 
ff 
accused the treaty- makers of abandoning the Christians to the 
.revenge of .Turke5r. "The ru.th was quite the contrary. Russia had 
gained some territory in Asia, but her influence at Constantin- R13, 
ople was destroyed, and was never regained. In Europe she had 
gained nothing but the cession of Bessarabia, for the attempt 
to establish her influence over Bulgaria failed, and within a. 
few years the divided halves of that country were united under 
a German prince. The second accusation was equally false, for 
V 
' he Treaty of Berlin repeated practically all the assurancep 
regarding reforms embodied in the Treaty offSan Stefano, only 
if placed them under the surveillance of the powers in general, 
instead of under that of Ru sia alone. Salisbury evidently in- 
, 
14 tended that Britain should play the part Russia had intended for' 
J ' 
herself: the establishemnt of the British military consuls in 
Turkey was the earnest of the work that he meant- tá. do. It was 
the Liberal government who, as soon as they entered office, ab- 
andoned all pretence of protecting the Christians. The m tary 
consuls were removed by Gladstone on a frivolous pretext, and it 
V 
appeared that the Libers-1 championship of the Christians when 
out of office had been no more than a move in party warfare.. 
The Conservatives, when .ay returned to power, despairingly 
accepted the situation, and for this, not for their policy in 
1878, must equally share the blame of the betrayal of the 
Turkish Christians? and the horrors which subsequently ensued. 
A far more serious accusation against the Treaty of Berlin 
is that its most important results were those that were never 
contemplated by the British treaty -makers. 
Russia having been cast out, Constantinople was swept and- 
garnished only that German influence Might élter instead. In the 
interests of humanity, the change was not for the better. The 
motives of Russia might be selfish and hypocritical, but at 
least she made some attempt to better the conditions of the Turk- 
ish Christians; but Bismarck and his successors cared nothing 1146. 
for "ces gens l -- bas." The only policy of Germany was to exploit 
the economic resources of Turkey in her own interest, and to 
organise the military force of Turkey with a view to possible 
uses in the fui.ure. It may be regarded as certain that in us tige 
0 
Sit is possible that the advice of Bismarck influenced the. 
Liberals in this step. nq g s G. .0. IV,. ch. t. 
-.. 
the object of Beaconsfield end Salisbury was to leave 3ri Zisli 
i 
influence supreme, not to make roomif ar a, third. power. 
Thirty years before, Cobden haci remarked that even if 
Russ is should obtain control of Constantinople itself, it would 
not be dd.ngerous to Britain. The problem of assimilating a new inn, 
and probably turbulent dominion to her already vast and unwieldy 
empire, would,- soa absa.rb her`,'energies that s.she would not only be 
disinclined ko; but \Eould be incapableilof, further aggression 
for a long period. In fine, he held that such an acquisition 
would be a tr urce of weakness rather than strength to Rus sia as 
a military powers It would be better, he argued, that these 
rich territorities should be in the hands of a Christian power, 
backward, perhaps, but at least more capable of improvement ;than 
a barbarous and decadent Mohammedan state. We- had opposed the 
advance of Russia in the Near East and the Ear East, in Europe 
and in Asia; but she must be allowed to satiate her appetite 
¡where. Schweinitz, the German diplomat, stated the case more 
ibly to Morier. "Every ship (Russia) builds and launches in the, 
lterranean, " he said, "Is a hostage given to you for her good be- 
our in the East... If a dog and a fish have a quarrel to settle 
fish must pray God that the dog should come into the water." 
Germany, however, had entered on a course by which she hoped 6o 
the adver,atages desired by Russia, without any of the counter- 
rcing disadvantages. She made no atteipt to force an &liken rule 
rkey. Peaceful penetration was the method adopted, and Germany- 
crref,zl to avoid offending the Porte by interference and demands 
eform, as Russia and 3ritain had done, but allowed Turkish mis-- 
'luaert to go on unchecked. 
Apart from the arguments of Cobden and Schweinit.z, it seeris 
ful if the policy adopted by Great Britain 
prier Il p. 361. 
I V_ 
tiq 
was the best method of opposing the advance of Russia. It ias 
been shown that its actual effect was almost to force Russia 
into declaring war on turkey: but it had another wea -aness. flt 
vr 
The whole British policy in the Hear East was baled or the idea 
that the liberated Balkan peoples would be subservient to Russia 
and that the Pan -Slavonic ideal had _as much influence in these 
the provinces as in the Russian courts of course, 
es4.43 ane --e' that these stirring peasant states should be 
allowed to develope free from the deadening influence of Russian 
absolutism' s tl'a they 
Stileiskagar-4142-t,- :fai.1 under- Russia -e rot: but to subject :therirrin- 
S 
definitely to the rule of Turkey was a yet more evil alternatives 
None of the 3ritish statesmen made iAti t effort to find 
out what were the real conditions in the Balkan states. They 5 /. 
took it as an unquestionable fact that these iSeoples would be 
quietly absorbed by Russia. That evidence was there for this? 
So far, the only sign shown by Serbia and Montenegro of devotion 
to Russia was to make what they could out of her. Greece detest- 
ed Russia. It was speedily shown that Bulgaria was equally hos- 
tile,.I. The case of Poland miPht have -rrhe -swan that Pan - 
slavism was not always alluring to Slavonic races. If they fear- 
ed Panslavi en in the Balkans, it would have been natural to make 
use of Roumania as a counterweight., but, as has been seen, they 1 &/ 
were absolutely indifferent tom fate , and their 
correspondence seems 
o 
indicate that they believed Roumania to 
be a Slavonic country. 
The possibility of using these thriving little states as s. 
barrier to the southward adva? of Russia never seems to have 
qr 
occurred to any 3ritish statesman. hadAnttheptat persÑst- 
tOttlYT6pposat ey3eoryaa.tt empt. At epragtesila 6 ;..appfirent- 
ty not äreglisingathat; the -stronger= -ese states were the more 
likely they were to be independent of Russia. Nhw the opportun- 
ity of making Britain the friend and protector of the 3alkan 
countries, and of opposing Russia's advance without Adopting the 's3. 
inmoral and reactionary course of supporting Turkey, was lost 
through pure ignorance. 
these -oints the Cons . rvative government showed the_msel- 4 
ves fully as much - e slaves o an idea as their-predecessors. 
Salisbury, it has been .,ken, h d tried to break away to a more 
independent policy, _ but he had not Ah ficient 
force of character to carry it ut »and in Balkan poli tfshe was as 
ignorant, as much htadered by o d beliefs -and theories, as any 
of his toll eagus. Beaconsfield, on the other 'hand, seems rather 
to have ta_ 
luded by it. 
advantage of this dealism than to have_ been de- 
"Austria did not mean to fight for Bessarabia. This was a mat - 
ter-of secondary interest to us.... .The Montenegrin and Serbian 
question does not interest us in the least." (Salisbury to Ell- 
iot, 3.1,.78. Salisbury II112,(0j,1 
Sou. 
Germany was far more alive than Britain to the importance 
of the Balkan states. Bismarck lost no opportunity to establish 
German influence there. He had set up a German prince in Rc um- 
ania, and the result there had been disappointing, 'ti'the whole, 
owing to the obstinately* Latin sympathies of ti_e. population. He 
made a second attempt, in the years following 1878, in 3u1g- 
aria, which was attended with much greater success. The Treaty 
of Berlin, therefore, marks, much more definitely than 1866, the 
entranc e Lof Germany into Balkan politics also. 5 
Another result, equally unexpected by Beaconsfield and 
V 
VI Salisbury, was the renewal of the Russo- German alliance, albeit 
on less intimate terms. They did not realise that, whatever 
their policy, they could not succeed in permanently isolating 
Russia. Russia was bound to seek an understanding, if not with 
the western Powers, then with Germany. British policy had 
enabled Bismarck to frighten Russia and punish her for her con- 
duct in 1875. He had shown her clearly that France could nort, 
and Britain would not, support her, and that her choice was 
therefore the German Alliance, or a splendid but dangerous isol -ass 
ation. He was successful; the Russo -German alliance was renewed 
and as preserved until Bismarck ikru,4 deliberately broke it. 
Of the extent add significance of the Russian alliance, however, 
in its various forms between 1863. and 1891, British statesmen 
never seem to have been quite aware. Their policy to Russia, 
from this point of view, is always like that of men half asleep. 
The better understanding with France, which had existed 
since the War Scare, and which affairs in Egypt had not yet. des - 
troyed, was likewise sacrificed, though Salisbury had made some 
attempt to preserve it. He had induced France _to accept:- thee` 1s6. 
BOOK& oftuDgt io:n of Cyprus by promising a free hand in Tunis. 
Two years later France found herself able to take advantage of 
this offer. She was partly impelled to do so by a wish to ob- 
tain compensation for the events which had occurred in Egypt. By 
this time the Liberals were in power, and their indignation and 
disgust were extreme. In reply to their .angry remonstrances 
France informed them of ,lisbury''s. offer, and Salisbury public 
dekied that he had ever made the agreement. His denials did not 
convince the Liberal 
etatesmen, and he was obliged to enlist the services of Lord Lyons istik 
to prevent the French government from justifying themselves by 
publishing the papers bearing on the subject. Granville was still 
eager to organise a European opposition to France, but is coll- 
93 eagues felt that Salisbury's action had tied their han s. Dilke 
and Hartington, instead, in ced Granville "to try to get .compen- 
(9j$ 
sation in Egypt for oursel s," forgetting that Tunis had been of- 
fered as compensation for Cyprus. The news of Granville's schemes 
"On May. 5th Lord Granville,against Tenterden's opinion and my 
own,sketched drafts to Germany and Austria as to the position of 
the French in unis with a view to raise the co ert of Europe in 
- (74F 
their path." Dilke', s diary,Dil_e p 380. lh. p.450. 
13ie`:r.nfi.. 7.7?iF` reached 7+'rs i, F? y :? , ';.h_fie; ¡a.r:ba^sa.oM ,;t,:.i.,' Gî.;l_. _. l' 
treLbpr,T, 1):tlkç, í"ii P.:i` - - - _ - . Y J.;. 
' i .,.<>" .TE:;,UG i r Ì _ %: . _ - ; ̀ : 
who le ìc iden the . t i.'n t1ì. e s3fa-. 1 C1.sJ ! f Granville, the hyiCiC2'i}i 
ica.;. insi*1r.rS'T ty of Tii.il:e,'_r1 i the treaci ,r.us conduct of rrt t'`}.? Q`l{ i, jy..4 i._ 
. _ i i .,. ' ,` CS'3,; `L' -+ i? 1. 'The incident, however, was 
only the first of many. Tit might haute been just possible to in- 
duce Prance to forgive the British occupation of Egypt by a 
generous policy regarding Tti 8, but instead, the British gov- 
ernment took every opportunity of nagging at France about the 
question, and did not scruple-to t010 yp, tW thout believing in 
them, the claims of the disreputable M. Levy as a weapon of 
offence. The French government, passionately irritated, allow- 
ed themselves to be drawn into Bismarck's net, and entered Upon 's9 
, under a policy of colonial expansion: and opposition to Britain 
his guidance. The two Western. Powers were soon involved 
and undignified colonial squabbles in every part of the 
and tIvoreach between them grew ever wider, as Bis iarck' 





t `. -eay. de, --e( Tì In, this way the friendship of France was 
sacrificed for a few scraps of colonies, as the friendship of 
Russia had been sacrificed for Cyprus. 
'For, in the end, that was the only-Again Britain reaped 
r 6_ç 
from the Treaty of .Berlin. Even that gain in itself could hardly 
V 
be balanced against the loss of moral prestige which, its accept- 
'Sae his own account, Dalke, Chap. 24. 
01'5 e- a? 111 
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anc e involved. It could hardly appear ±-t of herit than 
as a final _proof of the hypocrisy of 3ritain's ar itude ofi oral 
superiority.- -f res-f- r-om- ta, in4..--.G1ád. s. t one 
had inveighed against the a., e fzs,i tion when in. .but a s 
pro M. e t..s .. c,a,f3 , ...: caizk into office--, ras-not ,. 
t h -tmportanc a.,_:th_e 
For this doubtful gain Russia and Turkey had been alienated, 
3ritain herself almost completely isolated, and the possibility 
a some sort of re- establishment of the :B lance of Power sacrif- 
iced. 
It has been seen that the Conservative policy at this 
period showed a.odiSttnetitendencya -.ti wards the abandonment of 
tradition and principle. The current ideas about non - int erven t- 
i-dn, andapeace had been disregarded, and Britain had displayed I6!. 
an energy and resolution that had increased her reputation_ 
greatly, his new prestige/indeed, was a much more important 
gain than Cyprus, and to some extent compensated for her moral 
loss&s.:3ut otherwise, as we have seen, this new energy' had led 
to no British ;mac e, and produced results that were not only 
unexpected, but generally unfortunate for Sri twin. 
It had, in fact, only been possible to sacrifice these 
principles because another tradition had for the moment taken 
their place -- °--the tradition that any advance of Russia must be 
opposed as a threat to 3ritish interests. The influence of this 
idea roused press and people from their customary indifference 
%D to foreign ñ affairs, and e _ allowed the 
1 
C,20 
Prime Minister to carry out triumphantly a policy which was 
largely one of personal ambition and personal prejudice. 
Hence it was that the departure from pri.ncipio was more 
,qmm ¢ e,n.t* -r: 
apparent than real. It involved nr. _'t+ of tradition' 
in the light of recent *forts, no readjustment of ideas to 
facts, no profít}(ing by experience. 132M British policy had not., 
even now, come to grips with reality. For this reason the Treaty 
of Berlin had results so far-reaching and so little contemplated 
by the British plenipotentiariest _._ these pieni- 
potentiaries were little mare than rpuppots in the grasp of /4 
Bismarck. For this reason it was that the- power which gained 
most by the Treaty of Berlin was neither Britain nor hussi a, 
but Germany. 
Throughout the period whose history had been here reviewed, 
Zt'fwhenever the influence of Great Britain declined, it was_ due to 
her own deliberate inaction. It was never caused by any essentik 
material wekaness, but by the timidity, vacillation, or indiff -_ . 
erence of . the government. Britain was flouted by foreign states 
because it was believed that she preferred to devote herself to 
economic matters, and that she would sacrifice any political in -r6 
terest to commercial secur *ty and success. Whenever, therefore, 1 
she chose to abandon her lassitude, and displayAenergy and de- 
termination -- -even so misdirected as it'had irately been - -- worthy 
of her real position, she began at once, almost automatically, 
1 
to recover the prestige she had lost. This curious phenomenon 
was due to her immense material wealth and resources. 
The developement of the new Germany struck at the root of 
this power of recovery, this ability, whenever need pressed, to 
/regain lost reputation by "rousing herself as if from sleep, and 
V 
shaking her invincible locks." No other country could have done ¡65, 
this to the same extent, because onlr in Germany could be found 
the peculiar combination of political and economic power, direct- 
ed and -arganired:by -an intelligence so ruthless and so far -see- 
ing, which threatened the position of Great Britain in Europe 






It was a dommon characteristic of the Victorian idealist to 
attribute to the principle that was his particular fetish the 
most various and universal results, and to ignore the complicat- 
ed and numberless causes that bombine :tó pr:oduc,e any: = given c tW 
dition. The great prosperity of 1 ' rR.'? 
o e inc in the middle part of the reign of Victoria 
was attributed entirely to the Free Trade policy that her gov- 
ernment had introduced, and other contributory causes were over- 
looked. 
In reality Free Trade was as much the result as the cause 
of British prosperity. Great Britain, owing to her happy situat- 
i.on ekter4Ng the lgreat war email devastated the continent, and to 
the fact that many of the great inventions )which at that time 
revolutionised industry)were those of her own citizens, had been 
industrialised much sooner than any other state. It was this 
that made a Free Trade policy both possible and necessary. 
)4During the Napoleonic wars Britain had virt?zally cág.tured 
the world's trade. Her greater wealth, better machinery, greater 
experience, and the foothold she had obtained in every market, 
gave her an immense advantage over her neighbours, and made kb 
possible: for her to profit to the full by-Free trade, 
anti) She could flood 'their markets with better, cheaper goods, 
in spite of their tariffs. For this reason it was that the gov- 
ernment had the full support of the manufacturers in introducing 
Free Trade. 
The change was necessary, because, with the advent of indus.. 
trialism, and the creation of an immense town population depend- 
4: 2 
dependant on industry, the country had ceased to be self-supp- 
orting, and had to import a steadily increasing quantity of food, 
Each Europeans state, as the process of industrialisation b°eaom.c 
general, found itself in the same position. with Britain the 
change came earlier and was the more complete, because she found 
in Peel a statesman resolute and capable enough' - to carry out suite` 
a revolutionary chan ,e ; because the great manufacturers taw -itf% 
was - t ii intereott that the labourEr should be cheaply fed; and 
because she had in Cobden and Bright agitators able to win over 
a large body of Public opinion. Fro _l 1832 to 186 the manufact- 
urers were the most influential class in politics, and their 
wishes were carried out. In Germany, where the great land- owners 
had the chief power, such a change was found to be impossible. 
The experiment was at first a complete success. No great ! 
war occurred to bring home the danger of living largely' on 
foreign supplies, and outside competition in agriculture did not 
become acute for some tic ity years. 
The true -blue Free -Trader in any case would rather have 
seen his country languishing under Free Trade than flourishing 
under protection. 
<i 
, - 1 L _ . , 
ngli sir q ed á. <mIn-tmut f H we ve 
r rom the a was at§ii!-.4.11à -1 wa-. quite free` 
"not -fed, 3 .the -sa te:-Ti Lil 
e ing pmsan " á frt é4`- .because, he,vhád.: -a 
f shown a con- 
tinental state building u industries and protecting agricult- 
ure behind a tariff wall,,would solemnly aver that this prosper_ 
4s 
ity was 6n 1.rß }äral - e .areal as a consumptive's appetite; and 
if shown an industry languishing ana dying unaer pressure of com- 
petition from abroad, would congratulate himself because larboamme 
L- 
the commodity in question could now be imported at a smaller 
price, and therefore this was the "natural" course of trade. 
c...' 1 
. 
This made him perfectly happy, The state went on pros- 
pering; saw its state -subsidised goods undercutting others in 
foreign markets; locked at its'busy factories and swelling vol- 
ume of trade; and heard undisturbed that all this was without 
any solid basis, It had the facts, and the British Free Trader -- 
the theory: both were satisfied, like Tack aoci the farmer when 
the cow was bartered for ïrtre coloured beans. 
"Our present system of one-sided Free Trade," said Cham- 
berlain, speaking in the momentary revival between two periods 
of trade^` 'depression,.. "Is absolutely the ve? y best that can be 
devised with regard to British interests and the interests of 
British trade. 
The Free Trade theory passed through four stages. It was 
the work of the scientist, the practical man, the idealist, 
and the fanatic: Adam Smith, Peel, Cobden, and I1 mmi. 
Speech of 24 T"arch, 1882. 
tom.:.. y. 
/ kr.16460.dake, had looked upon the question as an interesting 
problem which he worked out with scientific interest. reel adopt- 
ea the principle because he saw before him desperate suffering 
which must. be instantly relieve. Cobden lookd_at tt primarily 
from a moral point of view, sawxin it the means of securing 
international peace by the tightening of international bonds, 
and preached it like a gospel, but with the wide toleration 
of the earliest apostles, Bright saw it not as a condition to. 
morality, but as in itself moral:Ahe and his followers felt a 
departure from Free Trade principles as a real and positive 
crimetA ailed the dictum "Buy in the cheapest market and sell 
in the dearest" into an eleventh commandment. 
The attitude of Bright was the one which obtained thé reat- 
est hold upon British opinion, It was the one that was adopted by 
the Liberal Tarty and by the man in the street. In a more primit- 
ive state of society, a temple would have been concentrated to 
Free Trade at the entrance of the Stock exchange, and the .resi- 
dent of the Board of Trade, robed in cotton and crowned with 
wheat, would yearly have sacrificed some too aggressive Tariff 
Reformer,upon its altars. In modern times the feeling, though 
quite as strong, found expression only in the less poetical form 
of letters to the newspapers and political meetings y 
62..7 -der- 
Bfië Vietdtisn-'idealists.lOoked forward with confidence to the 
spread of Free Trade ideas on the continent. They has no doubt than 
the example of Britain and its shining success would be appreciat- 
ed, and that state after state would throw open its ports and mar - 
kets. °4exmany..especiaily they had high hopes, the establishment 
""the Gollve _3..: and the opinions ef the Liberai Ieadeers -both - 
em, sy. is rr ,t in that direction. It was however--in Franc hat_ 
`thë fi b Advance -was made. 
St, e c4.44 
ßñá signing of the Franco -British commercial treat: in 1 9 
cribed already. The motive on the French side -- -apart 
from the influence exerted by Chevalier - --was political. Indeed,Ii4&0 
ifcommercial inducement# watIO offered. Britain was about to take 
the final step to complete free trade, and to abolish the last of 
her protective duties, retaining only those needed for revenue. 
The reductionsmad e on French imports would they fore be made on a1_ 
imports of the same kind, and they would be made whether France 
made reductions on her side or not. The anxietygof the Emperor to 
show his friendly disposition towards Britain, and the influence 
of Chevalier and other French free traders, carried the treaty in 
spite of opposition from French manufacturers. it ea y, and 
dthe^s which followed it , e totTeffifd A¡L o y eG-T $ e 
enthamiseilie less _DrQ.aù ed_ than Cobden - --not because Britain 
gave any preference to French goods, for as has been-seen she did 
u4.9-4w4, apparently because to aGe-ept-aoneess,ions for British faabL 
4 --state still protectionist- - stained - e- irai,. _af- their coma_ 
rtriVi-integrArtrn 
The attachment to .4apoleon III displayed by succeeding minis- 
ters in London was clue to a belief that the French Free Trade rig- 
:` 
\i21±, incomplete as it rwas, depended u_ponliis goodwill, and that if 
JomQ pairar vantibQe Wag bt'm¢ ¡Mc( by firSncX írl.+41g C6V oS toncs os4-a1h ko-rncas . . 
e were removed there would be a reversion to protection. The 
B 
general tendency of opinion In France was towards protection; 
it was believed that Britis . competition was damaging French 
industries, . et it was also known that Sri al n would not retal- 
iate if the treaty were denounced. The events of 1870 -71 showed 
that British friendship was not of much practical value, and 
accordingly one of the first actions of Thiers -ras to denounce 
the treaty anis declare for 'high protection. ?`ost of his plans, 
hot,-ever, were abandoned by his successors, and the treaty was 
revived. Even the new tariff of 1881 was comparatively moderate, 
but the protectionist rnOve'lent grew stro np.er, and finally in 
1892 France adopted a tariff that made her one of the most pro- 
tected states in the world. 
In Germany, tiandencies towards a more liberal trade policy 
showed themselves at the opening of the century, and first in 
Prussia. It was an innovation on her traditional policy. The old 
kings, especially Frederick II, had laid the foundations of 
the national 
industries by careful protection. In the general disorganisation 
after Jena, stein and Hardenberg saw that liberty of growth was 
now a greater necessity than careful nursing. The general reduct- 
ion of duties that took place was but a part of their system of 
reform, and one of maw concessions to individual liberty. 
This event was soon followed by trie birth of the zollver.ein, 
which began witn an arrangement of some petty states with Prussia, 
was gradually extended, and was firmly established by the inclus- 
ion of Bavaria and iartemberg in 1835. It was attended with com- 
plete success, and was an important influence in favour of German 
unity. Under the Zollvertin trade policy was at first liberal, 
but from 1840 onwards a tendency towards a reversion to high pro-4' 
tection began to sliow itself. This was chekked by the adoption 
of r ,-ee Trade in Britain, and again the tide set towards freedom. 
The commercial treaty with France, iob ,_, gave a further impetus 
in this direction. Bismarck found the treaty ready when he came 
into office, and, as he later said, he gave "his economic con- 
science" into the keeping of Delbrück, the Liberal and Free Trade 
leader, Yleal - to whom he abandoned com-nerciaL 
affairs. In the years of the struggle for unity and power, Bis- 
marck had no time to examine such matters himself. After Germany 
was securely established, however, he began to consider them. In 
1875, under the direction of Delbrück, Camphausen, and von_,d.er 
Heydt, Germany adopted a plan for complete Free Trade, which was 
to take effectin 1877. In 187y, under the direction of Bismarck, 
Ì 
Germany abandoned Free Trade, and reverted to protection. He threw 
over his Liberal colleagueswithout scruple, for he no longer need- 
ed their support in the country. 
v 
,_,,,paid ....,with .dich rapidity, h.ad' 
na, u -ra1 st Z7nalus to,orqrranff-TFáú st .rÿ, w? it1T-.fts-o3-1vwz- 
n N r-ti-ytttr* 
,,,.a general depression of trade, and the steel and iron trades 
appeared to be suffering from forei n competition. Besides this 
reason for action, Bismarck4convinced - that, in the face 
/7 of keen British competition, industries could only 'be firmly 
and quickly established by the aid of protection. He heartily 
believed that GerTiary should be a self- supportinE nog retry, and 
he thought it particularly necessary to protect agriculture, and 
secure the food-supply of the nation. - t ____ 
,Tas also anxious to 
-oonc-il a.t-e the Junkers, the great landowners, with vho?a he was 
now seeking a reconciliation. Under his guidance, therefore, 
Germany reverted to protection, though she did not adopt a 
tariff as high as that of France, still less those of -cassia and 
the United States. 
The expectations of the British Free Traders 1T7ere°''complete -- ` È 
. 
ly disappointedFA only one or two small sta tes.} siichratoDenmark, 
Clung to a liberal trade policy. Britain was awkwardly placed. 
She could not retaliate against the denunciation of commercial 
treaties, or the imiptisitiOn of duties intended to hamper British 
industries, because she had lost her bargaining power. The reim- 
position of duties was :much more difficult than their automatic 
revival through the lapse of a treaty, and Free Trade opinion 
would never have permitted such retaliation, however mild. 
The high hopes of Cobden and his followers as to the great- 
er security of international peace, founded on the growing 
¿31 
interdependence "ó_f nations, were equally disappointed. 
pro éec t Zv4i-A?rt 
As far as agriculture was concerned, the three great 4.117- 
dustr. ial statas were in rauch the sane- position. Each had a grow- 
ing industrial population which it could not fetid. Britain was 
more industrialised than either France or Gerraa ì r: for her to 
retrace her steps was impossible. Protection for agrrc lture, 
except in the very :Wildest fora,, mould mean something like: 
starvation. For her neighbours it was not yet too late. With 
neither had industrialisation gone so far, nor agriculture 
fallen so low. in Germany-1 the great land - owners enforced agric- 
ultural protection in their own interests, steadily intensifying' 
it. The result was suffering for the working-man owin to high 
prices, but it was not starvation, and was compensated by the 
care of the governor it, which instituted e system a of state in- 
surance for sickness, accident and Old age; and by t ne greater 
steadiness of eriploynlent and smaller fluctuations of wages 
due to. industrial protection. In France the problem was yet 
aa 
ii 
more badly solved. France was les5 industrialised than Germany; 
her people clung to the land, and were slow to exchange agric4 ; 
ulture for factory life; her population was practically station- 
ary. She did not require to introduce a`rììultural protection 
till1/ S9o, and solarge a numher of her people were small pro- 61.0 
prietors that the measure had less the aspect of class legis- 
lation. The nature of her soil enabled her to keep a large 
ppoportion of her people of the land, and though sI e continued 
1,v 
to import food, the quantity did not relatively increase. 
In industry the case was different- In many cases the pro- 
tective tariffs were deliberately directed against Gle*IlitBritaiR. 
The now continental sYstera had two objects: it was to .protect 
native induSt.rìes against British competition at home, and to 
enable the protected state to suppla,nt. British goOds 
foreign markets, or even, in the end, in British markets. 
France was not a danre.rous rival. Mrs Knowles has pointed 
out that 19th century talk cif French co:nMercidl competition is 
but "half-hearted." There was no real rivalry, for France was 
3 
too far -behead. aesidve this, the two countries worked on diff- 
erent planes. Tot only did the French people show much less 
dispásition to take up an industrial life, but their genius led 
them to eppcialise in branches of industry where taste and skill 
were required, rather than iñ .the wholea.ale production which had 
been developed in Britain. Secondly, the industrialisation of 
t 
' of 1870 -' Franca received a severe set-back by the war c .. Even 
witout this, however, French rivalry could never have been 
acutely dangerous, because France laboured under geographical 
disadvantages wñ.ich could not be surmounted. 
Industry at this time depended almost completely upon coal, 
3) Knowles, p. 147. 
"The economic development of France has been more continuous 
than that of any other great country except England, and yet it 
has- diverged from that of England mora widely than has that of 
any other which bears equally high marks of constructive 
genius." tMarshall, p. 107.) 
and French coal was expensive and difficult to work, not always 
of good quality, and not conveniently placed for the chief iron 
fields and industrial centres. Her railv;ay system was not yet 
complete, and the transport of heavy goods was difficult. WÔr8e: =. 
still, there was no good cokable coal, and this specially hamp- 
ered the iron industry. France had to import foreign coal for 
her manufactures to the amount of nearly half her total needs. 
Thos was inconvenient, for the places which required this im- 
ported coal were not often accessible by sea.y04,1ácace 
larti*Auf¡roloOgoorcipoilhove16400utmeat of it *gs exptrted 
t cbç harked Win='Germany. asï;sheie.otzldant 
herself, 
a w 
Notwithstanding these disadvantages, great prorfress had 
been made in the textile and meta,liurgidal industries, and es- 
pecially in the manufacture of steel, where France in 1869VVas 
second only` to Britain. But the war gave an irreparable blow to _,f . 
Si all these industries, save iron -mining. The great steel -works, 
the textile- mills, the only important .:'aiachine- Lnanufacturies, and 
a" large part of the most valuable iron and coal fields, were, 
lost with Alsace -Lorraine. 
Ship -building had never recovered from the grey war, and 
in steam-ship building France was specially baC ̀hard: her ports 
were not well situated for her coal and iron fields. In the mils 
trade she leis], the fimit place, but did not compete directly 
with Britain, where high -quality fabrics were little made. Fine 
French worsteds competed more directly with British goads, but.'' 
it was only in the sugar trade that French rivalry seriously 
damaged British industry. 
The process of industrialisation was raucth more raid i?r 
Germany, once that Country really- began to develope her resour- 
ces. There, geographical conditions were peculiarly favourable. 
Genme.riy- possessed coalfields _reater and rich .r than those of 
3ritain, including large supplies of the less valuable but 
cheaply worked lìgnite.ln 1871 the coal out}aut of Germany was 
37, 900, 000 tons (including lignite), and that of Britain was 
JIt is dificult to tell hove riU }i of the German desire. to ac- 
Taite the provinces was due to economic motives. The potash de- 
posits of Alsace were then unknown, and the full extlAnt of the 
i On-'ie1tis was not yet discovered, but enough was known to make 
both provinces very desirable possessions. 
á0 In 1890 France built only to the amount of 944,000 tons, while 
British yards built to the amount of 8;0001 000. Cl ,pha1ì, 0.2.43-3-` 
118, 000, 000 tons. 37 1913 the output of Germany had risen to 
280, 000, 000 tons(inbIadlltit.ligtite4Whitaithatj cf Britain had 
17 only risen to" 292, 000, 000 tons , Germany continued to buy same '26"- 
coal from Britain for the use of her northern seabpar . distric ts1 
but she bes'an to export largely, and her merchants made a del- 
iberate attempt to undersell British coal. 
An equally remarkable advance was met in the iron trade. 
By the end of the century- Germany equalled Britain's steel out - 
pout, and in the next ten years she far outstripped it. In 186O 
Germany hhd produced only 529,000 tons of pig -iron, while Brit- 
ain produced 3,800,000 tons. By 1910 the German output was 
14, 794, 000 tons, and that of Britain only 10, 172, 000 tons, while 
Gerrany produced 13, 149, 000 tons of steel, against Britain's 
7,613,000 tons OGermany was not a serious rival in the cotton 
trade, but woollen goods came next to iron, machinery, and coal 
in her exIportI lists. in the silk trade she was second only to 
France, in the sugar trade she was one of the first producing 
powett.-Uttrwadfitoti in the world in the new chemical trades, 
and in the electrical industries was second only to the United 
States. in 1870 h'er total mercantile tonnage had been less than 
one -sixth of Britain's, but by 1912 it had risen toi more than 
a. quarter of the British total. Gernan steam-ship companies had 
their ,ßihiys upon all the great ocean routes, and between 1874 
and 1913 Germany's share of the world's mercantile narine rose 
from 5.2% to more than 10'. 
Before 1870 Britain had held the lead in almost all impor- 
Claphar,paJI, 2, 
Clapham, p. 285. 
Raws c n , p. 59. 
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important,, and almost _;Ionopolised the carrying trade of the 
world. In less than fifty years, t p. to ;the outbreak of war in 
1914, she lost the leadership in nearly all branches of trade 
and. industry. In coal she still held the lead, but Geralann was 
pressing her close. In iron, Germany was ahead of her. In steed. 
both Germany and the United States had left her far -eehind. In 
the woollen trade Germany was the most dangerous rival, and in 
cotton the United States, while India was ram ial'; iround. 
I 1 aachinery Germany and the United States were again her rivalss 
and in the new chemical and electrical industries Britain had 
never had the lead. She depended entirely upon German- for her 
supplies of aniline d,.res, and for some important classes of 
machinery, too, she was coming to depend largely on foreign 
imports: Onlur in ship- building had she still an overwhelr.Ing 
31 
superiority, and even here Germany was a respectable seconr, in 
mercantile tonnage, while as far as ships of war were concerned, 
the two pore rere rapidly coming to be equal. 
The volume of Britain's foreign trade sh c'aea a great posi- 
tive increase, but relatively to other countries she had lost 
`round. Not only was the rate of increase in 3ritish trade less 
than it had been but there were unpleasant symptoms. "The import 
lists showed a larger increase in fully and partly manufactured 
goods than in raw materials, while the amount of imported food 
grew steadily. The exports showed al`'fall in partly manufactured 
10) 
2. articles, and a rise in raw materials, including coal. 
I-, 1 )This tendency was already notable. The statistics of the ex- 
part trade for 1833 -69, and for 1880 --84, showed an '? :îcrease for 
the latter years of 8.21% in manufactured goods,but in increase 
of 102.46% in raw materials and instruments of industry. It is 
true that 1884 was a year of trade depression, but the tendency 
continued to be present after the depression had passed. (Report 
of the Commission on the Depression of Trade and industry 1886) 
Le 
It wes clear that the Free Trade policy that wae to Make 
Britain "the workshop of the world' had failed. Other countries, 
as well ose better equipped, demanded their Share of the world's 
Bitan 77ao still very prosperous, but if the advance af 
- Germany and of the United States continued for a little longer 
at the same rate, her position wculd_ be. less satisfectarY. 
She was now dependent for four-fifths of her wheat supply, 
3 
the greater part of her supply of other (tigelftmos=s4 efood-stuffs, 
and almost all the raw materials of her industries, save coal 
and irons upon imports fran without. When taken in conjunction 
with this, the danger that she might lose her position in in- 
dustry was one that threatened the very life of the nation. How 
could she pay for the import of food and raw material save by 
the export of manufactures? 
It was of course inevitable that she should ultimately lase 
her exclusive pontroirof commerce,. Accidental circumstances read 
favoured her industrial developenent and had Fiven her a start 
by which she had far outstripped her neie7hbours. Except as to 
shippinn'` however, nerprea?Lother -ebtritri es had reater natural 
,advantages than herself. Ili* 4441.61,foirtarttiirlay.-4, 
Pr d Plreid the -Inistaitesid,.. 
1.-ee-e.4er w-i4lei-w;4041.04,eleql.a4-Pletreineher f iavt- +nrItevim,e,it-ow It was 
tmpassible that Britain could long continue to hold a monopoly 
of the worlds trade and industry, and that her wealth should 
continue indefinitely to increase at the are rate. Other states 
must sooner or later demand and obtain some share in the worlds 
work, and the ideal of the Victorian Free-Traders had never been 
capable of realisation. 
From any but an exclusively 




transfer of trade abroad was desirable, so long a9 it tended to 
localise industries in the placea naturally suitable, IT.LPre pro- 
r duction was easiest and cheapest: but it was also desirable that 
the transfer should be due to natural causes only, and that 
artificial influences should not interfere, ._ } _ 
p , D stroying or da,ma?íng the established 
sources of supply where they deserved to Sur- ,rime. 
If Britain was to find herself only one of many great in- 
dustrial states, it would be well that she should not depend to 
completely upon industry, and above all that she should not 
allow other national interests to be sacrificed to industry. 
She must not allow herself to reach such a state that any per -. 
m+anent diminution of her share in the world's trade should in- 
volve irreparable damage ta the national well -being. 
It does not appear that thee.statesattplorAhwitidTilqtariad 
fpleriddchexUanyufarebbdilatikithe inevitable future. They gave 
most of their attention to the corirercial interests of the 
country, but all their action seems to have been based on the 
idea that the country could and must maintain her exclusive 
position. 
With regard. to food- supplies, the situation was. becoming 
extraottlainary. Between 1873 and 1883 the total foreign trade of 
the country rose 1+ßy the value of £235,000,000. Of this 
£141,000,000 consisted of imports, and £94, 000, 000 of exports, 
and of kth.'ese imports, 1! eat,butter, cheese, corn, and. sugar made up 
£57,000,000. In the same period the total acregme under crop in 
the United Kingdom decreased to the value of £13,000,000; the 
animals bred for food decreased to the value of L31287,750; and, 
the v {°lue of the 7round actually cropped or in Frrass fell to the 
xtent of Z31,651,000: the total loss to agriculture amounting 
to Z48,29427000. Between 18'71 and 1881 there was a great increase 
of popúlation, but there was a fall of loó in the number of - 
Ir 
farmers and agricultural l ebour fers. In 1851.e percentage of .a 
V 
the whole population of England and Wales supported by agricult,- 
ure ha,,d been 23.8. In 1881 it had fallen to 13. : 
n, + ;--.,á.t._°a.°. ^ trac;-- + 
441.....iza1=erti :' 
To the mind of the ordinary person it appears strange that 
any country that has to import large clunatities of foreign food 
should find the amount of home -crown food become steadily less 
and less. Was it then inevitable that the industrialisation of 
Britain should be carried to this extent, and should proceed 
on preciseT these lines? 
back 
The consideration of economic conditions would take us far 
ss 
into the previous century, and wad too complicated to be 
v 
treated in detail in this brief sketch. It ?must only be pointed 
out that the Industrialisation of Britain had from tale first 
been associated with unnecessary evils. Selfish class legislation 
ignorance, materialism sometimes amounting- to groes brutality 
and greed, and above all a blind and rigid application of the 
1.0 Repart of the Commission of. 1886. 
Lid 
principle of jaisr fa; rP÷ had 
produced a state of disorganisation and suffering of which the 
effects were still felt. It was this that made the policy of Free 
T,'ade the only possible one. The industrial worker must have 
cheaper food, if a catastrophe were to be avoided. The intreduct- 
0 
ion of Free Trade, and the great benefits that resulted, saved 
the country from the danger of social revolution, for the time at 
least. It did not remove the evils already present, but amelior- 
ated them. ririttln, the first country to paps tnroueh the Indus - 
trial Revolution, had neither example nos' experience to guide her. 
Blind chance ruled the process, ana from the turmoil graaually 
emerged the principle of .'ree Trade, regarded, not without reason; 
as the salvation of the country. There was, therefore, an extreme 
aversion to letting the government tamper with any or the process- 
es of production or exnnange, or attempt toJ:control tneir direction. +- '._ volution itself, an,>:-=-- 
Ly 1äí60 ndition ; 
had Freatly improved* iiimit.-4ite- reettip4o.of parI4-°r.a.tamanaffewlent were 
he inf1uam f i2mcm pair was still so` 
r.-t e -- s.onfue= Two 
1 
influences were at work to regu- 
late and improve the position of the labourer - --on the one side 
that of Trade Unionism, on the other the protective legislation 
introduced by a small but growing body of humanitarian opinion: 
but this was the work of the physician, when what was urgently 
called for was the investigation of the scientist. It aimed merely 
at removing incidental evils, and did not analyse the system as a 
whole. That this neglect did not bring immeaiate retribution was 
owing to the s of Free Traded' in lowering prices and 
rais:ling wages. V'h.at paternal legislation did in Germany, Free 
Trade did in Britain. lt made the position of the worker bear- 
able, and saved the. country, for the time, from anarchic influ- 
ences. It was small wonder that the government felt it to be the 
V) 
most important element in their syst ? == _ 'ßóu :Tr? , ? ^cir 
temporary exp ede en$ v -3 - : a41 __ ì tea- t ,ev' . ,af :,,.in ust 'el" . f4 
Wá 4Ai -- r, i rig- .t13 m, and wh' -- ae.-_oo.np¢ tß-3-- tJLon :.ri`fi rita1 ., 
sw- ottert `:from her- o b 1 t ion of '' -1 ??f ui -ye.f i t)3reCZ.,e$yrel hoi 
prob-lene,, t >è'i shelve mire' ged age. i3: in a -ew 
Since it was considered better to meet the dangers of in- 
dustrialism by the import of cheap f o r e i 7n. food rather than by 
trying to regulate its processes, was all done that could be to 
lessen the dangers which attended the remedy? 
Britain might be involved in war, and the enemy might inter 
cept her food supplies. She might. arouse the ?.-hostility of the 
power from which she bought supplies, which wok alci t hen osSZ p b l ' 
be stopped. A third danger was that the supplying power might 
cease to produce (as happened in the case of hessian corn in the 
next century.) Lastly, Britain might melon- ertee. able to pay 
for the imports required. 
The first danger could only be countered by maintaining a 
navy sufficiently powerful to protect British commerce at sea 
against any possible enemy the second, by buying food from 
countries which were not likely to become the enemies of Britain:, 
1) "T'.ze main reason why I do not join myself with the Protect - 
ionists is that I believe low prices in the necessaries of life 
ande political stability in a democratic constitution are pract- 
ically inseparable,and that high prices in the necessaries of 
life and political instability in a democratic constitution are 
also practically inseparable." Lord kandol hterchill in 188'7. 
Churchill p. 692. 
upon Free Trade as a complete success. Few were found to en- 
dorse Arnold's opinion that "the untaxing of the poor man's 
ey,s 
bread h£ s... been used, not so ruch'to make the existing poor 
man's bread cheaper or more abundant, but rather to create more 
men - eat , t The great prosperity of the country, poor L.Pn to , ,.   _ , , ri 
reality due to a variety of causes, was attributed entirely to 
Free Trade. Children at school were taught that foreign peoples 
wore wooden shoes and ate black bread because they did not have 
Free Trade, and, seizing the idea with the tenacity of infancy, 
grew up to form another generation of Free- Traders. 
The gradual but perceptible: increase of foreign competition 
and the periodic depressions of trade wich began to occur led V T 
to the appearance of a few critics, and to a divergence between 
the two political parties. The Liberals saw the value of Free 
Trade as a party cry, and held to it ever more enthusiastically. 
The Conservatives, who first associated themselves with the new 
. spirit of imperialism, were less averse to the idea od imperial 
preference. 
The Commercial Treaty with France in 1860 had first showed 
th& t differences of opinion might exist. The treaty and the 
system which it inaugurated were denounced by the extreme Free 
Trdaers. They could not deny that the treaty made trade with 
v , 
k 
France more free, but it was an infringement of their principles `4- 
to rìake any agreement that regulated trade, and the extremists 
would rather have seen France prohibit the entrance of British 
Foods than sully the purity of their commercial system by ob- 
0 "Culture and Anarchy." 
Vi 
/0 
_obtaining new markets through a .treaty with a protected state. 
As the treaty committed Britain to not?ling except not to rein- 
troduce protection against France for a certain number of Nears, 
and as France obtained only an infinitesimal and temporary ad- 
vantage over other states in British markets, it would be hard 
to find a more rigid adherence to principle. 
A series of treati asywith other states followed. Britain 
haa now little to o-Pfer in return for concessions, but she 
4- 
succeeded in obtaining very fair terms, chiefly because her 
Free Trade system was new, and foreign states wished to secure. 
their position in case she should return to protection. The 
- 
resült was the establishment of something approaching a Free 
0 
Trade regime ail over Europe, through a "network" of coï mercial 
treaties, each including a' "Most Favoured Nation" clause. 
After C ob den' s death, however, the narrower view began to 
obtain the ascendancy. Gladstone inclined to the Manchester 
school, and could sympathise with such men as Bonamy Pricerwh.o 
fr 
considered even the limitation of the hours of labour an in- 
fringement of the - principle of Free Trade not compensated for by 
the a , of t , } f the 
/{ 
r..s Zting improvement , the nal:,,h o.1 naticn. Thus no 
further treaties were concluded, and several times small duties 
were abolished without any attempt being made to utilise this 
to obtain better terms from foreign states, though in several 
1 
cases this could have been done with success 
It "taxed the community with dearer goods in order to confer 
special advantages on the working -man." Report of +he Co =rm .E on 
of 1^86. 
f 5, S e e Fuchs, Pt. I, Chap. 1. 
2 
The effect of thie. ; olicLT was s-een when the time carre for 
the treatie to renewed. It was now seen that Britain was 
not likely ever to revert t0 protection. The treaties were. all 
renewed on much less favourable terms and the effect On British 
trade was immediately f alt. The case of France was of special 
interest. Britain wished to conciiide a simple "Most Favoured 
Nation" treaty, but France would only concede this if Britain 
bound herself, not to alter her own tariff while the treaty last- 
ed. Tha government refused to bind themselves to this, and the 
negotiations therefore broke down. As France did not wish to 
discriminate against British goods, she resorted to the exped- 
ient of introducing a special law giving them "Most Favoured 
Nation" treatment, and. the postiou of British. trade with France '69 
v 
thus came to depend entirely upon the goodwill cf the French 
government, because Britain refused to guarantee France against; 
a. reversion to protection while the treaty lasted. 
The result was a nasty shack to British self -satisfaction, 
and the government used all that was left of their bargainirg- 
power - - -the final rectification of the wine duties---to. conclude 
treaties with Spain, Portugal, and Greece. 
British trade suffered not only from the resumption of high 
Aa 
protection by the continental states, but from 
A 
unfair competitinh 
of bounty -fed goods. The case of the sugar bounties 
v, 
is not only -'Jq) 
typical, but is -so much the most important that it will be ,suff- 
icient for discussion here. 
The British sugar supply had originally been drawn chiefly- 
from the canef ields o'f the ` `est Indies. Most of t!ie. European 
states had now taken up best -sugar production on a large scale, 
and a- s first em of drawbacks on export S''as in use, which acted as 
a bounty, enabled beet sugar to undercut can sugar in 3bitish 
markets, and seriously affected the 3riti sh sugar- refining in- 
dustry. 
France, Holland, and 3elgiuri were willing to AT /r ';eio_ 
Wmay.wit}a..// //gay' the bounty; but Wily if.3ritain, on her sides 
would engagr '.to place a countervailing duty on-bounty-fad sugar 
coning from countries which refused to sign the proposed con- 
vention. This was in order that their imports not be 
placed at a disadvantage if Germany and Austria refused to sign. 
3ritain refused these terms, and again her bargaining power was 
grattuit,iously thrown away by the abolition of the last of the 
sugar duties without reference to- the negotiations. 
At this time a commission of inquiry had jùst reported that 
the loaf-sugar refining industry was practically dead, though 
moist- sugar refining had flourished underhlow prices: production 
in the Test Indies was virtually at a standstill, and cane sugar 
could not be produced at the-price maintained b;:y bounty -fed beet 
sugar, an sugar was then selling at id the pound, so that a 
duty of 4d the pound, or 2A6 the hundredweight., would have been 
sufficient to give cane sugar an equal chànue in a fair and open 
: 'iarket.. 
Ellen, moved by the depression of trade in the early 
Eighties, the government did at last consent to a treaty wttch 
aAtc-altteTAMesabolition of the bounties and the prohibition 
of 
t )14- 
the iïnpo.rt o:f sugar coming from countries which. refused t,. 676 
sig, the agreement, the Free Traders were at once up in arils, 
and prevented the arrangement from being carried out. They de- 
Glared that it would involve a heavy loss to the. jam, biscuit, 
/4) 
and confectionery trades, which had thriven on cheap sugar. 
'est Indian planters were abandoned, and were only irn 
saved from complete ruin by the opening of a new market for cane 
sugar in <Canada. 
For Bright and those like-minded, _ ree Trade was at bottom 
not hing more or lese than the business maxim, .buy cheap and sell 
dear. aegause sugar,v fdt the moment, was cheaper under the bounty - 
system, they refused to take any steps to end that system. Yet - 
this attitude was much more contrary to the true doctrine of 
Free Trade than that of the Fair-Trader who wished to do away- 
with the bounties by means of a countervailing duty. ArtificdAI- 
low prices are as dangerous to production as artificial high 
prices. The essence of Free Trade is that the natural 
)"he fiepresentatives of these industries, however, Mid not 
a_i share this view. 
sources of production should have free play, and that artificial 
restrictions and artificial stimuli alike should be removed. The 
sugar-bounty system inznll/ p 1 the destruction o'v t e natural 
sources of prodù..ctian A3î the S74est Indies, and the forcing down 
of prices to an unnatLtralty low level. The- low prices this in- 
troduced c oúld not be a4 PeCu-r_-P. Fä,S if they had been arrived at 
ln the natural course of developenent. Should any accident in- 
terrupt the production of beet suger, the destruction of the 
cane sugar supply would be instantly and painfully felt. In the 
same ray the prosperity Of the confectionery inCìu. tries was in- 
secure in so far as it rested upan low pltráar prices due to ar- 
tificial c&uS Fs . The Free Tr&r.iers sacrificed the spirit of Free 'EA 
Trade in a slavish adherence to the letter of the law. It matter- 
ed not that the bounties were paid by foreign states; the effect 




_i.Cí introduced C. law 
giving 1 1 ̂ = 1 r eti J Z -'-1 LI i the j t 4} 11 
adrì e r en c P to 
In their riaici l ... - lA.isifer FAize the ?ovèrnmant 
neglected to take Any steps to encourage the ay.lication of 
new scientific knowledge to industry, as was done in Geifnany-. 
In 3ri:tain the facilities for -a general scientific education 
werQ much less, and no attempt was made lJ.r the state to bring 
science into close relation wlt h production ' íi.nl'1 exchange. This 
was an advantage which Britain could certainly not afford to 
i©Sb :;i h these days of ß(&eadi j &ntensifying cosipet it ion, but 
for this the public was more to blame than the Tovernment. Brit- 
ish manufacturers ignored dt± despised the scientific treatment - 
of industry, partly owing to bad education, and partly to that 
deep -- rooted conteupt and distrust of education co: lion to the 
60. 
.---,------ 
English middle and lower classes. 
lb such circumstances it was s-riall wonder that the idea of 
imperial preference should obtain cut little ' ̂ niti T=an 
Tent3ral public. Britain continued tO depend upon the goodwill of 
the colonies. for her position in her markets," relativel:% the GI 
most i nportant to her and the question of se r , the f 4 cu:ii.; n., oodt 
V 
suppler was left in abeyance. 
Enough has been said to show., that Britain's losses in trade 
and industry were not entirely due to natural and inevitable 
causes. Amore unprejudiced and fa;r- sighted attitude on the part 
of bot'_ government and people could have, at least slightly-, 
delayed and avoided them. Here also misfortune was partij due .to 
tilt 7 fluence of pre -conceived ideas, to blind self -satisfaction 
an. 
to conte'npt of foreigners, and to ignorant and narrow sub- 
servience to theories only"3 superficially understood. 
I71 The colonial trade formed a not very large percentage in 
the total -3ritish foreign trade, but it Vr0S rapidly groVing, and 
th !px°oartit):n tO ,theiae !popizlatïonctlaet- -,_.130-1pnikás7,7rergi,:Aràç04. 40. t i . '--}- +. ___',::: __ . :r _. sli, 0; rl : 1 6 c o .L ô?rirt-s-1,;-4-r. e 
very`few-1 4xibeptzons;,,_:heac.beat customers. 
lI. 
In 1860 i t was the general belief that the colonies would 
inevitably drift away from the mother country a:r,d be lost as the 
American colonies had been lost.; why t. was hoped, without any 
ill-feeling being aroused. This time there would be no oppositic5uì 
or grief at home. Free Trade, in the current view, did away with 
the necessity for colonies. It would soon be universal, and in 
this case all the present commercial adhhantaSes would accrue to 
Britain, without the expenses for which she was now liable. 
"I had always believed," wrote Lord 3lachford,`" who for many -G. 
years was Permanent TJnder- Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
"--- -and the belief so confirmed and consolidated itself that I 
can hardly realise the possibility of anyone seriously thinking 
the contrary---that the destiny of our colonies is independence; 
and that....the function of the Colonial Office. is to 'secure that 
our connection, while it lasts, shall be as profitable to both 
parties, and our separation, when it comes, as amiéable, as 
possible." 
Disraeli in his early days shared this opinion. "It can 
never be our pretence, or our policy," he said, "To defend the 
Canaditim frontierlagainst TJ.S....Leave the Canadians to defend (2((--- 
themselves; recall the African squadron; give up the settlements 
on the ',rest. Coast of Africa; and we shall make a saving which 
will...enable us to build ships a4i have a -good budget." This 
clarion call found its echo in the breast of many a'loatr.iotic . 





73,ritoïL of the day. 
"The best solution....-would probably be that in the course 
of time and in the lao;st friendly spirit the Dominion (Canada) 
should find ltäelf (sic) stronm enÒugh to proclaim leZ` (sic) 
4°) independence," wrote Granville to usselï ,in 1868. 
"1 cross-questioned two '?presFrtg+ive m en OY1- this suhjPct',' 
wrote ìu7.FJrier in 1875, "Lord 7.)erby and the i)úKe of Cleveland.... 
3ot,h rera.rded Canada as lost, and as a- province we should never 
11) fire a shot for.' 
"it seems in tri' nature of things that the United States' 
prestir"e should trou~ and that ours should wane in orth Anerica, 
and I wish we Were well and creditably out of the scrape," 
wrote Lyons in 1870, and Clarendon replied, "l agree with every 
word you 
\ 
,Za) Granville, $, fs2;2. 
2 ) -:orier, 111 r. 17(a. 
say about our possessions in North America, and wish that they 
would propose to be independent, and to annex themselves. we can'tLG% 
throw them off, and it is very desirable that we should part- as L, 
friends." 
. 
.4retiftteigh Lord Newton reports that he heard 'a Cabinet Minister, 
who had been colonial secretary,' say that "colonies were expeneie. 
luxuries w ich only a rich country like Enland could afford to 
.) 
indulge in." Disraeli spoke of them as "deadweights." Gladstone, im V 
his Midlothian campaign of 1880 used the expression, "1f Cyprus 
and the Transvaal were as valuable as they are valueless, I would 
repudiate them because they a. e obtained by means dishonourable to 
20 
the character of the country." As, however, he decided on coming 
into office to keepi"them bòth, perhaps the statement should not be '7 
taken at its value. 
Q_ ite-, ̂@,3 g&.t ^ + r. , i ; ,,, _ t e s v 
- i-. I 1 om 
s i , ion o. co . _ _ - by 
. 
Various causes contributed tò produce a. gradual change of op- 
inion on this point. .The growth of intercommunication was a neces4 
sary condition of the change. Improved methods of transport, and 
the invention of the telegraph, made the p ervation of the 3rit- 
ish Empire possible, even as it prevented the break -up of the 
United States. 
The growing importance of commercial relations with the colo- 
^ . The change of sentiment in 3rit- nies has already been i 
4l,yons 11p.2-(121 b.. _ .- 
Glads ton et IIi p , A , 
3rita i.n, however, was due to soraet hin mare than t b.i s. It was 
the first sign that the VA@t`:orian s;,oiritJ tn,*as dying out, and that L^ 
the country was entering upon a-ne - stage of (xeveiopei2el"it-,. 
The prophet of the new imperialism '4'?,s Sir Charles D17:TSe, 
7:1owP "Greater Britain published in 1868, first roused public 
opinion to an interest and pride in the empire. ,,' 4=° ,n{ 
:eaae43d.8Lixgi`,°°8ir,?ftrrt?kt ä.-cii --ilß,..._:c` i^ 
Lf 
' c ..4 urirr -.4e p rk outlook was pra-e leial 
ancinJormos4a..11 as compara.d with that of most of his contem- 
poraries. The new imperialism which he preached found disciples 
everywhere and in all parties. Disraeli perceived its romantic 
value and changed his tune: but in spite of the fact that the 
Conservatives 'rIer/ e the first to take up the idea as a party 
principle, lDi i ke found hearers even mote enthusiastic 82ong the 
Liberals, and in Chamberlain he met a mind of _his own type, 
though not of equal originality and depth. 
These rien were. imperialists pure and simple. Their aim 
to consolidate the empire, creating a strong federation of 
States in u:hirli England held the predominant authority and dis- 
posed of the resources of the rest to make herself the strongest 
power in the world, politically and commercially. They believed 
that the English ( "The Anglo -Saxon Race," as the fashion of the 
day had-it) had certain qualities which destined theK to be 
the ruling people of the world. They were pTee iriently fitted 
to colonise the temperate regions, and to convey the benefits 




eqùal gists in-these respects, or so much "aptitude for govern- 
ment." 
The current, of imperialist opinion, deepening ana widening 
with great rapidity, divided into two main currents. On the one 
hand was the commercial imperialism of such men as Cecil Rhodes, 
a distinctly nòn- Victorian conception. It had its greatness, 'hut 
it was 
, r. eat ae Bismarck's Prussia was great: selfish, greedy, 
aterialisstic, and coverin7 all this with a mask of humanitar- 
ian or even religious senttaent. Commercialism, under pressure 
Of co petition, was outgrowing its Manchester -jade pacificìprn,» 
and flovling into this new channel. It was the distinctively 
British manifestation of the new Spirit that had spread over 
Europe since Bismarck first sprang to success. Its watchword 
was Rhodes' "Her pia j esty's flag is the greatest commercial asset 
in the world." 
The second type of tiiperialisto e'rrn4E3i? ,:as the one generally 
adopted by pablitabdprinion. It was tha'roùghl3r Victorian, in its 
sentimántalis -,i, its unreality-, its Blind confidence. It, was 
simp1 a new idea added onto the stock of old oases, Without con - 
aideratio:n or understanding. Later ROseG)er;r, 'Vas its chief ex- 
ponent in politics, and preached sentimental imperialism in a 
style as thrilling, as solemn, and as vague as that in which 
Gladstone,thdaispiritueljtatheis, had once denounced fit. This 
sort of imperialism was almost as _pernicious as the commercial 
variety, for it lent itself to exploitation by tYe latter. Its 
devotees were sincere, brut their imperialism was ES ignorant: 
and a.7y4 superficial as thittitione7,Atilne view of the colonies as 
dead --we .fights." The'essential4 artificiality of :1 15 school of 
fl 
opinion Piay be exemplified by the fact that the United StPtesf-- 
were comTanly- included when "the solidarity of the Anglo-Saxon 
rab e" wa prociaid. asebery expressed this -i)-iew when he said, 
"it is difficult ,1?e5-r some of us---it is difficult at any rate 
2 
for myseLP-- uo consider the United States as .a foreign power. 
It was unfortunate that the 'United. States apparent177 did not 
find 'a parallel difficulty 'in thinking e Great Britain as a 
foreign power. 
These tendencies were as yet not fuully developed; Among the 
Liberals opinion was still divided 
--followred-beto--reA 
LT.he -col t ic lans of the o ld school; of whom Granville and 
Gladstonwere the chief, disliked annexation because they be- 14\-- 
lieved colonies were expensive and useless, though at the sane 
time they locked with jealousy and displeasure an the colonial 
acquisitions of other countries. With Granville, a vague, in- 
stinctive jealousy Was at times strong enough to. outweigh his 
prejudice ap! a ins t with Gladstone---thourh he justif- 
ied his attitude in public on high moral grounds---it is clear 
from his tone in private that, tough he was perhaps not fully 
conscious of it, the question Of expenditure was finally 
411) decisive. vittift-ttc!.+34.1_ 
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C:n the other side ,7erH the new Liberal imperialists, Dilke 
C}Laiaberlain, and their followers, who wished to prevent; other 
powers from acquiring colonial possessions, and to establish 
something like a colonial rrionopoly f'Or 3ritain. This had to some 
clone regarded temperate lut 
with the still unoccupied territories of t. t.ròpical -or eu)- 
1- 
tropical character, it as e4 '-., possible. Foreign states 
could no longer tamely accept such claims fhioth.Qr -s.rt -of Britain. 
After the Conjgress of 3erlin had for the riment settled the 
internal proble-as of ru.rope, all the Beat continè:ita,1 powers, 
for one reason or another, hegr -In to turn their attention to 
colonial expansion. 
In 1878 France was still the only power whose rivalry 
Sri tain dreaded in colonial affairs. France had already great 
colonial empire, 17r.ose extension was particularly j 
,W:e?n he 1Z- esl+citlng1y v d for ÿ,a,1 ,._ n£, over A 
uana, to erfla,n` , r, ater remP,rl{F to Herbe_ :. ?iisma.rcK,1-S ci 
even now k. ?Fr where AnPequena is. .F.O. + ,. 749. 
t II, p. 325. Harcourt t Kimberley, x,12.94. Hare 
i 
obnoxious to Britain:, partly owing to the traditional fea.r. of 
n 
French influence and power, and 'partly to the fact that France 
habitually establisY,.A a system of protection in ier colonies, 
wi t''z i nhapp '.. effeCise 1 on British trade. 
The British attitude to French colonial schemes was curious- 
. "k4,,A.av. 
iy inconsistent. Every ?1eVTnúcrl7.i.ç'i t i on Was received with threats 
and lai;lexttations in London, but at the same time the utmost con- 
tempt was poured on France as a colonic n power. 
"Now comes the question," wrote Colonel Clarmont in 1865, 
"hîat is to be done with a country (Al^eria) which they do nat 
know how to colonise, and the natives of which may be subdued 
fOr a time but are sure to rise main... Under Louis Phila.pÿ a 
the basis of the government was. peace in Europe, A!`.` cria was 
then a safety-valve where exuberant spirite iti7ht find a Meld 
and from which military bulletins could be dispatched to amuse 
the French eople...He (Napoleon Ill) knows the French are 
wretched colonists, he has tried every soreu of government for 
the colony...all.have qually failed.... All are ready to admit 
that this inanificent conquest has been and is still likely 
>,to 
be a constant source to them of eabarrassaent and expense." 
L:?ons spoke of the occupation of Tunis as "a cheap way of 
-- nti.fying their vanity and of advanc ine some of their apparent. 
interests."11) 
If colonies were only a source of rTeakriess and expense to. 
France, it is not clear why Britain so strongly objected to her 
Claremont to Cowl T, 17 Tan. 1865, F.O. France, 1566 
;i 
L rana II, :. ? =7. 
-;.cqùiring then?, nor is it clear why colonial exlok,nsion was fo: 
France a "gratification o`f vanity" but perfectly reasonable and 
justifiable in'the case of Britain. Dilke wrote, in 1887, "England 
v 
7 has made no annexations except in self-defence" aga:inct the annex.---1,1, 
3 
ationist policv of France and Germany,"' It will be. seen that 
17 
the a.tt eMp t to gather the cruiilbs which fell from the table of 
these powers was attended with some success., when we learn 
that between 1880 and 1915 :r ritain acquired 4,7 4, 000 square 
miles of new territory, while France acquired 3, 500, 0n0 square 
v 3. 
ì.iiles, and Germany only about 1,000,000 square ruiles. 
dk 
There ime no real justification for the British view that 
the French were markedly inferior to the British as a colonising 
race. it is true that j314 the colonising of te!'-iperate regions the 
3ritish appear to be much better suited, and that the"1attitude (i5D 
d 
of the French emigrant, "toujours borneftpar.la perspective au 
retour du pays," does not make for success. dut the districts- 
which were at this time the subject of dispute were not as a 
rule suitable for " ruropean colonisation. They were commonly 
tropical or sub -tropical renions with a prolific native popul- 
at.ion: and i1 dealing. with. such regions the French, though in 
same ways inferior to the 3ritish, were in cthers7W,j superior. 
The 3ritish government had the excuse, that they were many 
.rears ahead of Pra;nce\l in experience, and that as yet her colon- 0 
ial schemes were largely experimental, and her most striking 
successes were unwon. Nevertheless FranGd had natural advan- 
tages as great as Britain, though of a very different nature. 
30 Present position of European Politics, 7.. 95. 
Hobson, Pnperia.li6i41, p. 23 ft. 
1f B)rital.n was perhaps more successful in developing the 
economic resources af her colonies, prance proved herself , a 
lno`re suitable custodian for the treasures of an alien civilis- 
ation and for archaeological remains. The French invariably 
, 
display good taste and reverence in dealing with such, and with 
the natural' beauties of the country. 7jo British government, how- 
ever, ever stopped to consoler the preservation of natural 
beauties, whether at 1'tCm.ev ar abroad. 7here monetary prof, t may W 
be made factories will be built, though noble landscapes be 
blotted, rivers polluted, and air poisoned as the result- ln 
Raymt, some of the 'qo;t valuable historical remains were wantonly 
destroyed in the making of the barrage, though the destruc- 
tion could have been avo bT the expenditure of a-. f ew ac:iiit-- 
îo7'i'd",1 thousands of pounds. The attitude of the nfrlis!1 to an 
alien civilisation, in fact, always recalls that of Csa.lt:l s min- 
ister of state: "That, however, is a step in the progress of 
wants; having once acquired a desire for beef and rum, their 
(the Hindus) industry will thence be Stimulated ta '' obtalin these 
luxuries, and a superior morality will 
e 
gradually evolved by 3
the consequent cultivation of industry." The deliberate destruc- 
tion of the Indian silk and cotton manufactures for the benefit 
of the .T+,nglish cotton trade, and the unintentional destruction 
8,PProf. Q. H. garce is my authority for this statement. 
3 "The east of the Lairds," Chap. 16. 
of. the Indian v].11a.r?e cor:L'r+unity system by the introduction of 
Ñ ng.1].s%; methods of local government, are the most striking P?ç- 
Fúìplás of this attitude. 3 11) 
1 
:rh;le trie-3rlit ish usually make the beat acüninistra.tots and 
Frovernors of backward populations, the French have the advantage 
.having very much less colour-prejudice? which gives them 
great suÙcess in.' dealing with certain races. 
In the history of both countries as imperial powers, there! 
ar'e man-.r incidènts of brutality and oppression It is improbable) 
that arlta.ln can here cla.ir.i a.n.,r a.civa.11t,at*p over France; or 
there is any incident in the development ò.f the rreñc.h colonial 
empite quite comparable to the massacre of: the Tasmanian natives 
by- 73Sritlsh colonists, or to one or two incidents in the history 
of 3ritish India. 
As fa, as trade policy vlta.í3 concerned, the case against 
France was much clearer, On the one hand, it seems likely' that 
the foreign trade of the French colonies wasvconsiderably handi- S 
capped 1)7 the protect lire system, though in . EO.2 cases lt may 3 
have been an ébcivantct.qP to intis'nal industries. n:1_ the other hand? 
the protective duties certainly acted as -z hindrance to British 
trade in some cases at least. 
mhp damage done, however, was net very great. in lcir)'', for 
example, Britain took 45% of the te tal trade of Er;angb.íGuinea; 
34 11,4. CeN *ttit-41e Le T3. eLtevu á p. 75 16.4 Rtro t to :u . 2 
cr,r v CA e, E*-rvr wn.GVü -, 1 u u U 23-7444-7 
The boot- and -shoe trade of Constantine, for example, would 
ob ablT not have reached its present eminence so quickly under 
a Free Trade regime. 
the .hief import of this province and of Senegal (cotton goods) 
came almost entirely from 3ritaí.n; the- exports of Senegal do not 
come to 3ritain, but four- fifths of them are .round -nuts, which 
y ¡. 
are not used in Britain; they provinces of Tunis and Algeria 6- 
would in any case trade chiefly with France, owing to their 
geographical position. In 1885, 52% of the imparts of Tunis carne 
from France; in 1912, after years of liiEh protection, only 71", 
30 
of the imports of Tunis Were French. These figures will suffice 
to show that though hindered by the French protective system, 
British trade was net dangerously injured. was the amount of the 
loss, then, sufficient to justify the intense hostility display- 
ed by 3ritain to the colonial schemes 'of France? Was it worth 
while, for this trifling damage, to run the risk 
L 
of raising 
permanent ill -feeling in the mind of a great European power, 
Britain's nearest neighbour? 
Apparently, in the xiewf the government, it was worth 
while. They took up an attitude of nagging opposition to France, 
which for nearly, twenty Fears kept the two peoples on .bad terms, 
and which, therefore, seriously weakened Britain's own position 
in every crisis in international affairs. 
-sri to in had always looked more favourably upon the acquis- 
ition of colonies by Germany than b;r France, partly because 
Germany's colonial trade policy was less selfish, and partly 
because the7 had no serious apprehension that Germany would 
seriouslyLtake up the idea of colonial expansion. 
''the srigh eseal 
I 
3 to Figures from the Encyclopaedia 3ritannica. 
c6-7. 
, 
jealousy Of the Gerrnans acquiring colonial possessions." Glad- 
stone tOld Herbert -?lsJ?]`cLrckh at., if Germany had not of her own 
accord developed colonial ambitions, he would have felt inclined 
to "beseech" her t -d o so, so great 'olli be the benefit of her 
civilising influence.-)Even the imprlalists regarded German 
i 
annexation as a lesser evil. "-A rrerYnan annexation...." wrote 
1)ìlke, "înus t for Enr l anc'. be preferable to a French, so long as 
Germany does not...pla.ce differnnt,lal duties up0'n foreign goods. 
. . . . lt is impossible tevlE;w with much rex?7'Pt the nominal ac- Úq. 
Ciiçl í01 '.)V rer';ly Of yh°Se territories. 
The old idea, that xerriany would never become a colonial 
power, was strengthened by the declarations Of hlsriarck, who was 
at fist sincerely opposed to colonial ventures. in 1868 he 
wrote to koon that he did not believe colonies would be an acivan- 
tage to Germany, and that they would be expensive and difficult 
to defend. After 1878 he made the same statement so frequently 
and so emphatically to. Odo Russell, that it was evidently done 
intentionally tò conceal the chnge Of opinion that was going an 
in-his mind. Ps late as t.ugust 1883, the :tri+ ish Charge d d.iff- cit 
aires wrote: "1t would be a mistake to suppose that the Imperial 
Government haz an r present intention of.-establishing Crown Col- 
onies, or of imitating the practice adopted by France of assum- 
ing a protectorate over any territory acquired by a French trav- 
eller or explorer. The German government are opposed to any plan 
37) 2î 7Ncv.11883. Granville, 11, p. .337. 
3S G.F.O. IV, 760. 




which might hamper their foreign relations, and I believe that 
what Lord Amp +hill stated /is as true to-day as it was in 1830." 
'Tears before this, h.ord Lytton had pointed out the weakness 
òf thev safeguards on which 3rita.tn was relying. 
"Oda's impression....that 73isnarck does not want colonies 
rather surprised re. lt seems to me a perfectly natural And quit 
inevitable a:abition on the part of a power so strong r.s Germany 
nót to remain an inland state 'a moment longer than it can help, 
but to get to the sea and extend its seaboard to all possible 
directions 3u t yòu can't .be 'a = aritime Power without. col - 
onies... Lord Derb-r says that though Germany may probably cherikh 
such an ambition, she rTili have as much seaboard as she can prae -- 
tically want as long as she retains possession of'thre Duchies. ` 
3úi that As no:t -a very convenient commercial seaboard, and T 
confess 1 can't help doubting the absence cf ail desire for more 
and better outlets t0 the sea, as long. as her military power and 
rest ige remain unbroken: 
The-truth was that for Germany trade and colonial policy 
were almost as closely connected and as vitally irtportant as for 
3'ritain. The industrialisation "o'f the country was going on so 
fast that she must depend more and more upon imported food. She 
0. 
1 Auiust 1883 The Ampthill despatch. referred o is evidently that printed in the Wes+ Aftiofin?5luiebödk afr -- 
884c -nhe German government feel more want of soldiers than of 
colonies; under present circumstances, therefore, the plan 
for a German colony in south Africa has no prospect of success." 
¢ ,y tG'zi : fU , f T, s , 7 ci-irfef.0 s 7 if Ìp`'E°t $ 1¡ 
U 
e). 
Lauld conveniently feed, perhaps, forty aillions. ln 18 5 her ti 
population was' aiready forty --two millions, and was increasing (4- 
at the rate of 80',000 to 90i000 a year. 
As to imported food, Germany was in a worse positoon than 
3ritain, thoUrrh as yet she dirt not need to import such lare:. 
quaitit.ies. Heir ports were comparatively few, and therefore easy 
to blockade. The Baltic ports Were not upon t¡i open sea, and 
Denmark and ;Sweden held the shòres of the Sound. Even the build- 
ing, rig later, of the Kiel Canal, JacTe only partial relief. A free 
coast -line with good ports twasthegreatdtitsideratum of (èrnany. 
ZtJwas even a necessity, if she Wished to continue her deve.lo-pe-- q4- 
ment on the same lines as before. ow, could she be confident of 
ller own power, if the Danish fleet were sufficient to blockade 
her ports ?aile hier fbbik,supp y .wer to -b* kbctire, it must he 
transported in German bottoms and there must be a German navy to 
guard it in case of war;á It has been seen that the most peace- 
loving of 3ritish statesmen. realised this necessity; it was in- 
evitable that Germany should draw the same conclusion. 
But how have a navy without colonies? The big ar- shi± s 
could not live in port, perambulating the Baltic for exercise.`` qY 
t 
like prize greyhounds On leash. There must be harbours all over 
the world where they could put in for fuel and repairs. 
Emigration was not at the moment a- pressii problem, though 
in the past many of Germany's most valuable súo j ects had been, 
lost Ln this way: but there was a natural wish to secure control 
f some of the sources of the supplies of raw material and food- 
stuffs required by German in _dust.ry and people. 
? S' 
'loth government and people were be inning to awake to these 
necessities. The break with the Free Traders had directed 31s- 
ma,rck's attention to eeOnor:iic. matterst tntil _tgwhP :ha.tirñteen q - 
absorbed in European problems, but he ha.d now fir!ily established 
r 
Germany as a great power, and placed her in a position where she 
need fear, for some time to come, no.attack. lie surrounded her 
with a double entrenchment of alliances; he had isolated her 
most dangerous enemy. He now felt free, therefore, to take the 
next forward step, and begin to consider Germany's position as 
a world power, her extra -- European interests. At the 'same time,' 
he felt .that public opinion was sripening for action. Societies 
bean tovbF founded to encourage interest in overseas coloY:is- 
a.tion: mercantile companies were setting up- t.radin statiòris 
abroad, and dem0.ndinr" th? protection Of their government: new - 
- - ; 
outlets-Were : reqxIared.-ffotoGempà.n- cdpìtal. Iri-îltae, as a Fren'eli 
writer wittily rá,arks 4 "pQ r étre puissance coloniale] 
ii. ne lui manquait que des colonies. r~` 
3rrtish statesmen at first failed to realise how seriously 
German.',.' regarded her colonial empire. Grenville's patience did 
not stand the test of experience, and his first impulse was to 
oppose riermany,s new schemes. Mast Of the territory which Ger- 
many coveted had been repeatedly rejected by the British govern- 
ment, and when they at las t t ook s t eps to acquire i +,y it was ba- ql. 
ll caus-e ti -1e,T believed France was about to step ice. when Germany 
adroitl:' secured the disputed morsels, Granville entered upon. a 
Lair, /, 
4. fretful, dog-in-t!'I.-P2anger, and grudrTin7 policy, which 'cLroused 
3isma.rck/s annoyance. The Chancellor lost no time in teching 
rranville that rerma,ny was in earnest-and put an instant stop to 3 
British opposition u threatening t 0 support. in Env;{, 
Thus the ungenerous attitude of Great 3ritain in colonial 
matters led her into an undignified squabble with two of the 
great T4auropean powers, 6a that:: sheccdtad only defend herSelf 
ar`Tainst the one by surrendering conple'tely to the other. 
;? There was ne) justification whatever for the opposition to 
iermany's colonial enterprises. aritish tracte Was not threhteneçl, 
as Germany kept her colonial markets open. Ger171any has not since 
then proved a successful administrator and organiser of her co ?: 
'40 
onies, but 'Britain could not possibly foresee that. Granville's 
attitude was dictated b r an ig- Orant, in `itino'tive selfishness, 
and the_ more conciliatory policy of his colle agues .and his suet- 
essors was dite as much o rear of 3i snarck's threats as to a 
politic generosity. 
After colonies, came the navy. 
This_ had always b?.en looked upon in Britain as more o.r les "uZI, 
r of a joke. No one seriously believed that Germany could become a 
1,7*!TOne of the German colonies were self-su?poa'ting as long as 
' tl-iey were mnder rerl'+lan rule, and there were rr1?i.n;ÿ hideous admin- 
istrative a1%uSed. 
5 "hen Bismarck was asked now he would riefenra the new German 
c5onies, he replied, 'Against France at the gat :s of ;.,betz; 
against England in Agypt," 
great sea power. lt was assumed that she would cultivate tlie 
the friendship of -Britain, and would re.lV On the assistance of 
the 3rl!tisi: fleet, which, indeed, was freely proffered her in 
the Aighti s for Use a?ains t France. 
"Bismarck is very arnusi11; with his baby fleet, " 1_,ord huss- 
Ji't4 
\ell had written long before. 
The Prussian government," report Ad !Tapier in 1865, "CO,n- 
templates the creation of a naval force which shall bá fitted 
ror- a triple duty, to defend tre coast of the Confederation, to 
meet and attack a hostile war fleet onV thP open sea, and to 
pursue and capture the trading vessels of her enemy -ln distant 
regions. There is a large indulgence ci.f the fa.nc;;T in this pict--_ 
tare sketched by some enthusiastic and sedentary functionary in 
A ;.ïerlin bureau The expansion of Prussian. influe?îcF:. . . . is 
not inconsistent with...the 3alance of Power in Europe, and it 
wroizlci find a legi tì.r48,te and inoffensive field of action ahd 
satisfaction ih the developement; of the prus; ian navy, which 
will probably be the Je,;nan navy In mÿ hur:ilrle judgment 
10 1- 
the appearance of this new power on the + 
1/ . 1 sea need no-, inspire us 
with any jealousy ar apprehension. Enç -} and has made three great 
wars in con jt4hct7.on with ??ri8sia, and never fought against her. 
The "rerClcîn fleet might be a useful counterpoise in the 3altl.c 
to the fleet of Russia, it woulci. more probably appear às -an ally 
Y 
Of ingland than as an auxiliary of France in a general war' 
developP.r12tt or the naval power of :russ?-a w01k1t be in fact an 
R,.11(, 1k) C ic011"4w --ietruX5 i I $1410 . 0..04.V-A.A.a-ri- p 3 t . ,` 
'tote the instinctive assumption that in a general war 
France and Britain must be on opposite sides. 
increase of ±'_--) g :.e1'a,l def ens itr oanc,! aggressive strength of 
Germany, and England has at all tlmes desired that Ger!"`anr. 
&loiild be united and strong. I might acici the construction ofVan io( 
iron fleet for Germany wOuld prObably give employment and profit 
to. E_nglish labour and english (sic) constructors." 
In the upshot, however, it .Ta$ not 71ri t is1 Shipyards that 
built the rernan fleet. 
It is often said that Bismarck "did not want a navy," and 
never wished to make Germany a t?'reat sea-power. l+, is rertaínl'f 
true that ir. 1860 he would have looked on such ai scheme as 
visionary: he was then a Free Trader, and did not want colonies. 
cvj 
Tkevertheless, in 1879 he introduced p.rótection, 
N 
in the Bi mhtlies 
ha acquired for lerm?nv agreat colonial enire. ne was a prac- 10c{._. 
tical man, and did not try ó do two. things at once, making the 
mistake of the greedy dog in the fable: but it is not to be.be- 
lieved that the greatest ptactoaT genius of the age did not see 
that unless "er_many were to change her policy and abandon her 
pretensions sn e must sooner or later strengthen her ppsition at 
sea. Indeed, it is practically certain that 3isìiarck always had 
sonne such idea lurking at the back of his minci. It was he who 
planned the Kiel Canal, and he did so in 1863, 17 en the Slesvig --1' i06. 
? Holstein. Question was maturing. He wanted the :chies for the 
sake of their invaluable seaboard, and he wanted the Canal to 
give a German fleet swift access to the 'Forth SeL, anti free corms 
munication between this and the Baltic, independent of the Sound. 




To sooner had he settled the most pressing European proble ms 
than he entered upon negotiations with Britain for the cession 
of Leligolandnecessary for the s ecn4 i ty of Kiel, He dice not 
obtain what he wasted for twelve years, and as soon as he did 
building of a 
f/ 
so, the (",anal was constructed and thGerman war-fleet was tGb 
i6, 
i {/ first seriously* undertaken. 
y 
The ̀ develo.p ement w .s ñevit.abl.aï° aismar .k° s:-. ai n. w:as. to 
Diaoe xerman y in :sia6Yï a Posit ion: .thatit sha:.nyed,,.not f»a. " 
a war wit4 any single power. Germany's Ynilita.ry position on the 
continent *as not secure as long as she remained so weak at sea. 
in. 1864 Denmark had been able tó blockade-her ports. ln 1872 
the French navy had ha Cried her shipping, and France had been 
able to b.0 munitions in 3r4taii when this source of supply was 
closed to Germany, .very year, as her commerce grew, her colon - 
ial empire increased, and she had to. import 
u 
more food, she be- 1D-7- 
came more vulnerable Trance and Russia 
leere her superiors at sea; France was irrec-onciliably hostile, 
Russia was suspect. 
!Forst of all, however, was the danger fron 3ritain. 3.ritaip 
in case of war, could destroy the trade and shipping of Germany, an
blockade her ports, and occupy her colonies, as easily as a 
giant could crush a. pigmy How was it possible that 3ieraa ck's 
Ger-.rany-, with her strong self -reliance and her soaring ambitions) 
could long endure such a position? 
At present Britain was on yrer.r friendly ternes with Germany 
v r. 
but, in Germany at least, people were beginning to realise that O(' 
the Linterests '_the two states were essentially d'iirergent. in 
7 1 <l- ti1171 «.... I-t._c.c \. ^. _ F45_ 
ever,;- aspect of her new-ambitions, Germany came into direct, 
co apetition with Britain. 
We ?ere seen how Germany, aided by the richness of her re- 
sourd es, the intel:tigenc and industry' of her people, and the 
wise superintendence of her government, successfully contested 
the industrial and. commercial supremacy \of Britain; but Britain 
could still deal a destructiVe blow at German trace by reverting 
to a protective policytr. ') 
The colonial monopoly which Britain tried to enforce inter- 
fered with German expansion. Britain occupied or claimed the mo6k 
v 
valuable districts in Asia, Africa, ca Australasia, and- in -pa,rtic- 
ular hiss influence extended over t) ose to ij)erate regtons round 
the Cape of Good Hope, which appeared to Germany partirula.rly 
eudtable as the outlet for 'a superfluous population which she 
would soon require. 
The coasts most easily accesible to Germany, opening; on the 
ocean, were those Of Holland and 3elgtum. Ambition and sentiment 
in the past had caused some French governments and a section of 
the French people to cast covetous eyes uion :.elgium.: but the 
possession of that cÖunt ry had never been for Trance the urgent 
that was to r for Germany. -Prance 
4 
craving, _la it ga ,0 1)eeeoria .r Belgium fOr _ 
was a luxury, for lermany a necessaty. Yet here, above all,. 
yJ See Tuchs, Consliision. 
c 
l 
Britain, the 'self -constituted guardian of Belgium, stood between 
(reriaany and the satisfaction of her desires, barred the way to 
the sea. 
3ismarckl s successors, perhaps, felt this more keenly than 
he did. The superior naval power of Britain irked them as tha 
superior military power of France had irked their forefathers. 
In the year of the cession of Heligoland, Sir-Charles :Dilke 
warned his countrymen: "The Germans mean business with their 
o) 
61 t-vy." The opening declaration of the new Emperor, in the new:, 
Ara,-that began: with 
v 
israrikbs fall, was: "The future of Ìermany H. 
lies upon. the spa." 
Dilke, 11, p. 405. 
72 
Conclusion. 
we have seen what high 1_o -Il?s were cherished in. Britain Of 
the future of United Germany. How were they fulfilled? 
Thera were not wanting alrek dyrs inist e.r indications. 1n- 
In 1870 T.. rier had been startled to find his old friends, t1e. 
German Liberals developing qualities which he had not known, 
1) 
they possessed. The disillusioniint was great; but he was too 
honest not to face it. "1 never dreamt," he wrote,'that...tte 
+d-u a er twviv.i , matio wsuid, i in three years after the con- 
clusion of peace, be directly traceable to Germanys having 
learnt and exaggerated the ,resetting vice of the people she had 
\e' 
conquered. Far there is no denying that the malady under which f. 
Europe is at present suffering is caused by Berman Chauvinism, 
a new and far more formidable type of the disease than the 
French, because instead of. being spasmodical and undisciplined, 
2) 
it is methodical, calculating, cold -blooded, and self- containedV 
For Gem an Liberalism there was no future. That part; had 
given whole- hearted support to 3ismarck1= in 1870, and 
the Nears that followed saw their final collapse as a l ibing 
factor in German politics. in 1877, several assassination plots, 
chiefly forded by extreme socialists, against .ismarck and the 
King, grousedgoveral 'indignation. The Chancellor had long 
1) See his letter to Stockar, 21 August 1870. ,Merrier 
2) To Crown Prince Frederick, May 1875. Morier II, p. 346. See 
also p. 294. 
wished for an opportunity of passing repressive laws against the 
socialists. Since 1866 he had .relied an an alliance With the 
Liberals to carry on the government, but now he was sufficiently 
assured of his position to be able to dispense with their sup - 
port, and for some years he had been tending to a reconciliation 
with his old friends the Conservatives. The Liberal party was 
sensible of the growing weakness of position. To obtain a. 
dominating power for Germany in giurope, they had sacrificed % 
V 
3 
many of their principles, and the result had been a continuous 
loss of moral strength and independence. They now consented to 
pass the laws against the socialists, and it was the signal for 
their dissolution. The powers thus placed in the hands of the 
government were the negation of freedom of thought in Germany -. 
`"fit hin one month, 135 socialist associations 35 journals, and 
100 books and pamphl ets, had been suppressed. The Liberal party 
did not survive this exhibition of moral weakness. It split in 
two, one part being assimilated by the Progressists, while the 
majority followed :Bismarck to the 'night. Bennigsen retired; 
there was nothing else left for him to do. The Liberals had y- 
M 
failed far more disastrously than in 1848: then they had only 
shown that they lacked constructive faculty; now, that they 
lacked moral strength. 
Er, - t- the or position maimed, i e A 7 t ., z_, .yasìtio.î so h,_ expected 3eve_oye_nen4 
of English constitutionalism in Germany was not likely to appear: 
Far from progressing in the direction of responsible self -gov- 
ernment, Germany appeared to have resigned herself to remain 
under the old system. 
7)41 
The constitution of the new German empire was a slightly 
moui i ed version of that of the late 'north German Confederation. 
The Reichstag had not been allowed to have any real say in this 
matter, for before the debates began 3ismarck had induced the- 
Liberal leaders to consent to his plans. The Constitution was 
drawn up on principles strange to English politics. The Emperor 
held the Presidency; his coadjutors were the Federal Council and 
the Reichstag. The summoning and dissolution of the Reichstag, 
the making of war and peace and treaties, were in-his hands. T1s 
consent was not necessary, however, to(federal) legislation 
or taxation, which were handled by Council and Reichstag. The 
Council was formed of delegated from the various stated, which 
voted as units; Prussia held 17 votes, and so controlled the . 
voting, as rejection by 14 votes vetoed any constitutional 
change. The proceedings, of the Council were - secret. They init- 
iated laws, and could reject those passed by the Reichstag. The 
Council had also considerable executive powers. 
The Reichstag,. chosen by manhood suffrage, gave an illusion 
of democratic control. lts consent was necessary to all legis- 
lation, but its powers were really very limited. Its function 
was rather to assent to than to initiate legislation, its con- 
trol was as imperfect'as that o f an assembly elected by univer- 
sal suffrage must ever be, and its voting had little real effect 
on the 6(_z Yuent, because there. was no ministerial reeionsibi1- 7- 
ity. The Chancellor, who held a somewhat ill -defined position, 
was the connecting link between the three parts. He was head of 
the Council. He could only be appointed and dismissed by the 
Emperor, and was responsible only to him. He might thus hold 
office for an indefinite period, and there was no such thing as 
party government. 
The constitutions of the individual states d e.1t with their 
personal affairs. Some of the southern states devised liberal 
and enlightened systems; but -that of Prussia was as like a des - 
potism as a constitutional state could well be, and Prussia, as 
we have seen, really dominated the federal government. Those who 
regret that in many cases constitutional rights have been ob- 
tained by revolution and the use of force, might find consol- 
ation in observing Prussia: her constitution was äctroy4, the 
free gift of her king; and she was not allowed to forget it. 
Equal disappointment awaited those who had hoped that Ger - 
many, once secur4y established, would become one of the pillars 
of Ruropean peace. Far from reducing her forces in 1371, Germany 
increased them. The Tovernment succeeded in keeping the military 
expenditure practically under it awn control, and by one "tem- 
porary" arrangement after another, t he peace strength of the. 
army was added to, till in 1888 Sir Charles -Dine estimated, 
from the official statements of the German pencral staff, that 
in case of war Germany would be able to place 7,000,000 troops 
3) 
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. The figures for the peace -time army 
as fo llo's : 
Officers. `d.C.O.s. Sgldiers.TTnder instructi on. 
1872. 17,213. 48,000. t ?n0. 1,400,000. 
188.1. .i8, J'.... H . 427, 000. tt 
1890. 20,000. 60,000. 468,000. 2, 400, 000, 
1900. 23,850. 81,000. 495, 000. 4,000,000. 
Lair, Iwo'. .
73y maintaining her army in such strength in time or peace, 
Germany forced 'lar neighbours in self -defence to adopt a similar 
policy. Even 'Belgium began to strengthen her defences It was 
the beginning of that wasteful and pernicious system. of great 
armaments, which was to strain the resources of great powers 
10 like 3ritain, and almost ruin weaker powers like Italy. 
whether r;erm.:nv was likely to be paciÏ is ' in international 
affairs---whether this arniaînent was Meant only for purposes of 
defence---was demonstrated by the 'Th.r Scare of l8 ?5, the 
SchnaeThele incident, and the other war Scare of 1887. rerriany, 
it was seen, was ready to bully and browbeat her weaker neigh- 
bours, to use her strength to enforce unjust demands, and to 
Iliake war without provocation, whenever she found It convenient, 
if she were not restrained by the intervention of other great 
I I 
powers. 
At the scene time she had failed to justify her earlier wars 
and forcible annexations by reconciling the conquered populat- 
ions through a wise and Sympathetic rule. Alsace and Lorraine 
continued to preserve their loyalty to France notwithstanding an 
advance in material wealth which .night have served to compen- 
sate them for the change. Had the provinces been constituted a 
German state, a full member of the pire, they Might have been 
reconciled: but 3isrnarck and the general staff regarded the new 
acquisition from a military point of view. Alsace-Lorraine was 
j 2 prepared as a base for a future war, and an elaborate system of 
fortification at once commenced. For this the provinces mast be 
absolutely under the control of the central government, and they 
C. 
were therefore consituted as an imperial Territor.r (keicheland)4 
7,ater t1-ley were criiren 15 seats in the Reichstag, and were to be 
administered by a governo-re one of the governors attempted a 
conciliatory policy, but without success, and in general a system 
of repression was followed, in which incidents of brutality 
occurred frequently enough to transform the first indignation 
into a steady and enduring hatred of the-new "Fatherland." 
The management of Aldace might be dictated by a fear of 
France attempting to)rfccver her lost provinces; but the possess- 
ion of Slesvig was perfectly secure, for Denmark was no more 
likely to attack Germany than a mouse would attack a tiger. 
"et, in spite of persistent propaganda and several attempts at 
j errymandering, :,north Slesvig continued to return two Danish 
in 
candidates to make their ineffectual protests #e the Reichstag, 
and indeed the number of "Danish" 'totes actually increased with 
time. 
There was one quarter where German methods in dealing with 
an alien population could be observed more fairly than 
in either 
Alsace or Slesvig: a province that. Germany had held 
for a 
hundred years,-which had no independent. mother -country 
yearning 
for its recovery, and scarcely anyone who believed 
in the poss- 
ibility of _its future redemption. would tree German 
Empire- do 
what Prussia had never done, and reconcile the 
Poles to German_ 
rule? 
A new Polish policy was in fact undertaken in 1871, 
but it 
See Pryor, "North Slesvig 
under German hule." 
i3. 
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was not, more sympathetic: it was the most persistent -i.nd violent 
attack on Polish nationality that had Vitt been made. lt was an 
an attempt, to stamp out their individuality and submerge them in 
5) 
a German population. "You are not a people," said Bismarck, 
"You-have not } -zing behind you but your illusion; and fictions." 
The attempt met with the success Vcommon to such-systems: it 
degraded conquerors and conquered alike, and sowed new seeds of 
hatred in the breasts of the Poles. - 
Qs we have seen the economic policy of Germany developed 
on lines equally remote from what had been predicted in 3ritain. 
Germany had adopted a system of high protection, which in some 
cases Llas directed. especially aÿ°ains t British good 
She bad äequired a great overseas empire, which gave be?~ 
a contiguous land frontier with >ritain in several parts of the 
world. In the acquisition of this empire she displayed an 
5) 1873: the Polish language was forbidden in schools. Later 
free private instruction in Polish etas made punishable by fine 
or imprisonment. in 1883 religious instruction was forbidden in 
schools where Fï'; o f fer.e German. All Poles not 
Prus$ian .sub,j ects were expelled from the country. Measures were 
undertaken against,, homan Catholics. These proceedings resulted 
in the school- children's strike of 1906, with its wholesale 
floggings of children and imprisonment of teachers. In 1886, 
the system of German colonisation in Polish districts was begun 
----with the unfortunate result that the Germans were usually- 
absorbed by the Poles. In 1899 Polish teachers were forbidden 
to speak Polish to their families. In 1904 all rrovernment offi- 
cials or employees were forbidden to place, their earnings in 
Polish banks.krtc, etc. 
insolent anti aggressive spirit, and o-o_Ligeu 3ritain to refrain 
from opposition by threatening to attack her in other quarters. 
Finally, she bagithito plan the developement, of a strong 
navy, which would enable her to meet 3ritain on equal terms on 
the sea. 
In the light of all this, how stood the 7Tictorian theory of 
Germany as the peace- loving, anti-militaristic, Liberal power, 
the second pillar of Free Trade, the "natural ally" :hose inter- 
ests could never come into conflict with those c:' Treat 3ritain2 
Germany had obtained for herself a supreme position in 
Europe, by setting her own material interests before all.other 
considerations. The principle of her policy had been to destroy 
everything that might obstruct the .course of_ her developenent, 
arid to seize b.r force Whatever was desirable for her own power 
or security. 
In struggling for unity in herself and supremacy in Europe, 
Germany had been hindered by three states, Denmark, Austria, and 
France, and she had removed then successively from her path, 
"by blood and iron. "aving established herself as the dominant 
power in Europe, she now wished to become the dominant power irr 
the world, and she found herself face to face with a fourth 
pbv-er, tore formidable than any of t'.Je of }lers. 
ï 
Germany was the strongest military power in Europe, anq aB4 
rapidly becoming Öñe cif tths' greatest industrial powers. Her next 
necessity was an outlet for her superfluous capital and energy. 
She muet have a commercial marine, foreign markets, colonies. 
17, 
As she V %S the strongest power on land, she must riot remain the 
weakest power at sea. She must have a navy. 
The state which in all these aspects was now Germany's 
rival was the world's greatest commercial, colonial, and naval 
power---Great 3rita in. 
A compromise was possible: but a compromise meant the 
reversal of Germany's chosen policy. 
That sacrifice the. statesmen who guided h:r policy could 
not or would not make. As Germany had once created an army that 6- 
was to destroy the military supremacy of France, so she now set 
to work to create a navy that was to destroy the naval suprem- 
acy of " 3ritain. 
This was essentially the continuation of the policy init- 
iated b.r - iismarck thirty years before: it was only carried out 
legs skilfully. Bismarck would never have made the mistake of 
alienating Britain and Russia simultaneously. Fiis successo ~s, 
full of self-confidence, did not hesitate to do so. 
the personality of 
Germany had been too deeply influenced .) irA3ismarck, had 
learned too well the lesson he taught her, to change her course 090, 
even when it led her by dangerous ways. The triumph of material- 
ism, the glory of success, had blunted her sensibilities and 
deadened those instincts that r_i o z t hat: e warned her. It was 
not so much that she overrated her own strength, as that she. 
underrated both the material strength of her rivals, and the 
influence of moral considerations which she was now incapable of 
understanding. Her .history- for the next thirty years was the. 
N, 
inevitable outcome of her history for the last thirty gears. 
Success, however, cannot be continually attained by repeating' 
the same process. Only the genius of a 3ismarck could have 
ensured to this policy a new triumph: only a complete spiritual 





Abeken to Bismarck.. . as, 13 Tuer. 
tae King writes to ma: 
"Count Benedetti caught me wJ11.l4? 
I was out walking, in order to 
demand of me in a manner which 
finally became very i7!l,00r_ tunat e, 
That I should authorize him to 4 
te1.P:gragh imnediatelTT that I 3444 
undertook never again ta give my 
consent if the Hohenzollerns 
again brought forward that, ar7,dl 
iíwature I refused him, somewhat 
severely at last, as one cannot 
and must not take such enga.ge7aent9 
á tout jamais. Of course I told 4 
him that t had received no news j 
as --et and that as he had been ift- 
f .rats. 
farmed d 9W Paris c,, id Madrid ear- 
lier than I, he must Surely per 
c e iv e that my government had 
no m.flre interest in the matter." 
Since then H.M. has received a 4' 
Nrwritten communication from the Alk 
Prince. As H.M. had told Count :Be- 
nedetti that he was awaiting newp, 
1 
Bismarck's Condensation of the 
Ems Dispatch. 
After the news of the with- 
drawal of the. Prina e of Hhen- 
zollern had officially 
communicated to the French Im- 
perial Government by the Span- 
ish ko7a1 Government, the 
French ambassador, at Ems, fur- 
ther demanded of H;M. the King 
that he would authorize him to 
telegraph to Paris that H.M. 
the Kind pledged himself far 
the future never ap.ain to give 
his consent if the Hohenzo ll- 
erns renvred their candidature. 
Hereupon H.M. declined to re- 
ceive 1;ile French ambassador 
again, and sent him Ivo rd by the 
aide-de-camp on duty that H,l.S, 
had not''llng further to say to 
the ambassadsr. 
H... decided, with reference ri 
to the aforesaiárdemand4, of 
Count Euleaburr&is and Ay proposal; 
not to receive Count Benedetti acain, 
but mere Lr to send him word 'of an 
ai¿ìe -de -camp that H.M. had npw re- 
ceived f roia the Prince co of irmr..t on 
of the news which 3enedetj . `Lad 
al.read;r received fror:i Paris, and 
had nathing more to say to tielee 
ambassador. 
H.M. leaves it to Y. Kxceltency' 
discretion whether 3enedetti's new 
demand and its refusal should be 
at once communicated to our ailbass- 
aco`'_'Q, ?Q T-V tll as to the Press. 
